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ABSTRACT 
 
The deregulated scheduled passenger airline industry is in a constant state of motion 
as managers continually adapt their business models to meet the challenging market 
environment.  Such adaptation has led to a variety of airlines populating the industry; 
from the birth of low-cost carriers to the transformation of state-owned behemoths to 
lean and successful carriers.  These dynamics challenge airline managers to 
continuously acclimate their business models and to understand industry evolution.    
 
This doctoral dissertation addresses the issue of industry evolution and attempts to 
propose future airline business models based on airline behavior.  The intention is to 
improve understanding of industry evolution, propose a method for constructing 
future business models, and aid airline management in future strategic decisions.  
Three central themes are raised in the research: business model heterogeneity and its 
impact on airline performance, innovation and imitation as a justification for business 
model heterogeneity, and future business models grounded on airline innovation and 
imitation.  Each theme forms the basis for the project’s three analyses.  The research 
is categorized according to the customary industrial segmentation of full-service 
carriers, low-cost carriers, and regional carriers.  
 
The findings show that business model heterogeneity is evident at varying degrees in 
the industry, and that there is a positive relationship between the level adherence to a 
strategic group’s traditional business model and financial performance.  This indicates 
that airlines that abide by their strategic group’s traditional business model perform 
better than those that differentiate themselves form the traditional business model.  
The low-cost carrier group is the most heterogeneous while the full-service carrier 
group is the most homogenous, which one may attribute to the historical emergence of 
these two groups. 
 
Results from a global survey distributed to airline CEOs show that business model 
differentiation is predicated on both innovation and imitation.  The research shows 
that all airlines innovate, however business model changes based on this phenomenon 
may only afford an airline an advantage for a limited time period as imitation is 
prolific in the industry.  Airline behavior indicates that airlines that populate the 
periphery of their strategic group are more prone to imitate other strategic groups.  In 
addition, it is shown that airlines that closely adhere to their strategic group’s 
traditional business model are more likely to imitate airlines populating their own 
strategic group.   
 
The final analysis is based on the presence of innovation and imitation in the industry 
and incorporates these concepts in algebraic analyses which determine the unique 
combinations that continuously lead to a positive operating margin.  The business 
model results suggest that the clear, historical distinctions between the strategic 
groups in the industry are becoming blurred, and that a winning hybrid may emerge.     
 
 
  
DANSK RESUME 
 
Der er en konstant bevægelse i den del af luftfartsindustrien, der arbejder med 
passagertransport, da dens ledere bestandigt tilpasser deres forretningsmodeller til at 
imødekomme de krav, der stilles af markedet. Tilpasninger af denne karakter har ført 
til en mangfoldig industri og en række forandringer, fra fødslen af lavprisselskaberne 
til transformationen af statsejede giganter til strømlinede og succesfulde 
luftfartsselskaber. Disse dynamikker udfordrer ledere i luftfartsbranchen til konstant 
at akklimatisere deres forretningsmodeller og til at forstå udviklingen i branchen.  
 
Denne ph.d.-afhandling behandler problemet om brancheudviklingen og forsøger at 
udpege fremtidige forretningsmodeller for luftfartsindustrien baseret på 
virksomhedsadfærd. Intentionen er at forbedre forståelsen af brancheudviklingen, 
foreslå en metode til fremtidige forretningsmodeller og styrke ledelsen af 
luftfartsselskaber. Tre centrale temaer rejses i forskningen: heterogenitet i 
forretningsmodeller og dens effekt på profit; innovation og imitation som en 
retfærdiggørelse af heterogenitet i forretningsmodeller; og fremtidige 
forretningsmodeller baseret på innovation og imitation. Forskningen er kategoriseret 
efter de sædvanlige brancheinddelinger af netværksselskaber, lavprisselskaber og 
regionale selskaber. 
 
Resultaterne viser, at heterogenitet i forretningsmodeller i varierende grad er tydelig i 
industrien, og at der er et positivt forhold mellem niveauet af fastholdelse af en 
strategisk gruppes traditionelle forretningsmodel og økonomisk performance. Dette 
indikerer, at luftfartsselskaber, der står ved deres strategiske gruppes traditionelle 
forretningsmodel, performer bedre, end dem der adskiller sig fra den traditionelle 
forretningsmodel. Lavprisselskabs-gruppen er den mest heterogene, mens gruppen af 
netværksselskaber er den mest homogene, hvilket kan tilskrives den historiske 
tilsynekomst af disse to grupper. 
 
Resultater fra en global spørgeskemaundersøgelse omdelt til topledere af 
luftfartsvirksomheder viser, at differentiering i forretningsmodeller tilskrives både 
innovation og imitation. Undersøgelsen viser, at alle flyselskaber innoverer, imidlertid 
giver forandringer i forretningsmodeller baseret på netop innovation kun et 
luftfartsselskab fordele i et begrænset tidsrum, da imitation knopskyder og udbredes i 
branchen. Adfærd blandt luftfartsselskaberne indikerer, at selskaber, der ligger i 
periferien af deres strategiske grupper, er mere tilbøjelige til at imitere andre 
strategiske grupper. Yderligere ses det, at luftfartsselskaber, der holder sig tæt til sine 
strategiske gruppers traditionelle forretningsmodel, er mere tilbøjelige til at imitere 
luftfartsselskaber, der tilhører egne strategiske grupper. 
 
Den afsluttende analyse er baseret på tilstedeværelsen af innovation og imitation i 
luftfartsindustrien og inkorporerer disse koncepter i en algebraisk analyse, der 
bestemmer den unikke kombination, som kontinuerligt fører til en positiv 
driftsmargin. Resultaterne af forretningsmodellerne peger på, at den rene, historiske 
skelnen mellem de strategiske grupper i branchen er ved at blive udvisket, og at en 
vindende hybrid måske er under fremkomst. 
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High Flight 
- John Gillespie Magee Jr. – 
No 412 squadron, RCAF 
Killed 11 December 1941 
 
 
 
Oh! I have slipped the surly bonds of Earth 
And danced the skies on laughter-silvered wings; 
Sunward I’ve climbed, and joined the tumbling mirth 
of sun-split clouds, — and done a hundred things 
You have not dreamed of—wheeled and soared and swung 
High in the sunlit silence. Hov’ring there, 
I’ve chased the shouting wind along, and flung 
My eager craft through footless halls of air.... 
Up, up the long, delirious, burning blue 
I’ve topped the wind-swept heights with easy grace 
Where never lark nor even eagle flew— 
And, while with silent lifting mind I’ve trod 
The high untrespassed sanctity of space, 
Put out my hand, and touched the face of God. 
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1. Introduction 
- The first heavier-than-air, powered flight occurred on December 17, 1903 and achieved 
a distance of 120 feet, less than the length of an average 747 economy section - 
 
 
Strategic management of a firm attempts to strike a balance between supplying the 
market with a desirable product or service and the associated costs, and management is 
free to choose a strategy that best suits the firm’s goals and implement a business model 
that strives to achieve the strategic aim.  When the internal or external environments 
necessitate a change, management can adjust their short-term business model or their 
long-term strategy.  Change, however, is hampered with the historical baggage of the 
industry and firm, the current competitive environment, and the future direction of the 
industry; in other words, past, present, and future.  Past and current challenges can be 
dealt with systematically, while the latter is more difficult to chart precisely.  Forecasting 
and predicting of industry developments are vital to management as they aid in the 
allocation of firm resources, but fortune telling is a difficult vocation; “Forecasting is 
difficult, especially when it concerns the future,” a French philosopher once said (Davies 
& Quastler, 1995 pg. 165).  Strategic success depends partly on a firm’s ability to 
indentify emerging trends in the business environment and to act accordingly at the 
proper moment (Georgantzas & Acar, 1995).  Would the respective industries have 
evolved differently than today if competitors could have predicted Wal-Mart’s success in 
retailing, Toyota’s lead in hybrid vehicles, Skype’s achievement in communication, 
Apple’s performance in computers and design, or Southwest’s lead in air travel?  These 
examples show that both manufacturing and service industries are evolving, and that 
today’s winners may be tomorrow’s losers; it is no longer Sears Roebuck, General 
Motors, AT&T, IBM, or Pan-Am that grace front page headlines.  Leading firms of today 
benefit from keeping a watchful eye on both near and far competitors, lest they be 
toppled.  This omnipresent competition forces firms to innovate or imitate their product 
or service, leading to industry evolution (Bolton, 1993; Reinganum, 1985; Segerstrom, 
1991).  Such change may be grounded in technological advances, such as Skype’s voice-
over IP software, or in new management practices, as Wal-Mart’s retail model shows.  
Industry evolution may shift between the two, as shown in the aviation era.  In its 
childhood technology was a key driver for industry change, however in the most recent 
decades management practice has been an evolutionary catalyst. 
 
Historical perceptions of the airline industry are often glamorous and envious, yet this era 
was under the protection of industry regulation.  Today, free market forces prevail in 
many regions, which have led to revolutionary changes.  In the past, technological 
advances propelled industry change.  The introduction of the jet engine in the de 
Havilland Comet and the Boeing 707 in the 1950s, and the Boeing 747 in 1970 brought 
faster, further, more reliable, and less expensive air travel to the masses.  While today’s 
technology in the industry is rooted as far back as 1903 and the Wright brothers’ first 
flight (Jakab, 1990; Wright & Wright, 1903), management has only been allowed to 
experiment with new styles since deregulation, a mere four decades ago, and even later in 
some regions.  Government regulation restricted airline management to industry norms 
and practices, and factors, such as price, schedule, capacity, and even service levels, were 
controlled (Gidwitz, 1980).  The 1978 Airline Deregulation Act in the US brought about 
a flurry of activity in the United States and the rest of the industry, and a slew of new 
airlines and strategies were introduced.  These new management styles have led to a 
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categorization of different types of airlines within the industry which frequently lead to 
competitive battles in the marketplace.  Competition is fierce and the following figure 
shows the cyclical nature of the global scheduled passenger airline industry’s financial 
performance. 
 
Figure 1.1: Global airline financial data 1947-2006 
Global Airline Financial Data (1947-2006)
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The operating and net margins shown in figure 1.1 depict an industry that is challenged to 
earn a profit; occasionally the mere operation of the airline results in losses1.    The 
average margins for the entire period are 2.3% and 0.06%, operationally and net 
respectively.  The highly successful investor, Warren Buffett, famously quipped if he had 
been in Kitty Hawk in 1903, the best thing he could have done for investors would have 
been to shoot down Orville Wright, since the airline industry had, at least up to 1990, lost 
more money than it earned for equity investors2 (Rosa, 2006).  The graph shows that the 
industry is highly cyclical and follows the pulse of economy, emulating recessionary and 
other crises3 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001).  The real yield line shows 
the average annual airfare adjusted for distance and inflation for US carriers4, 
domestically and internationally aggregated.  Although not a global average, the trend is 
repeated in numerous markets throughout the world’s regions (K. J. Mason, 2005): 
progressively falling yields.  Together, these three graphs show a highly competitive 
                                                 
1 An investigative report by CNBC provides an inside look at American Airlines (CNBC, 2007) that 
concisely portrays the challenges facing the industry by showing that flight AA001, New York to Los 
Angles, the airline’s flagship route, on that particular day of filming operated a fully-loaded Boeing 767 
that contributed a mere US $200 to the airline’s operating results.  Revenues were US $53,000 (ticket sales 
plus $300 in freight and $800 in food, headset sales, and excess baggage) and expenses US $52,800.  
Contrast this with an intrastate Texas flight from Dallas to Hartford that profited the airline with US 
$8,400. 
2 The global industry has posted a cumulative net profit of 731 million USD between 1947 and 2006 (Air 
Transport Association, 2007) 
3 This reflects the income elasticity of demand apparent in the industry (O'Conner, 2001) 
4 Historical global average yield data is not obtainable 
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industry.  However, not all airlines are suffering equally.  Rankings according to 2006 
passenger figures, displayed in table 1.1, show that the largest carriers report varying 
levels of operating success. 
 
Table 1.1: Largest carriers’ operating margin (2006) 
     
Rank1 Full-service carriers Operating margin Low-cost carriers Operating margin 
     
1 Delta Air Lines 0.3% Southwest Airlines 10.3% 
2 American Airlines 4.7% Ryanair 21.1% 
3 Air-France-KLM 5.4% easyJet 7.3% 
4 United Airlines 2.3% AirTran Airways 2.2% 
5 Japan Airlines 1.0% Air Berlin 4.0% 
     
1: Passengers carried (2006) 
Source: Airline Business (2007b) 
 
This performance rift within the industry pressures management to seek new ways of 
organizing their business model.  New strategies may come from innovating their 
existing business or change through peer inspiration, together these forces drive industry 
evolution.  Management’s challenge is to predict which strategic elements are deserving 
of innovative resources or should be imitated from industry rivals.  The industry and 
research community has yet to propose a method addressing this issue. 
 
1.1 Research question 
The airline industry, as with so many others, struggles with future uncertainty.  
Predictions grounded in accepted methods may aid managers in preparing future 
strategies.   
 
Until this point the broad term, strategy, has been used, however convergence of the topic 
is desired.  Strategy often portrays the broad aim of a firm, while a business model refers 
to a short-term perspective of how a firm conducts business.  From this point forward the 
terms will not be used interchangeably but with their own distinct definitions.  While 
some researchers see no difference (M. E. Porter, 2001), others are careful to make a 
distinction (Markides, 2006; Osterwalder, 2004). 
 
The aim of this research is threefold:  
 
1. Propose and introduce a research method which may enable research in future 
scenario planning, both within the scheduled passenger airline industry and 
others.   
2. Inspire and guide airline managers in business model areas that should be 
innovated or imitated. 
3. Propose and describe the future business models within the scheduled passenger 
airline industry.  
 
Research methods within future studies continue to develop and one of this project’s aims 
is to present a new method which may be applied to various industries.  This method 
distinguishes itself from others by extrapolating future business models in an industry 
based on past firm behavior using algebraic methods.  The proposed research method is 
intended to complement the field of business model change and, more specifically, 
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What will be the successful future airline business models? 
 
This main question is answered by incorporating three complementing and 
supporting, subset questions: 
 
1. How does the variation of airline business models affect profit? 
2. Why is there variation in airline business models? 
3. What future airline business models can be proposed?  
aviation researchers in their attempt to grasp future developments.  Research in firm and 
industry group behavior suggests that firm and industry changes are inevitable, yet there 
is no sound method of analyzing what changes may take place.  The second aim is to 
provide a level of guidance to airline executives, consultants, policy makers, and 
practitioners in how to adapt their business model to the changing environment.  Industry 
practitioners and actors may benefit from this research by restricting limited resources to 
those areas of the business model that are important.  Finally, new business models for 
the scheduled passenger airline industry are proposed, which may provide foresight into 
how the competitive landscape may develop.  The main question of the research project 
is: 
 
1.2 Limitations 
As with all research this project has its limitations.  It is focused exclusively on the 
scheduled passenger airline industry, although parallels may be drawn to similar service 
industries.  Examples of these are presented at the conclusion of the report.  The main 
question incorporates two subjective terms, success and future, which require definitions.  
Success of a firm can have many facets.  Some may relate it to market share, product line, 
number of employees, or patents.  This research defines success as profit margin, and 
more specifically, annual operational profit margin.  This metric is used in strategic 
studies to measure success, and is touted as a measurement of value creation (M. E. 
Porter, 1985; Stewart Thornhill, 2007).  It is often used to measure performance within 
the airline industry (Alamdari & Fagan, 2005).  The time in question is the year of 2006, 
and this research is a lateral snapshot of the industry.  The future, on the other hand, is an 
even greater fluid concept, it may begin at the next sentence on this page; mere seconds 
away.  Or, it could be within the next century.  This report proposes industrial 
developments in the future, which in the realm of the airline industry the researcher has 
limited to take place in the next five to ten years.  The further one moves from the present 
the more subjective and inaccurate the analyses and results.  There are numerous external 
factors, for example technological or regulatory, which shape the industry, yet are not 
integrated in this research; complexity reduces simplicity.  The final limitation of this 
research is related to the three subset questions.  These questions are stand-alone research 
topics which support the main research question.  Although they can be read as separate 
chapters in the research project they do complement each other in sequential order.   
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1.3 Project background 
This Doctor of Philosophy manuscript is submitted under the Industrial PhD5 initiative by 
the Danish Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation.  It is a collaborative project 
between the Center for Tourism and Culture Management6 at Copenhagen Business 
School and Scandinavian Airlines Danmark A/S7.  The overall goals of the Industrial 
PhD program are to educate researchers within commercial aspects and to create links 
between academic and practical regimes.   
 
The goal of this research project is to investigate future developments within the 
scheduled passenger airline industry, which can aid SAS in developing future business 
models and strategies.  The industry develops at such a pace that it challenges airline 
managers to envision future developments, and the intention is to provide decision 
makers with predictions grounded in industrial strategic decision making behavior.  
Although this project is supported by the airline its findings are applicable to the entire 
industry and can be of benefit to all carriers.  The following chapter introduces the reader 
to the methodological underpinnings of the research. 
                                                 
5 Information about the ErhvervsPhD initiative can be found at http://fist.dk/site/erhvervsphd-ordningen 
6 Information about the Center for Tourism and Culture Management can be found at  
http://www.cbs.dk/tcm 
7 Information about SAS Danmark can be found at http://www.sas.dk and about SAS Group at 
http://www.sasgroup.net  
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2. Methodology 
- The diameter of a GE-90-115B turbofan engine found on Boeing 777-200LR and 777-
300ER models is 11 feet and 3 inches, while the cabin diameter of a new 737 is 11 feet 
and 7 inches, only 3% greater - 
 
 
A research project’s methodology shapes how a topic is interpreted, carried out, and 
analyzed.  It offers the underlying principles that guide a researcher throughout the 
journey of initial research to conclusion, and makes assumptions about reality (Arbnor & 
Bjerke, 1996).  Methodology differs from methods, which is a sub-set of methodology.  
Methodology can be understood as the supporting structures that consist of theories, 
frameworks, concepts, a researcher’s approaches and individual interpretations of subject 
matter, and the collection of methods that are employed.  Methods are the tools that allow 
a researcher to analyze and generate conclusions from the gathered data.  This chapter 
will review the three sub-sets of the methodology employed in this particular research 
topic.  It will commence from a macro level and review the paradigm and realms in 
which the researcher is operating.  The meso level will briefly introduce the theories that 
are utilized in this project; however they will be explained in greater detail in the 
subsequent theoretical chapter (Chapter 3).  Finally, at the micro level, an introduction to 
the particular methods employed will be mentioned.  To improve clarity the methods will 
be explained in greater detail in Chapter 5.  The aim of this chapter is to illuminate from 
which perspective the researcher interprets the research topic, and to make the reader 
aware of how the analyses were conducted.  This knowledge will allow for improved 
understanding of how a result was obtained and the logic supporting each element. 
 
2.1 Philosophy of science 
While researching a topic a researcher’s chosen rationale and philosophical assumptions 
that underlie the framework have an influence on how a topic is interpreted; rather than a 
theoretical lens that shapes the worldview, this is the uncorrected vision of the researcher.  
A paradigm contains the ultimate presumptions of the researcher (Kuhn, 1970), while 
methodological approaches attempt to convey the researcher’s reality assumptions and 
provide a framework for how data should be collected, categorized, and presented 
(Arbnor & Bjerke, 1996).  Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between the various forces 
acting within a research project (Arbnor & Bjerke, 1996).  The solid block arrows 
indicate how the ultimate presumptions and methods directly influence the research 
problem, while the dashed block arrows show how researchers and their presumptions are 
also influenced by these two factors.  Both the problem and the researcher’s presumptions 
impact the set of techniques available, which result in a collection of methods and their 
applicability. 
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Figure 2.1: Methods and application of methods 
 
Source: Arbnor and Bjerke (1996) 
 
2.2 Paradigms 
A paradigm explains the preconditions or assumptions, either explicit or implicit, that a 
researcher has prior to conducting research. A paradigm is the meta-theory behind the 
theory that explains how the researcher’s past experience and knowledge will influence 
not only how the problem is viewed but also how it is answered. During the research 
these conceptions become preconditions within the theoretical framework. It is important 
to note that each researcher has their own paradigm and that no two researchers view a 
problem in the same paradigm (Astley, 1985; Clark & Fast, 2002).  Kuhn (1977) states 
that paradigms are what members of a scientific community, and they alone, share.  
Burrell and Morgan define a paradigm as:  
 
“…meta-theoretical assumptions which underwrite the frame of reference, 
mode of theorizing and modus operandi of the social theorists who 
operate within them. It is a term which is intended to emphasize the 
commonality of perspective which binds the work of a group of theorists 
together in such a way that they can be usefully regarded as approaching 
social theory within the bounds of the same problematic” (Burrell & 
Morgan, 1982 (1979) pg. 23). 
 
The American philosopher, Thomas Kuhn, has made significant contributions to 
scientific theory due to his work related to paradigms (Kuhn, 1970). Kuhn states that 
paradigms are constantly evolving as the scientific framework for paradigms changes 
with new observations and reinterpretations, which leads to a revolution and new 
scientific frameworks arise in the shape of new paradigms (Clark & Fast, 2002).  Kuhn 
continues by stating that the difference between natural science and social science is that 
within natural science new paradigms replace the old ones, but within social science the 
old paradigms survive alongside the new paradigms (Astley, 1985).   
 
There are two paradigms, the functionalist and interpretive, which represent opposite 
ways of conducting analyses and have different implications for how to study social 
phenomena (Clark & Fast, 2002).  The paradigms represent alternative points of view of 
 
Problem 
Researcher’s 
ultimate 
presumptions
Set of techniques
Methods & 
application of 
methods 
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how reality is interpreted. They are mutually exclusive because one cannot operate within 
more than one paradigm at a time.  
 
The functionalist paradigm is based on the idea that reality is objective and that there is 
only one concrete, real reality. This paradigm tends to focus on functionality and 
structures. Research is conducted through observation, as the social world is seen as 
existing independently from human beings, while offering predictions provides 
explanations. This objectivity is based on classical positivism and rationalism that 
searches for causal relations that is assumed to exist between various factors. It focuses 
on explaining, describing and even predicting events using quantitative scientific 
methods. The functionalistic paradigm is a value-free science and expects a researcher to 
keep a distance from personal values and interfering beliefs. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum is the interpretive paradigm, or life-world tradition. In 
this spectrum it is believed that reality is subjective and reality occurs through inter-
subjective experience between individuals.  Reality is therefore constructed in the social 
world and society is understood from participation rather than observation. Therefore, 
there are multiple realities occurring within society. This subjectivity is based on 
idealism/subjectivism and neo-Kantianism that include such traditions as hermeneutics 
(Clark & Fast, 2002). Hermeneutics is a way that humans create knowledge through 
understanding, and assumes that people create knowledge by looking for meaning in their 
actions because they are interpretive beings that place their own subjective interpretation 
on reality. Hermeneuticists assert that there is a decisive difference between explaining 
nature and understanding or interpreting culture. For this reason, the natural science 
method of creating knowledge through explanatory means is deemed unsuitable for social 
science (Arbnor & Bjerke, 1996). Subjectivity views human beings as the constructors of 
the social world. Social reality is a product of three facets, the subjective, inter-subjective 
experience, and consciousness of individuals and is therefore a dynamic social process. 
When operating within a subjective dimension research is conducted by understanding 
humans and situations.  
 
This research is conducted within the realm of the interpretive paradigm.  This is 
bounded by the belief that the research questions are subjective phenomenon.  Although 
quantitative methods are utilized to address a number of issues the variables are 
subjectively interpreted by the researcher.  In other words, it is the interaction between 
the researcher and the subject matter that creates reality.  It is not a value-free science, a 
tenet of the functionalist paradigm.  It is highly likely that the subject matter of this report 
would not be studied in an identical manner by two researchers, and that relevant factors 
would be deciphered differently.   
 
2.3 Methodological approaches 
While paradigms describe the presumptions a researcher has regarding a problem, 
methodological approaches describe how a problem is categorized.  Arbnor and Bjerke 
(1996) list three methodological approaches present in business research today, the 
analytical, systems, and actors approach.  These approaches describe how the sub-sets of 
a problem relate to one another and to the problem as a whole; interactions between sub-
sets are ignored.  The analytical approach sums each sub-set of a problem to construct the 
whole.  The systems approach investigates the synergy between the sub-sets to construct 
the whole; the whole is not always equal to the sub-sets.  The final approach, the actors 
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approach, studies the characteristics of each sub-set to understand the whole; this 
approach is interested in social wholes rather than explanations.  This research focuses on 
the interaction and configuration of the sub-sets of the airline business model, lending 
itself to the systems approach. 
 
The systems approach finds its first beginnings within the energy and technology fields.  
Here the approach was applied with vigor and it soon expanded to allow society to 
explain complex relations in general.  Today, society discusses the hospital system, the 
educational system, the air traffic control system, or the production systems of a firm.  A 
system is a set of sub-sets, or parts, and the relations among them.  It will become 
apparent in subsequent chapters that a business model is comprised of a number of sub-
sets, or components8, that interact, either positively, negatively, or neutrally, to create a 
business model system.  Within systems thinking a number of concepts are given a 
priori, just as this project utilizes theories and previous studies to complement the 
findings.  However, new concepts can be added within the systems approach to arrive at 
new ways of classifying reality (Arbnor & Bjerke, 1996).  This project concludes by 
adding new concepts to the respective field and proposes new ways of classifying the 
airline industry.  Systems may be either models or real.  Systems models intend to 
replicate reality in a simple manner and omit superfluous components, and are often used 
as steering tools.  A real system attempts to replicate reality in its entirety, appropriate to 
the level of detail desired, which are descriptive in nature.  This research is shaped as a 
systems model as it intends to provide future direction and has omitted factors that, 
though influential, may be nearly immeasurable or lie outside of the researcher-
designated systems boundary.  Systems models can be segmented according to their use.  
Arbnor and Bjerke (1996) list the mechanic, biological, self-organizing, and value-laden 
systems model.  This project attempts to replicate reality and the model is of the self-
organizing type.  This type of model is able to adapt and change structurally to its 
environment to meet its predetermined targets.  In essence, the model is able to use 
environmental feedback and learn how to adapt.  This is representative of the real 
systems model of the airline industry.  The propositions for future development are based 
on current airline positions in strategic groups and the industry and airlines can learn to 
react to competitor influence.    
 
This section has explained the philosophy of science pertaining to this project.  The 
operating paradigm and approach was discussed and how it relates to the research.  The 
following section will present and discuss the project design. 
 
2.4 Research project design 
This project is a case study in business models of the airline industry.  The advantage of 
conducting a case study rather than purely an experiment or survey is the ability to 
maintain a holistic perspective and incorporate real-life events throughout the study (Yin, 
2003).  Case study research is ideal when examining contemporary events but when 
behaviors cannot be manipulated.  While an experimental study is able to answer the how 
and why of a subject, similar to a case study, it assumes that the researcher has control of 
events, which is not the case in this particular research project.  While researching airline 
business models the researcher is an insignificant witness that attempts to explain the how 
                                                 
8 The author uses the words, components, sub-sets, elements, and parts interchangeably.  They are 
synonymous in this realm and signify that they are the building-blocks of an entire business model 
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and why of the industry, and propose options for change, but is unable to affect events.  
This form of explanation falls into the realm of correlation, comparative, explanatory 
research.  Research of this type attempts to discover the existence of a relationship 
between two or more aspects (i.e. business model and profitability) and explain why the 
relationship exists (Kumar, 1996).  Yin (2003) provides a working technical definition of 
case study: 
 
“A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003 pg. 13). 
 
A case study requires the construction of a preliminary theory prior to data collection 
which acts as a blueprint for the study and is the glue that causally links the concepts 
together, and the level of analysis is dependent upon the developed theory (Gill & 
Johnson, 1997; Yin, 2003).  This deductive process plays an integral part in the research, 
and testing of results in the empirical world is more important than the incorporated 
theories (Gill & Johnson, 1997).  Stake (Berg, 2004) argues that researchers can choose 
to play an intrinsic or instrumental role in case study research.  The intrinsic role of the 
researcher is not to develop, understand, or test theory or theoretical explanations, but to 
better understand the intrinsic aspects of the particular case, while the instrumental role is 
provide insight or refine a theoretical explanation with the case as a supportive role in the 
research.  In this realm the researcher strives to intimately understand the case at hand. 
 
This case study incorporates the theories of business modeling, strategic groups, 
innovation and imitation.  These theories are woven together to provide a theoretical 
foundation to progress towards data collection.  Data collection consists of secondary, 
observational, and primary, empirical data.  Secondary and observational data sources 
include academic and trade journals, financial records, news sources, and conference 
participation.  Empirical data collection was obtained through internal meetings and 
group projects at SAS Danmark, and a mailed survey to airlines globally (see Chapter 7).  
These data sources allowed the researcher to gather a holistic view of the airline industry.  
Completed data collection allows the researcher to model the generic contemporary 
airline business models, perform configurational causal modeling, and finally to propose 
hybrid business models that the industry may begin to witness.  Validity is constructed by 
reviewing results with key informants within the industry, and discussing rival 
possibilities.  Figure 2.2 depicts the longitudinal case study construction utilized 
throughout the study, which combines the philosophy of science introduced previously 
and its affect on the researcher, as well as, the research cycle.  All research begins with 
the philosophy of science, which influences the researcher’s perception of the problem 
and the methodology.  This, in turn, reverberates throughout the study.  It impacts the 
theoretical framework, which impacts the data collection method and analysis.  These 
three elements comprise a case study.  The conclusion entails validation techniques, 
which may produce results that are monumental enough to shift a researcher’s core 
philosophy of science.  This may lead to a paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1970). 
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Figure 2.2: Longitudinal case study construction 
Source: Author’s own creation  
 
A case study design has five components: the study’s questions, propositions, unit of 
analysis, linking of data to the propositions, and the criteria for interpreting the results 
(Yin, 2003).  The research project’s questions and propositions were introduced in 
section 1.1, and will not be repeated in this section.  The unit of analysis for this case 
study design is the business model of a firm, and within the context of the scheduled 
passenger airline industry.  This unit of analysis is a snapshot study which is conducted at 
one point in time, an industrial cross-sectional analysis, rather than continuously or at 
numerous points.  This is appropriate for the type of data collected and considering the 
relative slow rate of change in the airline industry, which takes place over the course of a 
year or more.  Case studies can incorporate either a holistic or embedded design 
dependent upon the case itself and desired unit of analysis (Yin, 2003).  This project 
utilizes a multiple embedded design as the unit of analysis which is distinguishable from 
the entire system, in other words, the business model is discernible from the airline 
system.  However, as the research delves deeper into the embedded case it must return to 
the larger unit of analysis (Yin, 2003).  The context of this research is the scheduled 
passenger airline industry, which is comprised of three cases: full-service carriers, low-
cost carriers, and regional carriers.  The unit of analysis in each case is the business 
model.  This structure attempts to depict the industry in general.  Figure 2.3 depicts the 
embedded case design and the unit of analysis for the research at hand (Yin, 2003).   
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Figure 2.3: Case design  
 
Source: Adopted from Yin (2003).   
 
The linking of data and the criteria for interpreting results are the least developed of the 
case study design components.  This project utilizes the concept of pattern matching 
proposed by Campbell (inYin, 2003).  This concept matches the puzzle pieces of the case 
study with the binding theory incorporated at the beginning of the case study design.  The 
theories utilized allow one to propose future patterns of business models, which are tested 
using appropriate methods.  The interpretation of results is handled in numerous facets.  
The most important contribution is the participation of the client in the research project 
according to the action research practice tool, which is described in the following section.  
This form of collaboration allows the results to be processed with academic and practical 
rigor.  In addition, qualitative interpretation of survey results and qualitative 
interpretation of secondary data allows for understanding of generated results. 
 
2.5 Action research 
Action research is a method of research used to understand and change certain social 
practices, which requires that researchers include practitioners from the real world in all 
phases of inquiry (Masters, 1995); its intention is to produce information and knowledge 
that is useful to a group of people, and to enlighten a person in the group (Berg, 2004).  It 
is able to produce knowledge grounded in local realities (Herr & Anderson, 2005).  
Although its origins are vague the community tends to agree that American psychologist, 
Kurt Lewin, constructed the theoretical foundation of action research in the 1940s in 
affiliation with wartime studies (Berg, 2004).  It is a form of research that is inherently 
interdisciplinary and seldom fits into the norms of a particular field (Herr & Anderson, 
2005).  Action research has five main goals: generation of new knowledge, achievement 
of action-oriented outcomes, education of both researcher and participant, results that are 
relevant to the local setting, and sound and appropriate research methodologies (Herr & 
Anderson, 2005).   
 
Action research allows the researcher to not only contribute to existing knowledge but 
also aid in solving a practical problem.  Rapoport (1991, pg. 499)  describes action 
research as an, “…aim to contribute both to the practical concerns of people in an 
immediate problematic situation and to the goals of social science by joint collaboration 
 
Context:  Airline industry 
 
Case:  Strategic groups 
 
Unit of analysis: Business models 
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with a mutually acceptable framework.”  Action research shares similarities with 
ethnography, however it stands apart with researcher selection done by the client, while 
the opposite is true in ethnography.  In addition, ethnographers assume that they are mere 
observers, while action researchers strive to inflict reflection and change (Gill & Johnson, 
1997).  This research project adheres to outsider action research since the researcher was 
not a firm insider prior to beginning the project (Herr & Anderson, 2005).  An outsider 
action researcher has a desire to generate knowledge and contribute to the setting being 
studied, is invited inside to conduct research, and works outside the firm in collaboration 
with an insider.  This action research achieves a high level of ecological research validity 
and naturalism, in other words, how applicable results are to general themes, compared to 
other research methodologies, which is rooted in its research in natural and non-artificial 
settings (Gill & Johnson, 1997). 
 
Three main modes of action research exist, which include technical/scientific 
collaboration mode, practical/mutual collaboration mode, and emancipating/enhancing 
mode (Berg, 2004; Masters, 1995).  This project utilizes primarily the 
emancipating/enhancing mode action research type, although it does borrow elements 
from the practical/mutual collaboration mode.  The goals of the emancipating/enhancing 
mode include attempting to increase the closeness between day-to-day problems 
encountered by practitioners and to apply theoretically-based solutions, as well as, to 
assist practitioners in removing clouded understandings by raising their collective 
consciousness.  There is an attempt in this research study to bring theory closer to reality 
to improve both theory and practitioner understanding.   
 
There are four spiraling steps involved with action research: identification, gathering, 
analyzing, and sharing of results (Berg, 2004).  Identification involves the researcher 
collaborating with stakeholders to define a research question.  The most important 
element is that the research problem is considered important by the stakeholders.  In this 
case the research question was broadly defined by SAS Airlines Danmark, who saw how 
vital the research was to future development.  The researcher is guided by the question, as 
well as, the philosophy of science and methods.  The final step in the process includes 
knowledge dissemination of the results.  This occurs through publications and 
presentations to the core group of stakeholders, as well as, a broader audience.   
 
Validity is a central theme in action research, and it is important to discuss its 
methodological role in the research; the four types of validity are democratic, process, 
outcome, and catalytic (Herr & Anderson, 2005).  Democratic validity looks at the level 
of collaboration with stakeholders in the research.  This research project had an 
established forum of airline executives and managers that collaborated on the research 
framework, data gathering, and outcome presentation of results.  Discussions were held 
regularly with a group of participants, while outcome presentations were held for a 
broader audience.  Process validity rates the framework that allows for ongoing learning 
at the client, which ties in closely with outcome validity.  Outcome validity relates to the 
extent at which outcomes occur and leads to a solution to the problem studied.  The 
integrity rests on the quality of action that emerges from the research.  Catalytic validity 
is the degree to which participants are able to refocus their reality with the goal of 
transformation.  Both democratic and catalytic validity take place when an outsider 
initiates action research with a goal of deepening understandings and action as a goal.  
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The methodology and research project design have been presented and discussed to 
benefit the reader’s understanding of the underlying principles of the research, as well as, 
the role of the researcher throughout the project.  The following sections will present an 
introduction to the methods and project structure. 
 
2.6 Methods 
Methods are the tools that researchers use to investigate an issue.  At a broad level 
methods may be categorized as either quantitative or qualitative.  Quantitative methods 
are grounded in mathematics and investigate the relationships among quantitative 
phenomena, while qualitative methods rely on examinations, analyses, and interpretations 
to discover underlying meanings and patterns.  This research utilizes both types of 
research, however it is based primarily upon quantitative methods.  The research is 
divided into three sections, which address the fore mentioned research questions.  The 
first two research questions rely upon common statistical tools: regression, correlation, 
and analysis of variance.  They are used to investigate the relationship between airline 
profitability and adherence to a traditional business model, how the imitative and 
innovative behaviour of varies categories of airlines vary, and how the external factor of 
rivalry impacts behaviour.  These methods are well-known and mere summaries are 
provided in the detailed explanations in Chapter 5.  The final analysis introduces a new 
method, qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), to the field of business model research 
and industry analyses.  QCA may be understood as inhabiting both the quantitative and 
qualitative realms.  This method relies upon the researcher’s qualitative interpretation of 
variables and their measurement to be used in quantitative algebraic solutions.  The 
method allows the researcher to identify unique combinations that mathematically are 
always present in a pre-determined outcome.  QCA is used in this research project’s 
scope to investigate the combinations of business model elements that are always present 
in financially successful carriers.  This method is explained in detail in Chapter 5. 
 
The ingredients that are utilized with the chosen methods may be based on various 
sources.  Primary data is gathered first-hand by the researcher, while secondary data is 
gathered and presented by people other than the researcher.  This research project 
incorporates both types of data.  Primary data sources include open-ended interviews 
with participants at the client, participation in group projects, and discussions touching on 
various aspects of the project.  After completion of two-thirds of the allotted project 
timeframe a questionnaire was distributed to CEOs of scheduled passenger airlines 
worldwide.  Secondary data sources included airline industry-specific academic journals, 
primarily Journal of Air Transport Management, Transport Reviews, and Journal of Air 
Transportation.  Non-academic journals include Air Transport World, Airline Business, 
Airways, and Airliner World.  Numerous news websites were frequented and include 
Airliners.net, Air Transport World, and Airwise.  News and data from a slew of trade 
organizations has been incorporated, such as International Air Transport Association 
(IATA), Air Transport Association (ATA), European Low Fare Airline Association 
(ELFAA), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Regional Airline 
Association (RAA), and others.  Non-airline data sources include academic journals, such 
as European Management Journal, Harvard Business Review, Journal of Business 
Strategy, Journal of Business Research, and many others.  These journals, websites, trade 
organizations, and books complement the primary data for the research project 
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2.7 Project structure 
This research project attempts to guide the reader through the problem formulation to 
research findings in a structured and transparent manner.  Each individual chapter 
provides an overview of the subject at hand, while a glossary and various appendixes are 
referred to throughout the project to aid the reader in understanding the topic.  Figure 2.4 
is a summarized overview of the research project’s chapters, which should be referred to 
for the below-mentioned parts. 
 
The project’s problem formulation and methodology follows the introduction.  The goal 
of these chapters in Part I is to lay the groundwork for the project at hand and justify the 
methodological frameworks that shape the research agenda, as well as, clarify the 
relevance and goals of the research.  In order to lay the foundation for answering the 
research problem, Part II begins with a literature review of the relevant themes that 
support the research: strategic groups, imitation and innovation, and business models, 
which provide the reader with a comprehensive state of the art of the communities.  A 
review of the theories incorporated in the research proceeds the literature review.  The 
goal of this chapter is to familiarize the reader with the utilized theories that provide a 
guiding framework for the research topic.  The theoretical review builds upon the 
literature review by entwining the concepts, frameworks, and elements into a seamless 
tool.  An application of the theories to the airline industry follows, which includes an 
overview of the state of the industry and the role that the business model plays.  An 
analysis of the current airline business models is provided, as well as, an integration of 
the theories described earlier, which concludes Part II.  Part III integrates the introduced 
concepts and reviews the analytical research of the report.  The variables, hypotheses, and 
methods are introduced in a systematic manner.  The research is supported by both a 
quantitative survey-based review and a qualitative causal analysis, which provide 
supporting evidence for the research topic’s conclusions.  Part IV encompasses the 
chapters that reflect on the research design and the theoretical contributions.   
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Figure 2.4: Report structure 
 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
2.7.1 Phases 
This entire research project is divided into distinct phases and all build upon each other.  
These phases are: 
 
1. Theoretical research 
2. Empirical data collection 
3. Analyses 
4. Verification 
5. Conclusion 
 
The theoretical research segment entailed studying the academic literature for relevant, 
supporting theories and frameworks.  Once the appropriate theories were located they 
were studied and the researcher became familiar with the intimate details.  They were 
analyzed from both an academic and industry perspective.  Once the theoretical 
foundation was laid the researcher prepared the empirical-gathering process and initiated 
data collection.  Upon completion of the empirical data collection phase the researcher 
was able to commence analyses.  These were divided into three stages: regression and 
correlation, analysis of variance (ANOVA), and Boolean.  Although these analyses were 
completed relatively simultaneously they do reinforce one another.  The regression and 
correlation methods allow one to investigate the impact of strategic group placement on 
performance, while the ANOVA technique was used to research empirical survey 
responses regarding business model change in the industry.  This supported the Boolean 
analyses which provided the researcher with industrial propositions that address the 
 
Part I 
 
Part II 
 
Part III 
Introduction – Chapters 1 & 2: 
Research problem 
Methodology 
Supporting structure – Chapters 3 & 4: 
Literature review 
Theoretical review 
Industry application 
Industrial grounding & analyses – Chapters 5-8: 
Hypotheses and propositions 
Analyses of: 
• How airline business models differ 
• Why they differ 
• Future implications 
 
Part IV Reflection – Chapters 9 & 10: Research design 
Theoretical implications
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future direction of the industry.  The researcher initiated a verification phase to test the 
industry practitioners’ viewpoints of the future changes.  The project was finalized in the 
conclusion.   
 
The intention of this chapter was to explain to the reader the underlying philosophical and 
methodological structures.  The philosophy of science of the researcher and the 
perception of the research problem were presented, as well as, the project design.  The 
methods were briefly introduced, along with the representative case study groups.  This 
information should support the reader’s broad understanding of the research project and 
acts as an introduction to the theoretical framework utilized to better understand the 
research problem.  The following chapter is the beginning of Part II.  This part introduces 
the reader to the underlying theories and their application to the airline industry. 
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3. Theoretical review 
- The wing area of a 747-400 is 5,600 square feet, enough to hold 45 medium-sized 
automobiles - 
 
 
This chapter is a synthesis of past literature of the supporting theories.  The goal is to 
introduce the reader to the current threshold within the field, and provide the necessary 
background knowledge supporting the research question.  It begins from a meta-
perspective and reviews past literary contributions in the field of strategic management 
and funnels into more specific topics: business models, strategic groups, and business 
model change based on imitation and innovation.  These four core themes are reviewed to 
introduce the reader to the general concepts and the specific theoretical foundation 
supporting this research stream.  In the following chapter they are applied specifically to 
the airline industry.   
 
This chapter begins with a brief summary of strategic management and its varying 
analytical perspective through the decades, followed by the literary background and main 
themes of the three concepts.  The conceptual review begins with the analytical 
perspective of the firm at the business model level.  This is followed by the concept of 
strategic groups, which is a categorization tool to aid in analysis, and concludes 
embracing industry and firm heterogeneity, which is explained via innovation and 
imitation.  The innovation theme, which aids in explaining industry heterogeneity, has a 
broad literary base which alone can support many in-depth academic research projects.  
To maintain a level of clarity it has been incorporated in the business model theme as a 
sub-category, while the imitation theme remains separate.  This was primarily because 
business model innovation is a distinct research category in the field, while imitation is 
still a broad concept not yet applied within the specific realm of business models.   
 
3.1 Strategic management literature 
The strategic management field has expanded immensely since its inception in the mid-
twentieth century (Chaffee, 1985; Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan, & Yiu, 1999), all the while its 
focal point shifting approximately every decade between the firm-level (micro-
perspective) and industry-level (macro-perspective) as the unit of analysis (Hoskisson et 
al., 1999; McGee & Thomas, 1986).  Recent theoretical and methodological shifts in the 
field have renewed interest in analysis at the firm-level (Hoskisson et al., 1999).  
Hoskisson et al. (1999) refer to this transitory cycle as swings of a pendulum and their 
historical analysis provides an overview of the field from its humble beginnings as a 
general overview course to its solid place in the study of industries and organizations.  
Figure 3.1 is an overview of the main theories found in the field and their primary 
authors, which shows the transition to the current state of strategic management research.  
This brief overview is intended to give the reader an understanding of how the applied 
theoretical foundations are grounded and their symbiotic relationship with the chosen 
methodology and paradigms.   
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Figure 3.1: Strategic management’s transitory shifts 
 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
Strategic management was born with the works of Chandler (1996), Ansoff (1965), and 
Andrews (1971; 1997), and laid the foundations for later contributions.  These works 
viewed firms as closed systems, were focused on the internal workings, and proposed 
how they succeeded in the marketplace.  Their methodological approach was inductive 
and incorporated detailed case studies.  However, for advancement in the field 
generalizations and an open-system perspective were necessary, and the field shifted 
towards an economic viewpoint.  This is the industrial organization (I/O) and structure-
conduct-performance (S-C-P) paradigm.  Porter’s (1980; 1985) five-forces model, Hunt’s 
(1972) strategic groups, and Karnani and Wernerfelt’s (1985) competitive dynamics were 
the seminal works in this paradigm, which worked deductively and shifted the focus to 
the industry-level.  Statistical, scientific analysis enabled generalizations that could be 
applied across fields.  This paradigm shift coincided with the introduction of increased 
computing power, centralized, large-scale databases, and statistical programs which 
enabled broad-based, statistical analyses.  The pendulum reached its apex and swung 
back and strategic management turned its attention towards the firm once again with 
organizational economics, which is grounded in economic theory, yet attempts to crack 
open the firm’s black box with the hope of explaining its inner logic.  The major 
theoretical contributions of organizational economics is transaction cost economics 
(TCE) (Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1987) and agency theory (Fama, 1980; Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  In addition, the theory of strategic groups saw 
a focal shift from an industry-level perspective to a firm-level perspective based on the 
understanding that heterogeneity is evident in groups (Hoskisson et al., 1999).  This 
research ran into the problem of unobservables in firms and the lack of quantifiable 
variables, in addition to the varying assumptions that researchers’ held which influenced 
studies.  Some in the field continued to ponder why some firms were successful due to 
idiosyncratic characteristics, which led to an increased focus on firm specifics.  These 
theories include the resource-based view (RBV) (Penrose & Penrose, 1995; Wernerfelt, 
1984) and knowledge-based view (KBV) (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Polanyi, 1983).  These 
theories open the door to cross-discipline cooperation, in such fields as leadership styles 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996), organizational learning (D. J. Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 
1997), or entrepreneurship (Nelson, 1991).  The current state of strategic management, 
RBV and KBV, challenges researchers to measure immeasurables empirically, methods 
which are currently being developed (Hoskisson et al., 1999).  Hoskisson et al. (1999) 
propose that the future of strategic management includes incorporating industry dynamics 
into studies, as well as, integrating strategy across various levels of the firm (e.g. 
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international, corporate, business level) (G. G. Dess, Gupta, Hennart, & Hill, 1995).  Any 
changes to the strategic management field require researchers to possess a multi-
theoretical view and incorporate both quantitative- and qualitative-based research.  This 
research project attempts to accompany this request by straddling both the firm-level and 
industry-level perspective by incorporating both the business model and strategic group 
concepts, and relies on both quantitative and qualitative research. 
 
An analysis of the firm incorporates the business model framework; however the 
heterogeneity in industries requires a categorization concept to capture the unique 
differences.  This is achieved by incorporating the strategic group theory, which aids in 
analyses by grouping firms in related clusters.  Yet, it is necessary to analyze the 
motivation and reasoning for industry heterogeneity by analyzing firms’ innovative and 
imitative traits.  Figure 3.2 is a diagram showing the relationship among the underlying 
frameworks and theories in this study.  The level of departure is the business model 
framework, which is used to gain a deeper understanding of the representative firms in 
the industry.  As the analytical depth increases the second level of analysis is the strategic 
group theory which allows one to categorize firms according to their business models.  
This creates a map of the industry.  The apex of the research is achieved by incorporating 
innovation and imitation theories to aid in explaining industry transition and 
heterogeneity.   
 
Figure 3.2: Underlying interaction among supporting frameworks and theories  
 
Source: Adopted from Seddon (2004). 
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3.2 Business models 
Growth in firm size and complexity in the middle of the 20th century challenged current 
understanding of internal firm organization (Foss, 1997).  Theories for understanding 
internal activities and their roles have transitioned from identification of activities using a 
value chain analysis (M. E. Porter, 1985; M. E. Porter, 1996), to capability and resource 
uniqueness using the resource-based view (Rumelt, 1997; Wernerfelt, 1984), to today’s 
identification of combinations of firm activities and their interaction with one another 
using the business model framework (Osterwalder, 2004).  A business model is 
understood as a description of how a firm conducts its activities and the interactions 
between these activities.  A picture is often used to represent the activities and the 
interaction between these activities.  The term business model is relatively new to 
strategic management and to understanding firm structure.  However, its concept as a 
framework builds upon contributions made many decades earlier.  It was first with the 
introduction of electronic commerce that the phrase became commonplace in literature 
(Timmers, 1998).  
 
The definition the researcher utilizes in this report is:  
 
A business model is a framework of a firm’s activities and their combinations that 
interact to create value for customers and a profit for the firm. 
 
Activities are the primary actions of a firm that are performed related to creating 
customer value and firm profits.  Activities may include traditional actions such as 
production, service, or distribution, but also unique operational aspects, customer relation 
activities, or business-to-consumer interface, particularly in online aspects.  The 
processes and interactions between these activities are vital as their interface may create 
benefits unique to a firm.  Two firms can have identical business model activities yet 
different organizational processes among them, which may result in different customer 
value propositions and profit results.  The term, business model, is often associated with 
technology-based firms, especially since it appeared at the same time as the hype 
surrounding commercial activities using the Internet.  Today’s firms are often integrated 
and reliant upon information and communication technology, which plays a supportive 
role in business models.  However, it is important to stress that business models are found 
in all types of firms, both those fully reliant upon technology and those that are not.  In 
addition, business models may appear without the influence of technology, just as 
business models may be adapted utilizing existing technology; a new business model is 
not dependent upon new technology.  For example, a firm may reorganize its processes 
and discover an entirely new way of conducting business which results in a new business 
model.  Business model definitions, in general, are often grounded in technology firms, 
evident in the definitions below. 
 
“An architecture for the product, service, and information flows, including 
a description of the various business actors and their roles; and a 
description of the potential benefits for the various business actors; and a 
description of the sources of revenues” (Timmers, 1998 pg. 4). 
 
“A business model depicts the content, structure, and governance of 
transactions designed so as to create value through the exploitation of 
business opportunities” (Amit & Zott, 2001 pg. 511). 
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Box 1: The Internet – A value 
chain vs. business model 
analysis 
 
The Internet is a catalyst for
change in traditional business
practices.  Conventional brick-
and-mortar stores compete with
online powerhouses, such as
Amazon. However, other sites
are financially successful using
unconventional practices, such
as Google or Facebook. A
traditional value chain analysis
of these two sites would be
challenged to identify the
activities that make these sites
successful.  A business model
analysis enables one to identify
activities that may not fit in a
particular value chain category. 
 
“Stories that explain how enterprises work” (Magretta, 2002 pg. 87). 
 
“This [business model] is the method by which a firm builds and uses its 
resources to offer its customers better value than its competitors and to 
make money doing so.  It details how a firm makes money now and how it 
plans to do so in the long term” (Afuah & Tucci, 2003 pg. 4). 
 
“It is the set of activities which a firm performs, how it performs them, and 
when it performs them so as to offer its customers benefits that they want 
and to earn a profit” (Afuah, 2004 pg. 2). 
 
“A unique configuration or elements of elements comprising the 
organization’s goals, strategies, processes, technologies, and structure, 
conceived to create value for customers and thus compete successfully in a 
particular market” (Afuah, 2004 pg. 15). 
 
“A business model is the combination of ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘where’, ‘when’, 
‘why’, ‘how’ and ‘how much’ an organization uses to provide its goods 
and service and develop resources to continue its efforts” (D. W. Mitchell 
& Coles, 2004 pg. 17). 
 
A business model, at first glance, may appear strikingly similar to Porter’s value chain 
(M. E. Porter, 1985), however there are unique differences (see Box 1).  The value chain, 
with its primary and secondary activities, is a rigid 
framework that lends itself most easily to the 
manufacturing sector.  Its structure fails to allow 
one to analyze a firm’s unique composition of 
activities, but rather challenges a user to force 
firm activities into pre-determined categories.  
The business model, on the other hand, is a more 
fluid structure that allows a user to identify the 
particular activities of a firm and their 
interactions.  Two firms in an industry may offer 
the market similar products or services, yet may 
perform differing activities to achieve this goal.  
A value chain analysis may fail to capture the 
uniqueness of the firms, while a business model 
analysis is more adaptive.  More recent work by 
Porter has stressed activity sets of firms, which is 
more representative of a business model than a 
value chain (M. E. Porter, 1996).   
 
3.2.1 Literature 
The literature stream related to the concept of 
business models is relatively short compared to complementing and competing concepts.  
This section will introduce the literary steam and tenets of the business model framework.  
The basic elements of the contributions by various authors will be discussed, as well as, 
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dynamics related to innovative change, and the conflict that has arisen between business 
models and strategy. 
 
The concept and terminology of business models entered the literature at the end of the 
20th century with the meteoric rise of the Internet and electronic business (e-business).  
Although, the initial scholarly article introducing business models appeared in 
Accounting Review in 1960 (Jones, 1960), the field lay virtually dormant for nearly four 
decades.  A review of the number of peer-reviewed articles in academic journals in the 
Business Source Complete9 database investigating business models through the decades 
indicates a growing interest that coincides with the growth of e-business.  Figure 3.3 
highlights the growth of the term starting from 1995 through 2007.  The term progresses 
from the publications’ abstracts to the title, and eventually appearing as a keyword in 
1999; the year following Timmers’ (1998) seminal work. 
 
Figure 3.3: Use of term business model in academic publications 
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The term itself proliferated during the heyday of the Internet boom even though it was 
misunderstood and misused.  It was used to describe a gamut of firm aspects; everything 
from revenue generation to organizational structure was incorporated, described, and 
defined as a business model (Linder & Cantrell, 2000c).  The expression itself is used 
interchangeably with terms, such as, “e-business models,” “internet business models,” 
and “business framework.”  For the purpose of this dissertation the phrase, business 
model, will be utilized.   
 
Table 3.1 is an overview of the primary literature stream within the field.  This summary 
indicates the authors and their publications’ business model endowment.  The overview 
begins by identifying the core context of the work.  While the majority of literature 
focuses on e-business some authors have expanded the generalization of the business 
model realm.  The overview analyzes whether a lucid business model definition is 
proposed.  This is complemented by discussing the proposed classification of business 
models.  The majority of authors with a spotlight on e-businesses tend to propose 
                                                 
9 Business Source Complete contains a database of full-length articles from approximately 9,500 
publications within such fields as business, management, economics, finance, and many more fields. 
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business model classifications, while generalists avoid specifying typologies.  Next, it 
investigates the literature’s indication of business model components.  Researchers regard 
the field in a systematic structure (Arbnor & Bjerke, 1996), however not all present the 
building blocks comprising the system.  Component synergy is also reviewed, which 
indicates those authors that discuss the relationship among business model components.  
Finally, an overview of whether the literature stream includes a model metric is analyzed.  
These elements of the business model literature stream overview highlight the field’s 
shift since its major literary introduction in the late 1990s. 
 
Table 3.1: Business model literature contributions 
 
Author(s) Context 
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Timmer (1998) e-business ? ?    
Linder and Cantrell (2000c) general ? ? ?   
Hamel (2000) general   ? ? ? 
Amit and Zott (2001) e-business ?     
Afuah and Tucci (2001) e-business ?  ? ? ? 
Weill and Vitale (2001) e-business ? ? ?   
Margretta (2002) general ?  ?   
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002) & Chesbrough (2003) general1 ?  ?   
Hedman and Kalling (2003) general 2   ? ?  
Afuah (2004) general ?  ?   
       
1: Chesbrough (2002, 2003) discuss business models with a focus on exploitation of technological 
products 
2: Hedman and Kalling (2003) discuss business models within a ICT realm, yet it is a general 
framework 
Source: Adopted from Osterwalder (2004) 
 
Context 
Paul Timmers, then head of the European Commission in the Information Technologies 
Directorate, is regarded as producing the initial publication specifically directed towards 
business models (Timmers, 1998).  This work focuses its attention on e-business and the 
potential for creating new forms of transactions utilizing technology.  Although Amit and 
Zott (2001) and Weill and Vitale (2001) incorporate a wealth of general theories their 
analyses study e-business within a business model framework.  Their work stresses value 
creation theory in the burgeoning e-business industry rather than a transaction-oriented 
approach.  Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002) view business models as a mediating 
construct between technological value and economic value.   
 
Linder and Cantrell, from the Accenture Institute for Strategic Change, have written a 
series of publications about business models (2000a; 2000b; 2000c; 2000d; 2001).  Their 
work is general in nature, and is applicable to, and draws examples from, a wide range of 
industries.  Magretta (2002) presents a business model discussion from a broad 
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perspective, and discusses their importance and implication in a number of industries.  
Her work stresses the complementary role business models provide strategic 
development.  As the depth of the field expands over time the applicability of the 
business model template broadens, with Hedman and Kalling (2003) proposing a general 
business model grounded in strategic theory and ICT technology, and Afuah (2004) 
focusing on the complements of a firm’s resources on the chosen business model. 
 
Definition 
The business model definition has gone through various transitions, often reliant upon the 
context of the publication.  Timmers’ (1998) broad definition demonstrates the budding 
business model field.  There are three core elements proposed: architecture for product, 
service, and information flows, as well as, a description of business actor roles; a 
description of potential benefits for the actors; and an explanation of revenue streams.  
Timmers (1998) stresses that a business model is inadequate for understanding how a 
company achieves its mission, it is necessary to incorporate “marketing models” to 
complement the business model.  Weill and Vitale (2001) provide a definition inspired by 
product, information, and money flows, while incorporating the roles and relationships 
present among consumers, customers, partners, and suppliers, and identify actor value.  
While Timmers’ (1998) and Weill and Vitale’s (2001) definition’s inspiration is 
information flows, Amit and Zott (2001) focus on transaction flows.  Their definition 
describes business models as a construction designed to create value through exploitation 
of transaction content, structure, and governance. 
 
Afuah and Tucci (2001) weave application of the Internet throughout their interpretation 
of business models.  They state that any company that is present on the Internet should 
have a unique Internet business model.  It is their view that business models can be 
divided into Internet and non-Internet business models.   
 
Work by Linder and Cantrell (2000a; 2000b; 2000c; 2000d; 2001) state broadly that 
business models are a company’s core logic for creating value.  Magretta (2002) presents 
business models as a story of how a company does business, which she separates from 
the concept of strategy.  Magretta’s (2002) description dissects business models into 
system pieces that explain how the model fits together, which opposes business strategy 
by not incorporating performance or competition.   
 
Afuah (2004) defines a business model as a framework for profit, which is rooted in the 
activity set of the firm.  Firms are distinguished by the activities it performs, how it 
performs them, and when it performs them.  
 
Classification 
Various authors provide a classification of business models according to various traits.  
Timmers (1998) acknowledges that a systematic approach to business model generation 
can lead to an abundant number of models, although only a fraction are implemented in 
practice.  He identifies 11 business model classifications measured on two axes: degree of 
innovation and functional integration.  While these business model classifications are 
relevant their usefulness beyond e-business is limited due to the entwined Internet 
perspective.  
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Linder and Cantrell (2000c) offer a classification that focuses on a model’s core profit-
making activity versus its relative position on a price/value continuum.  A business model 
can focus on three activities.  The first is providing, which is a model that makes money 
through product or service transaction.  A channel role profits through services that wrap 
around an offering, such as sales techniques, buying experience, or offering advice.  The 
final activity is intermediary that brings buyers and sellers together to create markets.  
The price/value continuum is comprised of offerings ranging from high value, premium-
priced innovations to low priced, commoditized offerings.  The proposed business model 
classifications are price models, convenience models, commodity-plus models, 
experience models, channel models, intermediary models, trust models, and innovation 
models.  
 
The work by Weill and Vitale (2001) identify eight atomic business models which 
describe various ways to conduct electronic business.  These models are the content 
provider, direct to customer, full-service provider, intermediary, shared infrastructure, 
value net integrator, virtual community, and the whole-of-enterprise/government business 
model.  These models describe how a company interacts electronically with customers. 
 
Although Afuah (2004) does not propose business model classifications, he does 
emphasize that many classification contributions are rooted in revenue models.  It is 
believed this is inaccurate because two firms can have identical revenue models, however 
their business models can be completely different.  The business model is concerned with 
profit, not revenue alone.   
 
Components 
While various authors deepen the business model understanding some identify the 
various components that comprise a business model.  An analysis of this type bores a 
level deeper in the business model field.  Through a component-understanding one is 
better able to analyze and propose a framework for companies.  Linder and Cantrell 
(2000) recognize seven components of a business model, and highlight that media often 
only discuss one component while disregarding the remaining.  These components are: 
the pricing model, revenue model, channel model, commerce process model, Internet-
enabled commerce relationship, organizational form, and value proposition.   
 
Hamel’s (2000) depth of work in business models is limited compared to other authors in 
the field; however his contribution is still an integral part of the field.  He states that a 
business model is merely a business concept that has been actualized.  This work 
proposes four main model components: customer interface, core strategy, strategic 
resources, and value network.  Each business model component is connected via a link to 
complete the model synergy.  The entire model is supported by an underlying framework 
of how the model will earn profits.  This framework is presented in figure 3.4.  
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Figure 3.4: Hamel’s business model concept 
 
Source: Adopted from Hamel (2000) 
 
Afuah and Tucci (Afuah & Tucci, 2001) center their business model components on 
value creation.  The model must address a number of areas: what value should be offered, 
which customers should be offered the value, in what way should the value be 
distributed, how to provide the created value, and how to sustain benefits derived from 
the value.  The components they propose include customer value, scope, pricing, revenue 
source, connected activities, implementation, capabilities, and sustainability.  While 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002) do not explicitly provide a business model 
definition they operationalize the concept by incorporating the value offered in their 
proposed business model components, as well as, identification of the target market, 
structure of the firm’s value chain, analysis of the cost structure and profit potential, 
identification of the firm’s position in the value system, and the formulation of the 
competitive strategy.  This framework unites the technological domain and the economic 
domain, as depicted in figure 3.5. 
  
Figure 3.5: Business model as a mediator between technical and economic domains 
 
 Source: Adopted from Chesbrough (2002)) 
 
While Hedman and Kalling (2003) do not succinctly provide a business model definition 
they do propose a general business model of seven components that incorporates strategic 
theory to ground the concept.  These components are, beginning from the market level: 
customers, competitors, offering, organization and activities, resources, supply input, and 
a longitudinal component to cover the dynamics of a changing business model over time.  
Hedman and Kalling’s comprehensive business model structure is shown in figure 3.6.  
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Figure 3.6: The components of a business model 
 
 
 Source: Adopted from Hedman and Kalling (2003)) 
 
Magretta’s (2002) elementary description of business models as a story complements her 
proposed model components.  She distinguishes between two elementary parts: those 
activities associated with production and those with distribution.  
 
Afuah’s (2004) proposition of business model components consists of industry factors, 
activities, resources, positions, and costs.  The resources of a firm are the roots of the 
business model and via the activities allow a firm to deliver value to customers.   
 
Component synergy 
While some authors merely list the components that comprise a business model, others 
investigate the relations among the components.  This aspect adheres to the concept of 
the systems approach; a system is the sum of its parts and the affect of the relations 
between the parts (Arbnor & Bjerke, 1996).  It is not always the components themselves 
that create a competitive advantage but the relations among them that is often challenging 
for competitors to emulate, thereby creating a distinct competitive advantage (M. E. 
MARKET / INDUSTRY 
Customers Competition 
Offering 
Physical component Price/Cost Service component 
THE FIRM 
Scope of management 
Activities & organization 
Resources 
Human Physical Organizational 
SUPPLIERS 
Factor markets Product inputs 
Market level, e.g. 
five forces and 
capital and labor 
Resource level, 
e.g. RBV 
Activity and 
organizational 
level, e.g. value 
chain 
Offering level, e.g. 
generic strategies 
Market level, e.g. 
five forces 
Longitudinal 
dimension, e.g. 
constraints on 
actors, 
cognitive, and 
social 
limitations 
 30 
Porter, 1996).  Hamel’s (Hamel, 2000) four-component business model concept is 
interconnected with three bridges (see figure 3.4): customer benefits, configuration, and 
company boundaries.  Customer benefits links the demand interface with a firm’s 
strategy; a strategy should complement market demand and offer the benefits that are 
sought.  The configuration should bridge a firm’s strategy with its resources.  In some 
industries nearly all firms may possess nearly identical resources; however unique 
configurations can lead to business model advantages.  For example, many service 
industries are unable to patent their services or products which makes the business model 
configurations vital.  Finally, company boundaries link the upstream supply system (M. 
E. Porter, 1985) with the firm.  A business model may involve many in-house functions, 
while another may have a propensity for out-sourcing.  The underling four-step factors, 
efficiency, uniqueness, fit, and profit boosters, entail how a business model intends to 
earn a profit.  Efficiency stipulates that a business model deliver value at a cost less than 
what the market is willing to pay; there must be a positive operating margin.  A unique 
business model allows for differentiation among competitors, but it must be valued by the 
market.  Fit demands that a business models’ elements must be mutually reinforcing in a 
positive manner; customers must experience consistency throughout an interaction with a 
firm’s business model.  The final supporting factor is profit boosters, which recommend 
ways that a business model can aid in boosting profit and become a stellar performer. 
 
Afuah (2001) acknowledges the importance of the synergy among business model 
components, referring to them as linkages.  The value that is offered to customers must 
be mirrored in the components and the linkages.  Afuah uses Southwest Airlines as an 
example of a firm pursuing a low-cost strategy, and with the carrier’s low level of service 
and use of secondary airports its business model components support the value offered. 
 
Hedman and Kalling’s (2003) business model (see figure 3.6) lists five broad components 
that transgress from demand market level, through the firm, to the supply market level.  
The authors emphasize that there are causal relations among the components.  The 
business model must produce an offering, comprised of both physical and service 
components, that is valued by the demand market level, and be offered at an attractive 
price/cost ratio.  The offering can only be produced by the unique configuration of 
activities within the business model, which, in turn, is supported by the resources the firm 
has access to and possesses, which are influenced by the supply market level.  It is stated 
that the flow of change can occur in either direction and that the depth of change will 
vary.  However, it is stressed that any degree of change may have a degree of influence 
throughout entire business model.  Additional authors in the literature imply that there is 
a level of synergy among the components of a business model, yet fail to elucidate on the 
phenomenon.  Chesbrough’s (2002) mediating business model (see figure 3.5) shows the 
interaction between a technical and economic domain, yet does not delve into how the 
components of the business model interact.  Afuah (Afuah, 2004 pg. 10) depicts a 
business model and its components with two-way interaction connection, yet does not 
clarify this relationship. 
 
Model metric 
Researchers of business models have recently begun proposing model metrics to measure 
the success.  This is an important tool to determine the vitality of a model.  Hamel (2000) 
discusses the potential of a business model from four perspectives.  Initially, the model’s 
efficiency in delivering customer benefits is measured, followed by the differentiation of 
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the chosen business model.  This concept borrows from Porter’s (1980) work in 
differentiation tactics to ensure above-average profits.  Strength among linkages proposed 
by Hamel’s (2000) component synergy may be measured, and finally the metric analyzes 
the ability of the business model to exploit profit boosters to generate above-average 
profits.  Profit boosters are described as competitor lock-out, strategic economies, and 
strategic flexibility.   
 
Afuah and Tucci (2001) propose three levels of metrics that analyze profitability 
measurements, profitability predictor measurements, and business model component 
measurements.  The first two levels incorporate common financial metrics, while the 
third level poses benchmarks for each of the publication’s proposed model components.  
The first level reviews earnings and cash flows, whose superiority over competitor 
metrics indicate a competitive advantage.  The second level measures profit margins, 
revenue market share, and revenue growth.  If those measurements are better than 
competitors’ it also indicates a competitive advantage.  The final level of model metrics 
incorporates benchmark questions for each of Afuah and Tucci’s (2001) business model 
components. 
 
The previous section has introduced the reader to the business model concept and the 
contributing authors in the field.  Definition and typology uncertainty is evident, however 
the authors all stress the importance of the framework.  The following section expands 
the business model concept to include innovation.  Within a competitive market 
innovation may provide firms with a competitive advantage; as Linder and Cantrell 
(2000a) stated, business models are carved in water and are adaptive.   
 
3.2.2 Business model innovation   
Firm success is often attributed to innovation (Christensen, Anthony, & Roth, 2004; W. 
M. Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Schumpeter, 1949; D. Teece & Pisano, 2003) however, 
industry evolution is often carried on the back of technological innovation as well.  The 
typewriter, rotary phone, and cable-driven excavating equipment industries were all 
transformed due to technological innovations (Christensen et al., 2004).  However, 
industry evolution is increasingly attributed to business model innovation, for example 
Enterprise’s business model for car rental, Unilever’s transition to private labels, or 
Dell’s order and manufacturing process.  It is important to note that business model 
innovation does not imply that a new product or service is introduced, but rather a new 
way of conducting business (Markides, 2006), although innovations in technology and 
business models may coincide with each other (H. Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002; H. 
Chesbrough, 2003).  Through business model interaction with both the external 
environment and internal supporting elements (Hedman & Kalling, 2003; Osterwalder, 
2004) it is often, and sometimes inevitable, that innovation takes place.  Chesbrough 
(2002) states that occasionally new products and their value cannot be unleashed with a 
firm’s current business model and firms must expand their perspective to capitalize on 
latent value.  Innovation is justified for a number of reasons: disruptions from the 
external environment, industry reshaping by firms, or the need to break free of a 
competitive rut (Govindarajan & Gupta, 2001).  The external environment can force a 
firm to innovate its business model in order to maintain its position or capitalize on new 
opportunities, firms within an industry can innovate their business model and have such a 
dramatic impact that the entire industry imitatively follows suit, or unsuccessful firms can 
see that they will maintain their poor competitive position without innovating their 
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business model.  New entrants or non-leading firms have been successful in attacking a 
leading competitor without the aid of technological superiority but rather with business 
model superiority (Markides, 1997).  Schumpeter (1949) is often bestowed the title of 
introducing the concept of innovation to strategic management, which has since 
progressed into the mainstream literature and been applied in numerous contexts 
(Fagerberg, Mowery, & Nelson, 2005).  The definition of innovation that will be utilized 
in this framework is: 
 
 “An invention is an idea, a sketch or model for a new or improved device, 
product, process or system...An innovation in the economic sense is 
accompanied with the first commercial transaction involving the new 
product, process, system or device, although the word is used to describe 
the whole process" [emphasis added] (C. Freeman & Soete, 1997 pg. 6).   
 
This definition stresses that the terms invention and innovation are not interchangeable, 
and implies that innovation pertains to the actualization of the invention.  An invention 
may lie dormant, waiting to be implemented; a case in point is Leonardo da Vinci’s 
helicopter invention in 1493 (Popham, 1945; Ramirez, 1999), which was not realized 
until more than 400 years later.  In addition, the definition of both the invention and 
innovation may involve many aspects, not merely a technological parameter, which 
extends to include business models.   
 
Success in unseating a leading competitor is not guaranteed by merely innovating a 
firm’s business model.  Studies have shown that the leading firm in an industry is 96% 
certain of retaining that position, and the second and third-ranked firms have a 91% and 
80% chance of maintaining their ranks (Markides, 1997).  However, success stories are 
found within industries and many times it occurred because of an innovative business 
model.  Markides (2003; 1997; 1998; 2004; 2006) has numerous publications in this 
realm, initially under the heading of strategic innovation, however in 2006 he states: 
 
“One type of innovation that tends to be disruptive to established 
competitors is business-model innovation. In earlier work ((Markides, 
1997; Markides, 1998), I called this type of innovation strategic 
innovation, which is a confusing term. Business-model innovation 
captures the essence of this type of innovation without ambiguity” 
[author’s own emphasis] (Markides, 2006 pg. 19). 
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Box 2: iTunes and business 
model innovation 
 
Apple introduced iTunes in early
2003.  The computer program
allows users to legally download
music, videos, and movies.  The
program is an example of a
business model innovation that
offers customers a new way of
purchasing media and entices
them to purchase more of a
product by offering increased
flexibility.  Apple announced
that since opening iTunes more
than 4 billion songs have been
downloaded {{1415 Block,R.
2007; }}.  iTunes has since been
imitated by competing programs,
such as Buymusic.com, Best
Buy Digital Music Store, and
Wal-mart Music Downloads. 
Markides’ definition of business model innovation argues that it is necessary to enlarge 
the economic pie, which demands attracting new customers or encouraging existing 
customers to increase consumption.  A business model innovation is not solely the 
discovery of new products or services, it may be a 
mere reinvention of existing platforms; this is not 
the case in technological innovation.  
Christensen’s work on technological innovation 
and industrial change (Christensen, 1997; 
Christensen & Raynor, 2003; Christensen et al., 
2004) is easily supported in the realm of product 
innovation, however it becomes less applicable as 
it is stretched to encompass business model 
innovation.  A key tenant of Christensen’s work is 
that a new entrant and its technology eventually 
dominate a market; however business model 
innovation is not so drastic.  The scenario that 
plays itself out in numerous industries is that a 
new business model experiences explosive 
introductory growth, which eventually stagnates 
and captures a significant share of the market.  
However, it does not succeed in overtaking the 
entire market (Hamel, 2000; Markides, 2006).  
This stresses that incumbent firms still have a 
choice to either imitate and embrace the 
innovative business model or continue with their 
current model.  The innovated business model may emphasize a different set of attributes 
that appeal to a different market segment or introduce a set of new activities that increase 
efficiency, lower costs, or provide customer value.  Therefore, the innovated business 
model is able to attract an entirely new group of customers, or entice existing customers 
to purchase more of a product or service (see Box 2).  Markides (Markides, 1997 pg. 9) 
sums up the concept by stating, “The trick is not to play the game better than the 
competition but to develop and play an altogether different game.” 
 
As the business model framework crystallized, the field expanded to incorporate the 
benefits of innovative change.  These works appeared at the turn of the 21st century, 
which coincided with the burst of the Internet bubble and the subsequent economic 
recession.  The literature was reaching for an explanation to describe how emerging 
companies could upset the market leader or clarify how firms in a declining industry can 
continue to be successful, many times without a radical new technological breakthrough.  
This section reviews the major influential literary contributions to the field of business 
model innovation, presented in table 3.2.  The first publication reviewed by Constantinos 
Markides from 1997 uses the term strategic innovation, and while he is not the first to 
study this specific field, the review will show that Markides in 2006 redefines his 
literature stream and research field to business model innovation. 
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Table 3.2: Business model innovation literature contributions 
 
Author(s) Goal 
C
ha
lle
ng
es
 
Fr
am
ew
or
k 
A
pp
ro
ac
he
s 
Su
cc
es
s f
ac
to
rs
 
      
Markides (1997) Identify and capitalize on industry gaps   ?  
Markides (1998) Reconceptualization of what the business is about ?   ? 
Choi and Valikangas (2001) Innovative themes provide perspectives on strategy formulation   ?  
Mitchell and Coles (2003; 2004; 
2004; 2003) 
Business model innovation is key to 
rapid success ? ?  ? 
Markides and Charitou (2004) Implementing two business models in a single firm ? ?   
Voelpel et al. (2004) Creation of disruptive competitive advantages ?  ? ? 
Markides (2006) 
Enlarge the economic pie through new 
customer attraction or increasing 
consumption 
?    
      
Source: Author’s own creation      
 
A review of business model innovation literature includes a presentation of the attempted 
innovation goal.  As the table highlights there is currently disparity within this young 
field of research.  The review analyzes whether the publications address business model 
innovation challenges, if an innovation framework and approach are presented, and 
whether success factors are highlighted.   
 
Markides (1997) initially introduced the term “strategic innovation” to describe how new 
entrants in industries successfully upset the dominant leader, or rather, how successful 
challengers successfully enter a new market by breaking industry norms.  He defines 
successful strategic innovation as when a firm identifies industrial gaps, fills them, and in 
turn, the gaps grow to become new markets.  Gaps are described as new customer 
segments, new customer needs, or new activities enabling improved customer products or 
services.  Strategic innovation has five distinct starting approaches:  
 
1. Redefine the business 
2. Redefine the customer segment 
3. Redefine the offering 
4. Redefine the activity base 
5. Review the firm’s industry at different points.   
 
These approaches can be applied selectively or in combination with one another, however 
they all require that a firm asks demanding questions of their business.  In Markides’ 
1998 publication he addresses the challenges that strategic innovators face.  He identifies 
that industry outsiders are more likely to be viewed as strategic innovators as established 
firms already have a position in their industry.  Established firms face four key 
innovating challenges:  
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1. Inertia of success 
2. Questions of what to become  
3. Uncertainty of new positions 
4. Implementation 
 
Inertia can be overcome when firms create “positive crises” and question their business, 
rather than waiting for a crisis to appear before initiating strategic exploration.  
Uncertainty in knowing what to transform into plagues strategic innovators, which can be 
addressed by challenging the accepted strategic planning process and institutionalizing an 
inquisitive attitude.  If a firm is able to imagine a strategic innovation, the question 
remains whether it will be a successful transition.  The dilemma that exists is that firms 
must be willing to initially trade efficiency for experimentation in order to determine 
which competencies need to be reinforced.  The remaining challenge for a firm is how to 
implement a strategic innovation.  Cannibalization is a threat and therefore 
implementation requires managerial and institutional support to facilitate success.  In a 
2004 publication by Markides and Charitou they discuss how firms can implement and 
manage a strategic innovation alongside the core strategy.  This article is the first where 
Markides and Charitou incorporate the concept of business models (2004), and they take 
issue with Porter’s notion that firms are unable to effectively compete with more than one 
strategic focus (M. E. Porter, 1985).  In Markides’ 2006 article he proposes that the 
theory of disruptive innovation (Christensen, 1997; Christensen & Raynor, 2003) requires 
clarification to continue its usefulness in practice.  Markides proposes that disruptive 
innovation should be viewed either through business model innovation or product 
innovation, and not congealed with Christensen’s work on technological innovation.  
Markides also clarifies his earlier work on strategic innovation by rebranding this term 
business model innovation to more accurately reflect its meaning.  He defines a business 
model innovation as an enlargement of the economic “pie,” which is achieved by 
attracting new customers or encouraging increased consumption, and continues to explain 
that innovators do not discover new products or services, they merely redefine what a 
product or service is and how it is distributed.  The challenge for incumbent firms is that 
innovative business models attract different customers and have conflicting activity sets 
that are initially not viewed as threats, which shares many similarities with Christensens’ 
work (Christensen, 1997; Christensen & Raynor, 2003).  However, contrary to the work 
on technological innovation by Christensen, Markides (2006) highlights that business 
model innovations do not overtake the incumbent business model, they coexist together 
in industry.   
 
Choi and Valikangas (Choi & Valikangas, 2001) analyze the strategy of more than 200 
firms in an attempt to distinguish innovation patterns.  The authors indirectly imply that 
there is a clear separation between a firm’s strategy and business model, as they state, 
“We examined nearly 200 strategies that departed from industry norms over the last two 
decades…We were primarily interested in innovations at the business model level” (pg. 
242).  Their analysis produces ten innovation themes:  
 
1. Convergence 
2. Experience 
3. Immediacy 
4. Mass-customization 
5. Universalization 
6. Providing solutions 
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7. De-verticalization 
8. Consolidation 
9. Disintermediation 
10. Going virtual 
 
These themes occur in three major patterns: reverberation across industries, strategic 
trajectory, and repetitive innovations.  The authors argue that innovation themes are 
found across numerous industries, suggesting their staying power.  In addition, they state 
that strategic trajectory suggests that these themes shift over a naturally progressing 
cycle, and finally that innovation themes are seldom entirely new, but can be traced back 
as far as the industrial revolution.  The authors propose that these themes can be used to 
devise an innovative business strategy by looking to other industries for success stories 
and imitating their business model or expanding an innovation theme beyond its currently 
accepted boundaries.  The article highlights examples from firms that have successfully 
implemented innovative themes.   
 
Donald Mitchell and Carol Coles (2003; 2004; 2004; 2003) have researched the success 
of the top US public firms in terms of stock price growth, and attribute this 
accomplishment to business model innovation.  This type of innovation is defined as 
business model replacements that provide new product or service offerings to customers 
(D. Mitchell & Coles, 2003; D. Mitchell & Coles, 2003).  Firm success is rooted in this 
type of innovation because continuous change forces competitors to either react to a 
firm’s innovative behavior or ignore it; however the required resources to respond to 
innovation are a hindrance.  As one CEO stressed, “Technological innovation gives a 
company a six-to-12 month advantage at most.  A business model advantage can last 
years, potentially yielding a dominant franchise” (D. Mitchell & Coles, 2003 pg. 19).  
The framework for applying business model innovation consists of a thorough 
understanding of a firm’s current business model, a clear innovation vision, and 
continuous design and installation of recurring innovations (D. W. Mitchell & Bruckner 
Coles, 2004).  The authors stress that business model innovation is not a single-stop 
process to be utilized during less successful periods, but rather a continuous, never-
ending process that builds upon previous experience.  Successful business model 
innovation is dependent upon top management’s interest and expectation of business 
model innovation, specialization in a firm’s core competencies, business model flexibility 
and scalability, and finally internal processes must facilitate and accommodate business 
model innovation.  Management’s embracement of innovation fosters firm-wide interest 
in the phenomenon, while firm specialization ensures true business model innovation 
rather than superficial, sustaining business model adjustments (Christensen et al., 2004).  
Nurturing of top management who are steeped in a firm’s current business model may be 
reluctant to implement a new, innovative business model for fear of catalyzing 
uncertainty (D. W. Mitchell & Coles, 2004).  Flexibility allows a firm to react in a timely 
manner to innovative tests, while scalability allows it to ensure implementation 
throughout the organization.  These factors are all facilitated by a firm’s internal 
processes to ensure that business model innovation permeate within all corners of a firm.  
The main challenge to innovation is micro-level optimization which fails to account for 
the relationship among a firm’s organizational system model (Arbnor & Bjerke, 1996).  
A micro-level innovation often leads to conflict within the organization, which a firm can 
avoid by lifting the innovative perspective.  Many firms focus on innovative optimization 
in a select few, key areas which do not allow a firm to implement a true business model 
innovation.   
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Voelpel et. al (2004) analyze business model innovation in relation to its creation of 
competitive advantage, which, as the authors argue, is necessary in today’s landscape of 
continuous and complex change.  Changes in the business environment necessitate that 
firms must continuously adjust their business models to compete effectively.  Incumbents 
face challenges in the face of business model innovation, entrenched routines, 
commitment to the existing business model, and reluctance at deconstructing the current 
business model.  Firms must be willing to cannibalize their current business models to 
transition to the next competitive stage.  The approaches firms can apply for innovating 
their business model include an extension of value chain management or expansion of 
customer value.  Underlying these approaches is firm commitment to business model 
innovation.  The authors highlight that firms are unable to effectively create and 
implement business model innovations without a supportive network.  Success factors of 
business model innovation rely upon four dimensions within environmental change: 
customer sensing, technological sensing, business infrastructure sensing, and economic 
sensing.  These sensing factors are synergetic and complement each other during 
innovate sensing.   
 
While the previous sections have introduced the reader to the business model concept and 
the role of innovation, the conflict between business model and strategy has yet to be 
addressed.  While many authors in the field see a clear distinction, others are less 
convinced.  This dilemma is addressed in the following section.   
 
3.2.3 Strategic conflict 
A raging debate which will not subdue in the near future is the strategy versus business 
model dilemma.  As Magretta (Magretta, 2002 pg. 92) describes the two terms not much 
is left to the imagination, “Today, ‘business model’ and ‘strategy’ are among the most 
sloppily used terms in business; they are often stretched to mean everything – and end up 
meaning nothing.”  Michael Porter shows no support for the concept of business models 
and stresses that a firm’s business model is no guarantee for creating economic value (M. 
E. Porter, 2001).  He states that a firm’s strategy is still the cause for success and that the 
business model framework should be excluded from business literature, it is part of the 
Internet’s destructive lexicon (M. E. Porter, 2001).  Strategy as a study subject is 
enormous and there are many schools of thought.  These include balancing internal 
strengths and weaknesses with external opportunities and threats (SWOT), company 
positioning within its industry (M. E. Porter, 1985), balancing the resources within the 
firm (Wernerfelt, 1984), or defining a set of goals and objectives (Drucker, 1995). 
 
However, many authors (Choi & Valikangas, 2001; Magretta, 2002), this one included, 
are strong supporters of a distinction between strategy and business models.  While 
strategy concerns itself with a firm’s competitive positioning, a business model outlines a 
firm’s value proposition and the activity system that is used to create and deliver value to 
customers (Seddon et al., 2004).  In other words, business models are abstractions of 
strategy and more inward-looking, while strategy is more outward-looking.  Figure 3.7 
depicts the relationship between the two concepts. 
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Figure 3.7: Relationship between strategy and business model 
 
Source: Adopted from Seddon (2004). 
 
Porter’s influence on strategy development has shifted over time from a macro 
perspective10 to a firm-specific micro perspective11.  Porter’s initial strategy work 
spawned the field of organizational economics and the development of numerous schools 
of thought (Hoskisson et al., 1999), including the resource-based view, which directs its 
attention internally in a firm.  This perspective transition may help to shed light on 
Porter’s distrust of the business model concept; however his interpretation of strategy 
continues to argue that it involves defining a long-term position in an industry, and 
making trade-offs about what activities a firm will and will not do to establish a 
competitive position.  It is this long-term perspective and trade-offs that are the role of 
strategy, while business models are short-term reflections of a firm’s business, or rather, 
abstractions of strategy.  Strategy is about making choices while business models are 
reflections of those choices and their operating facets (Shafer, Smith, & Linder, 2005).  
All firms will eventually encounter competition and dealing with this factor is the role of 
strategy, as business models omit one vital element of performance: competitive 
positioning (Magretta, 2002; Seddon et al., 2004).   
 
Business model role 
It has now been made clear the distinction between strategy and business model, however 
this section will crystallize the actual role that business models play in a firm.  A business 
model allows one to conceptualize how a firm operates, serves its customers, and earns a 
profit.  It is the link between a firm’s strategy, organizational structure, and information 
and communication technology (ICT) solution (Osterwalder, 2004).  As discussed 
                                                 
10 Five-forces model 
11 Value chain and more recently the activity system (McGahan, 2004b; M. E. Porter, 1996) 
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previously, a business model is the operationalization of a firm’s strategy, while business 
models are often supported by ICT solutions, although this is not a requirement.  These 
are three common windows that are used to peer into and analyze a firm.  However, if 
these viewpoints are the windows, then the business model is akin to lifting the roof off 
of a house and peering inside.  The business model allows all three facets to be combined.  
Figure 3.8 is a representation of the interaction of these three elements.   
 
Figure 3.8: Role of business model in a firm 
 
Source: Adopted from Osterwalder (2004) 
 
Strategy, its role, and differences from the business model were highlighted earlier.  What 
follows is a description of how the firm’s organizational structure and ICT solution 
support the business model.  The firm organization differentiates itself from the business 
model in that it describes how a firm organizes itself to facilitate implementation and 
running of the business model.  It is the departments, work flows, and processes that 
comprise the firm organization.  Changes in a firm’s business model are actualized in 
adjustments to a firm’s organization.  This is necessary to ensure efficient information 
and work flows throughout the firm.   
 
The final window into the firm is the ICT solution.  This encompasses all electronic 
communication and technological solutions that the firm utilizes to facilitate and 
implement a firm’s strategy, organization, and business model, such as distribution 
systems, customer relationship management software, websites, intranets, extranets, 
mobile services, etc.  ICT has become such an integrated element in business today that it 
is not possible to remove this element when studying a firm’s business model (Hedman & 
Kalling, 2003).  In addition, ICT has been a primary driver in the founding of numerous 
firms and enabling new and innovative business model prosperity.  Although ICT has 
been instrumental in web-based firms it has also allowed traditional firms to expand 
beyond their traditional realm.  It facilitates customer contact, improves supplier 
integration, opens new distribution channels, and expands traditional firm networks.  It is 
important that firms explore new ICT solutions to improve or change their existing 
business models when appropriate, or question how a business model change will impact 
the existing ICT infrastructure. 
 
The business model concept has been introduced and the literature in the field reviewed.  
Adaptations to the business model have been discussed in the realm of business model 
innovation, and the important distinction between strategy and business model was 
presented.  This tool allows the reader to deconstruct a firm and analyze its business 
Business 
model 
Business 
Strategy 
Business 
Organization 
ICT 
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model, however to improve industrial understanding a categorization tool is necessary.  
Firm heterogeneity implies that industrial analysis is best served with a method of 
creating groups, which is presented in the following section. 
 
3.3 Strategic groups 
Categorization and order appear to be a natural, human phenomenon.  It allows for 
improved understanding and enables one to make generalizations.  This phenomenon is 
apparent in the strategic management field with the strategic group framework. 
 
The strategic group concept dates back to 1972 when Michael Hunt attempted to explain 
the performance of the white goods industry (comprised of major household appliances, 
such as dishwashers, dryers, refrigerators, etc.) of the 1960s in his doctoral dissertation 
(Hunt, 1972).  Hunt (1972) observed that the white goods industry was increasing in 
concentration, yet firm performance was declining, contrary to current economic 
thinking.  His explanation proposed that there are three types of asymmetry between 
firms: extent of vertical integration, degree of product diversification, and differences in 
product differentiation.  These asymmetric aspects helped to spawn four distinct strategic 
groups within the industry; the rationale being that strategic groups minimized 
asymmetry within the group, essentially creating defensive barriers against new entrants.  
Hunt’s (1972) study generated a new field of study within strategic management, the 
strategic group.  Table 3.3 is an overview of this literature stream.   
 
Table 3.3: Strategic group literature contributions 
 
Author(s) Industry Strategic group basis 
   
Hunt  (1972) White goods • Vertical integration 
• Product diversification 
• Product differentiation 
Newmann (1973) 34 producer goods 
industries: chemical 
processes 
• Vertical integration 
Porter (1973) 38 consumer goods 
industries 
• Relative size of firm: 
leader/follower classification 
Hatten (1974) Brewing industry • Manufacturing variables: 
number, age, capital intensity 
• Marketing variables: 
number of brands, price, sales 
• Structural variables: 
firm concentration ratio, firm 
size 
Oster (1982) 19 consumer goods 
industries 
• Product strategy: 
advertising/sales ratio 
Frazier and Howell (1983) Medical supply and 
equipment 
• Customer groups served 
• Customer needs served 
Dess  et al. (1984) Paints and allied 
products 
• 21 marketing variables 
Hawes and Crittenden (1984) Supermarkets • Marketing strategy: 
target market, product, 
promotion, price, buying, 
display 
Cool and Schendel (1987) Pharmaceutical 
industry 
• Scope: 
market segment breadth, 
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product types, generic drug 
commitment, geographic 
scope 
• Resources: 
research commitment, 
marketing commitment, 
promotion strategy, size 
Mascarenhas  (1989) Offshore drilling • Product-line diversity 
• Technical capability 
• Global spread 
• Vertical integration 
• Marketing orientation 
Kling and Smith (1995) Airline industry • 19 consumer variables: 
Airline quality rating (AQR) 
Athanassopoulos (2003) Grocery industry • Firm size 
• Geographic concentration 
• Resource deployment 
• Benchmarking & target 
contribution 
Cappel et al. (2003) Airline industry • Porter’s generic strategies 
Zúñiga-Vicente et al. (2004) Banking industry • 7 strategic variables 
categorized according to: 
assets, liabilities, and 
asset/liability  
   
Source: Adopted from McGee (1986) 
 
While Hunt (1972) grouped firms according to asymmetry of operations within the same 
industry, Newman’s (1973) doctoral dissertation based strategic group formation on the 
extent of vertical integration.  Newman accepted Hunt’s asymmetric group formation; 
however he also proposed that groups can be identified by their relationship with member 
firms outside of the core industry.  He proposed that firms sharing similar businesses can 
be similarly grouped, while firms that operate in the industry but their principal business 
is in a different industry form a different group.  Newman did state that his interpretation 
of strategic groups does not address other operational factors that can theoretically and 
empirically distinguish strategic groups (Newmann, 1978).  Michael Porter built upon the 
concept in his 1973 doctoral dissertation and created a distinction between industry 
leaders and followers (M. E. Porter, 1973).  Porter based his argument on firm size, 
stating that firms comprising the leading group achieve economies of scale, including 
broad product lines and distribution capabilities.  Firms within the follower group will 
exhibit specialist or regional strategies.   
 
Hatten (1974) explored the rigors of creating intra-group homogeneity and group 
variation in his doctoral dissertation, and argued that the contributions of earlier work 
was too elevated at the group-level and he proposed focusing on the firm-level.  Previous 
contributions assumed industry homogeneity but they had failed to investigate firm-to-
firm homogeneity.  His work built upon case studies in the brewing industry and he 
created an eight-variable model focused on manufacturing and marketing.  Hatten 
concluded that strategic groups could potentially assist management in evaluating 
strategic proposals and investigate competitive positions.  Hatten’s critics pointed out that 
his chosen industry was undiversified, single-business units and therefore his study was 
of business strategy rather than corporate strategy.   
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Oster (1982) chose to focus on one firm element, product strategy, as the formation of 
strategic groups.  Product strategy was empirically measured by incorporating advertising 
and sales ratios, and firms were relegated to specific strategic groups depending on a 
firm’s ratios compared to industry averages.  Oster (1982) incorporated longitudinal 
change by analyzing the stability of groups over time.  The analysis concludes that 
although the formation of strategic groups is judgmental, they do expand industrial 
understanding.  Howell and Frazier (1980) apply the concept of strategic groups to the 
hospital supply industry, and incorporate the degree of scope and differentiation on 
customer groups and needs dimensions in order to create strategic groups based on 
customer needs. 
 
Dess and Davis (1984) expand the field of strategic group studies by incorporating a great 
deal of qualitative tools in their research of the paint industry.  Former studies focused on 
strategic outcomes, or ‘strategy as realizations,’ however their study focused on ‘strategy 
as intentions.’  Their variable creation relied upon industry experts to identify appropriate 
dimensions, which can then be used in a multivariate analysis to identify strategic groups.  
Hawes and Crittenden (1984) also rely upon marketing strategy variables in their retailing 
industry study.  Their research created four strategic groups within the industry and they 
uncovered a partial correlation between strategic group membership and successful firm 
performance.   
 
Cool and Schendel (1987) apply the strategic group concept to a longitudinal study of the 
US pharmaceutical industry, and attempt to determine group membership on firm 
performance and risk levels.  They hesitantly note that they identified an industry cycle of 
experimentation, imitation, followed by new experimentation, while also noting the 
challenges of group shifts.  Changes in group strategy are attributed to both exogenous 
shifts and endogenous initiatives.  
 
A dynamic, rather than static, study of strategic groups was conducted by Mascarenhas 
(1989).  He proposes that strategic change by a firm can result in a change in group 
strategy, group membership, or number of groups, based on the reaction by other group 
members’ reaction to an initial strategic change.  Results indicate that in declining 
economic periods firm mobility increases, especially among similar groups.  The study 
concludes that strategic groups are not solely dependent upon environment and industry 
structure but also competitor response.   
 
Strategic groups within the airline industry are analyzed by Kling and Smith (1995).  
They analyze customer quality ratings with firm costs and create strategic groups with the 
generic strategies proposed by Porter (1980).  This analysis does recognize the impact of 
firm size and they propose that the industry is characterized by limited barriers to entry. 
 
Athanassopoulos (2003) applies strategic group analysis to the UK retail grocery industry 
and uses four variables to compose strategic groups.  He identified four distinct groups 
among the study group and demonstrates that performance variation within groups is 
apparent, as well as, smaller performance variation between groups.  This longitudinal 
study attempts to identify reasons for variation over time, including macro-economic 
forces. 
 
Cappel et. al (2003) propose a strategic grouping of the US airline industry utilizing 
Porter’s generic strategies.  Past research in the field has indicated that successful firm 
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performance in the US industry adopted a combination of low-cost and differentiation, 
while in the EU a low-cost approach was more successful.  Their work proposes a 
research agenda for extending the analysis of Porter’s generic strategies, which they 
maintain are important to research in service industries expanding in globalized business 
environments.   
 
The field of strategic grouping has been expanded with Zúniga-Vincente et. al’s (2004) 
study of strategic behavior among Spanish banks.  This study analyzes how strategic 
groups adapt their competitive strategy to changing environmental conditions, as well as, 
applying a more robust quantitative grouping method.  The results indicate that 
environmental disturbances have important implications for group patterns and stability, 
and that strategic instability occurs during major environmental disturbances.  Group 
transition indicates that firms carry out incremental rather than radical strategic change, 
and that the industry is free of mobility barriers.  
 
The theory of strategic groups has progressed from the early 1970s through the previous 
four decades.  Past literary contributions have shown that the theory of strategic groups 
enables industrial simplification and attempts to answer how firms strategically respond 
to inter- and intra-environmental factors.  Numerous authors indicate the need for 
application of the strategic group theory to industries in order to facilitate managements’ 
strategic choices (McGee & Thomas, 1986). 
 
3.3.1 Mobility barriers, collusion, and rivalry 
Initial strategic group research proposed that firms within a group are more likely to erect 
mobility barriers surrounding the group as a result of collusion (R. E. Caves & Porter, 
1977).  Mobility barriers are described as barriers to both entry and exit, due to market or 
supply conditions, operations, firm characteristics, social processes, or financial resources 
(McGee & Thomas, 1986; M. Peteraf & Shanley, 1997).  High mobility barriers imply 
that the costs to change group membership outweigh the expected profitability, and vice 
versa.  Hatten and Hatten (1987) distance themselves from the belief that mobility 
barriers are at the heart of strategic group theory, rather they state simply, that to change 
strategies involves costs and the more dissimilar a firm’s strategy from another’s the 
higher the imitation cost.  Grouped firms have low costs associated with emulating their 
peers, while barriers between firms in different groups may be either high or low; 
research language commonly suggests that barriers are inherently high around all groups, 
which is not necessarily true (Hatten & Hatten, 1987).  Mobility barriers may also be 
asymmetric.  For example, a large firm may imitate a niche firm at low cost, while a 
smaller firm may experience high costs to imitate a larger firm; or, a high-cost firm may 
resist cost-saving and efficiency measures, while an efficiency operator may find it easier 
to add complexity to a business model.  Entry costs into a group, a mobility barrier, may 
be low, while exit costs may be high.  Porter (1979) wrote of this, “…the importance of 
entry barriers, then, depends on the particular strategy adopted by the firm.”  High 
mobility barriers do not always imply a firm advantage, rather they can become traps, 
even for industry leaders (Hatten & Hatten, 1987).  For example, an industry’s leading 
manufacturing assembler, a high mobility barrier against traditional competitors, can 
become a weakness, or exit barrier, in the face of a low-cost manufacturing assembler.  
An industry undergoes many structural changes over time and groupings must also 
change.  A great deal of strategic group research is either cross-sectional or a limited 
time-series study, which does not always capture industry and strategic change.  Long-
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term time-series studies (Hatten & Schendel, 1977; McLean & Haigh, 1954; Oster, 1982) 
shows that strategic change does occur, but over long periods and Oster (1982) referred 
to strategic change as “sticky.”   
 
3.3.2 Group populations 
Strategic groups can be populated with three types of firms: core firms, secondary firms, 
and solitary firms (K. O. Cool & Schendel, 1987; McNamara, Deephouse, & Luce, 2003; 
Reger & Huff, 1993).  A core firm follows the group strategy closely and is tightly 
aligned strategically, while a secondary firm follows a group strategy less closely.  Some 
authors describe core firms as pure firms and secondary firms as hybrid firms12 (Stewart 
Thornhill, 2007).  The range found between the primary and secondary firms is referred 
to as the “range of acceptability” (Deephouse, 1999).  Group membership, whether as a 
primary or secondary firm, sends a legitimacy signal to the market, which aids in 
acquiring resources (Deephouse, 1999), and is crucial for firm survival in fast-paced, 
highly-uncertain industries (Barreto & Baden-Fuller, 2006; Deephouse, 1996).  A solitary 
firm is identified as a single-firm group, which is not strategically aligned with the 
industries main groupings.  Reger and Huff (1993) label non group-member firms as 
misfits or idiosyncratic, whose strategies are either inconsistent or not easily expressed in 
terms used to explain most other firms in an industry.  However, such placement on a 
strategic map raises legitimacy challenges (Hirsch & Andrews, 1986) which question a 
firm’s actions.  Strategic definition of groups can be measured in a variety of ways, for 
example product line, investments, research and development costs, etc.  Managerial 
cognitive grouping is also an option, which analyses industry managers’ perception of 
strategic groups (Porac, Thomas, & Baden-Fuller, 1989).  Barreto and Baden-Fuller 
(Barreto & Baden-Fuller, 2006) present legitimacy-based groups, which place firms in 
communities based on perceptions of actors’ in positions of authority.  It is argued that is 
a better litmus test of modeling managerial decision-making.  
 
Initial research postulated that external conditions acting upon an industry’s groups will 
lead to similar firm performance within a group and varying performance among the 
remaining groups (R. E. Caves & Porter, 1977; K. O. Cool & Schendel, 1987).  Collusion 
among firm peers within a group leads to competitive isolation and erection of mobility 
barriers, which should lead to similar firm performance.  Past, and more recent research, 
has shown that there are indeed performance variations among strategic groups 
(Ferguson, Deephouse, & Ferguson, 2000; Ketchen et al., 1997).  Research focus, 
however, has recently shifted away from analyzing performance variation between 
groups to analyzing firm performance variations within groups (K. Cool & Schendel, 
1988; McNamara et al., 2003).  Results have shown that firm performance among firms 
within the same strategic group does vary, which is in contrast to earlier beliefs, and 
coincided with the emergence of the resource-based view (J. B. Barney, 1996; M. A. 
Peteraf, 1993).  The assumption of collusion is a vital element in performance variations 
among strategic groups, however its existence is under question (McNamara et al., 2003).  
This assumption builds on George Stigler’s (1964) remark that industry conditions 
influence the level of collusion.  Enforcement, number of firms, and bargaining power of 
buyers affect industry collusion, and there is growing support that similar firms are more 
rivals than colluders.  The ability to collude among firms is challenged due to 
                                                 
12 The author uses these terms interchangeably, although Thornhill and White’s (2007) publication is built 
on Porter’s generic strategies (M. E. Porter, 1985) rather than strategic groups (M. E. Porter, 1973). 
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coordination difficulties and variations in costs and benefits to industry firms (McNamara 
et al., 2003).  Research by both Cool and Dierickx (1993) and Fiegenbaum and Thomas 
(1995) failed to identify mobility barriers in their research, suggesting the lack of 
collusion.  Application of cognitive theories to strategic group research also question 
collusion among intra-group firms (K. Cool & Dierickx, 1993; Porac et al., 1989; Porac, 
Thomas, Wilson, Paton, & Kanfer, 1995).  Porac et al. (1989) states that intra-group firms 
compare themselves to their group peers and decision-makers attempt to distinguish 
themselves from their peers (McNamara et al., 2003).  Intra-group firms focus on their 
own competitive position within their group and are more reactive to their peers’ actions 
than that of members of other groups.  McNamara et al. (2003) determine from past 
research that intra-group rivalry rather than collusion is more prevalent, which reduces 
the heights of mobility barriers.   
 
3.3.3 Intra-group positioning 
The research community has conducted limited research on the role of firm positioning 
within a strategic group and its affect on performance.  The affect of choosing a position 
as a core or secondary firm within a group and its performance implications is not well 
known.  Secondary firms may deviate from a group’s core strategy as a result of core 
strategic implementation challenges; however the same firms may be attempting a 
differentiation strategy relative to core firms in an attempt to improve performance.  
Cognitive recognition and strong identification with a strategic group may lead to 
improved effectiveness, however core firms may also be more resistant to change and 
have limited industrial views.  There are two opposing theoretical propositions, oligopoly 
and resource based view, related to positioning and performance (McNamara et al., 
2003).   
 
Oligopoly theory suggests that core firms will outperform secondary firms.  This belief is 
rooted in firm legitimacy and resource access (McNamara et al., 2003).  Partners are 
more willing to interact with firms whose strategies are easily understood and perceived 
as rational, which may lead to improved terms.  Better exchange terms will enhance the 
likelihood of exchange and thus potentially improve the legitimacy of partners as well.  
Partners may punish less legitimate firms because of a perceived increase in risk.  
Thornhill and White (2007) research the impact of strategic purity at an industry, rather 
than strategic group level.  Results show that there is a relationship between firm position 
within a strategy continuum, however it is industry specific.  The authors state that it is 
not possible to make broad, cross-industry generalizations about strategic position and 
performance by analyzing a single industry. 
 
The resource-based view contrasts the oligopoly theory by suggesting that secondary 
firms should outperform core firms.  This belief is rooted in application of contestable 
markets theory13 (Baumol et al., 1982; Baumol, 2001) and the notion that similar firms 
face high competition and a high level of rivalry.  Secondary firms are more likely to 
create unique resources and local monopolies which lead to increased performance (J. B. 
Barney, 1996; J. Barney, 1991; M. A. Peteraf, 1993).  Porac et al. (1989) state that 
successful firms are able to balance pressures to conform with differentiation desires, 
                                                 
13 Contestable markets theory, developed by William Baumol (Baumol, Panzar, & Willig, 1982)), analyzes 
the competitiveness of markets and barriers to entry and exit.  A perfect market is considered a perfectly 
contestable market. 
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which is referred to as existing on the competitive cusp.  Firms must balance the trade-
offs of increased legitimacy and rivalry with decreased legitimacy and less competition 
(Deephouse, 1999).  Solitary firms may face little competition but surrender strategic 
legitimacy, while core firms submit to increased competition in exchange for the benefits 
of increased legitimacy.  Secondary firms strive to balance these two opposing forces. 
 
The previous section touched upon the concepts of business models and its distinction 
from strategy, and the categorization tool of strategic groups.  Strategy is related to 
broad-encompassing, firm positioning within an industry, while the business model is the 
conceptualization of a firm’s strategy.  In other words, strategy is the long-term goal of a 
firm, where as the business model is the short-term actualization of a strategy.  Firms 
may have similar strategies, yet uniquely different business models.  Strategic groups, on 
the other hand, allow for increased understanding of an industry through categorization of 
firms.  An in-depth understanding of business models allows one to categorize firms into 
strategic groups, which aids in further analysis.  Without the strategic group analytical 
tool the research may fail to recognize the detailed composition of the airline industry; 
one may see the airline industry as merely composed of similar airlines, while with the 
strategic group framework one recognizes three distinct groups of airlines, while the 
business model framework enables one to further classify airlines within these distinct 
groups.  While the previous section introduced the notion of strategic groups, which aids 
in industry comprehension, and business model innovation was described to explain 
heterogeneity and firm capitalization and creative solutions, industry homogeneity may 
also be evident and attributed to mimetic behavior.  Such firm traits are present in a 
number of industries and the concepts are introduced and explained in the following 
section.   
 
3.4 Imitation 
From afar an industry’s firms may appear strategically scattered, however as one 
examines the field more closely one cannot help but notice striking similarities among 
them, as DiMaggio and Powell (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983 pg. 148) asked, “Why is there 
such startling homogeneity of organizational practices?”  In reality, a strategic balance 
must be struck between differentiation and similarity.  Differentiation may reduce 
competition, while imitation may increase legitimacy (Deephouse, 1999); Porac et al. 
(1989) referred to this as the competitive cusp.  This is defined as the balancing act 
between a firm’s desire to conform and differentiate.  Imitation among firms is a common 
behavior seen in business.  Replication can be found in areas such as product 
development, process implementation, managerial methods, or market entry.  Mitchell 
and Coles (2003 pg. 16) refer to the, “…matching [of] the competitor’s offerings is a 
business model catch-up.”  Such imitation can take place for a number of reasons.  Firms 
may regard a competitor’s behavior as evidence of possessing better knowledge or 
understanding of the market, or firms may fear their competitor is widening the 
competitive gap.  Imitative behavior is a firm’s response to these doubts.  The results 
from such behavior can have the effect of increasing rivalry between firms, or promote 
collusion.  In the scope of this research it will be investigated whether business model 
imitation is apparent in the airline industry, and if so, what will be the effect of such 
behavior.  It is not possible to discern the underlying justification for imitative behavior 
among airlines, however.   
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Research often polarizes the concepts of innovation and imitation, and although 
antagonistically opposed they are related none the less.  A firm’s change in a process, 
technology, or system is often labeled as either an innovation or imitation, however 
classification is rarely so simple.  It raises the question: if a firm imitates a competitor’s 
product, yet adapts it to conform to its organizational resources, strategy, and market 
position, is it imitation or innovation?  Sevón (1996) stresses that firms often imitate only 
certain features of competitors, and that they modify these to meet their own conditions, 
which may be regarded as imitation by outside observers and innovation by those inside 
the firm.  Sevón (1996) demonstrates this phenomenon by referring to Westney (1987) 
who researched the imitative behavior of Japanese society during 1868 – 1912, and the 
innovative adaptations that took place.  This interpretation of imitation complements the 
definition of innovation, “…any idea, practice or material artifact perceived to be new 
by the relevant unit of adoption” [author’s own emphasis] (Zaltman, Duncan, & Holbek, 
1973 pg. 158).  This states that the firm that imitates a competitor yet adapts its imitation 
to conform to the adopting organization and perceives it to be new may regard the 
imitation as an innovation.   
 
Research of imitative behavior among firms is often fragmented and often takes place in 
specific communities.  Theoretical research dominates the field, while results grounded in 
empirical studies of rival imitation are few (Kennedy, 2002).  This is a reflection of the 
underlying theories used to study imitation, such as economic, institutional sociology, or 
population ecology.  However, Lieberman and Asaba (2006) attempt to assemble the 
field’s knowledge and provide two broad theoretical categories to explain the cause of 
firms’ imitative behavior: information-based or rivalry-based (Lieberman & Asaba, 
2006).  Information-based theories describe firms that mimic competitors that are 
perceived to possess superior information, while rivalry-based theories explain how firms 
imitate competitors to limit or maintain rivalry.  These two theoretical perspectives are 
not exclusive and can take place simultaneously.   
 
3.4.1 Information-based theories 
Knowledge generation and understanding within firms is not equal and in uncertain 
environments the relationship between action and outcome is blurred.  Information, 
whether gathered internally or externally, can be influential to managers in their decision 
process in such environments.  Information-based theories explain this type of 
phenomena. 
 
Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et. al (1992, 1998) introduce the concept of 
“information cascades,” which occur, “…when it is optimal for an individual, having 
observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding 
individual without regard to his own information” (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006 pg. 368).  
A firm may behave based purely on internal knowledge, however the behavior reveals 
that information to the market.  Competitors may elect to behave in a similar fashion, 
ignoring their own internal knowledge, thus perpetuating the initial behavior.  However, 
information cascades are easily broken and can be reversed if the contradicting signals 
emerge in the market, which can partially explain the growth of the “Internet-bubble” and 
its eventual collapse.  In the market some firms’ actions are more convincing than others’ 
and are regarded as “fashion leaders” (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1998).  
Historically successful firms are often mimicked as they are perceived to have better 
knowledge than less successful firms.  As firms change, organizational theory attempts to 
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explain mimetic behavior with firm organization, or institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983), a concept rooted in organizational sociology and ecology.  
Isomorphism is the process of one unit in a population mimicing other units that face 
identical environmental conditions (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006).  Firms imitate the 
organization of more successful firms when the environment is uncertain (Deephouse, 
1999; Haveman, 1993a).  Such organizational imitation may eventually become 
institutionalized in the market and other firms will adopt the behavior without 
questioning (Deephouse, 1999; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; March, 1981).  Empirical 
studies have shown that the likelihood that a firm is imitated is based on its size and 
profitability (Haunschild & Miner, 1997; Haveman, 1993a).  Industrial and 
environmental uncertainties also facilitate organizational imitation.  Experimentation can 
be expensive and time consuming for firms, which is not possible in industries plagued 
by uncertainty.  Therefore, imitation may be an attractive alternative.   
 
3.4.2 Rivalry-based theories 
While firms may imitate competitors holding the belief that superior information is 
possessed by other firms than themselves, others may display imitative behavior in an 
attempt to maintain a competitive position relative to competitors (Lieberman & Asaba, 
2006).  Rather than focusing on information, rivalry-based theories are rooted in business 
strategy.  When firms possess similar resources and market positions competition can 
drive down prices and erode profits.  Firms can attempt a differentiation strategy in this 
case (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005; M. E. Porter, 1985), however its success is not 
guaranteed.  Many firms elect to imitate rivals and match their behavior in an effort to 
reduce competition and risk (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006).  Studies of imitative behavior 
among rivals incorporating game theory have shown that firms can be punished by 
competitors for deviating from the “accepted” strategy of the group (Axelrod, 1985).  
 
3.4.3 Challenges 
Although imitation may appear as a viable solution for some firms, such as those that 
wish to reduce risk, implementation of such a strategy also faces challenges.  Case 
studies, analyst reports, and books written by a firm’s founders explaining the key to a 
firm’s success make some strategies and business models transparent14, yet emulators are 
sometimes unable to imitate the firm and be as successful.  The research-based view 
states that some resources are inimitable and if firms are able to control these resources 
they can stave off imitators, as well as benefiting from tacit knowledge, economies of 
scale, scope, and density, first-mover advantage (J. B. Barney, 1996; J. Barney, 1991; 
Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; M. A. Peteraf, 1993)  Rivkin (2000) states that a strategy’s 
complexity in itself is a barrier to imitation.  Complexity is based on the number of 
decisions and processes that comprise the strategy and the level of interaction among 
those decisions.  This viewpoint can be extended from the broad-encompassing firm 
strategy to the conceptualized business model of the firm.  It is often the activities and 
processes between the business model that create the advantage rather than the 
components themselves (Afuah & Tucci, 2001; Arbnor & Bjerke, 1996; Hamel, 2000; 
Hedman & Kalling, 2003; M. E. Porter, 1996); tacit knowledge requirements add 
complexity and success uncertainty (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006).  A firm may have a 
transparent strategy comprised of imitable elements, yet the interactions among those 
                                                 
14 Examples of this include: Freiberg (1996), Peterson (2004), Slater (1999), or Branson (2002). 
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elements may hinder imitation; a “...would-be imitator could understand most of the 
ingredients that make up a successful business system yet still fail to grasp the recipe” 
(Rivkin, 2000 pg. 825).  Porter (M. E. Porter, 1996) highlights that the activities that 
firms perform and the fit among them help deter imitators, as it is the fit rather than the 
activities themselves that challenge mimicry.  In addition, there is the danger that 
imitation may dissolve the incentive to innovate, however a homogenous market may 
stimulate past innovators to rise to the challenge again (Rivkin, 2000).  However, as 
Sevón (1996) and Westney (1987) explain imitation has traces of innovation interspersed. 
 
Naturally, the question posed when pursuing an imitation strategy is, who should be 
imitated.  If a firm determines that imitation is an appropriate strategy it must research 
which competitor(s) or strategic group is of mimetic interest, and what should be 
imitated.  Research suggests the “fashion leader” (Bikhchandani et al., 1998; Haunschild, 
1993; Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1997a), firms based on size (Haunschild & Miner, 
1997; Haveman, 1993a), or the most successful (Haunschild & Miner, 1997; Haveman, 
1993a).  “Fashion leaders” are those firms who have acquired a perception of superiority 
and expertise by other firms.  It is presumed that fashion leaders possess information and 
experience that others envy, and their behavior is often emulated regardless of other 
information signals in the market.  It can be described by firms in an industry that take a 
“wait and see” approach with regard to adopting a new technology.  All firms have an 
incentive to wait for the first to adopt in the hope of free-riding on their choice; the cost 
of deciding earliest is low for the firm with the greatest precision.   
 
Imitation and its two broad-based categories of information and rivalry theories have 
been presented, and the challenges of emulation were discussed.  This should provide the 
reader with a thorough understanding of this concept.  The following section presents 
selected literature in this field to provide a background of the research conducted. 
 
3.4.4 Literature 
Mimicry of competitors’ products, management or organizational styles, or processes is 
not a new phenomenon in strategic management.  Isomorphism is found not only in 
biology but also in the business world (Hawley, 1986).  Such behavior can result in 
competitive intensification or increase firm collusion, resulting in a reduction in 
competition.  The imitative literature stream subdivides into various related topics.  
Multimarket contact looks at how many markets competing firms share, which may 
increase oligopolistic and mimetic behavior (Heggestad & Rhoades, 1978; S. A. Rhoades 
& Heggestad, 1985; Scott, 1982; Scott, 1990); imitative foreign direct investment (FDI) 
bunching by firms as a means of reducing competitive risk (R. E. Caves, Porter, & 
Spence, 1980; M. J. Chen & MacMillan, 1992; R. Henderson & Cockburn, 1994; 
Hennart & Park, 1994; Knickerbocker, 1973; Kogut & Chang, 1991; Yamawaki, 1998); 
organizational imitation which shows that firms demonstrate mimetic behavior for a 
number of reasons (Baum & Haveman, 1997; Baum, Li, & Usher, 2000; Davis, 1991; 
Deephouse, 1999; Delios & Henisz, 2000; Garcia-Pont & Nohria, 2002; Greve, 1996; 
Greve, 1998; Haunschild, 1993; Haunschild & Miner, 1997; Haveman, 1993b; Westphal, 
Gulati, & Shortell, 1997b); economic herd behavior that discusses why competing firms 
behave in unison (Chang, Chaudhuri, & Jayaratne, 1997; Kennedy, 2002; Rao, Greve, & 
Davis, 2001).  The airline industry displays characteristics from many fields, however as 
this project is focused on business models it  is appropriate to review those areas that are 
complementary.  For example, airline networks are ideally suited for investigating the 
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effects of multimarket contact, and numerous studies have researched this topic (Baum & 
Korn, 1996; Baum & Korn, 1999; Evans & Kessides, 1993; J. Gimeno & Woo, 1996), 
however this topic relates itself to mimetic behavior and its effects found specifically in 
airline networks, not business models.  FDI and its affects are important strategic 
decisions that a firm must make, however this specific realm does not lend itself ideally 
to the airline industry.  Although air transport service is a highly-integrated, international 
service, its involvement in FDI is limited compared to other comparable industries.  Chen 
and MacMillan (1992) performed an extensive study analyzing mimetic investment 
bunching by airlines and the action response of airlines.  This study showed competitive 
response is dependent upon strategic dependence, and action irreversibility delays 
competitive response.  Investment strategy is a micro-perspective related to strategic 
decisions, while business model analysis is a meso-perspective.  Lieberman and Asaba 
(2006) have generated a literature list of the branches found in the imitation literature 
stream; although the document is not a literature review, it is a good source for the reader 
to delve deeper into the theory.  The following tables, 3.4. and 3.5., adopted from 
Lieberman and Asaba (2006), review the literature relating to organizational imitation 
and herd behavior.   
 
Table 3.4: Literature on organizational imitation  
    
Author Industry Analytic tool Findings 
    
Davis (1991) Fortune 500 Multivariate regression of 
16 variables of firms’ 
poison pill adoption 
• Adoption related less to imitation 
than to director contact and 
interlock 
Haunschild (1993) 1981-1990 
acquisitions of 
medium/ large 
firms in 4 
industries 
Regressions of director 
ties in firms 
• Directors imitate acquisition 
activities of other firms that 
directors are tied 
Haveman (1993a) 1977-1987 
market entry in 
savings and 
loan industry 
Event history analysis of 
change events 
• Traits of mimetic behavior is 
evident in industry, with some 
caveats 
Greve and Davis 
(1996) 
1984-1993 
adoption of 
radio formats 
by US stations 
Event history analysis of 
change events 
• Firms will imitate other members 
of the same corporation 
Haunschild (1997) 1988-1993 
selection of 
investment 
banker  
Regression of types of 
imitation used to select 
investment banker 
• Imitation behavior is influenced 
by frequency of observations, 
traits of copied firm, and quality 
of outcome 
Westphal  et al. 
(1997a) 
TQM 
implementation 
in US hospitals 
Heckman selection 
modeling  
• Initial TQM adopters seek 
efficiency gains, while secondary 
TQM adopters seek legitimacy 
Deephouse (1999) 1985-1992 
population of 
banks in US 
Hierarchical regression 
measuring return on 
average assets 
• Strategic balance is ideal; be as 
differentiated as legitimately 
possible 
Baum and 
Haveman (2000) 
1971-1996 
nursing home 
acquisitions 
Logistic modeling of 
probability of acquiring 
particular nursing home 
• Chains are more likely to imitate 
similar sized competitors in 
acquisition patterns 
Delios and Henisz 
(2000) 
1990-1996 
worldwide 
plant location 
decisions by 
Japanese firms 
Time logit analysis of 
plant location 
• Imitation of prior behavior 
legitimizes a firm’s choices 
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Garcia-Pont and 
Nohria (2002) 
1980-1989 
alliance 
formation 
among global 
automobile 
manufacturers 
Event history analysis of 
probability of firms to 
enter an alliance structure 
• Firms imitate others that occupy 
the same strategic group, rather 
than first-movers 
• Industry-level analysis tends to 
obscure mimetic studies. 
    
Source: Adopted from Lieberman and Asaba (2006) 
 
Davis (1991) studied the adoption of a “poison pill,” which is a shareholder rights plan 
issued by a firm’s board of directors and intended to increase the costs involved with a 
hostile takeover.  This study researched Fortune 500 firms and their adoption styles of 
poison pills.  Davis concludes that competitor imitation has less to do with poison pill 
adoption than interlocked board of directors that permeate through the Fortune 500 
companies.  Director interlock continues with Haunschild’s (1993) study of acquisition 
patterns among firms.  Results show that firms imitate those firms that directors are tied 
to via directorships.  Imitation spreads through manager’s inter-firm relationships. 
 
Haveman (1993) looks the savings and loan industry and its entry into six diversified 
markets opened up by regulatory changes and imitative firm behavior.  Haveman shows 
that entrants do not rely on imitative behavior of similar sized firms; however, large firms 
are role models for other large firms, while profitable firms are role models to firms of all 
sizes.  These findings support the notion of mimetic behavior and successful incumbents 
will entice new, imitative entrants, but as the market grows entrance will be less 
attractive, producing a u-shaped rate of entry.  Greve (1996) studied how incumbent 
firms adopt a new market position in an industry, and discovers that industry positioning 
does not change as a result of mimetic behavior.  His unit of analysis is US radio stations 
and their entrance into a new radio format.  Results show that stations will imitate sister 
stations that are owned by the same corporation; although Greve notes that mimetic 
behavior can create organizational isomorphism or polymorphism.  Polymorphism is 
defined as the imitative behavior displayed by firms populating a conglomerate, while 
isomorphism is related a single firm (J. Freeman & Hannan, 1983).   
 
Haunschild and Miner (1997) hypothesize that three types of mimetic behavior take 
place: frequency imitation (copying common practices), trait imitation (copying practices 
of firms with specific features), and outcome imitation (copying based on a historical 
outcome).  Results show that the types of mimetic behavior are observable empirically 
and that they do influence imitation of other firms.  Westphal et al. (1997) research 
adoption of innovative organizational practices, total quality management (TQM), in US 
hospitals.  Findings show that early implementers of TQM seek to increase efficiency 
gains and seek customization of process innovations.  Later implementers tend to seek 
legitimacy and display mimetic behavior rather than innovative trends.  External social 
pressures have increased isomorphism of TQM practices.   
 
Firms are pressured to differentiate themselves to reduce competition, yet legitimacy is 
also constantly pressuring managers.  Deephouse (1999) investigates this balancing act 
within the population of banks found in a US metro area.  Findings suggest that firms 
must avoid excessive differentiation which will reduce market legitimacy, while an 
abundance of conformity will increase competition beyond acceptable levels.  Deephouse 
agrees that managers must balance the “competitive cusp (Porac et al., 1989),” and that a 
model of strategic balance is more appropriate than conformity or differentiation.   
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Baum et al. (2000) focus their research on imitative behavior of chain firms, finding 
empirics in nursing home acquisitions.  Inspiration stems from a lack of research in 
chains’ spatial expansion.  Analysis was conducted on the probability of a chain 
acquiring an independent or component nursing home.  Results show that chains are most 
likely to acquire targets that are spatially near their recent acquisitions and that 
acquisitions mimic those of similarly sized competitors.  Henisz and Delios (2001) 
research worldwide plant location decisions by Japanese firms and results demonstrate 
that firms routinely imitate decisions by competitors in the home country, especially 
when locating their first foreign plant.  Imitation of firms in the same business group was 
less correlated than imitation of competing firms.  In addition, results show that 
uncertainty regarding policy implications has an impact on imitative behavior and firms 
imitate others to reduce uncertainty.  Garcia-Pont and Nohria (2002) analyze alliance 
formation and imitation in the automobile industry between 1980 to 1989.  Horizontal 
industry alliances among strategic groups were necessary for Asian manufacturers to 
learn regional distribution tactics and reduce preemptive collusive movements by US and 
European competitors, while their counterparts required the Asian manufacturing 
techniques to streamline operations.  Results show that mimetic behavior at a macro, 
industry-wide level is not present, but do appear at a meso, strategic-group level.  In 
addition, firms show little herd-like behavior and blatant copying of industry first-
movers, but rather imitate those firms that closely resemble themselves and attempt to 
mimic their behavior.   
 
This particular literature stream has focused on mimetic isomorphism, which borrows 
from organizational sociology, and shows that imitative behavior does exist in various 
industries.  Prior research has shown that the level of analysis at the strategic group level 
is more appropriate, rather than an industry level analysis, which shows that firms are 
likely to imitate others in the same group, however legitimacy and balancing the 
competitive cusp are also important factors.  Imitation may be instigated by director 
interlock, connection to a sister firm, and observation of similar competing firms.  
Organizational mimicry is but one tributary of the literature stream, and the following 
section will provide an overview of the other relevant tributary: herd behavior. 
 
Herd behavior is a term borrowed from biological behavior displayed by animals, and 
refers to actors (individuals, groups of individuals, firms) that perform together yet lack a 
planned direction.  Herd behavior is evident in areas such as manager mimicry 
(Scharfstein & Stein, 1990), stock market fluctuations (Scharfstein & Stein, 1990; 
Schiller, 2005), everyday decision making (Banerjee, 1992), or firm location decisions 
(Chang et al., 1997).  While mimetic isomorphism borrowed from organizational 
sociology, herd behavior seeks inspiration from economics (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006).  
Table 3.4 shows the literature within this stream (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006).   
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Table 3.5: Literature on herd behavior  
    
Author Industry Analytic tool Findings 
    
Chang and Jayaratne 
(1997) 
1990 -1995 bank 
branch openings in 
New York city 
Profit analysis of 
branch locations 
• Branch openings 
display herd behavior 
and follow existing 
branches 
Rao et al. (2001) 1987-1994 NASDAQ 
firm and security 
analyst coverage 
choices  
Regressions of firm 
adoption rates of 
analyst coverage 
• Actors imitate 
competent peers to 
reduce search costs 
• Cyclical adoption, 
disappointment, 
abandonment cycle 
Kennedy  (2002) 1961-1989 prime-time 
network television 
programs 
Simultaneous equations 
model 
• Herd behavior evident 
in industry, although 
imitated programs 
underperform 
    
Source: Adopted from Lieberman (2006).   
 
Bank branch openings and herd behavior was researched by Chang et al. (1997) and 
results show that firm location choices display herd behavior.  Banks locate their branch 
offices in the same geographical area as their competitors, although they do avoid 
increasing competition beyond a threshold (Chang et al., 1997).  Results also show that 
rational herding exists, however profit reduction is a side effect of this policy.  Rao et al. 
(2001) turn their attention to herd behavior among security analysts and their coverage of 
firms listed on the NASDAQ.  The authors introduce the concept of social proofs and that 
actors imitate the actions of others that are regarded as competent in an attempt to 
increase legitimacy and reduce search costs.  Regressions of adoption and abandonment 
rates among analysts show that adoption, disappointment, and abandonment of firm 
coverage is evident, and that institutionalism rooted in imitation is fragile.  Adoption 
based on imitation of peer coverage causes over-estimation and leads to disappointment 
followed by coverage abandonment by analysts.  However, imitation of abandonment 
does not appear; actors are able to self-evaluate once information is available and initiate 
their own abandonment rather than follow cues of peers.   
 
Kennedy (2002) researches broadcast television programming between 1961 and 1989 
for signs of imitative and herd behavior.  Future programming among the three large, US 
cable networks is relatively transparent, which can lead to imitative behavior.  The author 
establishes that networks can choose either a differentiated or imitative programming 
strategy, and through simultaneous equation modeling shows that imitative programming 
behavior is evident.  Results show that programming is influenced by rivals, however 
such behavior leads to underperforming compared to differentiated programming.  This 
behavior may be explained by herd behavior and participation in information cascades, or 
agency issues which influence managers’ wishes to stray from industry norms. 
 
This final section has researched the literature on the concepts of imitation, which 
followed the discussions regarding strategic groups and business models.  The intention 
of this chapter is to bring the reader to the current literary threshold on the theories that 
support method of addressing the research question: what will be the successful future 
airline business models.  This chapter introduced the theories in the broad context of the 
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research; however these are narrowed in the following chapter which will apply them in 
the field of the passenger airline industry. 
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4. Theoretical application to the airline 
industry 
- A 25 minute taxi in a 747 burns approximately the same amount of fuel a Learjet 31 is 
capable of carrying, 1300 kilograms - 
 
 
The airline industry suffers from cyclical highs and lows, just as its aircraft on a typical 
journey; however, this is not for a lack of professional or academic interest.  Amazon lists 
more than 8,000 books on the airline industry and Google Scholar lists more than 74,000 
papers, books, theses, and abstracts.  Universities throughout the world educate future 
employees through specialized industry courses and degrees.  This research project aims 
to complement the decades of previous research, and this chapter focuses on the 
underlying structure of the airline industry.  The chapter is segmented into the three core 
themes: business models, innovation, and imitation.  A review of past literary 
contributions is provided to complement the review provided in Chapter 3.  It is, in 
essence, an application of the utilized theories and concepts.   
 
4.1 Strategic management 
Books on the theme of airline strategic management run the gamut from general 
management topics (Banfe, 1992; Dempsey & Gesell, 1997; Doganis, 2006; Flouris & 
Oswald, 2006; Holloway, 2003), marketing (Shaw, 2007), computer simulation  (J. R. 
Smith & Golden, 1991), to alliances (Kleymann & Seristö, 2004).  One recurring critique 
of strategic management studies center on the lack of detailed, industry-specific research 
performed by industry experts (McGee & Thomas, 1986).  Practitioners and academics 
must seek common ground in order to learn from each other.  For example, McGee and 
Thomas (1986) state that knowledge and understanding of industry-specific strategic 
groups would improve if researchers steeped in industry whould carry out more studies.  
The airline industry is highly visible and economically important yet suffers from 
enormous challenges, and incorporates multiple facets of strategic management, supply 
chain logistics, finance, etc.  It is these roots that have spawned great interest in the 
industry and many studies are performed by individuals distant from the industry.  This 
research attempts to bridge this gap through a dual-faceted, academic-practical 
cooperation; however it remains a complement and continuation of past contributions.  
The review of business model literature specific to the airline industry is appropriate to 
introduce the reader to underlying contributions to this research.  Some publications have 
already been mentioned earlier in the literature review, however their specific 
applicability to the airline industry lead to a more detailed analysis. 
 
4.2 Airline business models 
This section will provide the reader with a general overview of the main business models 
found in the scheduled passenger airline industry.  These three models include full-
service carriers, low-cost carriers, and regional carriers.  There are additional strategic 
groups in the broader passenger air transport industry, which include charter airlines, 
business jets, and air taxi.  These groups are omitted from the analyses for various 
reasons.  Charter airlines often operate on-demand flights to tourist destinations 
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throughout the year.  They are omitted from the analyses due to lack of participation in 
the researcher-distributed questionnaire, poor transparency among firms in the strategic 
group, and the varying degrees of integration in the industry’s value chain.  Many charter 
carriers are poorly represented in industry databases which challenge investigation.  In 
addition, charter carriers may be mere capacity providers for tour operators, while others 
are integrated in a conglomerate responsible for the packaging and distribution of tours.  
This variation in integration in the value chain challenges categorization and studies in 
industry analyses.  The business jet strategic group focuses primarily on offering on-
demand flights at a high ticket price.  One of the largest operators is NetJets 
(www.netjets.com) focusing on time-share ownership.  This group was omitted from the 
analyses as they operate ad-hoc and often regarded as a niche segment that overlaps little 
with airlines.  Air taxi operators operate on a similar foundation as the business jet group, 
however often with shorter-range aircraft.  These operators may provide similar on-
demand charter services, in addition to medevac15 flights, acting as a forward air 
controller16, or other duties.  The intention is to introduce the reader to the past and 
current makeup of the industry, and to prepare for the following summary of the literature 
in the field.  This is accomplished by introducing the three business models found in the 
scheduled passenger airline industry.  In addition, each group’s historical financial 
performance in the US is presented to highlight to the reader the fluctuations present in 
the industry.  While distinction among regions, for example, European, Asian, and South 
American would have been more appropriate, transparency in markets outside the US is 
challenging.   
 
Full-service carriers 
Historically, airlines have been a transporter of their nation’s cultural, political, and 
economic beliefs; they were flag carriers.  Regulatory constraints grounded in the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation17 limited capacity, pricing, schedules, and 
service levels, which stifled business model innovation.  For example, regulators often 
demanded that a competing flag carrier provide a similar level of service, promoting 
regulatory-instigated imitation at the expense of innovation18.  Limited, or non-existent, 
competition demanded that flag carriers offer their services to a wide range of market 
segments.  The business community was treated to premium service, justifying the high 
cost of travel, while the leisure traveler was able to purchase a lower-priced ticket with 
lower service standards.  Reduced competition and economic regulations ensured that air 
travel was an expensive mode of travel, and that carriers were nearly mirror images of 
each other.  Full-service carriers’ business models are often generalized by the following 
characteristics: 
 
 
                                                 
15 Medical evacuation flights; quick transportation of patients or organs is often done by air taxi firms. 
16 Forward air controllers are lead aircraft used in fire fighting duties responsible for coordinating fire 
suppression activities by other aircraft; such activities are seasonal and contracted to air taxi firms. 
17 This convention established the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), an agency of the 
United Nations, in 1947.   
18 A case in point was a pre-deregulation issue regarding service uniformity.  SAS was accused by its 
competitors of serving a sandwich which was more than a sandwich.  The airline responded that it was a 
traditional Scandinavian sandwich and the airline should not be penalized for conforming to cultural 
customs, which led to Czech Airline stating it would service free beer in economy class, as it was also a 
custom (Gidwitz, 1980).  Innovation was stifled due to stipulations regarding uniformity in various airline 
business model elements.  
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• Multi-market segment focus 
• On-line and inter-line connections with cooperating carriers 
• Membership in a global alliance 
• Adherence to traditional distribution strategies 
• Restrictive fares and complex booking policies 
• Amenities and reward programs 
• Both short- and long-haul operations with a diversified fleet 
 
This business model has struggled in recent years due to increasing encroachment from 
low-cost carriers and a challenging yield19 environment, as well as, an increasing cost 
structure.  Aircraft manufacturer Airbus states that 2007 capacity figures show that low-
cost carriers have captured 29% of the North American market, 26% of the European, 
and 9% of the Asian (Rouaud, 2007).  Figure 4.1 shows an average annual spread 
between the revenue per available seat mile (RASM) and cost per available seat mile 
(CASM) for the FSC business model.  A positive spread indicates that revenues exceeded 
costs, while a negative spread shows the opposite.  The average yield for the group is also 
displayed.  To provide a possible comparison with the following data for the other two 
strategic groups in the industry the FSC data includes a system-wide20 and domestic 
perspective.  The data was compiled from the Airline Planning Group (Seabury Airline 
Planning Group, 2008) and its grouping for FSCs21. 
 
Figure 4.1: FSC RASM-CASM spread 
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Source: Author’s own creation, data from Seabury Airline Planning Group (2008) 
 
This figure shows that prior to 2001 the FSC business model, on average, was generating 
positive financial results from operations; the RASM-CASM spread was approximately 
0.5 US cents, both domestically and system-wide, with a steady yield, although the 
impact of the economic slowdown in 2000 is evident.  However, the years following 
                                                 
19 Yield is a measurement of the average revenue collected per passenger kilometer flown.  It is used as a 
measurement of the average fare paid 
20 Domestic and international 
21 These carriers include: American Airlines, Alaska Airlines, Continental, Delta, Northwest, TWA, United, 
and US Airways. 
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2001 the business model was operating at a loss in a declining yield environment.  This 
trend was reversed in 2005, and while domestically the FSC business model continues to 
operate at a loss in 2007, system-wide the model is breaking even.  This is the result of 
more healthy overseas operations.  The yield has fallen approximately one US cent from 
its peak of 14.44 US cents in 2001.  The trends in the US are repeated in the European 
airline industry and its FSC carriers.  Intra-European yield in 2006 has halted its fall since 
2002, while international yield has reached its 2002 level (European Commission, 2007a) 
 
Low-cost carriers 
Low-cost carriers owe their existence to deregulation of the airline industry.  
Deregulation removes market constraints and allows competitive forces to shape 
industry.  Deregulation commonly refers to economic deregulation and although it would 
be more accurate to call it less regulation, the researcher will continue to utilize the 
accepted term of deregulation.  Deregulation first occurred on a national scale in the 
United States with President Carter’s signature of the Airline Deregulation Act, although 
deregulation was permitted prior to this on intrastate routes within the US (Davies & 
Quastler, 1995).  This ruling relaxed the requirements for establishing new airlines, 
eliminated the Civil Aeronautics Board’s oversight of fare setting, and allowed intrastate 
carriers to set joint fares with interstate carriers.  Deregulation in the US led to a growth 
in start-up LCCs which was repeated in the EU, displayed in Knorr’s (2004) research, 
shown in table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Number of US and EU LCC start-ups  
       
  US   EU  
 Entry Exit Net Entry Exit Net 
       
1979 1  1    
1980 3  3    
1981 3  3    
1982 3  3    
1983  1 -1    
1984 3 3 0    
1985       
1986  3 -3    
1987 1 3 -2    
1988  1 -1    
1989       
1990 1  1    
1991    1  1 
1992 1 2 -1 1  1 
1993 3 1 2 2  2 
1994 2  2    
1995    1  1 
1996  1 -1 2  2 
1997 2  2 1  1 
1998  3 -3    
1999 2 1 1  2 -2 
2000 2 2 0 3  3 
2001  1 -1    
2002  1 -1 12 1 11 
2003 3 1 2 12 7 5 
       
Source: Adopted from Knorr (2004) 
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The experiences from deregulation in the US industry were a catalyst for similar moves 
in other markets.  Europe, the second largest market behind the US, implemented 
deregulation in a three-step program (European Commission, 2007b).  The first package 
was adopted at the end of 1987 and relaxed fare setting regulations, this was followed by 
the second package in 1990 which relaxed fare setting regulations further and capacity 
constraints between EU members, and the third package was implemented between 1993 
and 1997; the final regulatory hurdle, cabotage, was permitted at the end of the third 
package.  This impact on the European air transport market has resulted in nearly a 170% 
increase in routes between 1992 and 2006, and more than a 300% increase in duopoly 
routes, approximately 20% more airlines since 1990, and the emergence of low-cost 
carriers (European Commission, 2008).  Deregulation has since flourished in a number of 
regions throughout the world: Australia, Asia, and South America are areas where the 
airline industry is changing.  A near-guaranteed feature following deregulation is the 
establishment of new carriers, especially low-cost carriers.   
 
New entrant airlines following deregulation often compete in the marketplace with a 
range of business models, however those carriers with a focus on efficiency and low-cost 
are often the most steadfast.  Examples of new entrant low-cost carriers include easyJet in 
the UK or Ireland-based Ryanair22, Australian-based Virgin Blue, Brazilian-based Gol, or 
US-based JetBlue.  The characteristics of these carriers include (Alamdari & Fagan, 
2005):   
 
• Single market segment focus 
• No on-line or inter-line connections 
• Non-alliance membership 
• Bypass of traditional distribution strategies 
• Non-restrictive fares and simple booking policies 
• No amenities or reward programs 
• Short-haul operations with a single fleet 
 
Figure 4.2 provides a snapshot of the RASM-CASM spread among LCCs, along with the 
yield among those carriers.  These figures are gathered solely from US-based LCCs23 and 
are provided to the reader to show the general trend in the particular market.  The figure 
is again compiled from APG data (Seabury Airline Planning Group, 2008).  The results 
show that the spread was similar to their FSC counterparts, nearly half of one US cent, 
although in 2000 declining yields and falling revenues, most likely attributed to the 
economic slowdown in the US, pushed the spread into negative results.  This downward 
trend has continued throughout the remainder of the period, although since 2006 both the 
yield has been increasing and the RASM-CASM spread narrowing from its negative 
results.  This graph is presented to dispel the common notion that the LCC is nearly 
always successful to the detriment of other models; this is not the case. 
 
                                                 
22 Ryanair was not born of deregulation but was initially a carrier offering dual class service from Ireland, 
however its poor financial situation forced the carrier to seek a new business model, which was copied 
from Southwest in the US. 
23 These carriers include: Frontier Airlines, AirTran Airways, America West, Spirit Airlines, ATA, 
Southwest Airlines, Midwest Airlines. 
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Figure 4.2: LCC RASM-CASM spread 
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Source: Author’s own creation, data from Seabury Airline Planning Group (2008) 
 
Regional carriers 
Regional carriers tend to play a supportive role in the scheduled passenger airline 
industry24.  The European Airlines Association (ERA) defines the business model as, 
“…essentially one that has its route structure concentrated on routes from regional 
points, either to a major airline hub or to other regional points” (French, 1995 pg. 1).  
Regional airlines are often independently owned and either support full-service carriers’ 
networks or operate in markets that are free of strong competitive forces (Berry, 2001); 
however, the largest regionals, measured in passenger figures, are exclusively integrated 
with mainline carriers (Airline Business, 2007b).  In the US market nearly 70% of 
passengers on regional carriers are feeding into the network of a full-service carrier 
(French, 1995).  Their lower cost base allows the carriers to operate on thinner routes 
which may be uneconomical for other business models, or complement FSC routes with 
increased frequencies during off-peak times.  Although these carriers are supporting the 
FSC business model and provide transport primarily for business travelers, the carriers 
are experiencing a growth of leisure travelers.  In Europe ERA’s members reported 48% 
of passengers were leisure in 2006, 5% more than the decade prior (ERA, 2007).  The 
characteristics of the regional carrier business model are as follows: 
 
• Multi-market segment focus 
• On-line and inter-line connections with cooperating carriers 
• Non-membership in a global alliance 
• Adherence to traditional distribution strategies, alternately full reliance on partner 
carrier 
• Restrictive fares and complex booking policies, often reflecting the policies of 
their partner carrier(s) 
                                                 
24 The US regional strategic group is the most developed and largest in the regional airline industry.  The 
relationship between FSCs and regionals, strongest in the US, can be traced back to a handful of defining 
events: the 1949 deregulation of interstate routes flown on aircraft weighing less than 12,500 pounds at 
takeoff, suspension-substitution agreements initiated in 1964, the Allegheny Commuter system of 1967, 
1978 industry deregulation and importance of FSC affiliation for regional carriers, and 1984 codesharing 
and CRS display regulation (Davies & Quastler, 1995) 
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• No amenities and reward programs, alternately full reliance on partner carrier 
• Short- haul operations with a single fleet 
 
The cooperative level between regional and full-service carriers may be highly integrated 
resulting in the regional carrier utilizing many of the FSCs’ business model elements.  
Although many regional carriers may adhere to the traditional distribution strategies in 
the industry, others may have no or limited distribution.  Rather, they are reliant upon 
their partner carrier to distribute the regional carrier’s capacity; likewise, for amenities 
within regional carriers’ business models.  A highly integrated regional carrier and 
mainline carrier may result in a regional carrier that merely operates as a capacity 
production platform.  This is the case of many large regional carriers in the US, such as 
SkyWest or Chautauqua.  It is not possible for passengers to purchase a ticket with these 
carriers as their mainline partners are solely responsible for sales, just as passengers may 
be entirely unaware that they are flying with these regional carriers.  They often operate 
with identical brand insignias as their mainline partners. 
 
Figure 4.3 shows the RASM-CASM spread between the years 1997 – 2007 and the 
average annual yield during the period.  This data is compiled from the APG regional 
data25 (Seabury Airline Planning Group, 2008).  The results show that the regional carrier 
strategic group has benefited from a generally high, positive RASM-CASM spread, 
which peaked at nearly six times greater than the FSC and LCC groups.  This may be 
representative of the agreements between regionals and FSCs in the US which often 
ensure a specific revenue or operational margin per flight.  The effects on the industry 
from 2001 are depicted by the sudden drop in spread, which did not recover until 2004.  
Many regionals were forced to renegotiate their cooperation with FSCs following the 
downturn in the industry in 2001.  An extreme example of such renegotiations was the 
transformation of Atlantic Coast Airways (ACA), a capacity provider primarily for 
United Airlines, into the stand-alone carrier, Independence Air; this was a result of the 
push by United to negotiate lower rates for ACA’s capacity, eventually driving the carrier 
to seek independence (Arnoult, 2004).  The yield has fallen steadily from the beginning 
of the period, especially in 2002, however it has settled nearly five US cents greater than 
the other two groups.  This data shows that regional carriers, in general, have been 
financially more successful than their brethren in the industry, however this success may 
be sensitive to the satisfaction of FSC partners.  If a regional carrier is not able to deliver 
a CASM that meets the requirements of an FSC the regional partner may be left out of 
future agreements.   
 
                                                 
25 These carriers include: American Eagle, Comair (Delta Connection), SkyWest, Horizon, ExpressJet, 
Mesaba Aviation, Mesa Airlines, Air Wisonsin  
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Figure 4.3: Regional RASM-CASM spread 
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Source: Author’s own creation, data from Seabury Airline Planning Group (2008) 
 
This section has summarized the three main business models found in the airline industry 
and provided a synopsis of the financial situation of each model.  The findings have 
shown that both the FSC and LCC business model have been struggling, at the group 
level, to generate revenues that exceed their costs, while the regional carrier strategic 
group has benefited from their lower cost base and relationship with FSCs.  This data is 
gathered from a selection of US carriers, however the results are representative of the 
European FSC airline industry as well (European Commission, 2007a), and one may 
cautiously extend the trends from the other groups to other regions.  A more detailed 
description of the specific business model elements is presented in Chapter 5.  The 
following section will present the literature stream regarding business models found in 
the airline industry.   
 
Literature 
Strategic thinking from a business model perspective within the airline industry is a 
relatively new phenomenon.  Research during the decades preceding the millennium 
followed a meso-level of perception, while research this decade has dug deeper into a 
micro level of perception incorporating the business model as the unit of analysis.  The 
literature tends to focus on either the LCC business model specifically due to its growth 
and impact on the industry, or on the airline industry’s dominating business models.  
Table 4.2 is a summary of the literature stream pertaining to business models within the 
aviation field.  Each author is mentioned with the focus area of the publication, for 
example LCC, airline industry, or general.  It is seen that the majority of research is 
focused on the industry as a whole, yet there is a strong interest in LCC business models 
specifically.  In addition, those elements that each author includes in the business model 
description are included.  Analysis shows that broad reaching elements, such as market 
segment and value proposition are seldom integrated into airline business model research.  
These elements are often discussed related to the expansion of new markets by LCCs 
(Lawton, 2002; Taneja, 2004).  The majority of business model research studies the 
activities comprising the model, and to some extent network metrics, of carriers or 
strategic groups.  These facets are transparent and quantifiable which aid in research.  
These factors include, for example, distribution, airport selection, fleet composition, stage 
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length, and horizontal alliances.  All authors in table 4.2 include at least six business 
model activities to explain an airline’s business model.  Some authors integrate change 
management and organizational flexibility into their business model analysis (Garvett & 
Hilton, 2002; Taneja, 2004), while factors such as workforce representation, historical 
context, or revenue generation are studied less frequently.   
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and partnerships are all discussed, as well as, the importance of revenue and growth 
generation.  This analysis has greater focus on the importance of networks in airline 
business models, both route structures and partnerships.  
 
Elements that positively correlate with profitability are very important, and Garvett 
and Hilton (2002) attempt to analyze which factors drive airline profitability.  They 
include four broad categories, cost, operational, situational, and commercial, that are 
tested for correlation.  If a category results in a correlated relationship the authors 
attempt to determine if it is a driver, marker, result, or coincidence.  Their results 
indicate that unit costs are not related to profitability for either US or worldwide 
airlines.  The explanation for such a counter-intuitive conclusion is that there are 
successful and unsuccessful high-cost and low-cost airlines.  There was a weak 
correlation between customer satisfaction and profit margin; however the authors 
researched a number of operational factors, such as aircraft size, fleet diversity, and 
aircraft age, which proved insignificant.  In addition, the authors fail to establish a 
link between firm size and profitability, which demonstrates a lack of economy of size 
in the industry.  Commercial factors were also analyzed and Garvett and Hilton 
(2002) find no relationship between yields and load factors with profitability.  
However, the authors did find a strong correlation between unit revenues and US 
airlines, however not among world wide airlines.  This would suggest regulatory and 
competitive distortion among some airlines in the world.  This publication suggests 
that airlines cannot simply focus on a select few elements to achieve profitability, but 
rather a holistic view of the entire firm is necessary, which is the role of the business 
model.   
 
Lawton’s 2002 publication focuses on LCCs and their inroads in the US and 
European aviation markets.  He is one of the first authors to introduce the importance 
of market segmentation and the value proposition to the airline business model 
discussion.  LCCs were able to tap into the vast underserved leisure market, 
emphasizing the importance of customer segmentation and moving the value 
proposition from schedule and flexibility to price awareness.  In addition, he builds 
upon the traditional LCC business model definition by stressing the importance of 
supply partner relationships and their role in ancillary revenue.  While Bieger (2002) 
discusses partnerships as an important step in gaining customer recognition, Lawton 
(2002) introduces the role that partners play in increasing non-ticket revenue.  The 
role of technology and brand are introduced as important business model elements for 
LCCs.  Technology allows LCCs to significantly lower their operating costs and 
extend their market reach, while strengthening the LCC brand increases in importance 
because of the commoditization of the travel service. 
 
The European Low Fares Airline Association (ELFAA), founded in 2003 to represent 
LCCs’ interests, attempts to clarify the business model of low fare airlines (European 
Low Fares Airlines Association, 2004).  The ELFAA definition focuses on 
distribution, operations, route network, and workforce representation.  ELFAA 
tributes LCC success to secondary airport utilization, quick turnaround times, point-
to-point network with a standardized fleet, direct channel distribution, secondary 
income sources, and a workforce with a high level of variable remuneration.  ELFAA 
stresses that these factors comprise the LCC business model and combine to bring 
numerous benefits to customers. 
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Taneja (2004) presents one of the first full-length publications specifically addressing 
the airline business model from a general airline perspective.  He defines the business 
model and its components, which include the value proposition, consumer behavior, 
integrated working relationships, location, past burdens, change management, and 
flexibility.  Taneja’s publication emphasizes that airlines must have intimate 
knowledge of consumer behavior and their market segment, in addition to a 
complementing value proposition.  He also introduces the importance of business 
model innovation and change management.  In today’s challenging business 
environment Taneja stresses that airline management must constantly be open to 
adapting their business practices, as well as integrating flexibility into the model to 
accommodate the industry’s cyclical nature. 
 
Alamdari and Fagan (2005) published an interesting account analyzing how the LCC 
strategic group has progressed from the initial business model founded by Southwest 
Airlines in 1969.  The authors recognize that some members of the strategic group 
have deviated from a focus on low cost to one of differentiation.  The authors elect to 
analyze three product features (network, service, and distribution) and four 
operational features (fleet, utilization, stage length, and airports).  These seven 
features represent 16 business model components that are measured against the 
original business model on a Likert scale.  Alamdari and Fagan compare the deviation 
results with the profit margins of the LCC study group, and conclude that those 
airlines that deviate the least from the original business model have the highest profit 
margin.  The authors discovered that US LCCs deviated more from the original model 
than their European counterparts, suggesting that greater competition leads to a 
differentiation strategy. 
 
Bieger and Agosti (2005) analyze the evolution of the airline industry and the 
perspective of change.  They state that, traditionally, the industry has supported four 
business models: network carrier, charter carrier, regional carrier, and low cost 
carrier.  The authors propose some success factors for each traditional business model, 
which include operation of a large hub and integrated work processes for network 
carriers.  Low cost carriers, charter carriers, and regional carriers seek lean and 
efficient processes, simple networks, while the charter carrier relies upon integration 
into a tour operator system and the regionals desire access to regional airports.  Bieger 
and Agosti (2005) state that there is a tendency to borrow from the low cost business 
model due to their greater success in the industry.  Charter carriers are witnessing the 
greatest change, either being absorbed back into their network carriers or transitioning 
to nearly pure LCCs.  Regional carries are currently being absorbed back into their 
network carriers due to their limited growth opportunities.   
 
Doganis (2006) discusses the airline industry from a general perspective and provides 
insight into the direction of the industry.  He presents a business model discussion that 
centers on business model activities, although he does stress the importance of market 
segmentation and the value proposition, especially due to pressure on decreasing 
yields and market instability.  Growth and revenue generation are also introduced as 
important aspects of the business model, the first of which can be achieved through an 
alliance strategy.  It is stated that revenue generation has become increasingly 
important as yields continue their downward trend.  Technology is a leading 
contributor to revenue generation by decreasing costs and improving efficiency, and 
providing an opportunity to generate revenue beyond the core travel activity. 
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Morrison and Mason (2006) complement the work of Alamdari and Fagan (2005) by 
addressing the issue of business model variation among the LCC strategic group.  The 
authors propose various metrics for measuring low cost business models, and 
correlations between operating margins and the proposed benchmark statistics that 
identify key cost and benefit drivers, work similar to Garvett and Hilton (2002).  
Aircraft utilization and employee productivity are key components of low cost 
profitability, while passengers per employee, average fares and yield are that variables 
most correlated with profitability.   
 
These publications address business models in the airline industry specifically.  There 
is a heavy focus on the activities found in airlines, as they are visible to industry 
observers and often used to study carriers.  Recent research continues to affirm that 
the passenger airline industry is comprised of four strategic groups: full-service 
carriers, low-cost carriers, regional carriers, and charter carriers.  This research project 
is focused solely on the scheduled passenger industry, which excludes the charter 
strategic group.  In addition, authors have suggested (Bieger & Agosti, 2005) that the 
industry is witnessing a fusion of business models, which is concurrent with this 
research stream. 
 
4.3 Strategic groups 
Application of strategic group theory within the airline industry has centered 
primarily on Porter’s (1980) generic strategy typologies.  However, some studies have 
incorporated the industrial classification based on revenue according to government 
methodologies (Stankus, 2007), yet industry understanding is improved if airlines are 
classified according to competitive strategies.  This section reviews the publications 
that pertain specifically to application of the strategic group concept in the airline 
industry, of which there are two (Cappel et al., 2003; Kling & Smith, 1995). 
 
Kling and Smith (1995) apply the Porter model to the deregulated US airline market.  
The authors capitalize on the relative industry stability during the early 1990s, which 
allowed the researchers to apply the theory, although they do recognize that industrial 
stability is short-lived, especially in the airline industry.  The authors focus on nine 
major US airlines between 1991 and 1993, utilizing the US government’s definition 
of a major airline26 (U.S. Department of Transportation).  They measure each airline’s 
CASM and airline quality rating (AQR). The AQR is an annual measurement of 19 
consumer quality factors produced by Wichita State University in the US.  A scatter-
plot is created comparing both the CASM and AQR variables.  The scatter plot 
creates four quadrants which the researchers utilize to define airlines incorporating 
differentiating, low-cost, and focus generic competitive strategies as defined by Porter 
(1980).  The authors integrate stage length measurements to capture lower CASMs 
resulting from longer flights (Holloway, 2003).  Validation of the results is 
                                                 
26 The US Department of Transportation (US DoT) classifies US airlines according to annual revenues.  
The classification, major airline, is deemed one that earns over 1 billion USD annually, a national 
airline earns between 100 million USD and 1 billion USD, and a regional airline earns less than 100 
million USD.  The classification is often criticized for its terminology which is not applicable in the 
current industry.  For example, many carriers that focus on short-haul routes, such as SkyWest, are 
often referred to as regional carriers because of their geographic focus, yet their annual revenue often 
exceeds 1 billion USD. 
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accomplished by observing operating profitability, and overall shows that the airlines 
straddling one or more of the generic strategies had an average operating profit 
margin of -3.57%, while those with a clear strategy achieved an average profit margin 
of 1.39%.  The authors observe that the smallest and largest of the nine airlines are the 
most successful, while the smallest firms have the lowest costs, suggesting the 
absence of economies of scale in the industry (D. W. Caves, Christensen, & 
Tretheway, 1997).  This publication is built upon the AQR ranking system, which is 
not a solid indication of consumer preference but rather Department of Transportation 
statistics regarding airline entity performance.  The AQR measures four broad 
categories that consumers value: on-time performance, denied boarding, mishandled 
luggage, customer complaints.  However, ticket price has been omitted from the 
AQR, which is especially important within a highly elastic industry (Brander & 
Zhang, 1990; Chang & Wei, 1993).  The AQR incorporates objectively measured 
metrics, of which fare prices are not captured because of lack of transparency from 
reporting airlines.  This omission is observed in low quality airlines offering low fare 
tickets, which are very successful; Ireland’s Ryanair was chosen as the worst airline 
according to an online poll (Evening Times, 2007), yet it carries more than 50 million 
passengers and is extremely profitable.  In addition, the AQR is based on Department 
of Transportation (DOT) data which is reported by the airline themselves, not 
verified, and categorized according to vague guidelines (M. Boyd, 2006) 
 
Cappel, Pearson, and Romero (2003) incorporate Porter’s (1980) strategic group 
typology in the airline industry.  This work builds upon a previous study by Cappel et. 
al (2003), which concluded that airlines incorporating a combination of differentiation 
and low-cost strategies were more successful than those utilizing a singular approach.  
However, the more recent publication returns to the topic following European 
deregulation and the terrorist events of 2001.  The authors highlight that the airline 
industry fails to display economies of scale or strategic proprietary, similar to many 
public and open service industries.  Economies of scale are potentially limited to 
advertising expenses.  On the other hand, differentiation is adopted by firms in mature 
industries, which the authors believe the airline industry has achieved.  However, 
research suggests that in mature industries services gravitate towards those desired by 
consumers and the effectiveness of differentiation minimizes.  In addition, there is 
limited consensus what constitutes consumer value in the airline industry and 
generalization is challenging.  The success of combining the low-cost and 
differentiation strategies has emerged as a result of the informed shopper.  The 
Internet has empowered airline consumers to the extent that they can make the most 
informed decision regarding price and value.  However, the industry environment 
post-2001 has shown that the most successful airlines are those that follow a low-cost 
strategy.  However, the authors question whether this transition from their previous 
research is temporary or a permanent industrial shift. 
 
These two articles represent research conducted specifically on strategic groups 
within the airline industry.  This limited research is reflective of McGee and Thomas’ 
(1986) statement that researchers with deep industry knowledge should conduct more 
research applicable to strategic groups.  The intention of this research project is to 
complement the existing literature with current research.  The following section will 
introduce the reader to innovation and imitation within the industry.   
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4.4 Innovation 
Innovation within service industries is hampered partly by the occasional lack of 
reliance on technology and the inability to patent or protect intellectual property rights 
(Hipp & Grupp, 2005; Tether, 2005).  For example, a retailer’s breakthrough service 
innovation can easily be imitated by competitors, or an online site may be able to 
protect its underlying technological framework but not the function that is performed.  
Tether’s (2005) findings support the notion that although service industries do 
innovate, their innovation differs from manufacturers, and tends to focus on 
organizational innovation or through collaboration (H. W. Chesbrough, 2006).  Ben-
Yosef (2005) stresses that for airlines innovation and change is matter or airline 
survival or airline extinction.  Markus (2007) investigates innovation within the 
airline industry and states that innovation in the industry may allow airlines to achieve 
improved profitability.  Markus’ (2007) innovation is segmented into the following 
categories: new business models and advanced customer segmentation, and new 
technologies.  New business models aim to expand the portfolio of offerings to 
customers, which will address advanced customer segmentation, all the while 
supported by process and efficiency gains through new technologies.  The historical 
and potential focus of airlines is presented in innovation cycles in figure 4.4 (Franke, 
2007). 
 
Figure 4.4: Airline innovation cycles 
 
Source: Markus (2007) 
 
The figure shows that focus in the industry tends to parrot the economic cyclicality.  
During the downturn of the early 1990s airlines turned their attention on operational 
efficiency and cost control, while the upturn in the middle of the decade led to a focus 
on services and revenue and optimizing network connectivity.  Following the 
downward cycle of the new millennium carriers continued their service and revenue 
focus, but through adopting LCC business elements, and eventually attempts to 
optimize productivity.  Current innovative attention is focused on advanced 
segmentation and new business models. 
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Historically, the greatest example of business model innovation within the airline 
industry is the introduction of the low-cost business model.  This efficient model first 
appeared in the US, yet has since flourished to all continents.  Southwest Airlines is 
often credited with introducing the model, yet Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) 
appears to have implemented a similar business model as far back as 194927 (Jordan, 
1979).  The researcher will continue to credit Southwest as the founding LCC carrier, 
yet regardless of which airline takes the honor, it is a business model that has changed 
the airline industry dramatically.  This radical innovation (R. Henderson & Clark, 
1990), made possible only through deregulation, introduced air travel to entirely new 
markets and has severely challenged incumbent firms within the industry.  In addition, 
the success of the model has influenced other industries to attempt to replicate it and 
its success (Moesgård Andersen & Poulfelt, 2006).   
 
The industry is currently witnessing the affects of innovations within advanced 
customer segmentation and adapted business models.  While the LCC model focuses 
on cost efficiencies for the masses, a new, niche model focuses on cost efficiencies for 
premium travel.  These business models have yet to prove their endurance, but their 
presence indicates that innovation within the industry is still present.  These carriers 
include US-based Eos and UK-based Silverjet28.  The business model is built on 
operating internationally a fleet often configured in a single, premium-class cabin, 
with high-end service, to secondary airports, relying primarily on point-to-point 
traffic.   
 
The two previous examples were related to entirely new and innovative business 
models within the airline industry.  An example of innovation within a specific 
business model element is related to Internet distribution.  Distribution of airline 
tickets via the Internet has been hailed as a technology-induced revolution in the 
industry (Calder, 2002).  This simple shift from travel agency-dominated distribution 
to user-generated diffused channels resulted in lower distribution costs for airlines.  
The US General Accounting Office (GAO) reports that online ticket distribution 
increased from 7% in 1992 to 30% in 2002 (GAO, 2003).  The GAO states that the 
increase in online distribution allowed major airlines in the US to reduce distribution 
costs nearly 26% over a decade.  As such, many airlines are striving to drive increased 
traffic to online channels as nearly 50% of tickets purchased continue to be serviced 
by Global Distribution Systems (GDSs).  Stelios Haji-Ioannou, the founder of easyJet, 
stated that it was the Internet that allowed easyJet and other LCCs to flourish as they 
were unencumbered by high distribution costs and predatory behavior of competitor-
owned GDSs (Calder, 2002), which is one major advantage the industry’s current 
LCCs had over their earlier predecessors (K. A. Hvass, 2005).  Airlines have two 
options for distributing tickets online: through own websites or third-party websites.  
Own websites, such as www.ryanair.com or www.ual.com, allow airlines direct 
control over distribution and limited costs.  Third-party websites, such as 
www.orbitz.com, are online portals that a GDS may operate as a separate brand.  Such 
                                                 
27 PSA was an intrastate carrier based in San Diego, California.  The regulatory framework of the US 
airline industry prohibited non Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)-designated carriers from interstate 
operations, although intrastate carriage was deregulated.  PSA was a sole intrastate carrier and opened 
its first interstate route the same year as the Airline Deregulation Act.  In 1987 the carrier was acquired 
by USAir Group (Norwood, 1996; Trinkle, 2007). 
28 US-based MaxJet operated with a similar model yet entered bankruptcy December 24, 2007 
(Arnoult, 2008). 
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third-party websites may continue to use GDS data and as such incur a fee, however it 
is commonly less due to bulk transactions.  The Internet has also spawned new 
distributors such as opaque travel distributors (GAO, 2003) or global new entrants 
(GNEs).  Opaque distributors sell distressed inventory; the seats that airlines may 
struggle to sell themselves.  The site www.priceline.com29 is an example of an opaque 
site that acquires distressed inventory from airlines and auctions it off to the public.  
GNEs are the new technology platforms that will allow airlines to bypass the 
traditional GDSs and capture cost savings similar to Internet distribution but with a 
wider audience.  They argue that their transaction costs can be near US$ 3, which is 
what it costs an airline to sell a ticket on their own website, all costs considered (Field 
& Pilling, 2006).   
 
Industry development is not rooted merely in innovation but also in imitation, as 
introduced in Chapter 3.  While the previous section applied the concept of innovation 
within the airline industry, the following section highlights imitative examples. 
 
4.5 Imitation 
The airline industry displays imitative traits, though there is limited research 
conducted on the phenomenon.  Smith et al. (1997) investigate competitive response 
among airlines segmented according to strategic groups.  Results show that imitation 
of competitors within the same strategic group is just as likely as imitation of 
competitors from different strategic groups.  This would indicate the lack of 
significant mobility barriers within the airline industry.  This research complements 
the current research project; however its analytical perspective is elevated and does 
differentiate among, for example, business model imitation, price imitation, or route 
imitation, while this project selectively studies business models within the industry.  
Gimeno and Chen (1998) investigate airline strategic positioning, mimetic behavior, 
and rivalry within the industry and conclude that airlines will strive for differentiation 
due to competitive pressures but they will strive for similarities with better performing 
carriers.  These findings indicate that imitation is present in the industry, rivalry has a 
catalytic affect, and this behavior impacts the positioning of carriers in industry. 
 
If one observes the airline industry it is possible to discern imitative behavior.  
Reward amenities, such as frequent flyer programs (FFP), were introduced by 
American Airlines in May, 1981 (Frequent Flyer, 1997; Klophaus, 2005), to retain the 
airline’s most loyal customers by rewarding loyalty.  Imitative behavior by 
competitors in the same strategic group led United Airlines to implement Mileage 
Plus days after American’s AAdvantage was introduced, and Delta Air Lines, 
Northwest Orient, Braniff, Continental, Western, and Trans World Airlines to follow 
suit the same year (Frequent Flyer, 1997; The Wall Street Journal, 1981).  Such 
mimetic behavior resembles Smith et al.’s tit-for-tat imitation (K. G. Smith et al., 
1997), which measured an imitative response to a competitor’s action.  This 
marketing development transgressed to other hospitality industries, and within half a 
decade nearly all the major airlines, hotels, and car rental agencies had implemented 
                                                 
29 Priceline allows consumers to enter a binding price bid for an airline ticket, which the site attempts to 
pair with its inventory.  If the entered bid is matched with a ticket in the inventory the transaction is 
completed.  The consumer may only enter the departure and arrival destinations, and date of departure; 
airline brand, cabin, time of departure and arrival, and connections are not available options to the 
consumer. 
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loyalty programs (Frequent Flyer, 1997).  However, the airline industry’s low-cost 
strategic group was initially reluctant to implement such programs, however they 
eventually imitated their group competitors.  Southwest’s CEO is often quoted as 
saying: 
 
“We didn't want an FFP. But it came to my attention that FFPs were 
siphoning business travel away from us. We did it defensively, and I 
think if we had not done that we would have been terribly 
disadvantaged" (Frequent Flyer, 1997). 
 
This quote shows that LCC Southwest Airlines imitated its FSC competitors by 
mimicking the loyalty programs that so many had initiated as a defensive reaction to 
rivalrous behavior.  Industry behavior seems to reflect Smith et al.’s (K. G. Smith et 
al., 1997) findings that tit-for-tat imitation is apparent both within and among strategic 
groups, and rivalry is often a catalyst for such behavior.  Today, frequent flyer 
programs as a business model element are a very common sight among the world’s 
airlines.  However, some of Europe’s leading LCCs have been reluctant to implement 
the programs, just as their role model, Southwest Airlines, was hesitant, however 
many industry observers predict that such programs will eventually be implemented 
among European LCCs as their marketing potential may outweigh their costs (ATW, 
2005b; Bhagwanani, 2004; Klophaus, 2005; Rose, 2004; Thompson, 2006).  
Klophaus (2005) provides suggestions to how Europe’s LCCs may structure their 
FFPs, while this research project’s future configurational analysis (Chapter 8) will 
investigate whether LCCs should invest in such ventures.   
 
Organizational imitation is not new to the airline industry; rather than imitating 
selective business model elements some have attempted to mimic the entire business 
model, in the hopes of achieving superior results (Lindstädt & Fauser, 2004).  This is 
evidenced most clearly by the creation of separate LCC business units by FSCs.  
Morrell (2005) analyzes the creation of low cost subsidiaries by US FSCs, with the 
objective of spinning off profitable businesses, staving off and competing effectively 
against low cost competitors, and establishing a test-bed for low cost business model 
elements to eventually benefit mainline operations.  Prior to the millennium the US 
industry saw a plethora of LCC offshoots from FSCs: Continental’s Calite, United’s 
Shuttle by United, Delta’s Delta Express, and US Airways MetroJet.  None lasted 
more a decade (Morrell, 2005).  These LCC subsidiaries were hampered by lack of 
mainline differentiation, labor animosity, and most importantly, limited cost 
reductions.  US FSCs have again attempted the strategy of airlines within airlines 
(Morrell, 2005) with United establishing Ted and Delta’s Song.  Ted’s viability has 
often been questioned as the subsidiary has been diluting the mainline operations 
(Doganis, 2005), while Song was silenced in 2006.  However, Song was able to 
implement and test various service features that the mainline carrier adopted (Adams, 
2006; ATW, 2005a).  Such imitation behavior is not limited to the US market.  British 
Airways established Go (1998-2000), KLM established Buzz (2000-2003), SAS 
founded Snowflake (2002-2004), while still existing airlines within airlines include 
Qantas’ Jetstar, Singapore’s Tiger, and South African Airways’ Mango.   
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Network developments among LCCs have led some carriers to adopt similar FSC 
business model elements, or more specifically, cooperative feed traffic30 
arrangements.  FSCs have traditionally used regional inter-lining agreements to 
complement their network offering, as well as, obtain economies of density and scope 
(D. W. Caves et al., 1997; French, 1995), while the LCC business model has often 
focused on a solely operated point-to-point network (Alderighi, Cento, Nijkamp, & 
Rietveld, 2005; Calder, 2002; Tretheway, 2004).  FSC feed traffic has often been 
provided by smaller regional carriers through various cooperative agreements, such as 
franchise agreements (Dennis, 2005; Denton & Dennis, 2000) or capacity purchase 
agreements31 (CPAs) (Arnoult, 2007a; ATW, 2006a; ATW, 2007b).  The forerunner 
to today’s agreements was the Allegheny Commuter franchise of 1967.  This 
innovative business model of Allegheny Airlines32 was the first agreement between a 
full-service carrier and smaller regional carriers that placed the identifier code of the 
mainline carrier on all flights, integrated schedules, and published flights in computer 
reservation systems (Davies & Quastler, 1995).  This was nearly an exclusive 
business model until 1985 when the success of Eastern and Metro Express’, “…was 
highly publicized, and the operation was inevitably copied” (Davies & Quastler, 1995 
pg. 138).  Current examples of this business model include United Airlines’ short-haul 
operation, United Express, operated via CPAs by Skywest, Mesa, Shuttle America, 
Trans States Airlines, Chautauqua, and Colgan Air, or British Airways’ franchise 
operators Comair in South Africa, Sun Air in Denmark, and Loganair33 in Scotland.  
Various LCCs have adopted similar feed traffic agreements, although these are mainly 
restricted to the North American market.  Frontier had an agreement with Mesa to 
operate Frontier JetExpress, however Alaska Air Group’s, Horizon, took over the 
responsibility two years later.  Today, Republic operates the flights using 76-seat 
Embraer aircraft (Arnoult, 2006).  Currently, 8% of Frontier’s ASKs are provided by 
regional partners (see Appendix VI).  This agreement allows Frontier to place the 
smaller aircraft in less dense markets without the operational challenges, which is 
delegated to Republic, or to complement more dense routes with increased 
frequencies during off-peak times.  Frontier has recently started operations of a new, 
regional carrier, Lynx Aviation, using Bombardier Dash 8-400 turboprop aircraft to 
service markets within 650 miles with a cost base 30% lower than mainline operations 
(Karp, 2006; Ranson, 2006; C. Walsh, 2006; Yamanouchi, 2006).  Additional LCC 
feed share agreements have been America West Express and Midwest Connect.  
These types of agreements show that the LCC strategic group is open to imitation 
beyond their own group’s borders.  This behavior will be address in more detail in 
Chapters 6 and 7.   
                                                 
30 This element is described in detail in Chapter 5, however a brief definition is provided. Feed traffic 
refers to the common FSC strategy of cooperating with smaller, regional carriers to operate in less 
dense markets to feed traffic into the FSC network. 
31 CPAs are agreements between a feed share carrier and mainline carrier and are nearly exclusive to 
the North American market.  Agreements vary from carrier to carrier, however the main structure is 
that a regional carrier agrees to provide a certain amount of capacity with the associated costs absorbed 
by the mainline carrier.  In exchange, the mainline carrier is responsible for marketing and sales, and 
benefits by depositing all the revenue earned.  The agreements often include a predetermined fee paid 
by the mainline carrier to the regional carrier.  CPAs are similar to wet-lease contracts but extend over 
many years and are more integrated, while wet-lease arrangements tend to be short-term (i.e. 
approximately 2-3 years (Regional A1, 2008)).  In addition, the party retraining the revenue and 
exposure to costs varies between the two agreements. 
32 Renamed USAir in 1979 
33 This agreement will cease in October 2008 (Low-Fare and Regional Airlines, 2008a) 
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This chapter attempts to apply the research project’s theoretical foundations to the 
airline industry, and reviews the literature that is specifically applicable to this realm.  
Examples of imitation and innovation within the industry are provided to allow the 
reader to grasp and apply the concepts.  The following chapter will delve deeper into 
the research and introduce the specific business model elements that are researched in 
this project and their measurement. 
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5. Hypotheses and propositions  
- At 31,285 cubic feet the passenger cabin of a 747 contains pressurized air that 
weighs approximately 1 ton - 
 
 
Hypotheses, propositions, methods, and variables are the ingredients of a researcher’s 
project.  Hypotheses are assumptions that the researcher would like to test using 
appropriate methods, while variables are the elements that researchers use to test 
hypotheses.  This chapter will explain in detail the hypotheses, methods, and variables 
that are used throughout the project.  The hypotheses are presented first, which will 
introduce the reader to the overarching aim of the research.  This is followed by a 
discussion of the methods used to address the chosen hypotheses, while the 
presentation of variables explains in detail to the reader how constructs were 
measured.  Finally, an explanation of the study groups used to analyze the industry 
concludes the chapter.   
 
5.1 Hypotheses and propositions 
The main research question of this project, what will be the successful future airline 
business models, and the three supporting questions are comprised of hypotheses and 
propositions.  Hypotheses are assumptions that the researcher believes describe the 
airline industry; they can be tested and either proven or disproved by the researcher.  
Propositions, on the other hand, are presented by the researcher which can be 
accepted or not by the reader.  The propositions are the researcher’s bid for what 
shape the future airline industry’s business models may take.  It is not possible to test 
and prove future propositions; acceptance should be grounded in the applied research 
strategy, methods, and responses from airline representatives that were confronted 
with the research results.  
 
The main research question is supported by the three sub-questions: 
1. How does the variation of airline business models affect profit? 
2. Why is there variation in airline business models? 
3. What future airline business models can be proposed?  
 
Integral research questions comprise the three sub-questions.  Figure 5.1 is an 
organizational chart consisting of five levels that show the structure of sub-questions 
and the hypotheses and propositions.  The chart only displays the hypothesis and 
proposition number.  A detailed explanation can be found proceeding the figure.   
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Figure 5.1: Hypotheses and proposition organizational chart 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
5.1.1 Business model purity: H1 
Sub-question 1, how does the variation of an airline’s business model affect profit, 
can be rephrased in terms of business model purity (Alamdari & Fagan, 2005).  A 
pure business model is one that adheres to the traditional model of the respective 
strategic group, as presented in Chapter 4.  Past research has shown that airlines with 
pure business models have higher profits than those without (Alamdari & Fagan, 
2005).  However, this research was only applied to the LCC group.  The researcher 
wishes to test this research across the industry.  Hypothesis 1 states: 
 
  78
H1: The more pure an airline’s business model the greater the operational 
profit margin. 
 
5.1.2 Business model change: H2-4 
Hypothesis 1 investigates the level of an airline’s adherence to the traditional business 
model in the respective strategic groups.  It will be determined whether business 
model variation does exist in the airline industry.  The next challenge is investigating 
what is the source of business model change.  Airlines change their business models 
for various reasons and use either imitation or innovation as a tool.  The following 
hypotheses are grounded in the strategic group theory and incorporate the 
segmentation of airlines as pure (i.e. core) airlines and non-pure (i.e. secondary).  The 
hypotheses incorporate a main assumption: an airline’s level of adherence to the 
traditional business model will affect the types of business model change. 
 
H2A: The more pure the business model the more innovative an airline. 
H2B:  The less pure the business model the more imitation among strategic 
groups. 
H2C: The less pure the business model the more imitation within strategic 
groups. 
 
It may appear counterintuitive to state that pure airlines are more innovative than less 
pure carriers as innovation implies change, which should mean that innovative 
carriers would become less pure as they change.  However, innovation is measured by 
analyzing the amount a carrier changes its traditional business model elements (see 
5.3.2.5).  Innovation, therefore, fails to capture the changes that drive a carrier to less 
purity; this is the role of imitation.   
 
Rivalry is an important concept within the strategic group realm and has been 
incorporated in the next hypotheses.  The goal is to research the presence of rivalry in 
the industry and its affect on business model imitation, both internally and externally. 
 
H3A: A high rivalry within a strategic group will negatively affect internal 
imitation of airlines with a pure business model. 
H3B: A high rivalry within a strategic group will negatively affect external 
imitation of airlines with a pure business model. 
H3C: A high rivalry among strategic groups will negatively affect internal 
imitation of airlines with a pure business model. 
H3D: A high rivalry among strategic groups will negatively affect external 
imitation of airlines with a pure business model. 
 
Rivalry’s affect, both internally and externally, on innovation is captured in the final 
hypotheses.  Rivalry will affect innovation of an airline’s business model is the main 
question being addressed. 
 
H4A: A high rivalry within a group will positively affect innovation of 
airlines with a pure business model. 
H4B: A high rivalry among groups will positively affect innovation of 
airlines with a pure business model. 
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5.1.3 Business model propositions: P1-13 
The previous hypotheses all support the final analyses, comparative configurations of 
future airline business models.  The hypotheses test the business model variation in 
the industry and explanations for this deviation.  Comparative configurations give the 
researcher a method for analyzing what impact innovation and imitation will have on 
future business models.  The method incorporates Boolean algebra, which is 
explained in detail further in the chapter.  There are two innovation-propositions for 
each strategic group, four imitation-propositions among strategic groups, and one 
imitation-proposition within each strategic group.  Table 5.1 categorizes the 
propositions according to macro-level variable headings.  They are propositions 
regarding future general trends in the industry, rather than detailed and specific 
predictions.  The propositions will be compared with the findings from the QCA 
analyses to test their accuracy, similar to testing hypotheses. 
 
Table 5.1: Overview of propositions 1-13 using variable headings 
      
Proposition Network Distribution Service Operational 
     
Innovation     
P1 Innovation:  pure FSC 
Sustained 
integration 
Sustained 
GDS presence 
Sustained service 
levels 
Fleet 
standardization 
and longer stage 
lengths 
P2 Innovation:  pure LCC 
Sustained 
network 
segmentation 
Sustained 
GDS absence 
Sustained “no-
frills” concept 
Sustained fleet 
standardization 
P3 Innovation:  pure regional 
Network 
integration with 
CLT 
Sustained CLT 
reliance 
Sustained CLT 
reliance 
Fleet 
standardization 
P4 Innovation:  non-pure FSC 
Increased ticket 
flexibility 
Sustained 
GDS presence 
Sustained service 
levels 
Fleet non-
standardization 
P5 Innovation: non-pure LCC 
Restricted 
network 
integration 
Restricted 
GDS presence 
Restricted 
unbundled 
service 
Fleet non-
standardized & 
longer stage 
lengths 
P6 Innovation: non-pure regional 
Network 
integration as 
stand alone 
carrier 
Sustained 
GDS presence 
Sustained 
complementary 
service 
Fleet  
non-
standardization 
      
External imitation     
P7 
Imitation:  
non-pure FSC & 
non-pure LCC 
Increased 
network 
integration 
Increased GDS 
presence via 
third-parties 
Unbundled 
service features 
Fleet 
standardization 
P8 
Imitation: 
non-pure FSC & 
non-pure regional 
Increased 
network 
integration & 
CLP 
Sustained 
GDS absence 
Sustained 
reliance on 
partner providers 
Fleet 
standardization 
P9 
Imitation: 
non-pure LCC & 
non-pure regional 
Network 
segregation 
Increased GDS 
presence via 
third-parties 
Unbundled 
service features 
Fleet 
standardization 
P10 
Imitation: 
non-pure FSC & 
non-pure LCC & 
non-pure regional 
Increased 
network 
integration 
Sustained 
GDS presence 
Unbundled 
service features 
Fleet 
standardization 
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Internal imitation     
P11 
Imitation: 
pure FSC &  
non-pure FSC 
Network 
segregation 
Sustained 
GDS presence 
Sustained service 
levels 
Fleet 
standardization 
P12 
Imitation: 
pure LCC &  
non-pure LCC 
Network 
integration 
GDS presence 
via third-
parties 
Unbundled 
services 
Fleet 
standardization 
P13 
Imitation: 
pure regional & 
non-pure regional 
Sustained 
network 
integration 
Sustained 
GDS presence 
via partners 
Sustained 
bundled services 
via partners 
Fleet 
standardization 
      
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
Configurational comparative analysis will allow the researcher to propose which 
unique combinations of business model variables the industry may witness in the 
future, grounded in either innovation or imitation.  The method, described in the next 
section, may not utilize all of the 18 variables analyzed in its conclusions.  Therefore, 
the researcher’s propositions only focus on those variables that are believed to be 
included.  The results may indicate otherwise.  The propositions under each variable 
heading utilize key words, which are explained in the following section.   
 
The propositions under the network heading focus on integration, segregation, 
complementation, and flexibility.  Network integration is defined as a network that 
relies on through-fares, restrictions, interlining, onlining, alliances, codeshares, and 
capacity lift.  These features need not be limited to FSCs and not all business model 
variables must be present for a network to be integrated.  Segregation implies a 
business model that focuses on a point-to-point network, and has few or none of the 
integrated variables.  A complementary network is often a supporting, short-haul 
network offered by a regional carrier.  These carriers will offer their partner airlines 
capacity and feed traffic either through an alliance, codeshare, or capacity lift 
provider.   
 
Distribution propositions relate to GDSs and suggest absence, presence, or presence 
via a third-party provider.  Some propositions suggest that carriers will maintain their 
current GDS presence while others may opt to join this traditional distribution 
channel.  Existing and future IT solutions may allow carriers to join GDSs on a 
limited basis through third-party providers.  Such a solution may offer a cost and 
revenue advantage to participants.   
 
Service features in the future will either be bundled or unbundled.  This relates to 
offerings such as loyalty programs and lounge access.  Costs associated with a service 
offering may be subsidized by passenger fare expenses or they may be unbundled and 
paid for on a piece-meal basis.  The bundling of service offerings may entice more 
passengers to experience the service; however the higher cost may deter some from 
purchasing a ticket with a carrier.  An unbundled service feature brings transparency 
and allows the passenger to judge the value of the offering; however the transparent 
cost may deter some from experiencing the offering.  In addition, it is proposed that 
services to secondary airports may supersede bundled/unbundled service features for 
selected business model change in the future. 
 
Operational propositions will focus on either fleet standardization or stage lengths.  
Standardization of fleets will be a primary operational change for carriers in an 
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What will be the successful future airline business models? 
Business model purity hypothesis Business model change hypotheses Future business model propositions 
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Kruskall-Wallis test
Comparative configurational analysesRegression 
attempt to lower costs.  Stage lengths may be lengthened or shortened in the future to 
enter new markets with a new business model, or to complement existing networks.   
 
The hypotheses and propositions that will be addressed in the analyses have been 
described.  The following section of this chapter will explain the methods utilized in 
the research project to address the above-mentioned hypotheses and propositions.   
 
5.2 Methods 
The methods utilized in research vary according to the type of data accumulated, 
procedure, and desired format of the outcome.  This research utilizes four methods, 
presented in figure 5.2 and their relationship to the specific analysis, to address the 
three sub-questions.  This section will describe the methods individually and conclude 
with an overview of the variables that are utilized in each analysis and method. 
 
Figure 5.2: Specific methods used to address sub-questions 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
Hypothesis 1 utilizes two methods, correlation and regression, to accommodate the 
type of data available to address the research question.  The aim is to show the 
relationship between business model purity and profit.  An analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) and Kruskall-Wallis test are used to address the level of variance between 
variables in hypothesis 2.  This research studies the variation within and among 
carriers in the respective strategic groups.  The final analysis, hypothesis 3, proposes 
future business model configurations using qualitative comparative approach, also 
known as comparative configurational analyses.  The descriptions of the correlation, 
regression, ANOVA, and Kruskall-Wallis test are mere summaries as these are 
standard and often used methods.  The researcher points the reader in the direction of 
statistics books for more detailed explanations, such as Aczel and Sounderpandian 
(2002), Weiers (1998), and Carlson et al. (2003). 
 
Correlation 
While one may be interested in knowing whether two variables are related and use a 
coefficient of correlation or chi-square analysis these results fail to show in what way 
the variables are related.  For this one may use a correlation analysis.  A correlation 
analysis measures the strength and direction of a relationship between variables; it 
searches for interdependence.  The correlation between two random variables x and y 
is a measure of the degree of linear association between the two variables (Aczel & 
Sounderpandian, 2002 pg. 448).  In the analysis that utilizes this method the 
independent variable (x) is business model purity and the dependent variable (y) is the 
operating profit margin.  Correlations can be linear, y increases as x increases, or non-
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linear, y increases as x increases but then y changes directions and decreases.  This 
analysis studies the relationship in a linear fashion.  In other words, the researcher 
investigates the rise or fall in operating margin as business model purity changes. 
 
The correlation coefficient, or r, shows the strength and direction of the relationship.  
The values of r can vary from -1.0 to +1.0; if r is positive the relationship is positive, 
y increases as x increases, or conversely if r is negative.  The correlation equation is 
well known and can be found from a range of sources (Carlson et al., 2003 pg. 65), 
therefore the researcher will omit from publishing it.  MS Excel was used to calculate 
the correlation in this project. 
 
Partial correlation 
While correlation analyses investigate the strength and direction between two 
variables it may be appropriate to test for the effect of external influences.  This is 
done by performing a partial correlation, which controls for a third, or more, 
variables.  These variables are referred to as control variables.  The results of the 
controlled correlation are compared with the original correlation to determine the 
affect of the control variable.  If there is no difference one may constitute that the 
control variable has no affect, however if the controlled correlation approaches 0 one 
may state that the original correlation is influenced externally.  MS Excel was used to 
calculate the partial correlations with add-on WinSTAT34. 
 
Regression 
Correlation concerns itself with the degree of association between variables while a 
regression analysis seeks to describe the dependence of the dependent variable on the 
independent variable.  The difference is that while correlation may confirm that a 
relationship exists, it does not tell whether there is dependence; a change in the 
independent variable will lead to a change in the dependent variable.  Through 
utilization of a regression analysis the symmetry of the statement, the correlation 
between x and y or the correlation between y and x, is removed.   
 
The coefficient of determination, or r2, measures the strength of a relationship.  A 
measure of how well the regression line fits the data.  The r2 figure explains the 
percentage of variation in y that is explained by the regression line.  The number is 
between 0 and 1; 0 being the line explains none of the variation of y, and 1 signals 
that all is explained.  The coefficient of determination reveals nothing about the 
direction of the relationship, or, in other words, a negative or positive association.  
However, the value of r2 reveals the power of prediction.  A greater value allows for 
more accurate predictions.   For this method the researcher utilized MS Excel.  While 
the correlation and regression methods are utilized to investigate the relationship of 
business model purity and financial success the analysis of variance method is used to 
study the survey responses from the industry.  This method is explained in the 
following section. 
 
                                                 
34 http://www.winstat.com/ 
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ANOVA 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) method is utilized to study the second hypothesis 
regarding business model change.  ANOVA compares the means of groups and tests 
for significant differences between the groups, which is appropriate for this research 
investigating variation between pure and non-pure airline business model change.  
ANOVA is a statistical method for determining the existence of differences among 
several population means (Aczel & Sounderpandian, 2002 pg. 370).  A factor is the 
independent variable(s) and is the cause in variation; in this research the constructed 
business model variables.  The ANOVA equation is found in numerous statistical 
textbooks (Aczel & Sounderpandian, 2002; Carlson et al., 2003; Weiers, 1998) and 
the research will refrain from presenting a copy here.   
 
ANOVA has related statistical calculations which are necessary for determining the 
validity of the ANOVA results.  These calculations include the F-statistic and the 
significance.  These two calculations have an inverse relationship; as F-statistic 
increases, significance decreases.  The F-statistic is a ratio that compares the variation 
between groups and variation within groups.  In other words, as the distance increases 
one may have greater confidence in the results because there is greater difference 
between the groups under study.  Significance, on the other hand, is a test which 
shows the probability of calculating a statistic that is statistically significant.  
Statistically significant is a choice that the researcher makes and often lies at either 
5% or 1%.   
 
The Kruskall-Wallis test is similar to the ANOVA method, however it addresses the 
issue of a non-normally distributed population and utilizes ranks within groupings as 
measurement rather than means (Kruskal & Wallis, 1952).  The advantages of this 
include simplified calculation, only very general assumptions are made, and data in 
ordinal form may be used; it does not assume normal distribution, although it does 
assume that observations come from populations with the same shape of distribution 
(J. H. McDonald, 2007).  The observation with the lowest value is ranked as a 1, the 
second-lowest 2, and so forth.  If there are observations with identical values they are 
all assigned an average rank.  A group containing less than five observations is 
deemed too small (J. H. McDonald, 2007).  The Kruskal-Wallis equation is not 
presented in this project but can be found in various publications (Aczel & 
Sounderpandian, 2002; Carlson et al., 2003; J. H. McDonald, 2007; Weiers, 1998).  
The test statistics report the significance of the results, which must often be below 5% 
to be considered significantly different.  In other words, if the results are significant it 
shows that there is significant difference between the groups analyzed, and the mean 
rankings show which group is significantly different.  The statistical software 
package, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), was employed to run 
both the ANOVA and Kruskall-Wallis tests. 
 
This section reviewed the ANOVA and Kruskall-Wallis test methods that are used to 
study how business models change in the airline industry.  The final method utilized, 
comparative configurational analysis, is new to the field of business model change 
and is explained in detail in the following section. 
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Comparative configurational analysis 
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines compare (Merriam-Webster) as:  
 
“To represent as similar; to examine the character or qualities of, 
especially in order to discover resemblances or differences; to view in 
relation to.” 
 
Researchers are often tasked with comparative analyses, either in the hope of 
identifying similarities or differences; although the term contrast is more appropriate 
when seeking dissimilarities.  One aspect of this research project is a comparative 
analysis of airline business models which attempts to highlight the evolutionary 
direction of the industry.  This comparison is applied in the researcher’s slightly 
feigned assumption that it is possible to precisely predict the future; although a 
presentation of likely scenarios in the future airline industry is possible.  The intention 
of the propositions (see table 5.10) and their testing is to present the reader with 
scenarios of future industrial evolution.  Scenarios may be used to explore uncertainty 
and prioritize issues, identify signals of emerging risks, focus attention on external 
challenges, or to prepare for surprises (Ringland, 2002).  These scenarios are created 
using qualitative comparative analysis35 (QCA) (Ragin, 1987), whose underlying 
concepts, and application are presented in the following section.  
 
A comparative analysis allows a researcher to compare or contrast two or more 
elements, for example theories, articles, or in this research project’s realm, airline 
business models.  A comparatist must elect from which lens the comparison is 
conducted.  Does the researcher elect to view element B through the lens of A, or are 
both elements equally weighted?  The chosen perspective influences the analysis.  In 
this research there are three lenses, the full-service carrier, low-cost carrier, and the 
regional carrier.  Each case group is viewed irrespective of the other and afforded 
equal weight.  Once the comparatist lens is formed the researcher often faces an 
analytical dilemma: complexity versus generalization.  Research that focuses on 
complexity often relies on qualitative, case-oriented, or small-N methods; while 
research that provides generalization is often quantitative, variable-oriented, or large-
N focused.  This over-simplified, polarization of research methods often portrays 
complex research as "...rich and emancipatory but soft and subjective," and general 
research as, "...scientific but sterile and oppressive" (Ragin, 2000 pg. 22).  The case-
oriented researcher is focused on depth, while the variable-oriented researcher 
demands breadth.  As Rihoux (2006) points out, topics of interest are sometimes 
limited in number, especially at the meso-sociological level (e.g. firms), which 
demands that researchers posses techniques for analyzing small-n populations.  As 
Ragin (Ragin, 2000 pg. 25) shows there are an abundance of small-n studies and 
large-n studies, with a depression within medium-n.  In addition, there appears to be 
an inverse relationship between the number of cases and the number of variables that 
researchers study researchers tend to study either many cases with few variables or 
few cases with many variables as shown in figure 5.3 (adopted from Ragin 2000). 
                                                 
35 Qualitative comparative analysis is a term that has yet to be fully adopted by the community.  Other 
names that may be used include comparative configuration analysis.  The author uses both of these 
interchangeably.  
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Figure 5.3: Relationship between number of cases and number of studies and 
variables  
 
Source: Adopted from Ragin (2000)) 
  
These two analytical methods do have their advantages and disadvantages.  When a 
study analyzes a large number of cases it is challenging to conduct an in-depth study; 
the details eventually become blurred and the researcher is challenged to remember, 
distinguish, and analyze the data.  Quantitative studies are more appropriate for large-
N studies; however breadth replaces depth.  Qualitative studies attempt to understand 
how all the different pieces interact within a case; this configurational view sees case 
elements as interconnected, as in a systems approach.  However, quantitative studies 
attempt to understand how the pieces fit together among cases, or cross-case analysis; 
a pattern of co-variation is the evidence researchers seek (Ragin, 2000).  Case-
oriented studies offer answers that are intensively analyzed and justified by showing 
compatibility with other case-aspects or cases, and are commonly used to answer 
questions regarding cultural or historical phenomenon; while variable-oriented studies 
provide answers that are extensively correct using many observations and justified by 
showing generability, and are suited to identify broad, theoretically relevant patterns 
(Ragin, 2000).  Ragin (2000) stresses that academic environments have aided in 
creating a polarization of researchers who tend to identify themselves and each other 
as purely qualitative or quantitative; Crane (1972) mentions the formation of invisible 
colleges which reinforces this methodological dichotomy.   
 
Quantitative studies are common-place within strategic literature (Ketchen, Jr., 
Thomas, & Snow, 1993; Scandura & Williams, 2000), however the strategic 
management community’s ebb into business model analysis has failed to bring along 
quantitative methods.  The same can be said about analyses of airline business 
models.  Quantified data and metrics are abundant in the industry, yet for various 
reasons they have yet to be adapted and applied rigorously within the business model 
framework.  One may cautiously state that qualitative methods may precede 
quantitative in some fields as descriptive, explanatory characteristics of cases is easier 
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for researchers to analyze compared to quantification of case aspects.  As the field 
expands the community may begin exploring quantitative methods.  One transitional 
step in this research progression may be a bridge between the dichotomous qualitative 
and quantitative methods, which is precisely what Charles Ragin has accomplished 
with development of the qualitative comparative approach (QCA).  This allows a 
formal analysis in a small-N setting.  The term qualitative should not be understood as 
solely an interpretative method, but rather as a configurational method; QCA analyzes 
the presence or absence of variables, and determines specific configurations that 
explain a designated outcome.  The term comparative configurational analysis may 
be a more accurate description.   
 
QCA builds upon previous work on comparative methods (Gee, 1950; Smelser, 1973) 
and attempts to apply quantitative rigor within a qualitative realm; which Gerring 
(2001) rates as one of the few genuine methodological innovations of the last decade.  
Comparatists are focused on studying how various conditions or causes fit together in 
a particular setting and result in specific outcomes, and compare that with how 
conditions or causes fit together in another setting with specific outcomes; set 
theoretic methods are used to analyze causal complexity in a cross-case arena 
(Rihoux, 2006).  Each observational entity (Ragin, 1987 pg. 13), or case, is analyzed 
as an interpretable combination of parts, in other words, it is regarded holistically, 
complementing the systems approach perspective (Arbnor & Bjerke, 1996).  QCA has 
five general purposes as a methodology (Rihoux, 2006), presented from basic to 
complex.  First, it may used to summarize data in a truth table (presented in detail 
further on), which aids a researcher’s data exploration.  A review of data coherence 
and logical contradictions is a process that QCA does well.  It can also be used to test 
hypotheses or theories, as well as, testing of researcher’s assumptions.  Finally, in 
more complex situations QCA can be utilized to develop new theoretical assumptions.  
As Rihoux and Ragin (2004) state, the research community, as a whole, is still 
exploring the uses of QCA and some of the current uses are under explored.  This 
researcher intends to expand the use of QCA.  First, by contributing to the small but 
growing community of users within the fields of economics and management 
(Compasss, 2008), and by presenting a new application of QCA: predictions for future 
business models. 
 
The comparative method is based on logical methods (Gee, 1950; Mill, 1843), where 
researchers attempt to pinpoint commonalities across cases.  In practical terms, one 
identifies cases that share a given outcome and one attempts to identify shared causal 
conditions.  Or, one may elect to examine cases that all share a causal condition and 
determine whether these cases share a similar outcome.  Comparative method does 
not rely on common statistical criteria, but rather logical processes.  Seawright (2005) 
concludes that QCA should not be regarded as an advancement over statistical 
regression, however Ragin (1987) stresses his work in QCA is not to be seen as a 
replacement for quantitative methods but rather as a complement to current causal 
research; as a tool for small-n studies challenged by statistical limitations, and 
somewhat as a bridge between qualitative and quantitative methods, also referred to 
as a synthetic strategy by Ragin (1987), which attempts to “…integrate the best 
features of the case-oriented approach with the best features of the variable-oriented 
approach” (Ragin, 1987 pg. 84).  QCA has fewer formal boundaries compared to 
quantitative methods.  For instance, an infrequently occurring combination of 
conditions is equally weighted with a frequently occurring combination of conditions; 
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in other words, frequency of occurrence is irrelevant.  A statistical analysis of such a 
phenomenon might dilute the infrequent occurrence to the point that it does not 
influence the results, which may limit a study’s findings; outliers are often ignored 
though they may be rich in explanatory power.  Case diversity is diffused or even 
omitted in statistical methods, while the comparative process embraces heterogeneity.  
Statistical relevance, such as samples, populations, and frequency, are not relevant in 
the comparative method, which has many advantages over its statistical counterpart, 
especially in a small-n setting.  The comparative method surpasses statistical analyses 
in that combinatorial analyses are possible.  Statistical methods typically analyze 
conditions in a singular, linear manner.  Although, analyses of statistical interactions 
in a non-linear manner is possible this is challenged by collinearity and scarce degrees 
of freedom, especially in a small-n setting (Ragin, 1987).  The comparative method’s 
result considers every instance of a particular phenomenon; although deviating results 
may be evident, they are highlighted by the method and allow the researcher to delve 
deeper into the phenomenon.  Field boundaries within the method are determined by 
the researcher rather than by the population or data set.  Statistical methods are 
sometimes challenged by the source of information available which limits the sample 
used.  Finally, the comparative method requires the researcher to become intimately 
familiar with cases, as opposed to the statistical method which merely requires the 
researcher to disaggregate a sample into variables for a distanced analysis; QCA de-
emphasizes analysis of variables in isolation from the cases they describe (Seawright, 
2005).  Lieberson ( in Marx, 2005) criticizes QCA as being unable to distinguish real 
from random models, which would render the method useless.  However, Marx 
(2005) shows through a methodological experiment that variable bias is avoided by 
ensuring that QCA uses few variables and a significant number of cases.  Marx (2005)   
suggests that QCA research with up to 50 cases should limit the number of variables 
to a maximum of eight36.  Although, the over-simplified, polarization statement that 
small-n studies are only suitable with QCA methods and large-n studies for 
quantitative studies, the current QCA bibliographical database (Compasss, 2008) 
shows otherwise.  While a large number of studies look at five cases or less, there are 
more than 15 that observe between 10 and 50 cases (Rihoux, 2006), as well as, some 
studies that utilized cases that numbered in the thousands (Amoroso & Ragin, 1999; 
Miethe & Drass, 1999).  Limits to case selection are only restricted by the 
researcher’s tolerance for complexity and interest in familiarity with each case.  
Herein lays the strength of QCA and its overlap with quantitative facets.  QCA and its 
ability to analyze a large number of cases open up the method to generalization, a key 
tenet of quantitative studies (Rihoux, 2006).  Scientific advancement is possible as 
QCA is a replicable, analytic approach which allows others to corroborate results, 
however the method does leave room for holistic interpretation, as it is a transparent 
technique which requires a researcher’s theoretical understanding and justification.   
Algebraic logic 
The underlying comparative quantitative logic of QCA is Boolean algebra, which is 
also referred to as the algebra of logic or the algebra of sets (Ragin, 1987).  Boolean 
algebra was invented by the British mathematician and philosopher, George Boole, in 
the mid-19th century, and is at the core of computer science and electrical circuitry 
(Boole, 1854; MacHale, 1985).  Boolean algebra and QCA views cases with varying 
combinations holistically and identifies patterns of multiple conjectural causation.  It 
                                                 
36 This project uses, on average, 31 cases and 16 variables in the MVQCA analyses  
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has a narrowing, funnel-like approach to minimizing complexity as it proceeds from 
the bottom up (Ragin, 1987).  It begins with the highest level of complexity: every 
logically possible combination of case variables is analyzed, which are reduced 
through experiment-like contrasts.  The final result is a parsimonious, causal 
descriptor of logical sets that explain a specific outcome.   
 
In QCA cases are represented by independent variables, referred to as conditions, and 
dependent variables, called outcomes.  In traditional QCA conditions or outcomes are 
dichotomously noted as either true or false; present or absent; black or white.  These 
are coded as 1 (true; present) or 0 (false; absent); presence is often indicated by an 
uppercase condition and absence by lower case, if binary digits are not used to 
represent conditions.  QCA advancements allowing non-dichotomous notation will be 
described and applied in the following sections.  There are two Boolean notations that 
QCA utilizes which are tantamount, conjunction and disjunction, which differ from 
mathematical notation.  Conjunction is logical AND, which is represented by a 
multiplication symbol (* or x); this symbol is commonly omitted and implied in 
analyses.  Disjunction is logical OR, which is represented by an addition symbol (+); 
this symbol is always present and not implied, unlike logical and.  Table 5.2 is an 
example of Boolean set notation, which shows the use of codings {1} and {0}, and 
logical and.  It shows how, for example, Copenhagen is a capital city and it is in 
Europe and it is not large, or that students who study hard and pass an exam or 
students who do not study hard and do not pass an exam. 
 
Table 5.2: Example of Boolean set notation 
  
Variable Set notation description 
  
Copenhagen Capital{1} * Europe{1} * Large{0} 
New York Capital{0} * Europe{0} * Large{1} 
Students Study hard {1} * Pass exam{1} + study hard {0}* Pass exam {0}  
  
Source: Adopted from Cronqvist (2007a) 
 
Application of QCA 
QCA operates in a four-step process:  
1. A truth table is generated,  
2. The truth table is minimized,  
3. Prime implicants are extracted, and  
4. Prime implicants are minimized to QCA solutions, as QCA attempts to 
identify the most parsimonious solution, or the shortest solution possible to 
explain the desired outcome.   
 
A truth table is generated from the raw data a researcher gathers and displays the 
configurations observed.  It is the researcher’s assessment and theoretical knowledge 
which determines the dichotomous, binary (0 or 1) set notation.  Thresholds which 
determine the recoding of raw data are determined by the researcher.  The truth table 
is then minimized.  Identical configurations are grouped together; as already stated, 
frequency of occurrence is irrelevant in QCA.  Within the truth table cases with 
identical configurations yet differing outcomes (some with outcomes 1 and others 
with outcome 0) are noted as C, or contradictions.  Once the truth table is minimized 
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the prime implicants are extracted; they are the unique combinations of conditions 
that uniquely explain an outcome, which can be coded as 0, 1, or C.  It is the 
researcher who elects to explain which of the three outcomes is to be explained.  The 
final step in QCA is to algebraically minimize the prime implicants to determine the 
QCA solution.  Appendix IV explains in greater detail the underlying logic of QCA, 
notation, and algebraic solutions, however, a small example is listed in table 5.3.  
There are three conditions in this example (A, B, and C) and 11 cases that are 
observed.  The example solves for an absence of the outcome, coded as 0.  Note that a 
lowercase condition indicates an absence, while an uppercase condition indicates a 
presence. 
 
Table 5.3: QCA example     
     
Truth table     
Case Conditions   Outcome 
 A B C O 
     
C1 0 0 0 0 
C2 0 0 1 0 
C3 0 1 0 0 
C4 0 1 1 0 
C5 0 1 0 0 
C6 1 0 0 1 
C7 1 0 1 0 
C8 1 1 0 1 
C9 1 1 1 1 
C10 1 0 1 0 
C11 0 1 1 0 
     
Minimized truth table     
     
C1 0 0 0 0 
C2 0 0 1 0 
C3, C5 0 1 0 0 
C4, C11 0 1 1 0 
C6 1 0 0 1 
C7, C10 1 0 1 0 
C8 1 1 0 1 
C9 1 1 1 1 
     
Prime implicants Minimization    
(step 1) (step 2) (step 3)   
     
abc ab a   
abC ac bC   
aBc aC    
aBC aB    
AbC bC    
     
Parsimonious solution     
     
0 = a + bC     
     
Source: Adopted from Ragin (1987) 
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This example shows the steps of a QCA analysis, and that the outcome 0 is explained 
by an absence of condition “a” or (indicated by the “+” symbol) the absence of 
condition “b” and (indicated by the implied “*” symbol) the presence of condition 
“C”.  This solution leads to the concepts of necessity and sufficiency.  A necessary 
condition is one which must be present for the outcome to occur, and all cases with 
the outcome share this condition.  There is no necessary condition present in the 
solution above; however if the reader solves for outcome 1, the reader will find a 
necessary condition.  A sufficient condition is one which in which the outcome occurs 
every time the condition occurs, however the outcome might occur in cases without 
this condition.  In the example above an absence of condition “a” is sufficient to 
explain outcome 0, however it does not explain every case containing this outcome.  
Therefore, solution “bC” must also be added.   
 
The basic tenets of Boolean algebra and QCA methods have been presented which 
introduce the methodology invented by Charles Ragin.  Although it is possible to 
perform a simple Boolean analysis by hand, as shown by the example above, more 
complicated data sets require the use of computer software.  There are two commonly 
used software packages: fs/QCA developed by Ragin et al. (Ragin, Drass, & Davey, 
2006) and TOSMANA developed by Lasse Cronqvist (Cronqvist, 2007b) which use 
the Quine-McCluskey algorithm.  QCA was originally designed for research in 
political science and historical contexts, which are the typical realms in which 
comparatists operate.  However, the method is expanding to encompass a wide range 
of other fields; a review of the bibliography on the Comparative methods for the 
Advance of Systematic cross-case analysis and Small-n Studies (Compasss) website 
(Compasss, 2008) lists studies using qualitative comparative analysis in fields that 
include sociology, economics and management, law and criminology, psychology and 
education, geography, philosophy and theology, life science, and applied science, 
although more than two-thirds of the documents are related to political science 
(Rihoux, 2006).   
 
Non-dichotomy 
Those who regard society through a black and white lens may benefit from a QCA 
analysis; however such a method disregards the shades of grey that may be present.  
Although QCA is a useful method its dichotomous nature constrains its advancement 
to other fields, therefore two complementary techniques have been added to the QCA 
realm: fuzzy-sets and multi-value QCA.  This research project utilizes multi-value 
QCA, which will be described in detail; however fuzzy-sets will be briefly presented 
to provide a holistic understanding of the various methods.  Ragin (Ragin, 1987; 
Ragin, 2000) built upon the QCA method by developing fuzzy-set QCA, which 
signals that conditions can have varying degrees of set membership rather than a 
dichotomous classification.  As Ragin (2000) explains, people’s height or investment 
risk is poorly coded using dichotomous notation.  Fuzzy sets build on QCA algebra 
but incorporate interpretation, which is half verbal-conceptual and half mathematical-
analytical, allowing researchers to become more intimate with ideas and evidence.  In 
essence, a fuzzy set allows researchers to code conditions between the dichotomous 
values of 0 and 1; social science’s shades of grey are brought to the surface.   
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Fuzzy sets allow a researcher to have greater dialogue with the algebraic method as 
the set is more infused with theoretical and substantive knowledge, which allow one 
to customize the set to best suit theoretical concepts.  It is imperative that condition 
coding and diversity is grounded in a researcher’s knowledge, otherwise its accuracy 
is not utilized.  Fuzzy sets combine both quantitative and qualitative assessment into 
one method (Ragin, 2000); even more so than the original QCA.  Each set contains 
two qualitative conditions: full non-membership (0) and full membership (1) and all 
the quantitative interpretation that lies between.  This tool does not restrict researchers 
to choose between pure dichotomous representations but allows multiple 
interpretations of a concept.  This method takes a closer step to quantitative methods 
as it is more probabilistic in its logic than QCA or multi-value QCA, which is veristic.  
fs/QCA is best used in situations with a larger N; it is generally accepted that 50 cases 
is the minimum necessary to utilize fuzzy-sets.  For more detailed information 
regarding this method see Ragin (2000). 
 
Multi-value QCA 
Cronqvist (Cronqvist, 2007b) developed multi-value QCA (MVQCA) as a 
complement to QCA and a tool to incorporate fuzzy sets but without losing Boolean 
synthesis as in fs/QCA.  It also allows a researcher to determine a parsimonious 
causal relationship for a set of identical outcomes, rather than a probabilistic 
relationship as in fs/QCA. 
 
MVQCA requires that values be ordinal or nominal, which requires that raw, interval 
scaled data be recoded.  After coding the researcher sets a threshold to which values 
of natural numbers (0, 1, 2, 3…) are assigned (Cronqvist, 2003).  For example, if a 
researcher was studying civil liberties and the ordinal scale was: none, few, most, or 
all, then the researcher may choose to set the thresholds at 0, 1, 2, and 3 (Cronqvist, 
2003).  In this case the natural number, 0, represents no civil liberties while 3 may 
represent a presence of all civil liberties, and 1 and 2 somewhere in between.  
Notation within MVQCA is similar to QCA, however with one caveat: upper- and 
lower-case notation is not possible.  As the researcher sets thresholds the conditions 
can have more than two possible outcomes which render upper- and lower-case 
notation infeasible.  Instead, set notation is used.  For example, a trichotomous (0, 1, 
2) condition (V) can be written as V{0}, or V{1}, or V{2}.  This type of notation is 
called a literal.  Table 5.4 is a hypothetical multi-value matrix to highlight the 
difference between QCA and MVQCA. 
 
Table 5.4: A MVQCA truth table 
     
Case Variable   Outcome 
 A B C O 
     
C1 0 1 1 0 
C2 1 2 1 0 
C3 1 0 0 1 
C4 0 2 0 1 
     
Source: Adopted from Cronqvist (2007a) 
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There are four cases in this example, Cx, three conditions (A, B, and C), and an 
outcome (O).  Variables A and C are dichotomous (0 and 1), while B is multi-value, 
or more specifically, trichotomous, that is 0, 1, and 2.  The literal B{2} occurs in cases 
C2 and C4.  In MVQCA Boolean conjunction and disjunction notation are identical.  
Therefore, one could write the literal for C1 as follows: A{0}B{1}C{1}.  One may also 
state that the literal A{0}+B{2} is present in C1, C2, and C4.  This concept can be 
illustrated with a practical example studying invitations to a party.  The cases 
represent individuals, while the variables are smart (variable A), good at sports 
(variable B), and wears glasses (variable C).  The outcome represents those that are 
invited and those that are not.  Individual 1 (C1) is not smart and good at sports and 
wears glasses, but was not invited to the party.  Those that are not smart or are good at 
sports are present in individuals 1, 2, and 4.   
 
While contradictions in the truth table have been discussed there is one factor that has 
yet to be introduced: logical remainders.  The example in table 5.12 had three 
conditions and eight unique combinations, which are the total number possible with 
dichotomous sets (23).  However, this is usually not the case in research, especially 
with a high number of conditions, which increase exponentially in crisp sets.  
Therefore, there will inevitability be logical combinations of cases that are not 
observed, which are referred to as logical remainders.  A researcher can elect to 
include logical remainders in an analysis or not.  If they are included in an analysis 
they do no contradict existing cases.  This adds some assumptions to the research, yet 
can result in greater parsimony.  It is common practice to include these remainders in 
an analysis.   
 
TOSMANA 
In connection with Cronqvist’s MVQCA model a computer program, Tool for Small-
N Analysis (TOSMANA) (Cronqvist, 2007b) was developed to perform the necessary 
calculations.  This section will provide a summarized description of the software.   
 
TOSMANA utilizes a clickable graphic user interface (GUI) that many computer 
users will find intuitive.  A user can choose to enter raw data directly into TOSMANA 
or import files from various programs (Excel, SPSS, fs/QCA).  Figure 5.4 is a 
screenshot of a raw data matrix taken from this research project’s raw data.   
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Figure 5.4: Screenshot of TOSMANA data entry 
 
Source: TOSMANA data 
 
TOSMANA allows a researcher the freedom to set threshold settings, which 
determine whether a condition is coded as 1 or 0 (in dichotomous sets) or with more 
thresholds in a multi-value analysis.  This feature gives the researcher the freedom to 
move the multivariable borders and achieve a parsimonious result; the grey borders 
found in reality can be moved to best represent reality.  An understanding of 
theoretical influence is important when setting thresholds, as well as, care not to split 
outcomes that are very close together.  Figure 5.8 is a screen shot of the threshold 
setting function found in TOSMANA for the condition stage length from this project.   
 
Figure 5.5: Screenshot of TOSMANA threshold setter 
 
Source: TOSMANA data 
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In this figure a single threshold is set and the median is displayed.  Care has been 
taken not to split two cases with similar condition data by the threshold setter.  
Although there are no hard and fast rules for threshold placement, the researcher must 
take care not to split close-lying cases, and can perform a cluster analysis in a 
software package or in the TOSMANA software to aid in placement. 
 
Comparative configurational analyses methods have been presented to the reader.  
These methods include QCA, fs/QCA, and MVQCA, which all allow a researcher to 
straddle both the qualitative and quantitative paradigms.  Choice of method is 
dependent upon the type of data available, the number of cases, and underlying 
theoretical foundation in the research.  Figure 5.6 (Rihoux, 2006) shows a 
summarized picture of the three methods and where their application is best served; 
note how MVQCA straddles the QCA and fs/QCA methods.   
 
Figure 5.6: Best use of QCA, MVQCA, and fuzzy sets 
 
Source: Rihoux (2006) 
 
The method used in this research is MVQCA.  It is appropriate for this particular 
research due to the limited population studied and the desire to capture industry 
heterogeneity in order to identify and propose the possible combinations airline 
business model elements that may appear in the future.   
 
Scenarios are but one prediction method available.  Other methods include a Delphi 
survey, quantitative trend studies, or environmental scanning.  Scenario planning is a 
method that has been employed in a number of industries (Ringland, 2002) and has 
many unique tools available.  This research project attempts to introduce QCA as a 
scenario-creation method, which has yet to be attempted.  The method has been used 
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in the antithesis of future studies, namely historical analyses (Berg-Schlosser & Meur, 
1994; Berg-Schlosser & Mitchell, 2000; Berg-Schlosser, 2004; Boswell, 2006; Brown 
& Boswell, 1995).  The researcher will attempt to identify unique combinations of 
business model elements that are present in successful FSCs, LCCs, and regional 
carriers using the MVQCA method.  These models highlight those business model 
elements that carriers may innovate in the future in attempt to maximize success.  In 
addition, the method is used to merge the successful configurations of business model 
elements from the respective strategic groups in an attempt to simulate imitative 
behavior in the industry.  Again the results produced are unique combinations of 
business model elements, however based on imitation rather than innovation.  It is 
these combinations of business model elements that create the scenarios within the 
industry.  This method differs from existing scenario planning, which is based on 
workshops that extract the underlying foundation.  Rather, the MVQCA method 
incorporates current success within the industry and extrapolates this success into the 
future based on industry behavior.  The previous section has introduced the reader to 
the methods incorporated in this study, and to provide a summary this chapter 
concludes with an overview of the variables utilized in each method. 
 
5.3 Variables 
This research project consists of two categories of variables: business model and 
constructed.  Business model variables are the micro-scale elements that comprise the 
business model of an airline.  Constructed variables consist of those that the 
researcher created from the survey responses in order to measure imitation and 
innovation of airline business models, both within and among strategic groups, and 
rivalry.  There are a total of 33 variables used throughout the project, however not all 
are utilized with each of the three methods.  At the end of this chapter, following an 
explanation of the methods, a table provides an overview of all the variables and their 
utilization with their respective method.  Some variables were inquired about in the 
distributed questionnaire, however were not integral elements of the measured 
business model.  This is mainly due to limited quantitative data for the respective 
variables.   
 
5.3.1 Business model variables 
This section will present the background information, airline relevance, and analyses 
measurement of the variables utilized.  There are five broad distinguishing variable 
headings: network, distribution, service, operational, and profit.  Within these 
headings features, such as connections, global distribution system participation, 
frequent flyer programs, fleet purity, and operational profit will be discussed. 
 
5.3.1.1 Network 
A carrier’s network is its primary product: travel.  This research project is not a macro 
network analysis (Gastner & Newman, 2006) but rather a meso network analysis, it is 
firm specific.  A micro network analysis would investigate specific routes or origin 
and destination markets.  These analyses will research a carrier’s network related to 
its business model from the following perspectives: through-fares, ticket restrictions, 
interline, online, alliances, codesharing, capacity lift provider, and capacity lift taker. 
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Through-fares: 
Airline fares are comprised of complex revenue management policies which manage 
demand.  As passengers, we know that fares vary according to a number of opaque 
strategies, and the only certainty is that we will not pay the same price for the ticket 
compared to the passenger next to us.  In addition, travel to a destination may require 
a connection, essentially the combination of two or more legs of travel.  However, the 
fare to travel from point A to point C, with a connection at point B is usually not the 
same as the sum of the fares from point A to B and point B to C.   
 
Passengers who wish to fly from San Francisco to New York may require a departure 
time when there is no direct flight, therefore they are required to transfer in Denver 
and are mixed with passengers whose final destination is Denver.  Yet the ticket price, 
San Francisco to New York via Denver, cannot be priced excessively more, even 
though it is a two-leg journey, as this may force the customer to travel with a 
competitor.  A through-fare is a single fare that is lower than the sum of fares that 
comprise the journey.  The advantage of through-fares is that they encourage people 
to travel with a particular airline.  Elasticity is relatively high in the industry (Davies 
& Quastler, 1995) and it may be necessary to provide a discount on one leg to entice 
the customer onto another leg; the short hop to the hub airport may be subsidized by 
the long domestic flight.  However, through-fares add complexity to the business 
model.  Revenue management is challenged to ensure that routes are profitable and 
that their pricing strategy is optimized and scheduling must ensure that transfers are 
adequate.  Therefore, many LCCs have opted not to offer through-fares for fear of 
complexity, while FSCs embrace the practice. 
 
Measurement 
Measurement of through-fares is challenged by airline-specific, proprietary data.  An 
average for carriers that offer through-fare discounts would have been preferred, 
however this was unobtainable.  The researcher opted to determine dichotomously if 
airlines offer a discount or not.  This was determined by investigating numerous 
routes at the specific airline.  The price of a two-leg journey was compared to the 
price of a single, non-stop leg from the same departure airport, on the same day and 
time, to the same destination.  This method was used for ten routes, if possible, on 
three varying days to determine if airlines offered a discount for connecting traffic.   
 
Trip restrictions 
Ticket restrictions are used to price discriminate among customers (Stavins, 2001); 
restrictions essentially screen customers because their demand is heterogeneous.  As 
Morrison states, “As they always have, travelers self-select into appropriate fare 
categories.  The few who cannot or will not meet any restrictions fly at unrestricted 
full fares; the vast majority who can meet some or all restrictions choose from a 
range of discount fares” (1995 pg. 78).  The most common forms of trip restrictions 
are advanced purchase discounts, reservation requirements, cancellation penalties, and 
Saturday-night stay-over requirements (S. A. Morrison & Winston, 1995).  Past 
research has shown that trip restrictions can lead to increased load factors (Borenstein 
& Rose, 1994; S. A. Morrison & Winston, 1990), as well as, increased revenues 
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(Holloway, 2003).  It has been estimated that yield management, coupled with ticket 
restrictions, yielded American Airlines an additional US$ 1 billion in revenue 
(Horner, 2000).  Trip restrictions and their use vary according to market dominance.  
Stavins (2001) concludes that airlines with high market share on routes increase their 
price discrimination.  Ticket restrictions and customer discrimination were the 
industry norm until the beginning of the 21st century when business travelers became 
increasingly reluctant to pay the exorbitant fares in exchange for flexibility, which 
coincided with the emergence of the simplified fare structure of LCCs (Ben-Yosef, 
2005).  Morrison (1995) shows that the Saturday-night stay requirement was 
particularly onerous to business travelers.  Ben-Yosef (2005) argues that the 
traditional yield management tool of restrictions was eroded due to FSCs offering 
their inferior product with a high number of restrictions while LCCs did not, therefore 
economy service and its restrictions became a viable option to high-yield business 
traffic as the economy slowed which eroded the effect of restrictions, and an 
increasing price gap in the late 1990s forced many high-yield passengers to purchase 
from other carriers.  Ticket restrictions complicate the revenue manager’s job and 
confuse and agitate the consumer.  LCCs were able to market themselves effectively 
on the fact that their prices were uncomplicated.  Restriction-less tickets were 
appealing and one factor that aided in the success of LCCs.  However, recent moves 
by FSCs have brought back restrictions, at least in the US market.  Reed (2008) states 
that carriers such as Continental, Delta, and United have reinstated Saturday-night 
restrictions in select markets after removing them in 2005 as a response to Delta’s 
SimpleFares and LCC growth.  The carriers have yet to implement the reinstated fare 
restrictions in all markets, choosing to selectively apply the changes. 
 
Measurement 
This variable uses a binary distinction: airlines either have trip restrictions or do not 
have trip restrictions.  Airline websites describe the restrictions associated with 
tickets, such as Saturday-night stay requirements, weekend restrictions, web-only 
restrictions, or round-trip versus one-way restrictions to name a few.  Change fees 
though are not regarded as restrictions.   
 
Interline 
There are many agreements between airlines covering a range of areas.  Interline 
agreements are experienced by passengers daily and form the basis for transfers.  The 
agreement is between two or more carriers and governs matters mostly related to 
ticketing and baggage.  It allows passengers and their baggage to transfer to another 
carrier on the same itinerary, and is sometimes used to accommodate passengers and 
baggage during irregularities.  Interline agreements create the structure of global 
alliances, though they are also found outside of these structures.  For example, British 
Airways had, until recently, interline agreements with Air Greenland and Russia-
based Krasair (British Airways, 2007) and has agreements in place with Star Alliance 
members Austrian Airlines, bmi and LOT as well as a number of others (Amadeus, 
2006).  It is common for FSCs to have numerous interline agreements, even among 
regional carriers (Davies & Quastler, 1995), however many LCCs have been reluctant 
to introduce the complexity of such contracts.  Carriers, such as Ryanair and Air Asia, 
have avoided interline agreements, however some LCCs, have introduced the 
agreements into their business model (AirTran Airways, 2002).  Southwest Airlines 
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historically had a single interline agreement with Icelandair (Southwest links deal 
with Icelandair, 1996) which was later suspended, however currently the airline states 
it does not have any interline agreements in place37. Although, the agreement the LCC 
has with US-based ATA though fulfills the criteria of the interline definition and the 
researcher regards Southwest as having an interline agreement in place38. 
 
Measurement 
Measurement of interline agreements is dichotomous and is researched by reviewing 
airline websites.  Airlines that are alliance members or have code-share agreements 
tend to offer interlining.   
 
Online 
An online agreement is similar to an interline agreement with the exception of one 
major difference: the agreement is an internal contract within a single airline.  This 
type of agreement allows passengers and baggage to transfer planes with the same 
airline on a single itinerary.  This type of transfer is used when passengers and their 
baggage transit an intermediary stop which requires a plane-change.  All FSCs tend to 
offer online capabilities, however regional and LCCs may operate a point-to-point 
network which does not necessitate such a policy.  An online agreement adds 
complexity and cost to the business model.  Missed passenger connections and lost 
baggage must be compensated, which dilutes the efficiency of the traditional LCC 
business model.  A carrier such as Irish-based Ryanair shuns onlining while 
Southwest has embraced the policy.   
 
Measurement 
Onlining is coded dichotomously for carriers and determined through airline websites.  
Onlining is not as common among LCCs as it is among FSCs and regional carriers. 
 
Alliance 
The airline industry has an abundance of alliances; there were nearly 500 in mid-2007 
(Airline Business, 2007a).  They have spawned a plethora of literature.  A keyword 
search in the article database, Business Source Complete, reveals more than 8,000 
results and Google Scholar more than 13,000 results.  Numerous books and chapters 
have been written on the subject (Doganis, 2002; Doganis, 2006; GAO, 2004; 
Kleymann & Seristö, 2004; Lu, 2003), too many to list all of them.  Alliances can take 
many forms and be based on numerous cooperative agreements (Doganis, 2006; 
Kleymann & Seristö, 2004; D. L. Rhoades & Lush, 1997), however in the context of 
this specific project the research is interested in membership of one of the three global 
alliances in the industry: Star, SkyTeam, or oneworld.  Alliances, as they are 
organized today, are the closest organizational form to a trans-border merger 
acceptable in the industry due to regulatory restrictions (GAO, 2004).  Alliances have 
existed since the mid-20th century with cooperative agreements between carriers 
related to maintenance or other operational issues (Page, 2005), however the structure 
                                                 
37 http://www.southwest.com/travel_center/childtip.html#policies 
38 This agreement ended abruptly with the bankruptcy of ATA in April 2008 
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present in the industry today dates to the late 1980s and the now defunct Wings 
Alliance.  Table 5.5 provides an overview of the three alliances found in the industry 
currently. 
 
Table 5.5: Alliance facts and figures – 2007  
    
 Star Alliance SkyTeam oneworld 
    
Founded1 1997 2000 1999 
Member airlines1 17 11 10 
Passengers (millions) 1 405.7 427.6 321.3 
Destinations1 855 841 688 
Global passenger share2 25.1% 20.8% 17.9% 
Global operating revenue share2 27.2% 20.2% 20.0% 
Global ASK share2 27.0% 22.5% 21.6% 
Global RPK share2 26.1% 22.3% 20.7% 
    
1: respective alliance website 
2: Star Alliance General Presentation  (2007) 
Source: Author’s own creation; data from various sources 
 
Star Alliance is the largest of the three alliances in all metrics except passenger 
numbers.  Alliances have been touted as huge cost savers and revenue generators, 
however some have stated alliances are merely “half-way houses” for smaller carriers 
and that these carriers only contribute a minute capacity and that their benefits are 
often overstated (Dixon, 2007; Mannion, 2007).  Alliance membership is a key facet 
of FSCs, however not all are members.  Asian and Middle-East carriers have only 
recently shown interest in the organizations and have slowly begun to join.  Air China 
and Shanghai Airlines joined Star Alliance and China Southern Airlines joined 
SkyTeam at the end of 2007 (Cantle, 2007; Straus, 2006).  Research has shown that 
non-membership can be disadvantageous and may lead to relegation as a niche player 
(Li, 2000; Oum, Park, & Zhang, 1996).  LCCs, on the other hand, have avoided or not 
been invited to be members of the major alliances.  The costs and complexity of such 
organizations are prohibitive for the LCC business model, while the requirements for 
a certain service-level may challenge some LCCs’ desire to join.  One carrier, Irish 
Aer Lingus, is the exception.  The carrier transformed itself from a small FSC to an 
LCC, a process that began in 2002 (Harrington, Lawton, & Rajwani, 2005).  By 2005 
the carrier had positioned itself beyond the boundaries of the FSC strategic group and 
was ranked the world’s 12th leading LCC according to operating revenue, sixth in 
operating profit, and fourth in net profit (ATW, 2006d).  However, the carrier was still 
a member of the oneworld alliance in 2006 and did not leave until late spring 2007 
(Buyck, 2006).  The current Aer Lingus CEO recently stated that the costs of alliance 
membership, related to such areas as IT investment, and the revenue earned were not 
in balance and leaving the alliance was a rational decision (Mannion, 2007).   
 
Measurement 
Alliance membership can be measured in a number of ways.  The researcher could 
have chosen to determine the level of activity by carrier measured in passenger 
numbers, available seat kilometers, or some other metric.  However, the researcher 
opted to measure dichotomously whether carriers are members of the three global 
alliances.  This option was chosen due to the challenge of data availability. 
 
  100
Codeshare 
The major alliances in the industry were previously discussed, however it was 
mentioned that alliances can take many shapes and forms.  A codeshare agreement is 
one form of alliance which is more arms-length than the three major alliances 
(Januszewski & Lederman, 2000).  It is defined as a contract between two or more 
carriers that allow joint marketing by carriers but a single operating carrier.  
Codeshares can take various forms, such as block space, block seat, reciprocal, free 
flow, and freesale.  Seventy percent of alliances include provisions for codesharing 
(OECD, 2000).  In essence, it is an interline agreement consisting of marketing, 
distribution, and operation.  One carrier may market and sell a ticket to a passenger 
with information implying it is the distributing carrier’s flight, however the operation 
of the flight is carried out by another carrier: the codeshare carrier.  In 2007 United 
Airlines had more than 20 codeshares, excluding regional partners, with carriers from 
all continents (Airline Business, 2007a).  Codeshare agreements allow carriers to 
expand their network without acquiring additional resources, and may sometimes 
expand beyond air services to include rail or bus operators (American Airlines; 
RePass, 2001); for example, American Airlines has codeshare agreements in place 
with German and French rail operators.  Codeshares offer carriers the advantage of 
single-ticket, seamless travel, a GDS marketing advantage by listing codesharing 
carriers before interline transfers, and resource collaboration and efficiency which 
may lead to cost reductions (Bissessur & Alamdari, 1998; F. C. Y. Chen & Chen, 
2003; Goh & Yong, 2006; Goh & Yong, 2006; Park, 1997).  However, cost 
reductions obtained through codeshare agreements may be immaterial (Goh & Yong, 
2006).  Research indicates that consumers benefit from codeshare arrangements 
through lower fares (Brueckner, 2001; Brueckner, 2003; Brueckner & Whalen, 2006; 
Ito & Lee, 2007).  Codeshare agreements have been a common alliance form among 
FSCs and with selected regional carriers (Airline Business, 2007a), however recently 
LCCs have begun to show interest.  2002 saw the first codeshare agreement among an 
LCC and FSC, Virgin Blue and United Airlines (Sobie, 2007).  This unique 
arrangement was born of circumstances; United lost its Australian codeshare partner 
with the collapse of Ansett in 2001 and chose Virgin Blue as a partner rather than 
rival Qantas to provide capacity from United’s Australian destinations.  Southwest 
Airlines’ acquired stake in ATA in 2004 drove the LCC-ancestor to push for a sudden 
codeshare, something the carrier had vehemently avoided in the past (Sobie, 2007).  
Other LCCs that have codeshare agreements include JetBlue and Cape Air, and the 
New York-based LCC will soon have an agreement in place with Aer Lingus 
(Mannion, 2007; Sobie, 2007).  Table 5.6 provides an overview of the LCC codeshare 
agreements in place in 2007 (Airline Business, 2007b). 
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Table 5.6: LCC codeshare agreements 
    
LCC1 Codeshare partner Date begun Type of codeshare 
    
Clickair2 Iberia 2006 One-way freesale 
Gol Copa 2005 Two-way blockspace 
Jetstar2 Qantas 2004 Two-way freesale 
Jetstar2 Japan Airlines 2007 One-way freesale 
Jet4you2 Corsair 2007 One-way freesale 
Southwest ATA Airlines 2005 Two-way freesale 
Virgin Blue Malaysia Airlines 2006 One-way freesale 
Virgin Blue United Airlines 2002 One-way blockspace 
Virgin Blue Virgin Atlantic 2005 One-way freesale 
    
1: Codeshare agreements with regional carriers are omitted 
2: Not members of study group but included for informational purposes 
Source: Airline Business (2007b) 
 
Measurement 
Measurement of codeshare agreements could have been determined a number of 
ways.  The researcher could have opted to measure the number of agreements, the 
level of interaction based on passenger figures, revenue, or similar metrics.  However, 
these are firm and market specific, as well as proprietary data.  The researcher chose 
rather to measure codeshare agreements dichotomously to capture industry specifics 
and trends.   
 
Capacity lift provider 
It has been discussed that carriers may choose to enter into different forms of alliances 
which are advantageous from various perspectives.  Major alliances and codesharing 
among carriers are but a few of the organizational options, however some carriers 
may opt for a third type: capacity lift provider.  A capacity lift provider (CLP) often 
enters into a codeshare agreement, however there is a distinct differentiation.  The 
CLP is a purely operational carrier and generally does not have any distribution 
functions, as opposed to a codeshare agreement among two FSCs which may 
distribute tickets on either other’s carriers.  A CLP is typically a regional carrier that 
provides a measurable amount of network capacity for an FSC.  Sometimes a CLP is a 
wholly-owned subsidiary, such as American Eagle, a vertically integrated sub-
contractor with a capacity purchase agreement (CPA) such as Skywest, or a 
franchisee, for example Denmark-based Sun-Air; however, the CLP usually has its 
own air operating certificate (AOC).  Occasionally, a CLP may provide capacity for 
an FSC while maintaining a separate brand, such as US-based Express Jet or Danish 
carrier Cimber Air.  For example, one is not able to purchase a ticket through 
American Eagle or Skywest as these carriers are only operators for American 
Airlines, and United Airlines and Delta Air Lines respectively.  However, Express Jet 
and Cimber Air have their own distribution channels for their own network, and 
provide capacity for Continental and Delta, and SAS respectively.  
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Measurement 
This meso-level measurement pertains exclusively to regional carriers and is 
measured trichotomously: the regional carrier provides capacity lift exclusively, such 
as Skywest, provides capacity lift and own-branded capacity, such as US-based 
ExpressJet, or the carrier provides no capacity lift, such as the Greek carrier Aegean 
Airlines.  A codeshare agreement does not fulfill the role as a capacity lift provider.  
Rather, a more integrated relationship is necessary, such as an FSC-owned regional 
carrier, for example American Eagle, a franchise relationship, such as Danish Sun-Air 
(not part of the study group) and British Airways, or a capacity purchase agreement, 
for example US-based Skywest and United Airlines.  This variable measures merely 
whether a regional carrier has a close relationship with an FSC. 
 
Capacity lift taker 
The explanation of capacity lift provider showed that a close, integrated alliance, 
often between a regional carrier and a larger partner was the mainstay of this 
relationship.  This variable looks at the capacity lift taker (CLT), or the partner in the 
relationship.  A CLT uses the CLP as a network supplement.  The provider is often a 
regional carrier that operates a fleet of smaller aircraft, regional jets or turbo-prop, and 
complements the CLT with short-haul routes.  A CLT is nearly always an FSC, 
although a single LCC benefited from a CLP.  US-based Midwest Airlines has had a 
CLP agreement in place with Skyway Airlines since 1989, a wholly-owned subsidiary 
of the CLT (Midwest Airlines, 2007).  Table 5.3 shows the regional carriers that flew 
for major carriers in 2006 (Airline Business, 2007b). 
 
Table 5.7: Capacity lift takers & providers – 2006  
     
Delta  American United  US Airways Continental 
Comair American Eagle SkyWest Piedmont ExpressJet 
ASA1 Executive Airlines Mesa Airlines Mesa Airlines Colgan Air 
SkyWest TSA Shuttle America PSA Chautauqua  
Chautauqua Chautauqua  TSA TSA RegionsAir 
Shuttle America RegionsAir Chautauqua  Chautauqua   
 Air Midwest Colgan Air Midwest  
   Colgan Air  
   Air Wisonsin  
     
Northwest Lufthansa Air France/KLM Qantas  SAS 
Mesaba Airlines Cityline Regional AirLink Widerøe 
Pinnacle Eurowings Brit Air Eastern Australia Skyways 
 Air Dolomiti CityJet Sunstate Airlines Blue1 
 Augsburg CCM Airlines  airBaltic 
 Contact Air Cityhopper   
     
British Airways Iberia Alitalia  Air China Air Canada 
BA Connect Air Nostrum Alitalia Express Shandong Airlines Jazz 
     
Source: Airline Business (2007b) 
1: Atlantic Southeast Airlines 
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Measurement 
Similar to capacity lift provider (CLP), this variable is also measured dichotomously.  
The variable pertains exclusively to FSCs and LCCs as regional carriers do not have 
relationships to provide feed and small-lift capacity within the same strategic group.  
Just as in CLP, a codeshare agreement is not regarded as a capacity lift taker.  FSCs 
and LCCs that have agreements such as wholly-owned, franchise, or CPAs are 
deemed to be capacity lift takers.  While this variable is measured dichotomously a 
related multi-value variable, level of feed share, is included in the operational section.   
 
5.3.1.2 Distribution 
Distribution of airline tickets has progressed immensely since the inception of air 
travel.  Just as aircraft have followed the path of aeronautical engineering so too has 
the technology of distribution.  The two most common distribution strategies are via 
global distribution systems, which is described in the following section. 
 
GDS 
Prior to advanced distribution technology airline passengers purchased their tickets 
directly from an airline’s ticket counter or own ticket office, or via a third-party travel 
agent.  Agents scoured the Official Airline Guide, a publication listing airlines and 
their flights, to construct an itinerary, and used phones and later telex machines to 
inquire about availability of seats and make reservations (Pemberton, Stonehouse, & 
Barber, 2001).  This process was time consuming and as the number of flights and 
seats increased it become an insurmountable challenge to accomplish this without 
electronic assistance.  American Airlines was the first to experiment with this by 
creating Reservisor in 1946 (E. A. Boyd, 2006).  Air Canada succeeded in placing 
automated query systems in their ticket offices in the early 1960s.  However, at the 
same time American Airlines and IBM were creating the next step in electronic 
booking systems.  Semi-Automatic Business Research Environment (SABRE) was to 
become the first widely-used and successful computer reservation system (CRS) 
(Pemberton et al., 2001).   
 
The expansion of CRSs beyond airline reservations to include numerous facets of the 
travel cycle and their global growth has led to their name being changed to global 
distribution systems (GDS), while an airline’s own, internal reservation system 
retained the CRS acronym.  GDSs host itineraries and seat availability data from 
airlines and make that information accessible to travel agents and the public through 
Internet-based portals.  Queries are made to the system and a booking is created for a 
customer if desired.  The proliferation of GDSs in airline distribution strategies has 
garnered the systems immense bargaining power over airlines; the sale of an airline’s 
product relies heavily on the system.  As the role of travel agents became more vital 
for ticket distribution they became an ad hoc sales force for the airline and their GDS 
was the weapon used to achieve goals.  Airlines used tactics such as travel agent 
commission overrides (TACOs) (Pemberton et al., 2001) and CRSs as competitive 
weapons, via information control, dissemination, and manipulation (Pemberton et al., 
2001; Schulz, 1992).  Regulatory interference reduced the biased competitiveness of 
CRSs, and although their distribution importance has diminished somewhat due to 
growth of other channels CRSs are still an integral distribution tool of many airlines.  
Today, airlines negotiate content deals with each GDS; airlines commit themselves to 
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paying a certain transaction fee for each booking in exchange for the display of their 
itineraries and availability on the system.  This fee is on average US$ 16 per 
transaction, and nearly US$ 31 including TACOs, and US airlines spent on average 
nearly US$ 545 million on distribution costs in 2003 (GAO, 2003).  GDS costs are an 
average of 2.5% of revenue (Field & Pilling, 2006).  Airlines may choose not to be 
present in all systems as their market share varies and may not coincide with a 
carrier’s own market presence.  This distribution relationship is presented in figure 
5.7. 
 
Figure 5.7: Summary of payment and fee flows in the current distribution of airline 
tickets 
 
Source: Adopted from GAO (2003) 
 
While nearly all incumbent carriers and some low-cost carriers opt to be fully present 
in GDSs, many LCCs are reluctant to incur the higher costs.  In addition, presence 
implies less control over distribution, which some airlines do not prefer.  However, 
there is an electronic compromise which allows airlines a limited presence in GDSs 
while maintaining greater distribution control.  This compromise was constructed 
specifically for Southwest, as the sheer size of the carrier was of particular interest to 
GDSs.  Therefore, Southwest has traditionally been absent from full-participation in 
systems, however it has had a limited presence to be visible to travel managers and 
the business community (Jonas, 2004).  This distribution strategy is also utilized by 
airlines such as easyJet and AirTran (Jonas, 2004).  The behavior of JetBlue, present 
in 2000, absent in 2002, and again present in 2006 shows the value of GDSs (ATW, 
2006b; ATW, 2006c; Eye for travel, 2006; Field, 2006).  The airline has stated that 
revenue per segment is US$ 35, minus GDS participation costs, higher than direct 
purchases (ATW, 2006c).  This is partly explained by the propensity of business 
travelers to purchase tickets via GDSs, but also because price comparison is limited 
via such systems (M. McDonald, 2007). 
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Measurement 
Measurement of GDS participation for airlines utilizes a three-level dummy variable: 
no presence, limited presence, and full presence.  No and limited presence is a 
common distribution strategy for many LCCs, while full presence is common for 
FSCs.  The researcher would have preferred to have included the level of GDS 
distribution for all airlines, however such proprietary information is difficult to obtain.  
Therefore, a trichotomous level of analysis was appropriate. 
5.3.1.3 Service 
Service is what helps to differentiate airlines; it can vary from the spartan to the 
luxurious, and everything in between.  The service concept, however, does not limit 
itself to the transportation element from point A to point B.  Features, such as loyalty 
programs, lounge access, in-flight classes, and airport selection all contribute to a 
customer’s service perception.  
 
Loyalty programs 
Airlines wish to reward their loyal customers for their repetitive patronage and created 
frequent flyer programs (FFPs) to not only reward customers for their past business 
but to capture their future business.  Western Airlines initiated the first FFP in early 
1980 (Maps of World), however it was American Airlines that capitalized by 
integrating FFPs with electronic databases, such as their CRS, SABRE, and created 
AAdvantage (FrequentFlier.com, 1997).  Programs work by allowing customers to 
accrue points for their past travels.  Points can be in the form of miles, a simplified 
point system, or in the case of Virgin Blue, based on the fare purchased.  Accrual is 
typically based on the distance flown, a longer distance allows for greater point 
accrual; however, some airlines, such as Southwest, have simplified the process by 
rewarding the number of trips taken, regardless of distance.  The variation in 
redemption value for travel results in differing annual mileage value.  Sorensen 
(2006) analyzed the average air fares in key US markets and frequent flier reward 
levels to determine a mileage value index from 1994 to 2005, as shown in figure 5.8.  
This analysis shows how airlines can manipulate the redemption value for a ticket and 
maximize the value of their members.   
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Figure 5.8: Mileage value index 
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The costs associated with programs (staff, hardware, newsletters, etc.), as well as, the 
potentially lost revenue from displacing a full-paying passenger and no revenue from 
reward redemption, initially made low-cost carriers and foreign airlines reluctant to 
implement similar programs.  However, the success of FFPs among the US flag 
carriers convinced other airlines that they would be beneficial.  Today FFPs are 
integrated with the entire travel cycle: hotels, rental car agencies, credit cards, retail 
outlets etc. are all affiliated members of airline loyalty programs.  Such co-branding 
allows FFPs to expand their presence and bring loyal customers closer to the airline, 
essentially locking their loyalty.  In addition, co-branding is a revenue source for 
airlines.  It is estimated that some reward programs bring in more than US$ 1 billion 
in revenue; United Airline’s, Mileage Plus, reported revenue of US $822 million 
through sales of miles to partners, an ancillary revenue of US $18.26 per member for 
the airline(Sorensen, 2005).  Figure 5.9 shows the breakdown of partners affiliated 
with LCC FFPs. 
 
The costs associated with FFPs have generated the belief that LCCs have omitted this 
from their business model.  While there are a number of large LCCs that eschew such 
programs, there are many that have incorporated loyalty programs, such as Southwest, 
Jetblue, Air Berlin, AirTran, Jetstar, Virgin Blue, and WestJet.  Sorensen (2005) 
provides a breakdown of the partners that these LCCs have affiliated themselves with.   
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Figure 5.9: Breakdown of LCC FFPs’ affiliated partners 
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Sorensen (2005) states that the number of partners per LCC varies, with JetBlue 
having merely two partners while Jetstar is affiliating itself with 156.  LCCs that are 
affiliated with FSCs and share FFPs have the advantage of benefiting from the FSCs 
broad range of partnerships.  There is a geographic split evident among LCCs and 
their implementation of FFPs.  The North American LCC market is the most mature 
with nearly all LCCs offering an FFP, while the European market has yet to see this 
level of penetration.  The two largest European LCCs, Ryanair and easyJet, have not 
created loyalty programs as of yet.  However, Ryanair has been able to capture 
additional revenue from co-branded credit cards, which rewards purchases with 
discounted travel on the LCC.  
 
Measurement 
Measurement of FFPs among carriers is done dichotomously and captures the 
presence or absence of such programs.   
 
Lounge access 
One amenity that many travelers can enjoy as premium customers is a carrier’s airport 
lounge.  Such a facility is made available to pamper the upper echelons of customer 
segments, instill brand loyalty, and increase the service offering.  Lounges may offer 
business facilities, refreshments, a tranquil environment, customer service assistance, 
and even such facilities as massages, dry cleaning, or hot tubs.  Lounges are 
commonly owned and operated by a carrier, or a group of carriers, who lease space 
from the airport operator.  An airline’s market share at a particular airport may 
prohibit the operation of a lounge.  In such instances access to an alliance or code-
sharing partner airline’s lounge may be possible.  Lounge membership is commonly 
offered to members with high-level status in a carrier’s FFP.  However, a number of 
US carriers do allow paid membership to lounge facilities, regardless of FFP status.  It 
is common though that first- or business class passengers are granted lounge 
admission on the day of their travel.  The inherent operation and goals of lounges 
tends to preclude such an amenity among LCCs; they are commonly found among the 
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majority of FSCs.  Just as FFPs are relatively uncommon among the world’s LCCs 
due to their associated costs and complexities, so too are lounges for the same 
reasons.  However, a small, but growing, number of LCCs have begun to offer access 
to airport lounges for a nominal daily fee.  Carriers, such as easyJet and WestJet, have 
partnered with third-party lounge operator, Servisair, to offer lounge amenities.  As 
these carriers expand their customer segmentation focus outsourcing of various 
functions may allow them to offer amenities similar to FSCs at a lower cost, 
especially if a pay-as-you-use feature is incorporated to ensure that overall higher 
fares are not incurred.  Mason (2001) states that although LCC business travelers do 
not prioritize lounge access such an amenity is significant among non-leisure 
travelers.  In addition, findings show that although business travelers of FSCs and 
LCCs have subtle preference differences the two customer groups are relatively 
homogenous in short-haul travel, which reinforces the imitative reflection of some 
LCC and FSC business models. 
 
Measurement 
Access to lounges was measured on a three-level scale: free admission, paid 
admission, and no lounge.  Carriers that offer both free admission to lounges and paid 
admission were coded as offering free admission.  A distinction was not made as the 
majority of carriers that adhere to such a dual strategy continue to prioritize free 
lounge access to loyal or high-paying customers. 
  
In-flight classes 
Segmentation of onboard airline customers allows carriers to differentiate fare prices 
and maximize revenue; one segment of the aircraft may be designed to cater to 
higher-paying passengers and another priced to attract leisure fares.  Such an increase 
in service level usually requires increased floor space per passenger necessitating 
higher fares to compensate for the loss of seats.  For example, Alaska Airlines 
operates the 737-800 with a first and economy class, with 16 and 144 seats 
respectively.  The seat pitch varies from 36 inches in first class to 32 inches in 
economy.  Ryanair, on the other hand, operates the same aircraft type with a single 
cabin of 189 seats at a 30 inch seat pitch.  Alaska Airlines has 45 fewer seats in their 
737s which necessitates being able to charge passengers, commonly those at the front 
of the aircraft, higher fares.  The number of premium class seats, the market being 
served, and competitive factors becomes a balancing act; too few premium seats and 
carriers are not maximizing their revenue, too many and they are turning away lower-
paying passengers because they may not be able to accommodate them.  Traditionally, 
FSCs have offered passengers a choice of two cabins: economy and business.  A 
handful of carriers have implemented a premium service level on first class, while 
others have provided a middle ground between business and economy with premium 
economy.  However, for the purpose of clarity and simplification carriers with a two 
class configuration are regarded as adhering to the traditional FSC in-flight class 
strategy.  The common distinction between FSCs and LCCs is that the low-cost 
brethren opt for the simplicity of a single class cabin.  An all-economy cabin increases 
organizational and operational simplification, such as revenue management, staffing, 
catering, cleaning, and aircraft configuration.  However, this simplicity and lower-cost 
base comes at the expense of a product offering which is attractive to premium 
customers who are willing to pay higher fares.  Some LCCs do offer their passengers 
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the option of a business and economy class seat.  US carriers such as Air Tran, Spirit, 
and the newly started Virgin America offer premium class seating at the front of the 
aircraft.   
 
Measurement 
Measurement of in-flight class structure varies by the type of analyses conducted.  
Adherence to the traditional strategy of the group is built on the premise that FSCs 
traditionally have a two class service, while LCCs offer a single class.  Some FSCs 
opt to offer more classes on long-haul operations.  In these cases the carriers are 
regarded as still offering a two-class product; in other words, the shorter-haul, 
domestic service offering takes precedence over long-haul operations.  It is not 
possible at this time to distinguish between short-haul and long-haul operations in the 
analyses.  When conducting configurational analyses the number of classes that 
carriers offer is entered into the data matrix.   
 
Airport selection 
Occasionally carriers have a range of airports they can elect to serve.  Some cities, or 
markets, have two or more airports in acceptable proximity and the necessary 
infrastructure to make it feasible for passengers to choose between airports.  Primary 
airports, such as San Francisco International or Copenhagen Kastrup, are the main 
airport of a city or region, while a secondary airport is usually a smaller, reliever 
airport, such as Oakland International or Malmø Sturup.  Bonnefoy and Hansman 
(2006) define a secondary airport as an airport with a 1% enplanement threshold of a 
region’s total commercial enplanement.  In addition, their research limits a secondary 
airport to within a 50 mile radius of a primary airport, and a runway limiting distance 
of 5 000 feet.  Sometimes a region’s secondary airport is closer and more convenient 
than the primary airport, such as Houston’s Hobby or London’s London City.  
Historically, airport classifications may shift as new, larger, and more efficient 
airports may be constructed, such as Dallas Fort Worth which replaced Dallas Love 
Field or Houston Intercontinental which replaced Houston Hobby (Bonnefoy & 
Hansman, 2006).  Historically, one would categorize primary airport airlines as FSC 
and secondary airport airlines as LCC (Calder, 2002; Doganis, 2006).  The common 
explanation is that primary airports are large, centralized hubs that allow for 
connections and economies of density and scale for FSCs.  On the other hand, 
secondary airports offer LCCs less airspace and airport congestion, lower airport 
charges, occasionally faster passenger handling service; overall simplicity and lower 
expenses (Calder, 2002; Doganis, 2006; M. E. Porter, 1996; Taneja, 2004).  However, 
this polarization of airport selection among strategic groups is becoming blurred.  
While FSCs continue to prioritize primary airports as their airports of choice, LCCs 
have begun to migrate from sole secondary airport users to hybrid users.  For 
example, Brazil’s GOL has a large presence at Sao Paulo’s primary airport, 
Guarulhos; easyJet and Air Berlin operate to a large number of primary airports 
throughout continental Europe, and Southwest has prioritized primary airports when 
opening new markets.  This cross-over by LCCs has had a negative impact on FSCs at 
their primary airports; competition is gaining in strength.   
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Measurement 
Airport selection measurement analyzes the share of ASKs that carriers operate to 
primary airports.  This type of measurement captures the percentage of seats that a 
carrier operates to a distinct airport type, rather than arbitrarily giving equal weight to 
a once-a-week flight to a primary airport or a six-times-daily flight for an LCC.  
Annual ASK data per destination was obtained for the study group from APG 
(Seabury Airline Planning Group, 2008).  Airports were coded as either primary or 
secondary by analyzing reports (Bonnefoy & Hansman, 2006), comparing operation 
with FSCs, under the assumption that an airport served by a number of incumbent 
carriers is a primary airport, and by using websites such as Airport Records by 
Position (Baudis & Eichhorn).  Such a database allowed the researcher to compile 
percentage of ASKs at primary airports operated by each carrier.  Thresholds were 
determined for each variable in their respective analyses to create a dummy variable. 
 
5.3.1.4 Operational 
An airline’s operational characteristics reflect efficiency.  Metrics are abundant in the 
industry, yet for analyses purposes this report focuses on fleet purity, aircraft 
utilization, and stage length.   
 
Fleet purity 
A carrier’s fleet assets require tremendous investments and all airlines strive for a 
reduction in overall life-cycle costs, however a fleet must match the operational 
requirements of a desired network.  It is uneconomical for most airlines to operate a 
wide-body aircraft on a short-haul route; the origin and destination markets of the 
majority of short-haul routes would not be able to justify such a large aircraft.  In 
addition, some carries strive to offer higher frequencies to destinations which may 
justify smaller aircraft rather than large.  Network design is a teeter-totter balance 
between market size and aircraft size (Kilpi, 2007).  However, fleet composition has 
an impact on an airline’s earnings (Seristö & Vepsäläinen, 1997).  Results show that a 
more diversified fleet correlates to depressed financial earnings at airlines (Kilpi, 
2007).  The traditional LCC fleet strategy has been to operate as pure a fleet as 
possible (Doganis, 2006; Lawton, 2002; Taneja, 2004), while FSCs tend to have less 
pure fleets to accommodate their diversified networks of short- and long-haul routes.  
Single fleets at LCCs give carriers efficiency gains.  Volume discounts, flight and 
cabin crew training costs, maintenance costs, and standardized operational equipment 
contribute to simplicity and lower costs for LCCs (Pilarski, 2001).  However, recent 
LCC fleet strategies have varied from the traditional.  For example, JetBlue acquired 
the 100-seat Embraer 190 to complement its Airbus 320 fleet.  This venture away 
from the traditional LCC fleet policy allowed the carrier to expand to markets that 
were too small for the A320s (Arnoult, 2005; Shifrin, 2005b), and to enter markets 
where other LCCs were not present due to fleet restrictions.  Similar fleet shifts have 
been accomplished by Frontier (Airline Business, 2006c; Arnoult, 2007c) and UK-
based Flybe (Shifrin, 2006). 
 
Measurement 
Measurement and research of fleet purity is limited (Kilpi, 2007).  The majority of 
literary contributions focus on network structure and fleet allocation, rather than fleet 
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composition.  Past contributions to the composition field include Adrangi (1999), 
Seristö (1997), and Beaujon (1987).  Kilpi (2007) builds on previous research (De 
Borges Pan,Alexis George & Espirito Santo Jr.,Respicio A., 2004) and constructs a 
fleet standardization index (FSI).  The FSI delves deeper than other purity 
measurement by incorporating four levels: manufacturer, family, models, and engines.  
Carriers may operate a fleet of an identical aircraft family, yet have numerous engine 
types.  This negates the benefits of a single fleet as engine maintenance is a significant 
expenditure (Doig, Howard, & Ritter, 2003).  Aircraft manufacturers of commercial 
aircraft include Boeing, Airbus, Bombardier (manufacturer of both the Canadair 
regional jet and De Havilland families), Embraer, and the now defunct McDonald 
Douglas.  The next level is the family of aircraft.  An aircraft family describes the 
group of models that are grouped together and usually require limited additional 
training or unique maintenance procedures and aid in cost reduction.  However, the 
FSI takes into account model variations to capture the truly pure fleets (identical 
manufacture, family, model, and engine type).  Sometimes carriers have the option of 
acquiring an aircraft with various engine types to best suit their needs.  An airline may 
have a fleet of identical models yet various engine types, which taints fleet purity and 
dilutes efficiency gains.  Table 5.8 lists examples of these four levels of fleet analyses. 
 
Table 5.8: Examples of aircraft families   
    
Manufacturer Family Models  Engine variations 
    
Boeing 737-x 737-100 
      -200 
      -300 
      -400 
      -500 
      -600 
      -700 
      -800 
      -900 
JT8D1 
CFM56 
    
Airbus A32x A318-100 
A319-100 
A320-200 
A321-200 
PW 6122A 
CFM56 
IAE V2500 
 
    
 A330/340 A330-200 
A330-200F 
A330-300 
A340-200 
A340-300 
A340-500 
A340-600 
CF6 
CFM56 
PW4000 
Trent 553 
Trent 556  
Trent 700 
 
1: 737-100 only    
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
Kipli’s (2007) FSI is calculated as follows: 
 
ersmanufacturofnumber 
∑= CSPIFSI  
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The cell standardization partial index (CSPI) (De Borges Pan,Alexis George & 
Espirito Santo Jr.,Respicio A., 2004) of one manufacturer is based on the indices cell 
standardization index (CSI) for each family from that particular manufacturer: 
 
 
ermanufacturthefrom familiesofnumber 
∑= CSICSPI  
 
 
The CSI (De Borges Pan,Alexis George & Espirito Santo Jr.,Respicio A., 2004) of 
one particular family is calculated as follows.  AMF is the number of aircraft models 
in the family and TAF is the total number of aircraft in the fleet. 
 
 
TAFAMF
family in theaircraft  ofnumber 
•=CSI  
 
 
Kilpi (2007) recognizes the limitations of a missing fleet scale component.  Lack of 
fleet scale integration does not factor in the size of a carrier’s fleet in the FSI.  A 
three-aircraft airline with three different families has a different expenditure structure 
than a 30-aircraft airline with a mix of three families.  Maintenance programs are 
dependent on scale, which is omitted from this FSI.  However, the advantage is that it 
allows comparison of different sized fleets, which is appropriate to the analyses.  A 
fleet scale analysis is appropriate if the desire is to analyze and compare comparable 
sized fleets.   
 
Kilpi’s (2007) FSI analysis incorporates a similar engine analysis based on engine 
models and types.  This detailed level of information is not readily available and has 
been omitted from this variable’s FSI.  However, the fleet summary from the journal 
Air Transport World (ATW) (ATW, 2007e) lists the world’s aircraft fleet by carrier 
and variation between engine models is noted.  This is incorporated as a different 
model of the same family type in the analyses.  Table 5.9 is an excerpt of Thai 
Airway’s fleet to demonstrate the incorporation of engine types. 
 
Table 5.9: Excerpt of Thai Airways’ fleet  
     
A/C mnft. Family Model Engine type # of a/c 
     
Airbus A300-x A300-600 GE 5 
  A300-600R GE 2 
  A300-600R P&W 13 
     
Source: ATW (2007e) 
 
In this example Thai Airways has three differing aircraft models of the same family, 
partly due to the varying engine types found on two identical models.  Such a 
disparity in engine models would dilute fleet purity and lower Thai’s overall FSI.   
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Table 5.10 is a sample FSI calculation for JetBlue. 
 
Table 5.10: JetBlue’s FSI      
        
Level A/C mnft. Family # of a/c # of models # of families # of mnfts. Index 
        
CSI Airbus A32x 101 1   0.8016 
CSPI Airbus    1  0.8016 
CSI Embraer E190/195 25 1   0.1984 
CSPI Embraer    1  0.1984 
FSI All  126   2 0.5000 
        
Source: Author’s own creation; data from ATW (2007e) 
 
The FSI data is gathered exclusively from ATW (ATW, 2007e). Those few airlines 
that had freighter versions of aircraft were included in the analyses39.  These aircraft 
contribute to overall fleet purity by bringing efficiency gains to the airline.  The 
measurement for the adherence analyses uses dummy variables 0, 1, and 2.  The 
configurational analyses use the raw data with a dichotomous segmentation.  Each 
analysis explains in detail the threshold-setting procedure. 
Average stage length 
Average stage length is another operational metric that allows one to compare the 
networks of carriers.  Stage length is a measurement of the average distance flown by 
the carrier.  LCCs have traditionally restricted themselves to shorter stage lengths, 
partly reflected by their fleet attributes, while FSCs have had longer stage lengths due 
to their long-haul networks.  Regional carriers have observably the lowest stage 
lengths due to their role as a short-haul network connector.  Studies have shown that 
an increase in stage length leads to lower unit costs, which O’Conner (2001) refers to 
as the cost taper.  Transport costs are allocated per passenger and spread over the 
distance traveled, therefore a shorter distance equates to a higher cost.  This is a 
combination of many factors, including the cost of handling passengers, which does 
not vary by distance flown, fuel burn, which is higher on short-haul trips due to a 
greater number of takeoffs and landings and higher landing fees.  This is compounded 
by the fact that short stage lengths are often in markets that are more elastic than long-
haul because air travel is competing with alternative transportation modes.  Cost taper 
may be regarded as a parabola that reaches a minimum cost at a certain stage length 
only to rise again as distance increases further.  Total fuel burn increases with stage 
lengths and as a flight travels beyond the minimum cost taper point it must remove 
passengers to accommodate greater amounts of fuel.  This leads to increased cost per 
passenger mile.     
 
Measurement 
Measurement of average stage length is in nautical miles.  The measurement for the 
adherence analyses uses di- and trichotomous dummy variables depending upon the 
specific analysis.   
 
                                                 
39 This carriers are: Air Canada, Air France/KLM, Alitalia, Cathay Pacific, China Southern Airlines, 
Emirates, Japan Airlines, Korean Air, Lufthansa, Northwest Airlines,  
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Feed share 
Alliances, codeshare agreements, capacity lift providers, and interlining have all been 
described within the network heading.  These variables were measured di- or 
trichotomously, which fails to capture the intimate relationship some carriers may 
have with each other.  The feed share variable allows the researcher to measure the 
amount of capacity provided by feed carriers.  These carriers often operate smaller 
aircraft and supplement larger carriers with passengers from outlying, short-haul 
communities (Graham, 1997; Pagliari, 2003; Pender, 1999).  These carriers are often 
contracted on an interline, wet-lease, franchise, or capacity purchase agreement.  
Regional operators are often chosen rather than FSCs or LCCs who operate their own 
short-haul capacity because of their lower-cost base (Davies & Quastler, 1995; 
French, 1995).   
 
Measurement 
Measurement of feed share measures ASKs flown by regional carriers for FSCs or 
LCCs.  System-wide capacity data was obtained from planning database, APG 
(Seabury Airline Planning Group, 2008), for the FSC and LCC study groups, which 
included information regarding the marketing carrier and operating carrier.  Regional 
carriers and their ASK contribution to the marketing carrier’s system were segregated 
to determine the share of ASK contribution.  This was not done for the regional study 
group as they do not use feed services from other carriers.  Thresholds were 
determined for the specific analyses.   
 
5.3.1.5 Profit 
Profit is often one of several motivating factors for a firm operating in a free-market 
economy (Friedman, 1970).  Other motivators may be market share, product line, 
revenue, or costs.  Airlines are no different, although it has been said that airlines are 
in business not to create a return on capital, but rather to acquire additional capacity 
(David, 2007).  Operating profit margin is often used as a determinant of financial 
prowess of airlines (Alamdari & Fagan, 2005; David, 2007; S. A. Morrison & 
Winston, 1995; Suzuki, 2000).  However, Roger (2007) attacks this notion and 
proposes that return on assets or return on total gross assets is a more appropriate 
measure of airline health.  He does acknowledge that profit margin is an acceptable 
measure of safety buffer for airlines.  The researcher has elected to measure business 
model success using operating profit margin.  Although the industry is very capital-
intensive the business model is comprised of more than aircraft assets.  Roger’s 
(2007) premise is based on a shareholder perspective and maximizing total 
shareholder return, while this research is based on an inclusive business model not 
fragmented by assets.  Margin, rather than absolutes, is used to allow equally-
weighted comparisons of airlines.  An absolute profit would distort smaller carriers 
and not allow an accurate configurational analysis.  This research utilizes operating 
profit margin as the dependent variable, rather than net profit margin.  Thornhill and 
White (2007) argue that operating margin measure value creation and value capture, 
which is the essence of strategy, an elongation of the business model concept.  These 
subtle differences relate to the underlying theoretical business model concept.  As 
reviewed in Chapter 3 the business model concerns itself with a firm’s activities.  
Operating profit and its margin is the most accurate reflection of these activities. 
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Measurement 
Operating profit margin is determined as follows: 
 
 
revenue Operating
income Operating margin profit  Operating =  
 
Data was gathered from the respective annual reports.  If none were available ICAO 
financial data was obtained (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2007) for the 
missing carriers.  For a small group of carriers current data was not available40.  The 
researcher utilized the Thompson Research financial database.  Averages were 
calculated from the data available to determine the average operating profit margin for 
the respective carriers.  
 
This section has reviewed the business model variables used throughout the analyses.  
These variables are segmented in the main headings of network, distribution, service, 
operational, and profit.  Each variable was described and the method of measurement 
was explained.  There are 18 business model variables in total, however airlines in the 
industry were inquired about additional elements.  Variables such as Internet 
distribution, ancillary revenue, ground services, and charter operations have not been 
included in the analyses and were not described in the business model description, 
though airlines were initially investigated on these factors.  Their omission from the 
analyses is the result of a lack of comparable data across all the airlines in the group.  
The business model variables were used to create constructed variables which are 
described in the following section. 
 
5.3.2 Constructed variables 
In early 2007 surveys were distributed to airlines worldwide (see Appendix V for the 
survey).  The intention was to explore the facets of business model changes through 
imitation and innovation taking place at airlines throughout the world and garner 
some useful results about the motivation and inspiration behind such changes.  A 
database of all CEO-level executive names and addresses for airlines worldwide was 
gathered from the OneSource41 business database.  The standard industrial 
classification (US87) for scheduled air transportation (4512) for all regions of the 
globe was selected to capture all relevant airlines.  The minimum revenue requirement 
was 5 million USD, which ensured that airlines of minimal relevant market 
significance were included.  However, the database query was also run for revenue 
figures of 10 million USD, 20 million USD, 30 million USD, and 1 billion USD in 
revenue.  This range of queries was to investigate the response rate at various levels to 
determine its generalization at varying industry levels.  The query results were purged 
of erroneous entries by cross-checking firms with their business activities; there were 
numerous entries consisting of such firms as cargo airlines, trucking logistical 
companies, and firms no longer in operation, as well as, duplicates.  The survey was 
distributed to the remaining firms in the database, which consisted of 208 airlines at 
the broadest level.  The survey was distributed via mail and respondents could choose 
to answer in written format or a link was provided to an identical, online version.  
                                                 
40 Brit Air, Lufthansa Cityline, and Régional 
41 OneSource (http://www.onesource.com) is a database that provides a breadth of information 
regarding companies and industries, including names and addresses of senior management.  
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68% chose to respond via the online version and the rest via mail.  The survey 
included open and closed questions and can be reviewed in Appendix V.  42 airlines 
chose to respond after three months, which resulted in a response rate of 21% and a 
sample error of 11%.  All respondents will remain anonymous throughout the 
analyses.  A detailed analysis of the responses can be studied in Chapter 7.   
 
The responses from the airlines allowed the researcher to construct measurements to 
analyze the level of rivalry, innovation, and imitation found in the industry.  These 
measurements were constructed to capture the level of rivalry and imitation at the 
firm level both within strategic groups and among strategic groups.  The following 
chapter will describe the variables that were constructed and used to analyze the data. 
 
5.3.2.1 Business model purity 
A purity value was created to measure which carriers adhere to the traditional, pure 
business model of the respective strategic groups; the group leaders.  The three 
strategic groups in the industry have their traditional business model which is often 
used to compare and contrast with group members.  The purity value, a percentage, 
was created by establishing thresholds to determine a di- or trichotomous dummy 
variable for each business model variable.  The sum of the di- or trichotomous 
dummy variables was divided by the sum of the traditional business model variables.  
This percentage is the purity of the carrier compared to the group’s traditional 
business model.  The threshold for each business model variable is explained in detail 
in the respective chapter (Chapters 6 and 8). 
 
∑
∑=
 variablesmodel business itionalDummy trad
 variablesmodel businessDummy 
 purity  model Business  
 
5.3.2.2 Business model purity-dummy 
A dummy variable for business model purity was created.  This variable allowed the 
researcher to categorize those airlines that were closely adhering to the traditional 
business model within each strategic group.  Airlines with an adherence level of 90% 
or greater were coded as 1, while those with an 89% adherence, or less, were coded as 
0, as shown in table 5.11. 
 
Table 5.11: Purity-dummy 
  
Adherence level Recoded 
  
90% or greater 1 
89% or less 0 
  
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
5.3.2.3 Rivalry 
Two types of rivalry variables were constructed from the answers provided: within 
groups, or internal rivalry, and among groups, or external rivalry.  Respondents were 
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asked to categorize their carrier in one of five42 strategic groups.  They were then 
asked to rank the level of competitiveness of all groups found in the industry.  This 
ranking took place on a five-point Likert scale. 
 
Rivalry-within-groups 
Dummy variables were created and responses were recoded as 1 for those respondents 
that ranked their own group as a direct competitor (5 out of 5) and 0 for any response 
of 4 or less within their own group.  This measurement determined the level of 
perceived rivalry within a strategic group.  Table 5.12 shows this relationship. 
 
Table 5.12: Rivalry-within-groups  
  
Response Recoded 
  
Respondent ranks competitors in own group as 5 1 
Respondent ranks competitors in own group as 4 or less 0 
  
Source: Author’s own creation  
 
Rivalry-among-groups 
Dummy variables were again created and responses were recoded as 1 for those 
respondents that ranked other groups as a near or direct competitor (4 or 5 out of 5) 
and 0 for any ranking of 3 or less, as depicted in table 5.13.  This measurement 
determined the level of perceived rivalry among strategic groups.  
 
Table 5.13: Rivalry-among-groups  
  
Response  Recoded 
  
Respondent ranks competitors in one other strategic group as 4 or 5 1 
Respondent ranks competitors in all strategic group as 3 or less 0 
  
Source: Author’s own creation  
 
The variation in the thresholds utilized to establish the thresholds for the dummy 
variables for rivalry-within- and among-groups is explained by the spread of answers 
given by respondents.  If the threshold for creating the rivalry-within-groups dummy 
had included both near and direct competitors (i.e. those ranked either 4 or 5) nearly 
all responses would have been recoded as a 1.  In other words, most carriers regard all 
carriers in the same strategic group as near or direct competitors.  If the threshold had 
been set at 4 or 5, 100% of FSCs and LCCs would regard others as near or direct 
competitors, and regional carriers 66%.  In order to ensure variation among the 
answers the researcher elected to code responses of 3 as 1, while all others as 0 to 
measure rivalry-within-groups.  On the other hand, the threshold for rivalry-among-
groups was set at responses 4 and above.  This enabled the researcher to widen the 
breadth of the perception of rivalrous behavior among groups.   
 
 
                                                 
42 FSC, LCC, regional, charter, and other 
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5.3.2.4 Imitation 
Airlines can choose to change their business model through strategic imitation.  This 
can take place by either mimicking competitors within the same strategic group or 
mimicry among strategic groups. 
 
Imitation-within-groups 
Internal imitation within strategic groups was measured by questioning airlines’ 
inspiration for changing their business models.  The level of inspiration attributed to 
competitors was multiplied by the rivalry-within-groups dummy variable; a high 
figure equates to a high degree of internal imitation.  In other words, airlines that 
perceived a high level of internal rivalry and ranked their competitors as high sources 
of inspiration were seen as imitating within their group.   
 
 
groups)-within-(rivalry  n)inspiratio competitor of Level(groups-within-Imitation ×=
 
 
Imitation-among-groups  
External imitation among strategic groups was measured by analyzing the level of 
change in each airline’s business model activities traditionally not present in the 
respective strategic groups’ business model.  If respondents indicated that they 
changed activities not present in their traditional business models it is an indication of 
external imitation, or imitation among groups.  There were three variables constructed 
to measure imitation among groups: external-imitation-overall, external-imitation-
activity, and external-imitation-average.   
 
External-imitation-overall 
This variable was constructed by summing the level of change for each carrier in each 
activity not traditionally present for the respective strategic group. 
 
 
∑= activities model business ltraditiona-non  tochangeoverall-imitation-External    
 
 
External-imitation-activity 
External-imitation-activity measures the average rate of change per activity not 
traditionally present in the business model.  This was constructed by dividing the 
variable external-imitation-overall with the number of activities not traditionally 
present in each strategic group. 
 
model business l tradtionain thepresent not  activities of #
overall-imitation-Externalactivity-imitation-External =
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External-imitation-average 
The constructed variable, external-imitation-average, compares the level of change 
per activity not traditionally present in the business model with the overall average 
level of change per activity not traditionally present for the entire group.  A result 
greater than 1 indicates that the airline on average imitates among other strategic 
groups more than their group.   
 
 
presentionally not tradit activitiesin  change group strategic Average
overall-imitation-External average-imitation-External =
 
 
5.3.2.5 Innovation 
Innovation, or change, of business model activities was determined by questioning 
airline management about the level of change in the traditional business model 
activities found in the respective strategic groups.  Unlike imitative behavior, 
innovation can not be categorized as either internal or external, although, similar to 
the constructed imitation variables, there are also three innovation variables: 
innovation-overall, innovation-activities, and innovation-average.  They were 
constructed in the same manner as the imitation variables, however the non-traditional 
activities were substituted with the traditional activities.   
 
Innovation-overall 
Innovation-overall measures the level of innovation found in each airline.  It was 
constructed by summing the level of change in the traditional business model 
activities found in the respective strategic groups. 
 
 
∑= activities model business al tradition tochangeoverall-Innovation  
 
 
Innovation-activities 
The constructed variable, innovation-activities, measures the average level of change 
in each activity.  It is constructed by dividing the overall innovation by the number of 
activities traditionally present in the business model for each respective strategic 
group.  A higher result indicates a carrier that is generally more innovative. 
 
 
model business l tradtionain thepresent  activities of #
overall-Innovationactivity-Innovation =  
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Innovation-average 
The overall innovation of an airline is compared to the average innovation of the 
respective strategic groups to determine which carriers are more innovative than the 
average.  The variable is constructed as follows: 
 
 
presentally  traditionactivitiesin  change group strategic Average
overall-Innovationaverage-Innovation =  
 
 
Both the business model variables and constructed variables have been described in 
detail.  The constructed variables are segmented according to business model purity, 
rivalry, imitation, and innovation.  These variables comprise the foundation of the 
forthcoming analyses and are all integral parts of varying degrees.  The following 
section describes in detail the hypotheses and propositions that the analyses will 
attempt to address. 
 
5.3.3 Control variables 
This research project incorporates two control variables in the correlation analyses 
(see Chapter 6).  The intention of this is to control for an external affect between two 
variables.  The literature review highlighted the affect of firm size in relation to the 
concept of imitation, which suggests that a carrier’s size may influence the analyses 
between business model adherence and profit.  Size is an elusive concept and can be 
measured in a number of ways.  One may look at customers served, revenue, 
employees, product line, or market presence.  While revenue is a factor of profit, to 
avoid bias the researcher chose not to look at this variable.  The number of employees 
in a carrier may represent size, however the data is occasionally elusive, especially 
among private carriers that do not report detailed information.  In addition, 
outsourcing, a common strategy in today’s industry, may result in inaccurate pictures 
of a carrier.  A more accurate measurement may be passengers handled by employee, 
however the previously mentioned challenge preclude this.  While product line may 
be more applicable to fast-moving-consumer-goods industries, market presence may 
be applicable to the airline industry.  However, with highly mobile assets, namely 
aircraft, one is challenged to determine when an airline is present in a market.  A 
weekly frequency between two city-pairs may not be equally weighted as an hourly 
frequency between two cities.  In order to test and control for the varying sizes of 
airlines in the study the researcher has measured two variables for size, passenger 
figures and the aggregate fleet of each carrier in the study group.  Both variables were 
not manipulated and the figures were entered as recorded from the sources.   
 
5.3.3.1 Size-passengers 
This variable controls for the size of airlines measured in passenger figures for the 
study year.  Data was gathered for each carrier from Air Transport World Traffic 
Results 2006 (2007f).  A large carrier would carry a large number of passengers. 
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5.3.3.2 Size-fleet 
Fleet size is representative of a carrier’s size; a large fleet would imply a large carrier.  
Fleet types are, however, not integrated in the metric.  This would be similar to the 
FSI variable discussed previously.  Therefore, a carrier with a large number of small 
aircraft would be considered to be larger than a carrier with few, but large aircraft.  
One may solve this issue by investigating the number of seats each carrier has 
installed in aircraft, however such data is often cumbersome to gather.   
 
5.3.4 Variable placement 
This research project utilized 33 unique variables distributed among three methods in 
the project.  Six variables (internet, in-flight service, ancillary, charter, ground) were 
inquired about in the distributed survey and were intended to be used in the QCA 
analyses.  However, the lack of necessary data and incompatibility with QCA notation 
made this impracticable.  Table 5.14 is a composition of the variables used throughout 
the project and their use with respective methods.  
 
Table 5.14: Use of variable segmented by method 
     
Variable 
heading Variable 
Correlation/ 
regression ANOVA Boolean 
     
Network Interline ? ? ? 
 Online ? ? ? 
 Through-fare ? ? ? 
 Restrictions ? ? ? 
 Alliance ? ? ? 
 Codeshare ?  ? 
 CLP ?  ? 
 CLT ?  ? 
     
Distribution GDS ? ? ? 
 Internet2  ?  
     
Service In-flight service2  ?  
 In-flight classes ? ? ? 
 Ancillary2  ?  
 Lounges ? ? ? 
 FFP ? ? ? 
 Seating2  ?  
      
Operational Service to primary/secondary 
a/p ? ? ? 
 FSI ? ? ? 
 Charter2  ?  
 Ground1    
 Feed share ?  ? 
 Stage length ?  ? 
     
Financial Operating margin ?  ? 
     
Constructed Business model purity  ?  
 Purity-dummy  ?  
 Rivalry-within-groups  ?  
 Rivalry-among-groups  ?  
 Imitation-within-groups  ?  
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 External-imitation-overall  ?  
 External-imitation-activity  ?  
 External-imitation-average  ?  
 Innovation-overall  ?  
 Innovation-activities  ?  
 Innovation-average  ?  
     
Control Size-Passengers  ?   
 Size-Fleet ?   
     
1: Variable was inquired about in survey but not utilized in analyses 
2: Used exclusively in the ANOVA analyses using answers from survey respondents 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The hypotheses, methods, and variables have been presented.  The following section 
describes the study groups that are used to represent the airline industry.  Rather than 
gathering information from all scheduled passenger airlines populating the industry 
the researcher chose to perform the analyses on a selection of airlines, which are 
described below. 
 
5.4 Study groups 
This research project utilizes two main study groups throughout the analyses.  The 
regression, correlation, and Boolean analyses study the representative group chosen 
by the researcher.  The empirical analysis using the ANOVA method incorporates the 
survey responses gathered from the industry.  The primary justification for using two 
study groups is to ensure a sufficient study group size to analyze future 
configurational combinations.  In addition, data access is a primary concern of the 
researcher.  A number of survey respondents are from privately-held airlines where 
the necessary financial data is not publicly available.  In addition, the researcher 
wishes to ensure a broad and equally-weighted Boolean analysis.  This can only be 
guaranteed if the researcher selects the study group from selected criteria.  The survey 
responses were representative of the industry, however the researcher wishes to 
expand the number of airlines.  This section will describe in detail the two study 
groups and the selection criteria. 
 
5.4.1 Researcher-chosen study group 
The researcher-chosen study group is selected by choosing those carriers from the 
three strategic groups that have posted the greatest revenue.  The researcher is 
interested in capturing the business model changes that the world’s largest airlines 
implement.  To avoid selection bias the researcher selected the study group according 
to revenue rather than profit.  It is an interpretation that airlines with large revenue 
pools have the financial and resource capabilities to be either innovative, imitative, or 
both, if the airline chooses.   
 
The researcher utilized the 2006 industry ranking presented in various publications: 
Airline Business (Panariello, 2007), Air Transport World (ATW, 2007d), and The 
Airline Industry Guide 2007/08 (Airline Business, 2006a; Airline Business, 2007b).  
More than one publication was utilized because some segment airlines according to 
strategic groups, such as a low-cost and regional airline ranking, while others 
geographically.  These publications rank airlines according to various metrics, 
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including 2006 revenues.  The researcher tabulated the data according to the three 
strategic groups found in the industry.  Strategic group categorization was achieved 
by using the publications’ categorization.  There were some carriers, regional 
especially, that did not appear in all the publications although their revenue was high 
enough to justify a placement.  The researcher added them to the research study 
group43.  In addition, two carriers were omitted from the regional study group: 
Republic Airways Holdings and Kras Air.  Republic Airways Holdings is a holding 
company representing three separate regional carriers: Chautauqua Airlines, Republic 
Airlines and Shuttle America.  Separate financial data and operational metrics were 
not available for these carriers and the researcher elected to omit the holding company 
even though the business models may be identical.  Kras Air, a regional carrier in 
Russia, was omitted due to lack of reporting data.  When possible the researcher 
utilized the financial data presented in the airline rankings.  If no data was presented 
the respective annual reports were used, as in the case with Air Asia.  When no annual 
reports were available the researcher utilized the Thompson Research database44.  
This was especially helpful when researching the regional carriers, which may not 
report or were erroneously omitted from the industry rankings.  Some regional airlines 
did not report their 2006 financial figures in the Thompson Research database.  In this 
event the researcher calculated an average of those years reported and used those 
figures.  This method was utilized for three regional carriers45.  The number of 
airlines in each strategic group varies.  The researcher categorized the rankings found 
in the various publications and determined that the FSC group was heavily 
represented.  Therefore, the largest strategic group chosen by the researcher is this 
group.  The share of the respective strategic groups is shown in figure 5.10.  The 
researcher chose the top 25 FSCs, 19 LCCs, 18 regional carriers ranked according to 
revenues.  Table 5.15 lists the airlines according to strategic group. 
 
Figure 5.10: Strategic group share in project 
Strategic group share in project
40%
31%
29%
FSC LCC Regional
 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
 
                                                 
43 These carriers are: Air Asia, Flybe, Air Canada Jazz, American Eagle, Brit Air,  and Lufthansa 
Cityline 
44 Thompson Research is a database providing current and historical financial data for all firms listed 
on US exchanges (12,000 firms) and in 53 countries.  Profiles may include business descriptions, SEC 
reports, financial ratios, earnings estimates, and current and historical stock information 
45 Brit Air, Lufthansa Cityline, and Régional 
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Table 5.15: Researcher-chosen study group 
    
Full-service carriers (IATA code)   
   
Air Canada (AC) British Airways (BA) Emirates (EK) Qantas (QF) 
Air China (CA) Cathay Pacific (CX) Iberia (IB) SAS (SK) 
Air France-KLM (AF) China Eastern Airlines (MU) Japan Airlines (JP) Singapore Airlines (SQ) 
Alitalia (AZ) China Southern Airlines (CZ) Korean Air (KE) Thai Airways (TG) 
American Airlines (AA) Continental Airlines (CO) Lufthansa (LH) United Airlines (UA) 
ANA (NH) Delta Air Line (DL) Northwest Airlines (NW) US Airways (US) 
   Virgin Atlantic (VS) 
    
Low-cost carriers (IATA code)   
    
Aer Lingus (EI) EasyJet (U2) Midwest Airlines (YX) Sterling (NB) 
Air Asia (AK) Flybe (BE) Norwegian (DY) Virgin Blue (DJ) 
Air Berlin (AB) Frontier Airlines (F9) Ryanair (FR) Vueling (VY) 
AirTran Airways (FL) Gol Transportes Aereos (G3) Southwest Airlines (WN) WestJet Airlines (WS) 
ATA Airlines (TZ) JetBlue Airways (B6) Spirit (NK)  
    
Regional carriers (IATA code)   
    
Aegean (A3) Air Wisconsin (ZW) ExpressJet (XE) Régional (YS) 
Air Canada Jazz (QK) American Eagle (MQ) Horizon Air (QX) Skywest (OO) 
Air Macau (NX) Brit Air (DB) Lufthansa Cityline (CL) TSA (AX) 
Air Nostrum (YW) Comair (MN) Mesa (YV)  
Air One (AP) Eurowings (EW) Pinnacle (9E)  
    
Source: Author’s own creation   
 
This research project analyses three strategic groups within the scheduled passenger 
airline industry.  Although the majority of readers may agree with the classification of 
carriers in the study group, there are a few in particular that may cause concern.  This 
is particularly true of the low-cost carrier group as there are often no definitive 
segmentation boundaries; classification parameters are permeable.  Irish Aer Lingus, 
U.S.-based Midwest Airlines, and UK carrier Flybe are three carriers that may be 
cause for discussion.  The researcher acknowledges that concern is warranted but 
classification is necessary and after a careful review all three carriers have been 
assigned LCC status.  Aer Lingus, the Irish flag carrier, has battled bitterly with their 
ultra-successful, pure LCC neighbor, Ryanair, for a number of years.  Aer Lingus 
went through a company-wide strategic transition to ensure the carrier’s survivability 
and this transition resulted in the carrier emulating the LCC business model.  Today, 
the carrier is often categorized as an LCC, and the CEO proclaims the airline is a 
leading LCC (Mannion, 2007).  Midwest Airlines, based in Milwaukee, US, is a 
carrier that has straddled both the LCC and FSC groups.  Recently, the airline was a 
takeover target by both an LCC and FSC, evidence of Midwest Airlines’ dual role.  In 
this research report it has been classified as an LCC.  Finally, Flybe from the UK is a 
carrier that overlaps the regional and LCC strategic groups.  The carrier has its roots 
in the regional industry; however due to a financial crisis the carrier implement many 
LCC standards.  The CEO, Jim French, explains that the transition by Flybe was 
questioned by many, however the same shift by Aer Lingus added creditability to 
Flybe’s own business model change (Pilling, 2007).  The glaring difference between 
the two was merely that Aer Lingus was operating narrow-body aircraft while Flybe 
had a fleet of regional aircraft (Pilling, 2007).  In addition, other analyses have 
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classified Flybe as an LCC, most notably the Analysis of the EU Air Transport 
Industry prepared for the European Commission (European Commission, 2007a).  
These events have led the author to place Flybe within the LCC group.   
 
5.4.2 Survey respondent study group  
While the researcher-chosen study group was used in two of three analyses, an 
empirical investigation was conducted to research why business model adaptation 
occurs in the industry.  This led to the survey-respondent study group46.  This group 
consists of the 41 airlines that returned a distributed survey.  The respondents were 
ensured anonymity however their descriptive characteristics compared to industry 
averages are presented in table 5.16.  The figures representative of the industry are the 
averages from Air Transport World’s, World Airline Report (ATW, 2007d; ATW, 
2007f), unless otherwise indicated.  The global, industry-wide data is consistently less 
than the researcher and respondent groups.  This indicates that these two groups are 
more representative of the larger carriers.  In addition, a number of carriers in the 
industry have a strong focus on charter operations, which is not always the case with 
the larger, scheduled carriers.  The figures from the researcher and respondent groups 
are similar, indicating that they are representative of each other. 
 
Table 5.16: Survey respondent study group descriptive characteristics 
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Industry          
FSC 3321 30,1131 10.7 4,301 178 274 33,222 25,665 5661 
LCC 852 7,4012 7.1 1,113 104 107 15,089 10,601 5462 
Regional 1443 4,5183 2.9 638 60 15 3,842 2,193 2213 
          
Researcher group          
FSC 224 36,365 42.3 16,003 871 3,487 122,359 92,277 989 
LCC 86 6,939 16.9 1,940 152 180 22,854 39,676 832 
Regional 106 5,207 9.1 1,350 123 22 9,470 6,960 325 
          
Respondent group          
FSC 198 40,605 41.7 13,487 703 2,794 134,199 106,474 1024 
LCC 138 11,358 32.1 1,939 152 180 89,200 108,915 689 
Regional 60 5,493 4.3 693 41 26 5,306 3,775 270 
          
1: Data compiled from following carrier database – AA, AS, CO, DL, FL, NW, TW, UA, US (Seabury 
Airline Planning Group, 2008) 
2: Data compiled from following carrier database – B6, F9, FL, G4, HP, NK, SY, TZ, U5, WN, YX 
(Seabury Airline Planning Group, 2008) 
3: Data compiled from following carrier database – 9E, AX, MQ, OH, OO, QX, XE, XJ, YV, ZW 
(Seabury Airline Planning Group, 2008) 
Source: Author’s own creation        
                                                 
46 Detailed information about the process of composing and analyzing this group can be found in 
Chapter 7. 
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This chapter has introduced the reader to three supporting facets: hypotheses, 
methods, and variables, as well as, the study groups.  The hypotheses should provide 
insight into the changes the industry may witness, while the methods were presented 
to describe to the reader how they were tested.  The variables presented explain in 
detail how they were measured and constructed.  Finally, the study groups that are 
used to gather the data are described.  This chapter is the first step towards the 
analyses, which begin with the next chapter. 
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What will be the successful future airline business models? 
Business model purity Business model change Business model propositions 
H1 
6. Business model adherence 
- Singapore Airlines’ flight from Newark to Singapore is the longest scheduled 
passenger airline flight at 16,600 kilometers and nearly 19 hours in the air; the 
shortest flight is said to be between Papa Westray and Westray in Scotland, a mere 3 
minutes - 
 
 
Adherence to an industry’s strategic group’s traditional business model can have 
either positive or negative affects on performance (Alamdari & Fagan, 2005; Stewart 
Thornhill, 2007).  Some industries may reward firms which adhere to pure, traditional 
business models, while other industries may punish strict adherence to traditional 
ways of operating.  The intent of the first of three analyses is to investigate the level 
of adherence among the airline industry’s strategic groups.  Figure 6.1, an 
organizational chart showing the research structure with the main research question 
and three sub-questions with the respective hypotheses or propositions, is presented 
and will precede each analysis.  This shows the relationship between the main 
research question and the hypotheses being addressed. 
 
Figure 6.1: Business model purity organizational chart 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
This section will present the analyses to test hypothesis 1:  
 
H1: The more pure an airline’s business model the greater the operational 
profit margin. 
 
The goal of this research is to address the questions: how do airline business models 
vary, and how does variation impact financial performance?  Past research (Alamdari 
& Fagan, 2005) has shown that LCCs that deviate from the pure, traditional LCC 
business model incur a financial penalty.  While striving for differentiation LCCs 
accumulate costs which are often not substantially covered through higher yields or 
other sources of revenue.  However, this analysis was conducted on only one 
particular strategic group and not across the other groups, or at an industry-wide level.  
Suzuki (2000) concludes that airlines maximize operational profit by providing either 
high quality or low fares, suggesting that adherence to either a pure FSC or LCC 
business model is best.  However, this research analyzed the ten largest US carriers 
and did not perform the research at the strategic group level but rather meshed the 
airlines together.  The researcher intends to complement past research by expanding 
the study groups to include all groups FSCs, LCCs, and regional carriers, as well as, 
update the findings with the most recent data.  The chapter is segmented according to 
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the analytical depth.  It commences with an investigation at the strategic group level 
and concludes with a macro-level, industry-wide analysis. 
 
6.1 Strategic group analyses 
Each strategic group analysis utilizes 15 constructed dummy variables to measure the 
level of adherence to the traditional business model.  The dummy variables and their 
thresholds are described prior to each analysis, while an explanation of the variables 
and the method of measurement of business model purity was provided in Chapter 5.  
 
Although the researcher has composed an airline business model consisting of 16 
variables, only 15 are included in the correlation analyses.  The researcher chose to 
omit the variable capacity lift provider from the FSC and LCC strategic groups 
because this is not an element that is relative to these groups47.  Whether or not the 
variable was included in the analyses would have no affect as no FSCs or LCCs 
displayed this trait.  Within the regional strategic group the variable capacity lift taker 
was deleted from the analyses as this is not the role of regional carriers; they are 
providers rather than takers.  Again, no regional carriers displayed this trait and its 
inclusion or omission from the analyses is redundant.  Of the remaining 15 
independent variables that are utilized to measure an airline’s business model 10 are 
dichotomous.  These variables are either present or not present in the carriers’ 
business models.  The remaining five variables are multi-value and require that the 
researcher establish thresholds to recode the data.  These variables are: in-flight 
classes, primary airport share, feed share, FSI, and stage length.  The calculation for 
each of the three strategic groups will be presented, however the actual thresholds are 
presented in the respective analyses for clarity.   
 
In-flight classes: Each of the three groups has its traditional cabin configuration, 
however a number of carriers have deviated from this layout.  The researcher creates a 
threshold of ±1 cabin from the traditional configuration.  A second threshold is 
created for those carriers with +2 cabins from the traditional configuration. 
 
Primary airport share: Two thresholds are created for this variable.  The thresholds 
were determined using a simple cluster method available in TOSMANA48.  They are 
presented in the respective strategic group analyses.  FSCs and regional carriers with 
high share figures were ranked highly, while LCCs with low shares were ranked with 
high dummy scores.  This is to reflect the traditional FSC and regional models of 
focusing on primary airports, and the LCC appreciation of secondary airports. 
 
Feed share: The dummy variable for this business element was also constructed 
utilizing two thresholds created using the cluster method in TOSMANA.  A high level 
of feed share among FSCs is highly ranked, while low feed shares for LCCs and 
regional carriers is representative of the traditional business model, and therefore 
highly ranked. 
 
                                                 
47 Capacity lift provider is applicable only to regional carriers; the variable is used to analyze the 
production of seats, or lift, for FSCs or LCCs 
48 The researcher utilized the threshold setting function in TOSMANA which was an efficient way for 
recoding multi-value data.  TOSMANA was not used to conduct any correlation analyses.  The 
researcher utilized Microsoft Excel and SPSS for correlation and regression analyses. 
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Fleet standardization index:  The FSI thresholds among the three strategic groups 
vary.  A traditional FSC fleet must accommodate a varied network.  Therefore, a high 
FSI, indicating a standardized fleet, is not indicative of a traditional FSC fleet 
composition and not necessarily a desired fleet makeup.  Therefore, the researcher 
calculated the average FSI for the FSC study group (0.11) and created two thresholds 
which are ±20% from the average.  Indexes within these thresholds are recoded with a 
dummy variable of 2, indicating a high level of adherence to the traditional model.  
Two more thresholds were created, again ±20%, to create the zones recoded with 
dummy variable 1.  FSIs lying beyond these thresholds were recoded with a 0.  LCC 
and regional FSIs are traditionally 1, indicating a standardized fleet.  For these two 
groups the researcher used the clustering method in TOSMANA to create two 
thresholds.  In other words, the FSC FSI dummy variable was created with four 
thresholds, while the LCC and regional dummy variable used two thresholds, as 
shown in figure 6.2. 
 
Stage length: The thresholds for stage length in the three groups were determined 
identically to the method utilized to set the FSC FSI threshold.  As carriers have a 
varied network a threshold set near their average stage length rather than the furthest 
or shortest is best representative.  The researcher determined the average stage length 
for the individual strategic groups and padded either side ±20%.  Lengths within this 
zone were recoded with dummy variable 2.  Dummy variable 1 was attributed to those 
carriers with stage lengths ±40%, and 0 to those carriers with outlying stage lengths.  
Figure 6.2 shows the thresholds determined for the strategic groups.  Tables 6.1, 6.4, 
and 6.7 show the thresholds for the respective strategic groups.  The entire raw data is 
available in Appendix VI.   
 
Figure 6.2 is a graphical representation of the dummy variables utilized for the FSI 
and stage length variables, segmented by strategic group.  As the figure shows, the 
average FSC FSI raw data was coded with the maximum 2, while the remaining two 
groups, LCC and regional, were recoded with maximum dummy variable 2 for high 
FSIs.  The stage length raw data was averaged for all three groups, which was recoded 
with the maximum 2, and decreased as the raw data was further away from the 
average. 
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Figure 6.2: Dummy threshold determinants for FSI and stage length 
 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
6.1.1 FSC 
Incumbent flag carriers often have challenges when attempting to drastically change 
their business models.  These carriers are lethargic business model adapters compared 
to other strategic groups in the industry.  Deregulation in the world’s airline markets 
removed the political protection many FSCs enjoyed and introduced them to the 
hardships of market economics.  Suppliers, partners, stakeholders, trade unions, 
customers, and occasionally political entities have challenged FSCs when attempting 
to adapt their business model to address the competitive market environment49.  This 
analysis studies the correlation between full-service carriers and operational profit.  
The level of business model adherence among the FSC carriers will be shown and 
how profit is impacted.  The thresholds that were used for this analysis are presented 
in table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1: FSC correlation – thresholds 
    
Dummy variable 0 1 2 
    
Online 0  1 
Interline 0  1 
Thru-fare 0  1 
Restrictions 0  1 
GDS 0  1 
FFP 0  1 
Lounges 0  1 
In-flight classes 4 or more 3 or 1 2 
Alliance 0  1 
Codeshare 0  1 
                                                 
49 A recent example of this phenomenon is the Italian government’s stipulations related to a sale of the 
Italian carrier, Alitalia (Migliaccio, 2006; C. Walsh, 2007). 
FSC 
LCC 
Regional 
Raw data 
Dummy variable Dummy variable 
2 11 00
1 20
Low High Low High
FSI Stage length 
1 20
2 11 00
2 11 00
2 11 00
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CLP Omitted Omitted Omitted 
CLT 0  1 
Primary airport share x<0.85 0.85<x<0.90 x>0.90 
Feed share x<0.06 0.06<x<0.13 x>0.13 
FSI x<0.06; x>0.14 
0.06<x<0.08; 
0.12<x<0.14 0.08<x<0.12 
Stage length x<680; x>1541 
680<x<880; 
1321<x<1541 880<x<1321 
    
Source: Author’s own creation   
  
The researcher has removed one carrier from the correlation analysis as this data point 
was an extreme outlier.  Alitalia, the flag carrier of Italy, reported an adherence level 
of 83% and an operating margin of -10%.  This operating margin fell outside of the 
distribution seen in the scatter plot and was removed (Carlson et al., 2003).  Prior to 
removal of the outlier the average business model adherence and operating margin are 
78% and 4.6% respectively.  Figure 6.3 is a scatter plot depicting business model 
adherence and operating margin which includes the outlier.   
 
Figure 6.3: Relationship between FSC business model adherence and operating 
margin 
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Source: Author’s own creation; outlier included; see table 2.2 for IATA code definition 
 
The results indicate that there is limited variation among FSCs today.  However, 
changes are taking place as some carriers adapt their business models.  The variation 
seen in the strategic group ranges between 60% and 97%, although the average for the 
25 carriers is 78% (outlier excluded).  Virgin Atlantic (VS), based in the UK, has the 
lowest level of adherence.  This carrier focuses on providing long-haul transit on high 
density routes.  The carrier has an average stage length of nearly 4 000 NM, which is 
nearly 1 500 NM more than the second longest average stage length.  In addition, VS 
is only one of six FSCs among the study group not to be a member of one of the three 
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global alliances.  Delta Air Lines (DL), from the US, on the other hand, has the 
highest level of adherence among the study group.  The only category the airline 
deviates from the traditional FSC model is its fleet composition.  DL has a slightly 
more diverse fleet than the average range for the group.  It is possible to discern a 
slight geographic clustering of carriers.  There are nine carriers that have an adherence 
level of 85% or more, and two-thirds of them are based in the United States.  This 
may be indicative of a reluctance to adapt the US FSC business model drastically.  
The spread among the Asian and Middle Eastern carrier is only ten points, between 
63% and 73%.  Less than one-third (30%) of the Asian and Middle East carriers are 
members of the global alliances in the industry, and none of them have a strategic 
partnership with a regional carrier to provide capacity.  These factors help to 
distinguish these carriers in figure 6.3 and contribute to a lower level of adherence.  
European carriers are spread throughout the spectrum, from 60% to 93%.  Variation is 
attributed to alliance membership (VS), ticket restrictions (SK), stage length (LH), 
and FSI (AF).  Such findings may imply that regional differences may impact 
business models (Berry, 2001), French (1995) makes this very statement regarding the 
differences in regional airline business models; historical, competitive, political, and 
economic differences influence the business model of FSCs.  It can be stated that, in 
general, business model change is slow to infiltrate the FSC strategic group, although 
some regions are quicker to react than others, however all differences are discernable 
and measurable.  The economic results show that the average operating margin for the 
group is 5.2% with a spread between 0% (DL) and 14% (QF).  Table 6.2 shows 
descriptive metrics regarding the FSC group and adherence and margin. 
 
Table 6.2: FSC correlation descriptives 
     
Metric1 Median Mean Low High 
     
Business model adherence 76.7% 78.1% 60% 97% 
Operating margin 5.0% 5.2% 0% 14% 
     
1: Outlier omitted     
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
A correlation analysis measuring business model adherence and profit margin is 
conducted to investigate the relationship between the two variables.  The analysis of 
the FSC group shows a weak, negative correlation between business model adherence 
level and operating margin.  However, this contradicts the two other, forthcoming 
analyses and the industry-wide analysis.  Therefore, the researcher is hesitant to 
conclude that there is a negative correlation within the FSC group as the industry’s 
other groups indicates otherwise.  Past research (K. Hvass, 2006) and comments (M. 
Boyd, 2007) on the subject showed a moderate, positive relationship between 
business model adherence and operational profit.  The correlation results are 
presented in table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3: FSC correlation results 
  
Strategic group FSC 
  
Correlation coefficient -0.2478 
  
Control: Size-Passengers -0.1670 
Control: Size-Fleet -0.1701 
  
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
These results show that there is a weak correlation between the two factors; that 
business model adherence explains a portion of the financial results of FSCs.  In 
addition, the partial correlations using size as a control are less than the regular 
correlation, indicating that carrier size does impact the relationship between business 
model purity and operating margin.  This holds true for both control variables.  The 
negative sign indicates that as FSCs transition from the traditional business model to a 
more diffuse model operating results should increase.  Although the researcher has 
questioned these findings, if the negative relationship is accepted it may partly explain 
why FSCs transition from a pure business model to a non-pure model in an attempt to 
extract greater profits from the market.  However, this finding contradicts the notion 
that FSCs strive for model impurity to achieve firm survival rather than greater 
success50.  If firms achieve greater financial success with non-pure business models 
one may expect the business model purity in the strategic group to be more diffuse 
rather than so highly concentrated with pure business models.  It is the operational 
variables that have a strong, negative affect of business model purity; the level of 
adherence to the traditional operational elements is lowest among feed share, FSI, and 
stage length51.   
 
The correlation between business model adherence and operational profit within the 
FSC strategic group has been investigated.  However, the industry is comprised of 
two more strategic groups which are analyzed in the following sections. 
 
6.1.2 LCC 
The previous analysis showed that there is a limited amount of variation among 
carriers in the FSC strategic group, and that there is a weak, negative correlation 
between business model adherence and operational profit.  The FSC group, however, 
is not representative of the entire scheduled passenger airline industry and the 
following analysis will look at a very dynamic group, LCCs.  Industry observers have 
commented on the variation seen among the world’s LCCs (Baker, 2006; Thomas, 
2005).  A number of self-proclaimed LCCs no longer adhere to the traditional 
business model, commonly accredited to Southwest Airlines.  The analytical method 
utilized in this analysis is identical to the FSC method.  The thresholds utilized in the 
                                                 
50 The case of Aer Lingus and its transition from a pure FSC to a non-pure LCC is one example 
suggesting that firms may change their business model purity or strategic group membership entirely, 
in an attempt to stave off extinction rather than to maximize profits.  Aer Lingus and other carries, such 
as Flybe, have changed their business model to avoid bankruptcy.   
51 A correlation with the four operational business model elements removed resulted in a higher 
correlation figure, although still negative (-0.4353). 
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LCC analysis are shown in table 6.4.  Unlike the FSI variable in the FSC analysis, 
which has four thresholds (see figure 6.2) , the LCC analysis only utilizes two 
thresholds.  This is reflective of the strategic group’s traditional business model of 
favoring a single, standardized fleet. 
 
Table 6.4: LCC correlation – thresholds 
    
Dummy variable 0 1 2 
    
Online 1  0 
Interline 1  0 
Thru-fare 1  0 
Restrictions 1  0 
GDS 1  0 
FFP 1  0 
Lounges 1  0 
In-flight classes 3 or more 2 1 
Alliance 1  0 
Codeshare 1  0 
CLP Omitted Omitted Omitted 
CLT 1  0 
Primary airport share x>0.84 0.55<x<0.84 x<0.55 
Feed share x>0.07 0.03<x>0.07 x<0.03 
FSI x<0.42 0.42<x<0.75 x>0.75 
Stage length x<396; x>924 
396<x<528; 
792<x<924 528<x<792 
    
Source: Author’s own creation   
 
The LCC group also contains an outlying carrier that distorts the findings.  Vueling, a 
Spanish-based carrier, reported a -22% operating margin with a 90% adherence level.  
The carrier reported that costs associated with its initial public offering, scheduled for 
the following year, and a competitive environment hampered the newly started LCC 
(ATW, 2007c).  The scatter plot shown in figure 6.4 shows the outlying effect the 
carrier has.  The average adherence level is 58% and the average margin is 3.3% 
before removing the outlier. 
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Figure 6.4: Relationship between LCC business model adherence and operating 
margin 
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Source: Author’s own creation; outlier included; see table 2.2 for IATA code definition 
 
The analysis shows that there is a greater level of variation to be found among LCCs.  
The average level of adherence is 56%, with a low of 23%52 and a high of 97%.  This 
high degree of variation compared to the FSC study group shows that LCCs may be 
more adaptive or flexible at accommodating their business models to changing market 
situations.  The average operating margin, 4.7%, is more than a percentage point 
lower than the FSC study group, which shows that the LCC business model is not a 
success guarantee, as some industry commentators believe.  Table 6.5 shows the LCC 
correlation descriptives. 
 
Table 6.5: LCC correlation descriptives 
     
Metric1 Median Mean Low High 
     
Business model adherence 51.7% 55.7% 23% 97% 
Operating margin 4.0% 4.7% -0.08% 21% 
     
1: Outlier omitted     
Source: Author’s own creation    
 
The LCC correlation analysis shows a strong, positive correlation between business 
model adherence and operational profit.  This result complements the findings by 
Alamdari and Fagan (2005), although with a different methodology based on different 
                                                 
52 Aer Lingus, EI, adhered 23% to the traditional LCC model.  The carrier recently made a change from 
FSC to LCC, which explains the low adherence level to the LCC model.  If the carrier had remained an 
FSC it would have adhered 73% to the traditional FSC business model with its 2006 business model 
configuration.  This is near the FSC median.   
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business model elements and a regression-only analysis.  Table 6.6 shows the 
correlation coefficient for the LCC analysis. 
 
Table 6.6: LCC correlation results 
  
Strategic group LCC 
  
Correlation coefficient 0.4819 
  
Control: Size-Passengers 0.4705 
Control: Size-Fleet 0.5029 
  
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
These findings show that those LCCs that strive for differentiation may do so at 
detriment to their financial success.  Carriers may attempt to place themselves in an 
unoccupied space within their strategic group, however this may commonly entail 
adding complexity to the business model without necessarily a responding increase in 
revenue.  A successful differentiation strategy (M. E. Porter, 1985) entails a 
successful price differentiation, which may be challenging to achieve in a price-
sensitive market, such as air travel.  When controlling for size the results are nearly 
the same as the regular correlation indicating that size has nearly no influence on the 
relationship between business model adherence and profit.   
 
The LCC results show a strong, positive correlation between business model 
adherence and financial success.  This strategic group often operates independently is 
not reliant on other groups.  The same cannot be said of the regional carrier strategic 
group which often supplements the FSC strategic group. 
 
6.1.3 Regional 
If a regional carrier is not a stand-alone entity, then it is often affiliated with an FSC 
carrier; relatively few LCCs have utilized regional carriers to complement their 
business model.  Again the methodology is identical to the two previous analyses.  
The thresholds utilized in the correlation analysis of regional carriers are shown in 
table 6.7.  The variable capacity lift taker is omitted from this analysis as it 
contradicts the current business model function of this strategic group.  The variable, 
feed share has no thresholds even though it is a multi-value variable.  This is a 
testament to the regional airline business model as there were no multi-values for the 
study group; all regional carriers reported 0% feed share in their networks. 
 
Table 6.7: Regional correlation – thresholds 
    
Dummy variable 0 1 2 
    
Online 0  1 
Interline 0  1 
Thru-fare 0  1 
Restrictions 0  1 
GDS 0  1 
FFP 0  1 
Lounges 1  0 
In-flight classes 3 or more  1 
Alliance 1  0 
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Codeshare 0  1 
CLP 0 0.5 1 
CLT Omitted Omitted Omitted 
Primary airport share x<0.88 0.88<x<0.97 x>0.97 
Feed share Not applicable Not applicable 0 
FSI x<0.42 0.42<x<0.75 x>0.75 
Stage length x<195; x>455 
195<x<260 
390<x<455 260<x<390 
    
Source: Author’s own 
creation    
 
The regional study group has no outlying data points.  Figure 6.5 shows the strategic 
group’s scatter plot.   
 
Figure 6.5: Relationship between regional carrier business model adherence and 
operating margin 
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Source: Author’s own creation; see table 2.2 for IATA code definition 
 
This strategic group tends to follow the lead of the FSC group as the two are 
commonly entwined partners of varying degrees.  The average adherence level, 
73.1%, ranks closely to FSCs, with a spread of only 20 points.  Air One (AP), an 
Italian regional carrier, has the lowest level of adherence within the regional carrier 
strategic group.  The carrier distinguishes itself from the group by operating a 
simplified network and pricing structure, similar to LCCs, while offering various 
FSC-like amenities, including lounge access.  The carrier is closely affiliated with 
Lufthansa, although it is not a closely integrated capacity lift provider as Lufthansa 
Cityline.  Operationally, AP has a diversified fleet and operates a high percentage of 
its network’s ASKs to secondary airports.  The carrier reported a profit margin of 3% 
in 2006.  The metrics of the entire regional group show similar trends as the FSC 
group.  Group descriptives are shown in table 6.8. 
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Table 6.8: Regional correlation descriptives 
     
Metric Median Mean Low High 
     
Business model adherence 76.7% 73.1% 63% 83% 
Operating margin 5.0% 6.1% -4.0% 16% 
     
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The correlation analysis produces results similar to the LCC analysis, although the 
correlation is slightly weaker.  The results indicate that there is a strong, positive 
correlation between business model adherence and operating margin.  Table 6.9 
depicts the correlation results for this analysis 
 
Table 6.9: Regional correlation results 
  
Strategic group Regional 
  
Correlation coefficient 0.3631 
  
Control: Size-Passengers 0.3734 
Control: Size-Fleet 0.3205 
  
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The results from the regional analysis complement those of the LCC analysis.  There 
is a link between the level of business model adherence to the pure strategic group 
model and its affect on operational profit.  Again, when controlled for size there is 
little to no affect on the relationship.   
 
This primary analysis investigated the level of interdependence between business 
model adherence and operational profitability.  The FSC results showed a weak, 
negative interdependence between the two variables, however findings from the two 
other strategic groups indicate moderate to strong, positive interdependence.  
Therefore, the researcher can conclude that there is a positive interdependence at the 
strategic group level between business model adherence and operational profitability.  
However, this meso-scale analysis is complemented with a macro-scale investigation 
at the industry level. 
 
6.2 Industry 
While the previous analyses studied individual strategic groups this correlation 
analysis takes a step back and looks at the correlation affect between adherence and 
profit in the entire industry.  This analysis produced expected findings within the LCC 
and regional strategic groups, based on previous research (Alamdari & Fagan, 2005; 
Suzuki, 2000), and intriguing results within the FSC strategic group.   The industry-
wide analysis will study the correlation with both the FSC study group included, as 
well as, omitted.  In all the analyses the two outlying carriers, Alitalia and Vueling, 
are not included.   
 
The industry-wide correlation with the FSC group included results in a correlation 
coefficient of 0.2970, as shown in table 6.10.  This indicates a moderate, positive 
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correlation between the two factors.  Carrier size has little affect on the relationship 
between the two variables, as shown by the partial correlation results.   
 
Table 6.10: Industry correlation results – FSC included 
  
Strategic groups FSC, LCC and regional 
  
Correlation coefficient 0.2970 
  
Control: Size-Passengers 0.2675 
Control: Size-Fleet 0.2770 
  
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
If the researcher omits the FSC strategic group due to conflicting findings the results 
show a stronger, positive correlation.  The results produce a correlation coefficient of 
0.4475, seen in table 6.11. 
 
Table 6.11: Industry correlation results – FSC omitted 
  
Strategic groups LCC and regional 
  
Correlation coefficient 0.4475 
  
Control: Size-Passengers 0.4660 
Control: Size-Fleet 0.4473 
  
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
These results indicate that at an industry level there is a relationship between business 
model adherence and operational profit.  The interdependence between these two 
factors is moderately and positively strong, and strong and positive if the FSC group 
is omitted.  The correlation analysis merely demonstrates that there is a level of 
interdependence but not whether there is a relationship between the two variables, this 
is the role of the regression analysis. 
 
6.2.1 Regression 
While the correlation demonstrated interdependence the regression analysis will show 
a causal relationship between business model adherence and operational profit.  The 
researcher will again perform the analyses with the FSC strategic group included and 
omitted.  This is to ensure that full analytical transparency exists.  
 
The regression analysis with the FSC group included shows a significant but virtually 
non-existent causal relationship between the two variables.  Table 6.12 depicts the 
analytical findings for the industry-wide regression.  An R-squared of 0.0882 
describes a positive yet weak causal relationship. 
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Table 6.12: Industry regression results – FSC included 
  
Strategic groups FSC, LCC, and regional 
  
R-squared 0.0882 
Significance 0.0212 
  
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
If the FSC strategic group is omitted the regression analysis shows a stronger causal 
relationship, which is still significant.  The results are displayed in table 6.13. 
 
Table 6.13: Industry regression results – FSC omitted 
  
Strategic groups LCC and regional 
  
R-squared 0.2002 
Significance 0.0062 
  
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
These results show that there is a moderately, positive relationship between business 
model adherence and operational success.  This indicates that airlines with a pure 
business model will earn a higher profit than those carriers with a non-pure business 
model.  This is generally true for the industry as a whole, but more so among LCCs 
and regional carriers.  Research is divided whether this relationship is also evident in 
the FSC strategic group.  These results are consistent with the industry-level research 
by Suzuki (2000) and Thornhill and White (2007).  Thornhill and White’s research, 
segmented by industry, finds that services display the same downward performance 
trend as strategic adherence decreases.  They discovered that operating margins of 
pure firms exceeded hybrid firms by more than 17%.  Similar results were reported at 
the LCC strategic group level by Alamdari and Fagan (Alamdari & Fagan, 2005).  A 
scatter plot for the entire industry is presented in figure 6.6.  The outlying carriers, 
Vueling and Alitalia, have been removed from the graph.  It is presented to the reader 
as a graphical representation of the relationship in the industry between the two 
variables. 
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Figure 6.6: Industry relationship between business model adherence and operating 
margin 
AX
OO
YS
9E
YV
CL
QX
XE
EW
MNDB
MQ ZW
AP
YW
NX
QK
A3
WS
DJ
NB
NK
WN
FR
DY
YX
B6
G3
F9 BE
U2
TZ
FL
AB
AK
EI
VS
US
UA
TG
SQ
SK
QF
NW
LH
KE
JL
IB
EK
DL
CO
CZ
MU
CX
BA
NH AAF
CA
AC
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Business model adherence
O
pe
ra
tin
g 
m
ar
gi
n
 
Source: Author’s own creation; outliers removed; see table 2.2 for IATA code definition 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
The correlation and regression analysis has shown that there is a level of positive 
interdependence both at the strategic group level and the industry level, as well as a 
positive relationship between the two variables.  Although, there is some degree of 
disparity with the FSC results, the researcher concludes that hypothesis 1 cannot be 
rejected.  The findings indicate that the more pure an airline’s business model and the 
greater the operational profit.   
 
 
How does the variation of airline business models affect profit? 
 
Research findings suggest that there is a positive relationship between the
purity of a carrier’s business model and operating margin.  In other words,
carriers that diverge from the traditional business model of their strategic group 
may experience depressed margins compared to more traditional carriers.  This
link has been noticed at both the strategic group level and industry level,
although with varying degrees of correlation strength.  The FSC group shows
contrary findings which advocate additional research. 
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What will be the successful future airline business models? 
Business model purity Business model change Business model propositions 
Imitation Innovation 
Among groups 
Within groups 
H3B 
H3D 
H3A 
H3C 
H4A 
H4B 
H2A 
H2B 
H2C 
7. Survey results 
- Charles Lindbergh brought 5 sandwiches and 2 canteens of water on his 
transatlantic crossing in 1927; an average long distance flight in a 747 today carries 
more than 1,000 kilograms of food and 1,300 liters of beverages - 
 
 
This chapter analyzes the motivation and inspiration for changing the airline business 
model.  An overview of the hypotheses that are addressed can be seen in figure 7.1.  It 
begins by analyzing business model imitation among strategic groups (hypothesis 
2B).  The affect of rivalry, both internally and externally, is introduced (hypothesis 
3B, 3D).  Imitation within strategic groups follows in the same order (hypothesis 2C, 
3A, 3C).  Finally, business model innovation is introduced.  The affect of business 
model adherence and its impact on innovative behavior is studied, and again with both 
internal (hypothesis 4A) and external (hypothesis 4B) rivalry as a moderator.  
Innovation as a source of business model change is not divided into among strategic 
groups and within strategic groups as this distinction is not possible.   
 
Figure 7.1: Organizational chart of hypotheses addressing business model change 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
These analyses address the proposed hypotheses by utilizing the responses from the 
distributed survey and the constructed variables introduced in Chapter 5.  Distributed 
surveys have been used in past research, such as market orientation investigation 
(Martín-Consuegra & Esteban, 2007), business traveler priorities (K. Mason, 2006), 
enroute airspace capacity (Majumdar, Ochieng, Bentham, & Richards, 2005), airport 
selection factors (Warnock-Smith & Potter, 2005), performance measurement 
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techniques (Francis, Humphreys, & Fry, 2005), although an investigation targeting 
business model change based on innovation or imitation is lacking from the field.  
Table 7.1 provides an overview of the sample population and response rate for the 
various groups distinguished by revenue limitations.  This is provided to give the 
reader a perspective of the size of respondents, all of which remain anonymous 
throughout the study.  Five carriers chose to remain anonymous in their response and 
these were omitted from the response rate and sample error calculations at varying 
revenue levels above 5 million USD.  The population size for each revenue category 
was determined from categorizing the query results from the OneSource database.  
The response rate falls from the initial 21%, however peaks at 26% for airlines with 
revenue exceeding one billion USD.  This is testament to the high number of large 
airlines that responded to the questionnaire.  This level of response ensures 
applicability within the industry. 
 
Table 7.1: Survey response summary    
      
 Revenue > 5 
million USD 
Revenue > 10 
million USD1 
Revenue > 20 
million USD1 
Revenue > 30 
million USD1 
Revenue > 1 
billion USD1 
      
Population 208 186 173 170 68 
Response 42 26 25 24 18 
Response rate 21% 14% 15% 14% 26% 
      
1: excluding anonymous respondents    
Source: Author’s own creation    
 
The survey analyses address two core issues: imitative behavior, internally and 
externally, and innovative behavior, in the presence and absence of both internal and 
external rivalry.  The three primary strategic groups found in the airline industry, 
network, regional, and low-cost, are analyzed within these core issues.  Within the 
survey there are themes that reverberate: business model purity, rivalry, market 
segmentation, business model activity changes, motivation and inspiration for 
business model changes, and business model challenges.  The concepts of business 
model purity flow through from the previous analyses regarding adherence level and 
profit.  The same purity measurement was utilized in these analyses.  Rivalry, as a 
concept, is instrumental in analyzing strategic groups and is highly relevant in the 
context of the airline industry.  Cognitive perception of rivalrous behavior within and 
among groups is one measurement in the analyses.  A summarized response from 
each strategic group regarding perceptive rivalry within and among groups is 
presented in table 7.2.   
 
Table 7.2: Rivalry segmented by strategic group 
       
 # Respondents Network* LCC* Regional* Charter* Other* 
       
Network 26 4.96 3.65 2.72 2.24 3.75 
LCC 4 4.40 4.80 2.60 3.40 0.00 
Regional 10 3.89 3.89 4.30 2.78 4.00 
       
*: 5-point Likert scale 
Source: Author’s own creation 
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As the results indicate each strategic group indicates that there is a high degree of 
internal rivalry, especially among network carriers.  Of the respondents that identified 
themselves as network carriers only one ranked the competitiveness of other network 
carriers less than the maximum, and this ranking was four out of five.  Such a 
response may be a testament to the particular carrier’s geographic location, the 
periphery of Europe.  In addition, the rivalrous ranking of LCCs by network carriers is 
affected by the low LCC penetration in some regions of the world.  Those network 
carriers that ranked other forms of transport as competitors listed such factors as high 
speed trains (Román, Espino, & Martín, 2007) and competing airline alliances 
(Gudmundsson & Oum, 2005; Gudmundsson & Lechner, 2006).  Low-cost carriers 
appear to struggle nearly equally with rivalrous behavior both within their own 
strategic group, as well as, among network carriers, while regional and charter carriers 
score relatively low.  Regional carriers perceive members of their own strategic group 
as direct competitors, while network and LCC carriers are ranked equally.  LCCs tend 
to have longer stage lengths (see table 2.3) and may not compete on a large-scale with 
regional carriers, while network carriers often have a level of partnership with 
regional carriers which may reduce competitive perception.  The Other category was 
described as road transportation, a testament to the short networks that regional 
carriers tend to operate.  Only the LCC group ranked the charter group as a moderate 
threat, which reflects the charter strategic group as adapting their business model to 
include seat-only sales, which is able to compete with the LCC model (Binggeli & 
Pompeo, 2002; Williams, 2001).  Two measurements for rivalry were created for each 
strategic group with the response from the Likert scale: rivalry-within-groups and 
rivalry-among-groups.  Table 7.3 is a summary of the average intensity of rivalry 
found in the industry’s three strategic groups using the constructed dummy variable.  
The results complement table 7.3.  A response closer to 1 indicates a high level of 
rivalry. 
 
Table 7.3: Constructed group rivalry 
   
Strategic group Rivalry-within-groups (internal) Rivalry-among-groups (external) 
   
Network 0.958 0.792 
Low-cost 0.750 0.750 
Regional 0.700 0.800 
   
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The results show a high degree of rivalry within the same strategic group, especially 
among network carriers.  However, rivalry among groups is also prevalent with all 
groups reporting that at least one other group in the industry is a near and direct 
competitor.   
 
The rivalrous behavior found in the industry leads to constantly fought battles among 
competitors.  Carriers can elect to either innovate their business model activities or 
imitate a competitor, either from the same strategic group or another.  All three 
strategies were measured and analyzed.  External imitation begins the analyses, 
followed by internal imitation, and concludes with an innovation analysis.  In 
addition, excerpts from the survey respondents are included which address questions 
such as, business model descriptions, challenges to change, and expected future 
challenges. 
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7.1 Business model imitation 
Airlines can display mimetic behavior in the form of imitation within strategic groups 
or imitation among strategic groups.  Both strategies have their advantages and 
disadvantages.   
 
Imitation may be used as a strategic response by carriers to reduce rivalry, 
disseminate signals to the market, or as a response to inadequate information.  
However, imitation is merely one source of inspiration when it comes to business 
model change.  In the distributed survey carriers were asked to rank their inspiration 
for changes to their business models.  Table 7.4 ranks the responses by strategic 
groups.   
 
Table 7.4: Inspiration for business model change segmented by strategic group  
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Network 26 3.84 4.46 3.50 2.71 4.12 2.84 3.31 1.86 2.60 
LCC 4 4.00 3.75 3.00 2.75 3.75 2.75 3.00 1.67 1.00 
Regional 10 3.90 4.30 3.10 2.40 4.00 2.10 3.40 2.11 1.50 
           
*: 5-point Likert scale         
1: Board of directors         
2: Chief executive officer         
Source: Author’s own 
creation 
        
 
Airlines of all strategic groups responded that inspiration comes primarily from 
internal sources, such as the board of directors or chief executive officer.  However, 
external sources are not ignored; customers especially are a strong source of 
inspiration for specific changes to the business model.  Some airlines even look 
beyond their own industry, such as at the hospitality, retail, or aircraft manufacturing 
industries.  However, the results show that external inspiration from competitors is not 
overlooked.  All carriers said that competitors have some to medium affect when 
making changes.  In addition, the rankings show that competitors rank above average 
for all inspirational sources in all three strategic groups.  It is this finding that points 
to mimetic behavior in the airline industry.  However, it is necessary to differentiate 
between competitors within the same strategic group and those from other groups.  As 
table 7.3 shows airlines, especially FSCs, rank their own group and competing groups 
very highly as competitors. 
 
The traditional, or pure, business model has been described in Chapter 4 for each 
strategic group found in the industry.  However, as the previous analysis of business 
model adherence uncovered, there is business model heterogeneity evident in the 
industry, and as table 7.4 shows, airlines turn to competitors for inspiration when 
changing their business model.  Table 7.5 is an overview of which business model 
elements were traditionally not part of the respective strategic groups, yet can be 
found today in numerous airlines.  If you compare with table 7.9 you can determine 
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which groups have been imitated.  For example, the US LCC, Frontier, is present in 
numerous GDSs, yet this is not part of the traditional LCC business model but of the 
traditional FSC model.  Therefore, Frontier has displayed mimetic behavior of a rival 
strategic group. 
 
Table 7.5: Imitation business model elements segmented by strategic group 
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Network         ?     ? ? ?  
LCC ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ?   ? ? 
Regional         ? ? ?   ?  ? ? 
                  
1: Global distribution system 
2: Frequent flyer program 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The following section will address both types of imitation, internal and external, and 
the influence of rivalry.  The analyses will tackle the following hypotheses: 2B, 2C, 
3A-D.   
 
7.1.1 Business model imitation – among strategic groups 
Analyses of the responses using the ANOVA (see section 5.3) method indicate that 
airlines with a low adherence to the traditional business model in their strategic group 
tend to be more imitative of other strategic groups.  This is true for airlines that 
perceive both a high level of internal and external rivalry.  As the strategic distance 
increases from a group’s traditional business model, airlines tend to gather inspiration 
from airlines of other groups in the market.  Table 7.6 provides an overview of the 
results. 
 
Hypothesis 2B analyzes external imitation without introducing rivalry as a moderator.  
The results show significant differences of overall external imitation between non-
pure and pure airlines.  Non-pure airlines have a pronounced imitative behavior of 
other groups.  In addition, there are differences between non-pure and pure airlines 
when measuring the average external imitation.  Although, the results are nearly 
significant when analyzing the results at the activity level, the results do show that 
non-pure airlines tend to be more imitative.   
 
When rivalry, both within and among strategic groups, is introduced as a moderator 
the analyses display similar results, however with even more significant differences in 
imitative tendencies among pure and non-pure airlines.  The results are only displayed 
for a high level of rivalry and not for an absence of rivalry, this is because there is not 
one airline among the respondents that perceive a low level of internal rivalry. 
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Hypothesis 3B states that non-pure airlines within a highly rivalrous strategic group 
will imitate airlines from other strategic groups.  The results show that non-pure 
airlines that experience a high rivalry within their own strategic group display an even 
greater tendency to imitate other groups in the industry, than if there was no internal 
rivalry.  Overall imitation and average imitation per activity display significant 
differences and strong imitative behavior.  The average external imitation also 
displays these significant results, yet not as large variation between non-pure and pure 
airlines.   
 
Internal rivalry is not the only competitive factor airlines experience; external rivalry 
also influences imitative behavior as dictated by hypothesis 3D.  The ANOVA 
analyses show that overall external imitation among strategic groups is significantly 
different between non-pure and pure airlines.  Non-pure airlines display strong 
mimetic behavior of other groups, even if the perceived rivalry from outside the 
strategic group is high.  Average activity and group imitation does not display 
significant differences, however non-pure airlines do show greater imitative 
tendencies than their pure brethren.   
 
Table 7.6: ANOVA results – imitation among groups  
      
   ANOVA Test Kruskal-Wallis  
     
Variable: External-imitation-overall N Mean Mean Rank  
Non-pure business model (0) 25 12.92 23.24  
Pure business model (1) 13 7.54 12.31  
  F 9.395 Asymp. Sig. 0.004  
  Sig. 0.004   
     
Variable: External-imitation-activity N Mean Mean Rank  
Non-pure business model (0) 25 2.350 21.42  
Pure business model (1) 13 1.885 15.81  
  F 2.256 Asymp. Sig. 0.137  
  Sig. 0.142   
     
Variable: External-imitation-average N Mean Mean Rank  
Non-pure business model (0) 25 1.082 21.82  
Pure business model (1) 13 0.842 15.04  
  F 3.167 Asymp. Sig. 0.074  
H2B 
  Sig. 0.084   
      
      
     
Moderator: High rivalry-within     
Variable: External-imitation-overall N Mean Mean Rank  
Non-pure business model (0) 20 13.45 21.08  
Pure business model (1) 13 7.54 10.73  
  F 10.509 Asymp. Sig. 0.003  
  Sig. 0.003   
     
Moderator: High rivalry-within     
Variable: External-imitation-activity N Mean Mean Rank  
Non-pure business model (0) 20 2.538 19.73  
Pure business model (1) 13 1.885 12.81  
  F 4.144 Asymp. Sig. 0.042  
  Sig. 0.05   
H3B 
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Moderator: High rivalry-within     
Variable: External-imitation-average N Mean Mean Rank  
Non-pure business model (0) 20 1.156 20.03  
Pure business model (1) 13 .842 12.35  
  F 5.149 Asymp. Sig. 0.025  
 
  Sig. 0.03   
      
      
     
Moderator: High rivalry-among     
Variable: External-imitation-overall N Mean Mean Rank  
Non-pure business model (0) 21 14.10 18.19  
Pure business model (1) 9 9.00 9.22  
  F 7.135 Asymp. Sig. 0.01  
  Sig. 0.012   
     
Moderator: High rivalry-among     
Variable: External-imitation-activity N Mean Mean Rank  
Non-pure business model (0) 21 2.540 16.60  
Pure business model (1) 9 2.250 12.94  
  F 0.839 Asymp. Sig. 0.291  
  Sig. 0.367   
     
Moderator: High rivalry-among     
Variable: External-imitation-average N Mean Mean Rank  
Non-pure business model (0) 21 1.179 16.95  
Pure business model (1) 9 1.005 12.11  
  F 1.784 Asymp. Sig. 0.165  
H3D 
  Sig. 0.192   
      
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The concluding result is that airlines with a low adherence to their own strategic 
group’s traditional business model imitate business models of other strategic groups.  
This behavior is more pronounced if there is a high degree of rivalry within an 
airline’s strategic group.  In addition, a high degree of rivalry among strategic groups 
positively affects the external imitative behavior of airlines.  These results have 
verified and partially verified hypotheses 2B, 3B, and 3D.  Such findings indicate that 
mobility barriers may be relatively weak among strategic groups, especially from a 
non-pure carrier perspective.  However, this research fails to investigate the 
underlying justification for imitation; whether it is based on information or rivalry.  
Behavior may suggest that external imitation is an attempt by carriers to differentiate 
from strategic group member peers, yet this has not been explored by the researcher.  
The following section studies the phenomenon of initiation within strategic groups. 
 
7.1.2 Business model imitation – within strategic groups 
While the previous analyses dealt with business model imitation among strategic 
groups, airlines can look internally in their own strategic group for inspiration.  Such 
behavior may be used to reduce the strategic distance among similar competitors and 
dilute a differentiating aspect, or stem from the perception that competitors possess 
superior information.  These analyses address hypotheses 2C, 3A, and 3C, as shown 
in table 7.7.  These hypotheses state that non-pure airlines will display higher levels of 
imitative behavior than their counterparts.   
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The results for internal imitation without the influence of rivalry show significant 
results between non-pure and pure airlines.  However, the imitative behavior is not 
displayed by the non-pure airlines but rather the pure airlines.  It appears that airlines 
that have a high level of adherence to the traditional business model are more 
imitative than their strategically distanced counterparts.   
 
If the same analysis is conducted with the influence of a high degree of internal 
rivalry in the strategic group the results no longer show a significant difference 
between the types of airlines.  However, the mean results do indicate that pure airlines 
are more internally imitative than non-pure airlines.  One may cautiously state that 
internal imitation may be practiced by all types of airlines in a strategic group if there 
is a high degree of internal rivalry.  A reduction of competitive distance may be a goal 
of internal imitation, which merely compounds the rivalrous situation; an ever-
tightening downward spiral.   
 
Hypotheses 3C studies imitation within a strategic group while in the presence of high 
rivalry among strategic groups.  The results indicate that pure airlines imitate 
internally significantly more than non-pure airlines.  As a matter of fact, a high degree 
rivalry among strategic groups leads to greater internal imitation than if rivalry is not 
a factor.  It appears as if pure airlines react to external competitive forces by changing 
their business model but only within the sphere of their own strategic group. 
 
Table 7.7: ANOVA results – imitation within groups 
      
   ANOVA Test Kruskal-Wallis  
     
Variable: Imitation-within N Mean Mean Rank  
Non-pure business model (0) 25 2.36 16.70  
Pure business model (1) 13 3.38 24.88  
  F 4.563 Asymp. Sig. 0.025  
  Sig. 0.040   
H2C 
     
      
     
Moderator: High rivalry-within     
Variable: Imitation-within N Mean Mean Rank  
Non-pure business model (0) 20 2.95 15.00  
Pure business model (1) 13 3.38 20.08  
  F 1.281 Asymp. Sig. 0.118  
  Sig. 0.266   
H3A 
     
      
     
Moderator: High rivalry-among     
Variable: Imitation-within N Mean Mean Rank  
Non-pure business model (0) 21 2.57 12.90  
Pure business model (1) 9 3.89 21.56  
  F 6.954 Asymp. Sig. 0.010  
  Sig. 0.013   
H3C 
     
Source: Author’s own creation 
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The analytical results of internal business model imitation surprisingly showed that 
pure airlines are significantly more imitative within their own strategic group than 
non-pure airlines.  However, the research is unable to indicate whether the internal 
imitation of pure airlines is of other pure airlines or non-pure airlines.  It is concluded 
that none of the hypotheses are verified, however hypotheses 2C and 3C are 
unverified with significant results of the opposite phenomenon. 
 
Imitation among airlines is also reflected in how carriers describe their business 
model.  Survey respondents were asked an open-ended question: how would you 
describe your business model?  There is a discouraging lack of differentiation and 
creativity among the answers from the 39 of 42 respondents who chose to answer.  
The researcher segmented the reoccurring keywords in the answers, which are shown 
in table 7.8.  The majority of carriers mentioned their service and/or product in their 
business model description.  Fares and the network were the next two elements that 
airlines highlighted.  Finally, punctuality and safety, two factors that are an integral 
part of the basic service package, are highlighted in the business model description.   
 
Table 7.8: Recurrence of keywords in business model descriptions 
      
Keywords Service/ product Fares Network 
Punctuality
/ reliability Safety 
      
Mentioned in business 
model description1 60% 33% 30% 20% 13% 
      
1: All respondents      
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
Such results can be interpreted to highlight that many airlines, regardless of strategic 
group, regard their business model in a similar fashion.  Such descriptions may be 
reflective of the imitation that is taking place in the industry.  Some highlights from 
the responses include: 
 
“Leisure scheduled airline.  Full service carrier but with low fares 
(low cost, selling through a number of channels, including 
Internet/agents/tour operators).” A network carrier  
 
“[omitted] is a subsidiary of [omitted], a network carrier. [Omitted] 
has a mission to fly to markets where [omitted] can’t compete anymore 
with new LCCs.  Although we are an LCC, we offer to our customers 
the attribute of our mother company (network connections, alliances, 
FFP, availability of tickets through the traditional channels).” An 
LCC carrier 
 
“A regional airline combing best practices of network/”classic” 
carriers with low-cost model elements, depending on competition on 
each route.” A regional carrier 
 
“It is a traditional full service airline.” A regional carrier 
 
Such responses indicate that carriers from all strategic groups are picking business 
model elements from other groups in an attempt to capitalize on changes.  However, 
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such changes may lead to an industry that is increasingly homogenous.  Respondents 
were also asked to answer the following question: describe the tangible benefits 
customers obtain from using your product; answer the question, “Why should I buy 
this product.”  Some of the answers included: 
 
“Safety, quality, reliability.” A network carrier 
 
“Focused on providing quality product. Meals at mealtime, good 
customer service, reliable product.” A network carrier 
 
“Attributes of a traditional network carrier with affordable fares.” An 
LCC carrier 
 
“We offer: low fares, high punctuality, primary airports, low number 
of short shipped bags, easy access to the product (Internet), high 
number of high quality travel add-ons at competitive prices (hotels, car 
hire, insurance, etc.).” An LCC carrier 
 
“Quality product of a network carrier in combination with flexible 
pricing and yield management ensures competitive deal for each 
individual purchase instance.” A regional carrier 
 
“Punctuality, reliability, e-services, frequent flyer program, hub 
connectivity to worldwide network.” A regional carrier 
 
Airlines have a tendency to market similar service features of their product, which 
may contribute to diluting the entire message as it is muddled by nearly identical 
messages from competitors.  There was one response which concisely describes the 
market, “Because of market conditions normal competitive mechanisms are not 
entirely relevant,” written by a regional carrier.  In addition, only one carrier, an 
LCC, stressed the subjective, intimate contribution of employees to answer why one 
should purchase a ticket; “…dedication to the highest quality of customer service 
delivered with a sense of warmth, friendliness, individual pride, and company spirit.”  
Although this analysis has shown that imitative behavior is evident in the airline 
industry, innovation does also take place, as analyzed in the following section. 
 
7.2 Business model innovation  
The previous analyses studied business model change due to imitation; however 
airlines can also utilize innovation as a force for change.  Unlike imitation, which can 
take place both internally and externally, innovation only takes place internally and is 
therefore not segmented.  Innovation was measured by noting the change in business 
model elements that were part of the traditional business model for the respective 
strategic groups (see table 7.9)   
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Table 7.9: Innovation business model elements segmented by strategic group 
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Network ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ?    ? 
LCC  ?       ?     ? ?   
Regional ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?    ? ?  ?   
                  
1: Global distribution system 
2: Frequent flyer program 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
These final analyses of the empirical survey will address hypotheses 2A and 4A and 
4B, which all state that more pure airlines will be more innovative.  The results are 
displayed in table 7.10.  Hypothesis 2A states that pure airlines will be more 
innovative than non-pure airlines.  The results however indicate otherwise.  They 
show that there are no significant differences between pure and non-pure airlines in 
their innovative behavior.  In addition, non-pure airlines are seen as being slightly 
more innovative than their pure competitors, however the difference is only slight.   
 
Rivalry within the strategic group is introduced as a moderator in hypothesis 4A.  The 
results show similar tendencies as those from hypothesis 2A: no significant 
differences between pure and non-pure airlines and non-pure airlines show a slightly 
greater innovative tendency.  However, average innovation per group shows nearly 
significant differences between the two types of airlines, with non-pure airlines being 
faintly more innovative.  External rivalry, hypothesis 4B, does not have an affect on 
the results and it is not possible to discern any significant differences between the two 
types of airlines in this analysis.   
 
Table 7.10: ANOVA results – innovation    
      
   ANOVA Test Kruskal-Wallis  
     
Variable: Innovation-overall N Mean Mean Rank  
Non-pure business model (0) 25 31.240 19.26  
Pure business model (1) 13 21.615 19.96  
  F 0.008  Asymp. Sig. 0.853  
  Sig. 0.929   
     
Variable: Innovation-activities N Mean Mean Rank  
Non-pure business model (0) 25 2.714 20.36  
Pure business model (1) 13 2.432 17.85  
  F 0.963 Asymp. Sig. 0.508  
  Sig. 0.333   
     
Variable: Innovation-average N Mean Mean Rank  
Non-pure business model (0) 25 1.058 21.04  
Pure business model (1) 13 0.888 16.54  
  F 2.472 Asymp. Sig. 0.236  
H2A 
  Sig. 0.125   
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Moderator: High rivalry-within     
Variable: Innovation-overall N Mean Mean Rank  
Non-pure business model (0) 20 33.200 17.45  
Pure business model (1) 13 31.615 16.31  
  F 0.141 Asymp. Sig. 0.740  
  Sig. 0.709   
     
Moderator: High rivalry-within     
Variable: Innovation-activities N Mean Mean Rank  
Non-pure business model (0) 20 2.849 18.40  
Pure business model (1) 13 2.432 14.85  
  F 2.059 Asymp. Sig. 0.302  
  Sig. 0.161   
     
Moderator: High rivalry-within     
Variable: Innovation-average N Mean Mean Rank  
Non-pure business model (0) 20 1.107 19.10  
Pure business model (1) 13 0.888 13.77  
  F 3.743 Asymp. Sig. 0.121  
  Sig. 0.062   
H4A 
     
      
     
Moderator: High rivalry-among     
Variable: Innovation-overall N Mean Mean Rank  
Non-pure business model (0) 21 32.286 15.07  
Pure business model (1) 9 35.556 16.50  
  F 0.594 Asymp. Sig. 0.683  
  Sig. 0.447   
     
Moderator: High rivalry-among     
Variable: Innovation-activities N Mean Mean Rank  
Non-pure business model (0) 21 2.824 15.95  
Pure business model (1) 9 2.735 14.44  
  F 0.116 Asymp. Sig. 0.667  
  Sig. 0.736   
     
Moderator: High rivalry-among     
Variable: Innovation-average N Mean Mean Rank  
Non-pure business model (0) 21 1.113 16.71  
Pure business model (1) 9 0.999 12.67  
  F 1.418 Asymp. Sig. 0.248  
H4B 
  Sig. 0.244   
      
Source: Author’s own creation   
 
The analyses of business model innovation among airlines show no significant 
differences between pure and non-pure airlines.  However, this leads the researcher to 
conclude that all types of airlines innovate, not just pure or non-pure.  This finding 
supports the notion that all airlines realize that innovation may be beneficial and use 
this strategy to adapt to their competitive landscape (Business Week, 2007; Franke, 
2007).  While it is accurate to state that the results also indicate that no airlines 
innovate the researcher draws attention to the questionnaire results that indicate that 
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airlines do change traditional business model elements, which indicates that 
innovation is present.  However, hypotheses 2A, 4A, and 4B are unverified.   
 
The findings from the previous analyses are summarized in table 7.11. 
 
Table 7.11: Summarized hypotheses confirmation   
   
Hypothesis Result Comments 
    
H2A: The more pure the business model the more 
innovative an airline 
Rejected  
H2B: The less pure the business model the more 
imitation among strategic groups 
Accepted  
H2C: The less pure the business model the more 
imitation within strategic groups 
Rejected Opposite findings 
though with significant 
results 
H3A: A high rivalry within a strategic group will 
negatively affect internal imitation of airlines with 
a pure business model 
Rejected  
H3B: A high rivalry within a strategic group will 
negatively affect external imitation of airlines with 
a pure business model 
Accepted  
H3C: A high rivalry among strategic groups will 
negatively affect internal imitation of airlines with 
a pure business model 
Rejected Opposite findings 
though with significant 
results 
H3D: A high rivalry among strategic groups will 
negatively affect external imitation of airlines with 
a pure business model 
Accepted  
H4A: A high rivalry within a group will positively affect 
innovation of airlines with a pure business model 
Rejected Opposite findings 
though with 
insignificant results 
H4B:
  
A high rivalry among groups will positively affect 
innovation of airlines with a pure business model 
Rejected  
    
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
7.3 Challenges to business model change 
Whether an airline elects to maintain their current business model or implement 
changes, whether via imitation or innovation, challenges may appear.  Change 
management may be useful in some carriers as they attempt to adapt their business 
model to accommodate market forces (Franke, 2007).  As one network carrier 
described, “Change is the only constant in the airline business and time needs to be 
spent on ‘selling’ change internally.  This is the biggest challenge for any large 
corporation.”  Survey respondents were asked to describe the challenges with 
implementing business model changes: 
 
“Getting the customer to accept change and conform behavior.” A 
network carrier 
 
“Securing government/political buy in and approvals.  Converging 
customer expectations across different market segments.  Transition 
change management on people and processes.” A network carrier 
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“Changing the inertia of current practice often needs great effort to 
change the mindset.  Convincing board of directors is also a big 
challenge.  Market situation changes so quick and accurate decision 
making is critical.  Power and leading edge simulation tools for quick 
decision are essential but difficult to keep improving them.” A network 
carrier 
 
“Main challenge is to follow the industry trend and where/how to 
grow.” A network carrier 
 
“Hard to cover all segments, trying to be best in all.” A network 
carrier 
 
“Paradigm shift; unifying the thought.” A regional carrier 
 
“High flexibility demands to apply an aggressive ‘low-cost’ model on 
one route (with high competition) and a classical high-fare on 
monopoly routes.  Lack of revenue management systems.  Lack of 
specialists with profound knowledge of low-cost model.  Adaption to 
market differences, e.g. high Internet sales in Western Europe and 
practically no Internet sales in C.I.S/Middle East markets.” A regional 
carrier 
 
As airlines have explained, change is a challenge, regardless if it is imitation or 
innovation.  Even carriers that are convinced a change is appropriate and will 
generate rewards, implementation may stifle such benefits.  Imitation, as explained by 
one regional carrier, is not as easy as one may expect.   
 
7.4 Conclusion 
The analyses of the survey results show that there are varying degrees of imitation and 
innovation among pure and non-pure airlines, all of which contribute to business 
model change.  It can be stated that there is variation among the types of airlines and 
their imitative behavior.  Non-pure airlines are more imitative of business models 
from other strategic groups, while pure airlines are more imitative within their own 
strategic group.  Non-pure airlines display greater imitative tendencies among groups 
when both internal and external rivalry is present.  Pure airlines, on the other hand, 
only show pronounced imitative behavior when there is strong rivalry among strategic 
groups.  Such imitative behavior is reflected in the business model descriptions 
provided by the survey respondents.  There was a high level of descriptive repetition, 
with the majority of carriers focusing on the product offered and a third of the carriers 
stressing fares and the network.  Innovation, on the other hand, was not significantly 
different between pure and non-pure airlines.  Rather, it can be stated that all types of 
airlines are innovative, however non-pure airlines tend to show slightly greater 
innovative traits.  Despite the type of change, imitation or innovation, airlines are 
challenged to adapt their business model.  Factors include changing customers’ 
momentum, employee reluctance and hesitation, and industry uncertainty.  Future 
challenges, such as operating a hybrid model, competition, and infrastructure will test 
future management.  These findings contribute to the understanding of how airlines 
change their business models and one can make predictions of what traits the future 
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airline business models may display.  The next chapter will address precisely this 
question using a structured method to propose what kinds of business models may 
appear in the industry grounded in the results of imitation and innovation from the 
survey.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why is there variation in airline business models? 
 
Research based on survey responses from industry actors indicates that business
model variation is grounded in innovation and imitation.  Results show that both
pure and non-pure carriers innovate, while external imitation by non-pure
carriers is present and only strengthened by increased rivalry.  Internal imitation
by pure carriers of group peers is also evident in the industry, however it is not
possible to discern whether this is of pure or non-pure peers. 
  159
  160
8. Configurational comparative analysis 
- The wingspan of a 747 becomes 60 centimeters longer while being fully fueled as the 
wings sag from the added weight; the wings are strong enough to flex up to 26 feet 
while the metal at the wingtip is only 2 millimeters thick - 
 
 
The previous chapters have shown how strategic positioning of airlines within 
strategic groups impact profit, and empirical evidence was presented supporting the 
presence of the concepts of business model imitation and innovation among all groups 
found in the scheduled passenger airline industry.  This contribution brings the field’s 
current boundary into view, yet to surpass the threshold it is necessary to analyze 
outcomes grounded in innovation and imitation that will impact the industry in the 
near future.  Current literature (Franke, 2007; J. Gimeno & Chen, 1998; Taneja, 2004) 
agrees that these two forces are present in the airline industry, with Gimeno and Chen 
(1998) concluding that both forces are present simultaneously in the industry, 
however there lacks an analytic method to propose what potential business models 
will appear in the future as a result of such behavior.  These configurational analyses 
and propositions are made possible by utilizing MVQCA and the TOSMANA 
software, as presented in Chapter 5.  The intention is to identify which configurations 
lead to profitability among full-service, low-cost, and regional carriers, identifying 
elements that are deserving of innovation, and to combine strategic groups resulting in 
new business models grounded in imitative behavior.  Figure 8.1 shows the types of 
analyses that will be conducted using this method.  Each of the three strategic groups 
is segmented according to leading and secondary airlines based on operational profit 
margins, as demonstrated in Chapter 6.  The justification for utilizing profit margin as 
the segmentation criteria rather than business model adherence is grounded in the 
theoretical understanding that imitative firms are potentially mimetic of successful 
rivals.  Carriers in the industry may be more prone to imitate competitors that post 
profits, as discussed in Chapter 4.  However, this method may be challenged if 
applied to a study group with no profitable carriers.   
 
The analyses begin by analyzing which business model elements deserve innovative 
solutions for both leading and secondary airlines (analyses 1-3 for leading airlines and 
analyses 4-6 for secondary airlines).  This results in six innovation-themed analyses.  
The following analyses are based on imitation, both among and within strategic 
groups.  Imitation among strategic groups is based on secondary airlines.  There are 
four analyses of this type (analyses 7-10).  The final analyses, of which there are 
three, are based on imitation within strategic groups (analyses 10-13).   
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Figure 8.1: Configurational Boolean analyses based on imitation and innovation 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
Figure 8.2 depicts the organizational chart of these analyses.  It is the third, and final, 
analyses supporting the main research question.  There are two main themes, 
innovation and imitation.  Innovation is sub-divided into the three strategic groups 
and further segmented by leading airlines and secondary airlines.  Leading airline 
innovation is addressed in propositions 1-3, and secondary airline innovation in 
propositions 4-6.  Imitation is sub-divided into imitation among groups, which 
consists of propositions 7 through 10, and imitation within groups, propositions 11-
13.  Refer to table 5.10 for detailed descriptions of propositions. 
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REGIONAL 
4 1 52
36
10
7
8 
13
9
11 12
Strategic group
Leading firms 
Innovation 
analyses
Imitation 
analyses: 
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What will be the successful future airline business 
models?
Business model 
purity
Business model 
change
Business model 
propositions
FSC 
P1 
LCC 
Regional 
P4 
P2 
P5 
P3 
P6 
Innovation Imitation 
Among groups 
P7 
P8 
P9 
P10 
Within groups 
P11 
P12 
P13 
Figure 8.2: Configurational Boolean analyses configurational chart 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
Use of configurational comparative analysis requires that the researcher establish 
thresholds for conditions or outcomes, regardless if dichotomous or multi-values are 
utilized.  Table 8.1 provides an overview of the conditions that are incorporated into 
the Boolean analyses, the type of notation utilized, and how to interpret the notation.  
The specific thresholds for each condition are not shown in table 8.1 as these are 
specific to each analysis and can vary; rather, they are presented prior to each specific 
analysis.  Half of the 16 conditions are dichotomous while three are trichotomous.  
The remaining six conditions are multi-value and the thresholds were determined by 
the researcher prior to beginning the analyses.  Appendix VI lists the raw data and 
truth tables for the respective analyses. 
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Table 8.1: Threshold settings 
   
Condition Notation Notation interpretation 
   
Online transfer Dichotomous 0 = absence; 1 = presence 
Interline transfer Dichotomous 0 = absence; 1 = presence 
Through-fare discount Dichotomous 0 = absence; 1 = presence 
Ticket restrictions Dichotomous 0 = absence; 1 = presence 
GDS presence Trichotomous 0 = absence; 0.5 = presence via third-party;  
1 = presence 
Frequent flyer program Dichotomous 0 = absence; 1 = presence 
Lounge access Trichotomous 0 = absence; 0.5 = paid membership;  
1 = free membership 
Cabin numbers Multi-value Varying thresholds – see specific analysis 
Alliance membership Trichotomous 0 = no membership; 1 = global alliance member 
Codeshare agreements Dichotomous 0 = absence; 1 = presence 
Capacity lift provider Dichotomous 0 = non-provider; 0.5 = FSC brand & own brand ops; 
1 = provider 
Capacity lift user Dichotomous 0 = non-user; 1 = user 
ASK % to primary airport  Multi-value Varying thresholds – see specific analysis 
ASK % by partner Multi-value Varying thresholds – see specific analysis 
Fleet purity Multi-value Varying thresholds – see specific analysis 
Stage length Multi-value Varying thresholds – see specific analysis 
   
Outcome   
   
Operating margin Multi-value Varying thresholds – see specific analysis 
   
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
Analyses of truth tables with non-dichotomous outcomes may result in a large number 
of contradictions which are not presented to the TOSMANA user.  To alleviate this 
problem trichotomous outcomes (0, 1, 2) are recoded by the researcher as 
dichotomous prior to minimization.  In the innovation and external imitation analyses 
the research attempts to minimize for outcomes of 1 (i.e. secondary firms), however 
with trichotomous or multi-value outcomes the truth table is generated prior to 
minimization, and the TOSMANA software interprets multi-value outcomes as a 
binary outcome.  In other words, within this research stream the researcher attempts to 
minimize outcome 1, however TOSMANA regards outcomes 0 and 2 as a 0 when 
minimizing.  This may result in a high number of contradictions; however the 
TOSMANA user is unaware of this predicament because the generated truth table is 
presented as trichotomous.  This fault is a result of the solution sequence performed 
by the software.  To alleviate this, the researcher recoded outcomes 2 as 0, in effect 
creating a dichotomous truth table.  This allowed the researcher to capture any 
contradictions and attempt to reduce their impact prior to minimizing for 1.  This 
procedure was done for all innovation and external imitation analyses53.   
 
8.1 Innovation 
Innovation within firms has been shown to be a leading contributing factor to firm 
success (H. W. Chesbrough, 2006; H. Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002; Christensen 
et al., 2004; Fagerberg et al., 2005; Franke, 2007), however management may be 
challenged to envision innovative moves.  Figure 8.3 is a graphical representation of 
                                                 
53 The author wishes to thank Dr. Lasse Cronqvist for assistance in this matter. 
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the types of analyses conducted.  Analyses 1-3 will propose which business model 
elements and their configurations are consistently present in successful leading 
airlines, while analyses 4-6 will do the same for secondary airlines. 
 
Figure 8.3: Innovative configurational analyses 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The following sections are segmented according to strategic group and leading and 
secondary firms.  Prior to each strategic group analyses a table shows the thresholds 
used. 
 
8.1.1 FSC 
The propositions for analyses 1 and 4 are presented in table 8.2. 
 
Table 8.2: Overview of propositions 1 & 4 
 
Variable 
headings Network Distribution Service Operational 
     
P1 Sustained integration 
Sustained GDS 
availability 
Sustained service 
levels 
Fleet 
standardization and 
longer stage lengths 
P4 Increased ticket flexibility 
Sustained GDS 
availability 
Sustained service 
levels 
Fleet non-
standardization 
     
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The researcher proposes that pure FSCs will continue to strive for network 
integration, traditional distribution tactics, differentiated service and in-flight classes, 
and fleet standardization coupled with longer stage lengths.  Non-pure FSCs, on the 
other hand, will increase network flexibility through restriction-less travel, maintain 
status quo GDS distribution strategies, simplified service offerings, and fleet 
standardization and secondary airport service. 
 
Table 8.3 shows the thresholds utilized in the full-service carrier analyses.  The 
thresholds are identical for both pure and non-pure FSCs.  They were determined by 
analyzing the spread of the individual business model element data for the study 
FSC LCC 
REGIONAL 
4 1 52
36
Strategic group
Leading firms 
Innovation 
analyses
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group and placing the threshold accordingly.  The truth table for this analysis is 
available in Appendix VI.  Research shows there is currently limited variation in the 
FSC business models, as discussed in Chapter 6. All airlines in the study group 
continue to adhere to the traditional FSC business model of offering onlining, 
interlining, GDS distribution, FFPs, lounges, and codeshares.  This means that the 
configuration analyses results will not incorporate these specific elements in the 
results. 
 
Table 8.3: FSC innovation – thresholds 
    
Dummy variable 0 1 2 
    
Online transfer 0 1  
Interline transfer 0 1  
Through-fare discount 0 1  
Ticket restrictions 0 1  
GDS presence 0 1  
Frequent flyer program 0 1  
Lounge access 0 1  
Cabin numbers 2 3  
Alliance membership 0 1  
Codeshare agreements 0 1  
Capacity lift provider 0 1  
Capacity lift user 0 1  
ASK % to primary airport  x<0.94 x>0.94  
ASK % by partner x<0.13 x>0.13  
Fleet purity x<0.26 x>0.26  
Stage length x<1200 x>1200  
    
Operating margin x<0.00 0.00<x>0.03 x>0.03 
    
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
Two carriers with contradicting outcomes were removed from the analyses.  This 
practice allows users of qualitative comparative analysis to capture a more 
representative snapshot of the industry.  However, rather than remove contradicting 
observations the research may elect to adjust the thresholds in an attempt to reduce the 
number of contradictions, or add more conditions.  The complication with QCA is 
that contradictory cases are analytically omitted; therefore researchers wish to limit 
the number of contradictions observed.  Contradictions occur when cases with 
identical conditions report differing outcomes.  In this case, airlines with identical 
business models reported both positive and negative operating margins.  Two carriers, 
Italy-based Alitalia (AZ) and U.S.-based United Airlines (UA), were creating a 
contradiction of results among eight observations.  Six of the eight observations 
reported margins greater than 3% (i.e. an outcome of 2) while Alitalia and United 
Airlines reported lower margins, less than 0% (i.e. an outcome of 1) and between 0- 
and 3% (i.e. an outcome of 0), respectively (see table IV in Appendix IV for the raw 
data).  This resulted in the unacceptable omission of eight observations, caused by 
two contradicting cases.  With the removal Alitalia and United Airlines from the 
analyses the researcher ensured that the six remaining observations were included in 
the analyses and results, rather than omitted as contradictions.  The researcher will 
delve deeper into these two omitted carriers in an attempt to explain in greater detail 
why their business models were identical to others yet failed to generate similar 
operational profits. 
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The configurational FSC innovation results are segmented according to pure and non-
pure airlines.  The purity threshold was determined from the spread of the airlines’ 
operating results and the threshold shown in table 8.3.  Pure airlines are those with an 
operating margin greater than 3% and non-pure those with a margin between 0% and 
3%.  Carriers with a margin below 0% are not of interest, as the researcher is of the 
opinion that unsuccessful (i.e. loss-making) carriers are most likely not of innovative 
or imitative interest to other carriers.  These results report the specific combinations of 
business model elements that result in the specified outcome (operating margin). 
 
8.1.1.1 Pure FSC 
The analyses present the following results shown in figure 8.4. 
 
Figure 8.4: Configurational pure FSC innovation results 
 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The interpreted business model combinations from figure 8.4 that lead to an operating 
margin greater than 3% are the following: 
 
• No through-fare pricing OR 
• An ASK percentage to primary airports less than 94% AND a 2-
class cabin configuration OR 
• An ASK percentage to primary airports less than 94% AND 
membership of one of the three major alliances OR 
• An ASK percentage to primary airports less than 94% AND 
capacity purchase agreements with regional carriers OR 
• An ASK percentage to primary airports less than 94% AND an 
ASK percentage flown by regional partners greater than 13% OR 
• An average stage length greater than 1200 NM AND an FSI less 
than 26% OR 
• An average stage length greater than 1200 NM AND an ASK 
percentage to primary airports greater than 94% OR 
Pure (P1): 
Thru-fare (0) + Primary a/p share (0) In-flight classes (0) + Alliance (1) + CLT (1) + Feed share (1)
Stage length (1)  
+
Fleet (0) + Primary a/p share (1) + Restrictions (1) In-flight classes (1) Alliance (1) 
Alliance (1) CLT (0) + Alliance (0) CLT (1)  
+
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• Ticket restrictions AND a 3-class cabin configuration AND 
membership of one of the three major alliances OR 
• Membership of one of the three major alliances AND an ASK 
percentage flown by regional partners less than 13% OR 
• Non-membership of one of the three major alliances AND an ASK 
percentage flown by regional partners greater than 13% 
 
Future innovation of pure FSC business models will either focus on simplifying the 
network by eliminating through-fares and introducing single-leg pricing or operating 
to outlying airports combined with varying forms of partnerships, such as alliance 
membership, capacity purchase agreements, and regional feed providers.  FSCs may 
also elect to lengthen their network by operating longer stage lengths coupled with a 
reduction in an airline’s FSI.  As an FSC may choose to expand to outlying markets a 
diversified fleet may be necessary to meet operational requirements.  Finally, the 
traditional FSC business model will continue to exist as indicated by the Boolean 
analysis results of a model with ticket restrictions, a 3-class configuration, and 
alliance membership.  The calculated Boolean results are to some extent innovative.  
While, pure FSCs may benefit from transitioning to a simplified network, others may 
be better placed transitioning to the traditional FSC model.  This can be interpreted to 
indicate that carriers in selected markets that have not fully adopted the traditional 
FSC model, may be prone to innovative their business model in this manner.  
Examples may include some Asian, Middle Eastern, and African carriers that have not 
yet entered into global alliances or utilize.  While the results may not appear 
innovative at the industry level, specific carriers may regard such business model 
changes as innovations.   
 
8.1.1.2 Non-Pure FSC 
Non-pure FSC carriers are those with an operating margin between 0-3%.  The 
configurational analysis results are as follows (see figure 8.5): 
 
Figure 8.5: Configurational non-pure FSC innovation results 
 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
Non-pure FSCs will focus their innovative attention on the following areas: 
 
• Through-fare pricing AND removal of ticket restrictions OR 
• Non-membership of one of the three major alliances AND an ASK 
percentage to primary airports less than 94% 
 
These results indicate that future innovation of non-pure FSCs will combine select 
LCC business model elements.  These include a focus on extending flexibility to 
passengers via restriction-less travel, or departure from the industry’s three major 
Non-pure (P4): 
Thru-fare (1) Restrictions (0) + Alliance (0) Primary a/p share (0) 
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alliances (Buyck, 2006), and increased focus on secondary airports.  However, 
various traditional FSC business model elements will be retained, such as through-
fare discounts. 
 
8.1.1.3 Proposition confirmation 
The propositions for these analyses, as presented in table 8.2, are partially confirmed.  
Table 8.4 presents a checklist over those variable headings that were confirmed by the 
configurational analyses. 
 
Table 8.4: Confirmation of propositions 1 & 4 
 
Variable 
headings Network Distribution Service Operational 
     
P1 Confirmed Confirmed Unconfirmed  (status quo) Partially confirmed 
P4 Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Unconfirmed 
     
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The FSC innovation propositions were partially confirmed.  Sustained network 
integration among pure FSCs was confirmed with the continued membership in the 
global alliances and continued use of capacity purchase agreements among pure FSCs 
supports this proposition.  GDS presence among pure FSCs will continue54.  A focus 
on service elements among pure FSCs is not part of the innovation results, rather the 
current status quo appears to be maintained.  Pure FSCs will not initiate fleet 
standardization, however an increase in the average stage lengths will occur.  This 
proposition was partially confirmed.  Among non-pure FSCs network flexibility will 
receive innovative attention in the future.  GDS presence will continue.  Fleet 
standardization will not be a core innovative focus among non-pure airlines in the 
future.  This may coincide with future focus on non-alliance membership and 
increased ASKs to secondary airports.  This direction suggests a non-standard fleet 
may be necessary. 
 
8.1.2 LCC 
The low-cost strategic group in the industry has shown a propensity for greater 
diversity compared to their FSC brethren.  One explanation may be that LCCs strive 
for differentiation in an attempt to maximize revenue and create a strategic distance 
(Alamdari & Fagan, 2005).  The propositions for the LCC analysis are presented in 
table 8.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 The lack of any variation in GDS presence among the study group entails that it will not be a 
condition in the results 
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Table 8.5: Overview of propositions 2 & 5 
 
Variable 
headings Network Distribution Service Operational 
     
P2 Sustained network segmentation 
Sustained GDS 
absence 
Sustained “no-
frills” concept 
Sustained fleet 
standardization 
P5 Restricted network integration 
Restricted GDS 
presence 
Restricted 
unbundled service 
Fleet non-
standardized & 
longer stage lengths 
     
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The propositions state that leading LCCs will maintain a segmented, point-to-point 
network, with a focus on non-GDS distribution, while maintaining a limited service 
concept, and single fleet focus; in essence, the traditional LCC business model.  
However, the secondary LCCs will lean towards an integrated network and a limited 
GDS presence, as well as, providing unbundled service attributes, and a non-
standardized fleet with longer stage lengths.   
 
Table 8.6 shows the thresholds utilized in the LCC analyses.  The thresholds are 
identical for both leading and secondary LCCs.  As explained in Chapter 5 the 
measurement of business model variables vary between the various strategic groups.  
The LCC group has been integrating unbundled services, which enables customers to 
purchase specific elements at their leisure, such as with lounge access.  Distribution 
tactics among LCCs vary as well, third party access to traditional distribution systems 
is a strategy followed by some carriers. 
 
Table 8.6: LCC innovation – thresholds 
    
Dummy variable 0 1 2 
    
Online transfer 0 1  
Interline transfer 0 1  
Through-fare discount 0 1  
Ticket restrictions 0 1  
GDS presence 0 0.5 1 
Frequent flyer program 0 1  
Lounge access 0 0.5 1 
Cabin numbers 1 2   
Alliance membership 0 1  
Codeshare agreements 0 1  
Capacity lift provider 0 1  
Capacity lift user 0 1  
ASK % to primary airport  x<0.55 x>0.55  
ASK % by partner x<0.03 x>0.03  
Fleet purity x<0.75 x>0.75  
Stage length x<740 x>740  
    
Operating margin x<0.00 0.00<x>0.08 x>0.08 
    
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The segmentation of results into pure LCCs and non-pure LCCs is explained in the 
following section. 
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8.1.2.1 Pure LCC 
Figure 8.6 shows the Boolean results for pure LCCs which suggests that in the future 
pure LCCs will adjust their business model in specific areas.   
 
Figure 8.6: Configurational pure LCC innovation results 
 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
Pure LCCs will maintain the status of their business models with a few exceptions.  
The traditional business model and its focus on secondary airports, GDS-free 
distribution, and standardized fleets will be one option; however some network and 
service changes may take place.  The results of pure LCC innovative focus is as 
follows: 
 
• An ASK percentage to primary airports less than 55% OR 
• GDS presence via a third-party AND passenger onlining OR 
• GDS presence via a third-party AND through-fare ticketing OR 
• GDS presence via a third-party AND a frequent flyer program OR 
• No GDS presence AND a standardized fleet AND a frequent flyer 
program OR 
• No GDS presence AND a standardized fleet AND a stage length 
less than 740 NM 
 
These results indicate that service to secondary airports by pure LCCs will continue to 
be of primary focus.  However, distribution tactics may change to allow access to 
GDS systems.  This may encourage an increase in high-yield business travel, which 
would necessitate network integration by providing through-fare discounts and on-
lining functions, as well as a frequent flyer program.  In addition, the traditional LCC 
business model will survive in an opaque form.  Internet-only distribution will be 
coupled with an amenity-free model, however short stage lengths and a diversified 
fleet is an option.   
 
8.1.2.2 Non-Pure LCC 
The LCC pure/non-pure innovation analyses do not contain contradictions and 
therefore no carriers were removed from the analyses, as in the FSC analyses.  Figure 
8.7 shows the results for non-pure LCCs.  
 
 
 
Pure (P2): 
Primary a/p share (0) + GDS (1) Online (1) + Thru-fare (1) + FFP (1)
GDS (0) Fleet (0) 
+
FFP (0) + Stage length (0)
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Figure 8.7: Configurational non-pure LCC innovation results 
 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
Non-pure LCCs will innovate their business model by changing the following 
business model elements: 
 
• No passenger onlining AND GDS presence via a third-party OR 
• No passenger onlining AND lounge access via payment OR 
• No passenger through-fare AND GDS presence via a third-party 
OR 
• No passenger through-fare AND lounge access via payment OR 
• Lounge access via payment AND no passenger interlining OR 
• Lounge access via payment AND no frequent flyer program OR 
• Lounge access via payment AND no codeshare agreements OR 
• No ticket restrictions AND a stage length greater than 740 NM OR 
• 2 class cabin configuration AND a stage length less than 740 NM 
OR 
• GDS presence via a third-party AND no frequent flyer program 
 
These results indicate that non-pure airlines can elect to maintain a segregated 
network, however self-paid amenities may be offered, in addition to a GDS presence 
via a third-party.  In addition, a go-it-alone strategy of no partnerships is an option for 
carriers.  Finally, it is discovered that non-pure LCCs lengthen their stage lengths 
while maintaining restriction-free travel or shorten their stage lengths and provide a 
dual-class service.    
 
Non-pure (P5): 
Online (0) + Thru-fare (0) GDS (1) + Lounges (1) 
Lounges (1) Interline (0) + FFP (0) + Codeshare (0) +
Restrictions (0) Stage length (1) + In-flight classes (1) Stage length (0) + GDS (1) FFP (0) 
+
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8.1.2.3 Proposition confirmation 
The proposition confirmations are presented in table 8.7, which shows that some 
business model headings are confirmed while others are unconfirmed. 
 
Table 8.7: Confirmation of propositions 2 & 5 
 
Variable 
headings Network Distribution Service Operational 
     
P2 Partially confirmed Partially confirmed Partially confirmed Partially confirmed 
P5 Unconfirmed Confirmed Confirmed Partially confirmed 
     
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The network proposition of pure LCCs is partially confirmed with the result showing 
that some carriers may elect to offer through-fares, coupled with a limited GDS 
presence.  In addition, the potential for pure LCCs to offer an FFP is high, which 
limits the confirmation of the proposition.  The Boolean analysis partially confirms 
the operational proposition of sustained fleet standardization with the results showing 
that successful pure LCCs have an FSI of less than 0.75.  One explanation for this 
seemingly contradictory finding is that some LCCs may strive to reduce aircraft 
manufacturer supplier bargaining power by diversifying its fleet.  Non-pure LCCs will 
continue to operate a segmented network, however these carriers will attempt to seek 
distribution channels that provide limited GDS access.  Ancillary revenue though 
unbundled service features is an option that some non-pure LCCs may seek.  Finally, 
there is a potential that secondary LCCs will attempt to operate longer stage lengths, 
although a non-standardized fleet is not a viable option in the foreseeable future.   
 
8.1.3 Regional 
The final innovation analysis concerns the regional airline strategic group.  These 
carriers often provide supplemental capacity to larger FSC carriers (Davies & 
Quastler, 1995), although a select few LCCs are also attempting to benefit from 
similar arrangements (Arnoult, 2006; Karp, 2006; Ranson, 2006).  This division 
among regional carries is reflected in the researcher-proposed propositions, shown in 
table 8.8. 
 
Table 8.8: Overview of propositions 3 & 6 
 
Variable 
headings Network Distribution Service Operational 
     
P3 Network integration with CLT 
Sustained CLT 
reliance 
Sustained CLT 
reliance 
Fleet 
standardization 
P6 
Network integration 
as stand alone 
carrier 
Sustained GDS 
presence 
Sustained 
complementary 
service 
Fleet  
non-standardization 
     
Source: Author’s own creation 
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The researcher proposes that pure regional carriers will continue their close 
relationship as capacity lift providers with FSCs.  This will result in limited 
innovative moves, although changes in fleet composition will take place.  Non-pure 
regional carriers, on the other hand, will attempt to continue network integration as 
stand-alone carriers, while maintaining complementary service.  A non-standardized 
fleet will allow these carriers to provide the necessary operation to meet market 
demands. 
 
Table 8.9 shows the thresholds utilized in the regional carrier analyses.  The 
thresholds are identical for both leading and secondary regional carriers.  The 
variable, capacity lift provider, is a trichotomous measurement as some carriers 
operate as branded feed carriers for FSCs, as well as, operating as an own-branded 
carrier, denoted as a 1 in the Boolean dummy variable.  A Boolean dummy variable of 
2 would indicate a regional carrier that operates solely as a capacity lift provider, 
while a 0 would signify a stand-alone operator. 
 
Table 8.9: Regional innovation – thresholds 
    
Dummy variable 0 1 2 
    
Online transfer 0 1  
Interline transfer 0 1  
Through-fare discount 0 1  
Ticket restrictions 0 1  
GDS presence 0 1  
Frequent flyer program 0 1  
Lounge access 0 1  
Cabin numbers 1 2  
Alliance membership 0 1  
Codeshare agreements 0 1  
Capacity lift provider 0 0.5 1 
Capacity lift user 0 1  
ASK % to primary airport  x<0.88 x>0.88  
ASK % by partner 0   
Fleet purity x<0.75 x>0.75  
Stage length x<383 x>383  
    
Operating margin x<0.00 0.00<x>0.06 x>0.06 
    
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
Two regional carriers were removed from the QCA analysis which led to 
contradictions, just as in the FSC analyses.  Table IV in Appendix IV shows the raw, 
contradictory data.  These two carriers, Skywest and American Eagle, pure capacity 
lift providers in the U.S., with profit margins of 11% and 10%, respectively had 
identical business models with other capacity lift providers yet better performance 
results which surpassed the designated threshold.  Eight observations risked being 
omitted from the analyses due to their classification as contradictory observations.  
With the removal of the contradictory carriers the number of observations with an 
outcome of 1 was doubled; a larger number of observations increase explanatory 
power.  The removal of these two regional carriers ensured greater analytical 
parsimony.  The next three sections will provide the analytical results of pure and 
non-pure regional carriers, and proposition confirmation. 
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8.1.3.1 Pure regional 
The Boolean configurational results for pure regional carriers are presented in figure 
8.8. 
 
Figure 8.8: Configurational pure regional innovation results 
 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The analysis provides the following results: 
 
• Capacity lift provider OR 
• No passenger through-fare AND passenger on-lining OR 
• No passenger through-fare AND no lounges OR 
• No passenger through-fare AND an ASK to primary airports 
greater than 88% OR 
• A single cabin class AND an FSI greater than 0.75 
 
The results show a surprising finding that pure regional carriers will continue with the 
traditional capacity purchase agreement coupled with a stand-alone brand (i.e. CLP 
designated with a 1).  This is similar to the business model shift that US regional 
carrier, Express Jet, is attempting (Airline Business, 2007d; Field, 2007).  This stand 
alone brand may operate a business model with regional carriers providing a point-to-
point operation with single-leg pricing and limited amenities to a high level of 
primary airports.  At the same time, the regional carrier will maintain an agreement to 
provide short-haul capacity to a mainline partner.  This may emulate to some extent 
an LCC model, however possibly with ties to a larger partner.  The remaining results 
indicate that regional carriers will focus on single-segment pricing but provide on-
lining capabilities, while continuing to focus on providing service to primary airports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pure (P3): 
CLP (1) + Thru-fare (0) Online (1) + Lounges (0) + Primary a/p share (1) +
In-flight classes (0) Fleet (1) 
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8.1.3.2 Non-Pure regional 
The Boolean findings for non-pure regional carriers are presented in figure 8.9. 
 
Figure 8.9: Configurational non-pure regional innovation results 
 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The results that indicate which business model elements non-pure regional airlines 
will innovate are shown to be: 
 
• No passenger on-lining  
• A single cabin class configuration AND an FSI less than 0.75  
• A dual cabin class configuration AND an FSI greater than 0.75 
• A capacity lift provider AND a dual cabin class configuration AND 
ticketing through-fares 
• A capacity lift provider AND a dual cabin class configuration AND 
ticket restrictions 
• A capacity lift provider AND an FSI less than 0.75 AND ticketing 
through-fares 
• A capacity lift provider AND an FSI less than 0.75 AND ticketing 
ticket restrictions 
 
Again the results of the non-pure regional carrier MVQCA analysis show eye-opening 
results.  Carriers may elect to operate a business model with a diversified fleet and a 
single cabin configuration, or a standardized fleet and dual-class configuration.  
However, non-pure regional carriers can also elect to operate as pure capacity lift 
providers with a dual-class configuration and diversified fleet.  Although pure 
regional carriers also operate as a capacity lift providers they have a diversified model 
with own-branded operations. Some regional carriers with lower operating margins 
have maintained the model of sole capacity lift providers. 
 
Non-pure (P5): 
Online (0) + In-flight classes (0) Fleet (0) + In-flight classes (1) Fleet (1) 
CLP (2)      In-flight classes (1) + Fleet (0) 
 
Thru-fare (1) + Restrictions (1)
+
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8.1.3.3 Proposition confirmation 
The proposition confirmation for the final innovation analyses are presented in table 
8.10. 
 
Table 8.10: Confirmation of propositions 3 & 6 
 
Variable 
headings Network Distribution Service Operational 
     
P3 Partially confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed 
P6 Partially confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Partially confirmed 
     
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The findings among pure regional carriers indicate a partially confirmed network 
model due to a dual-role business model as a capacity lift provider and self branded-
operator.  The remaining propositions are confirmed by the Boolean analysis, with a 
reliance on the mainline carrier for a significant share of business model functions.  
The findings for non-pure regional carriers suggest that network integration will not 
only happen as a stand-alone carrier but also as a pure capacity lift provider, which 
partially confirms the proposition.  Distribution and service attributes of the business 
model will continue to rely upon the traditional features of GDS distribution and 
complementary service features, while some carriers will focus on fleet 
standardization and others will not.  Those carriers that will operate a non-
standardized fleet are the pure capacity lift providers, which may be a testament to the 
unique agreements that these regionals enter into with mainline carriers.  For example, 
many North American FSC pilot unions have scope clauses in place which limit the 
equipment that regionals may operate.  If a regional carrier provides capacity for more 
than one FSC it may operate various equipment platforms to conform to the 
individual agreements (Airline Business, 2002; Airline Business, 2004; Field & 
Pilling, 2003; Shifrin, 2005a).   
 
This section was the first analysis of three using the Boolean method to propose 
which unique configurations the airline industry may witness among innovating 
carriers.  The findings suggest that FSCs may look to innovate those business model 
elements that LCCs have used to their advantage, such as ticket restrictions or 
through-fare pricing, while others may continue to focus on the traditional business 
model.  The low-cost strategic group will focus on the traditional LCC business 
model, as well as, ancillary revenue, new distribution tactics, and limited network 
integration.  The final segment, regional carriers, will begin to experiment with self-
branded operations while maintaining an FSC supportive role, while others will 
continue to provide pure lift capabilities for FSCs.  The following section will analyze 
the unique configurations resulting from imitative behavior, which is evident in the 
industry following the survey analyses (see Chapter 7). 
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8.2 Imitation among strategic groups 
The empirical findings expressed in Chapter 7 show that mimetic behavior is rampant 
in the airline industry.  Although this may not be a surprise to astute industry 
observers, its implications for future industrial development have not been studied.  
The MVQCA method allows the researcher to study what affect imitation among 
strategic groups will have.  Figure 8.10 shows the four analyses, 7-10, that this section 
addresses.  Each analysis will again be preceded with a description of the thresholds 
utilized. 
 
Figure 8.10: External imitative configurational analyses 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
These analyses differ from the previous innovation analyses in that only one analysis 
is conducted and it is for those carriers that are reporting an operating margin greater 
than zero yet below the appropriate threshold for pure airlines.  In other words, the 
QCA method is used to determine the combination of business model elements that 
leads to an operating margin dummy variable of one.  Carriers with higher operating 
margins are deemed as having a more pure business model and show a lower 
propensity to imitate among groups (see tables 7.6 and 7.10).  It is non-pure airlines 
that imitate externally.   
 
8.2.1 FSC – LCC imitation 
This is the first of four analyses studying imitation among strategic groups in the 
airline industry.  The four analyses are all the possible combinations that can take 
place.  The first one, FSC-LCC imitation, analyses and proposes how the future 
business model will be shaped as these two groups close the gap between them.  Table 
8.11 reviews the propositions of this analysis.  
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Table 8.11: Overview of proposition 7 
 
Variable 
headings Network Distribution Service Operational 
     
P7 Increased network integration 
Increased GDS 
presence via third-
parties 
Unbundled service 
features Fleet standardization 
     
Source: Author’s own creation 
  
The researcher proposes that a business model grounded in both the FSC and LCC 
models will display an increased level of network integration and GDS presence via 
third-party providers.  The service and operational features of the model will resemble 
LCCs.  Carriers will provide passengers with unbundled services features and strive 
for fleet standardization.   
 
The thresholds utilized in the analysis are presented in table 8.12.  They were 
determined in the same way as for the other analyses.  
 
Table 8.12: FSC-LCC imitation – thresholds 
    
Dummy variable 0 1 2 
    
Online transfer 0 1  
Interline transfer 0 1  
Through-fare discount 0 1  
Ticket restrictions 0 1  
GDS presence 0 0.5 1 
Frequent flyer program 0 1  
Lounge access 0 0.5 1 
Cabin numbers 1 2 3 
Alliance membership 0 1  
Codeshare agreements 0 1  
Capacity lift provider 0 0.5 1 
Capacity lift user 0 1  
ASK % to primary airport  x<0.85 x>0.85  
ASK % by partner x<0.13 x>0.13  
Fleet purity x<0.17 x>0.17  
Stage length x<1530 x>1530  
    
Operating margin x<0.00 0.00<x>0.16 x>0.16 
    
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
A single carrier was removed from the analysis which was creating a contradiction for 
a group of four airlines.  Alitalia had an identical business model to US carriers 
Northwest and Continental and Spanish Iberia.  However, Alitalia’s operating margin 
was much lower and beyond the threshold determined for the three other carriers.  
This was causing a contradiction and would have omitted the entire group of airlines 
from the analysis.  The researcher chose to omit the Italian carrier to ensure a more 
encompassing analysis. 
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Figure 8.11: Configurational FSC-LCC imitation results 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The results indicate that if the FSC and LCC strategic groups were to merge the 
business model elements that lead to an operating margin between 0% and 16% 
would be as follows: 
 
• GDS presence via a third-party OR 
• A triple class configuration OR 
• Membership of one of the three major alliances AND an ASK 
percentage flown by partner carriers less than 13% OR 
• A single class configuration AND an FSI less than 0.17 OR 
• A frequent flyer program AND no interline agreements OR 
• A frequent flyer program AND restriction-less travel OR 
• A frequent flyer program AND no code-share agreements OR 
• Restriction-less travel AND GDS presence OR 
• A frequent flyer program AND a dual class configuration AND an 
ASK percentage flown by partner carriers less than 13% AND 
through-fare pricing OR 
• A frequent flyer program AND a dual class configuration AND an 
ASK percentage flown by partner carriers less than 13% AND GDS 
presence OR 
• A frequent flyer program AND a dual class configuration AND an 
ASK percentage flown by partner carriers less than 13% AND an 
ASK flown to primary airports greater than 85% 
 
The MVQCA analysis shows that a carrier grounded in both the FSC and LCC 
business model will show network traits of LCCs.  There will be no inter-line, 
ticketing restrictions, and no codeshare agreements, although a frequent flyer program 
for this type of carrier is an option.  A frequent flyer program can also be combined 
with a dual class configuration, through-fare ticketing, GDS access, and a focus on 
primary airports, all elements that attract high-yield business travelers.  Finally, these 
carriers in the future may opt to merely change their distribution to include GDS 
FSC-LCC (P7): 
GDS (1) + In-flight classes (2) + Alliance (1) Feed share (0) + In-flight classes (0) Fleet (0) 
FFP (1) In-flight classes (1) Feed share (0) 
 
Thru-fare (1) + GDS (2) + Primary a/p share (1) 
FFP (1)      Interline (0) + Restrictions (0) + Codeshare (0)       +  Restrictions (0) GDS (2) 
+
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access via less expensive third-parties, or entering into a large-scale alliance with 
equal partners.  Such combinations of business model elements indicate that the two 
models, FSC and LCC, will inspire carriers to imitate each other to achieve positive 
synergies.  The QCA results indicate that the carriers would diversify their fleets, 
which is a surprising finding.  This may indicate that the higher costs associated with 
a diversified fleet outweigh the benefits of operating in markets that otherwise would 
be inaccessible.  This fleet diversification may aid in explaining the lack of feed share 
QCA results provide.  A diversified fleet would allow a carrier to operate in smaller 
markets and enable the carrier to capture passengers that a feed carrier would 
otherwise provide.   
 
8.2.1.1 Proposition confirmation 
Review of the proposition confirmation is presented in table 8.13. 
 
Table 8.13: Confirmation of proposition 7 
 
Variable 
headings Network Distribution Service Operational 
     
P7 Partially confirmed Partially confirmed Unconfirmed Unconfirmed 
     
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The results indicate that the propositions proposed by the researcher are only partially 
confirmed in some elements.  Network integration is only partially confirmed in that 
one model indicates that through-fares may be offered to integrate a network, 
however another model indicates that no interlining should be offered, a segregation 
of the network.  GDS distribution via third-parties is one channel that a combined 
FSC-LCC carrier can utilize, although another variation indicates that full GDS access 
is an option, which results in only a partial confirmation of the proposition.  Finally, 
the service and operational results do not confirm the propositions in that the results 
show that a combined carrier may retain complementary service features and that a 
low FSI is a feature of the business model.   
 
An FSC-LCC combination is not the only possibility.  FSC and regional carriers may 
also look to each other to imitate the respective models, which is shown in the 
following analysis. 
 
8.2.2 FSC – regional imitation 
Although regional carriers often play a supporting role for FSCs there is also the 
opportunity for the carriers to emulate each other.  FSCs may wish to operate an 
efficient short-haul route, while regional carriers may desire to expand their networks 
and operate beyond the scope of an FSC partner.  The propositions for this analysis 
are displayed in table 8.14. 
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Table 8.14: Overview of proposition 8 
 
Variable 
headings Network Distribution Service Operational 
     
P8 Increased network integration & CLP 
Sustained GDS 
absence 
Sustained reliance 
on partner providers 
Fleet 
standardization 
     
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
A combined FSC-regional carrier will display network characteristics of increased 
network integration while maintaining a role as a capacity lift provider.  Distribution 
channels will bypass the GDS systems, while the service level will continue its 
reliance on partners, all the while attempting to obtain a higher FSI.  Unlike the 
previous FSC-LCC analysis this grouping of carriers did not require the omission of a 
carrier to reduce contradictions.  The thresholds utilized in this analysis are presented 
in table 8.15. 
 
Table 8.15: FSC-regional imitation – thresholds 
    
Dummy variable 0 1 2 
    
Online transfer 0 1  
Interline transfer 0 1  
Through-fare discount 0 1  
Ticket restrictions 0 1  
GDS presence 0 1  
Frequent flyer program 0 1  
Lounge access 0 1  
Cabin numbers 1 2 3 
Alliance membership 0 1  
Codeshare agreements 0 1  
Capacity lift provider 0 0.5 1 
Capacity lift user 0 1  
ASK % to primary airport  x<0.92 x>0.92  
ASK % by partner x<0.13 x>0.13  
Fleet purity x<0.75 x>0.75  
Stage length x<3150 x>3150  
    
Operating margin x<0.00 0.00<x>0.13 x>0.13 
    
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
Using the thresholds provided in the table above in the TOSMANA software produces 
the results shown in figure 8.12.   
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Figure 8.12: Configurational FSC-Regional imitation results 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
A combined FSC-regional carrier will display the following business model: 
 
• A capacity lift provider with own branded flying OR 
• An ASK to primary airports less than 92% OR 
• A triple class configuration AND through-fare ticketing OR 
• An FSI less than 0.75 AND a single class configuration OR 
• An FSI less than 0.75 AND no GDS presence OR 
• An FSI less than 0.75 AND no frequent flyer program OR 
• An FSI less than 0.75 AND no lounge access OR 
• An FSI less than 0.75 AND a capacity lift provider OR 
• A dual class configuration AND no through-fare ticketing OR 
• A dual class configuration AND no GDS presence OR 
• A dual class configuration AND no frequent flyer program OR 
• A dual class configuration AND no lounge access OR 
• A dual class configuration AND a capacity lift provider OR 
• A dual class configuration AND an FSI greater than 0.75 OR 
 
These results show that some combined FSC-regional carriers will continue to 
provide lift capacity, however this will be augmented by own-branded flying.  Some 
carriers will acquire capacity from smaller carriers, but adapt their business model to 
operate without ticket restrictions, which coincides with the results of the business 
model innovation that will take place at non-pure FSCs (see figure 8.5).  The 
remaining results are segmented according to class configuration.  Results show that 
those hybrid carriers with a single class will continue to operate solely as capacity lift 
providers, while a dual class configuration carrier will attempt to provide capacity and 
streamline operations through a standardized fleet.  Finally, those carriers with a triple 
class configuration may drop their role as capacity lift providers while introducing an 
integrated network by providing through-fares or ticket restrictions. 
 
 
FSC-Regional (P8): 
CLP (1) + Primary a/p share (0) + In-flight classes (2) Thru-fare (1)  +   
Fleet (0)      In-flight classes (0) + GDS (0) + FFP (0) + Lounges (0) + CLP (2)  
In-flight classes (1)      Thru-fare (0) + GDS (0) + FFP (0) + Lounges (0) + CLP (2) + Fleet (1)    
+
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8.2.2.1 Proposition confirmation 
Proposition 8, an FSC-regional hybrid, is partially confirmed, as shown in table 8.16. 
 
Table 8.16: Confirmation of proposition 8 
 
Variable 
headings Network Distribution Service Operational 
     
P8 Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Partially confirmed 
     
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The results point to a hybrid model that will focus on network integration, either 
through own-branded flying and through-fare tickets, or by operating as a sole 
capacity lift provider.  Distribution via GDSs is not an option in the FSC-regional 
business model.  Carriers can rely on their partners to distribute their tickets or use 
other means, such as the Internet.  The results also indicate that the service level of the 
hybrid carrier will continue to rely on their partner airline, and factors such as lounges 
and FFPs will not be offered by the hybrid carrier.  Operationally, some hybrid 
carriers will attempt to standardize their fleet while others will not strive for a high 
FSI.  Such contradictions may be grounded in the type of operations the carrier 
conducts.  Some regional carriers that provide capacity may have to adhere to aircraft 
requirements from their mainline partner, which necessitates a diversified fleet in 
operating for more than one carrier. 
 
8.2.3 LCC – regional imitation 
Some regional carriers may wish to transform their business model from either a 
supporting role or a niche market player to a more efficient low-cost model.  
Likewise, carriers at the fringes of the LCC strategic group may wish to capitalize on 
an opportunity to transform their business model to that of a regional carrier.  Such a 
combined business model will display the characteristics presented in table 8.17. 
 
Table 8.17: Overview of proposition 9 
 
Variable 
headings Network Distribution Service Operational 
     
P9 Network segregation 
Increased GDS 
presence via third-
parties 
Unbundled service 
features Fleet standardization 
     
Source: Author’s own creation 
  
A hybrid LCC-regional carrier will display such characteristics as network 
segregation which allows for simplification.  Regional carriers are generally 
characterized as point-to-point carriers, although their O&D traffic often 
enplanes/deplanes at a hub airport.  Distribution will be through GDSs but access will 
be gained via less expensive third-parties.  Service features will be unbundled to 
capitalize on the simplified LCC model.  Finally, a standardized fleet of a hybrid 
carrier will be the goal.  Table 8.18 presents the thresholds used in this QCA analysis. 
  184
 
Table 8.18: LCC-regional imitation– thresholds 
    
Dummy variable 0 1 2 
    
Online transfer 0 1  
Interline transfer 0 1  
Through-fare discount 0 1  
Ticket restrictions 0 1  
GDS presence 0 0.5 1 
Frequent flyer program 0 1  
Lounge access 0 0.5 1 
Cabin numbers 1 2  
Alliance membership 0 1  
Codeshare agreements 0 1  
Capacity lift provider 0 0.5 1 
Capacity lift user 0 1  
ASK % to primary airport  x<0.55 x>0.55  
ASK % by partner x<0.03 x>0.03  
Fleet purity x<0.75 x>0.75  
Stage length x<740 x>740  
    
Operating margin x<0.00 0.00<x>0.15 x>0.15 
    
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
No contradicting carriers were omitted from this analysis and there were 28 unique 
business model combinations.  The TOSMANA software generates the following 
hybrid results presented in figure 8.13. 
 
Figure 8.13: Configurational LCC-regional imitation results 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
An LCC-hybrid carrier will display the following business model traits: 
 
• GDS access via third-party OR 
• A capacity lift provider and own-brand operator OR 
• A pure capacity lift provider AND an FSI less than 0.75 OR 
• Ticket restrictions AND a dual class configuration AND stage 
lengths less than 740 NM OR 
LCC-Regional (P9): 
GDS (1) + CLP (1) + CLP (2) Fleet (0) + Restrictions (1) In-flight classes (1) Stage length (0) + 
Restrictions (0)      Stage length (1) + Online (0) Fleet (0) + Thru-fare (0) Fleet (0)       
FFP (1) In-flight classes (0) Feed share (0) 
+
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• No ticket restrictions AND stage lengths greater than 740 NM OR 
• No ticket restrictions AND no onlining AND an FSI less than 0.75 
OR 
• No ticket restrictions AND no through-fares AND an FSI less than 
0.75 OR 
• A frequent flyer program AND a single class configuration AND a 
feed share less than 3% OR 
 
The results show that a hybrid LCC-regional carrier will capitalize on the new 
distribution agreements that allow GDS access via a third-party, imitating the GDS 
distribution model.  This type of carrier may continue cooperation with FSC partners 
as capacity lift providers, however it will branch out to operate as an LCC-regional 
hybrid under its own brand.  Fleet standardization is not a priority for this type of 
carrier, especially when operating as a capacity provider.  If the hybrid limits its 
network size to less 740 NM then it will maintain a restrictive ticket policy, however 
if it expands to more distant markets its network will be simplified.  It appears as if 
this hybrid carrier will elect to either operate a combined model as a capacity lift 
provider and own-branded operator, or continue its role as a pure capacity lift 
provider.  
 
8.2.3.1 Proposition confirmation 
The confirmation of proposition 9 is presented in table 8.19. 
 
Table 8.19: Confirmation of proposition 9 
 
Variable 
headings Network Distribution Service Operational 
     
P9 Partially confirmed Confirmed Partially confirmed Unconfirmed 
     
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
A hybrid carrier will focus on either providing integrated capacity lift for partners or 
own-branded flying with a segregated network with no through-fare ticketing.  This 
result only partially confirms the proposition that the network will be segregated since 
some LCC-regionals will continue as capacity lift providers in a limited form.  
Distribution will pass through lower cost GDS third-parties, which confirms the 
researcher’s proposition.  Service features will not feature prominently in the hybrid 
business model, although a frequent flyer program is an option.  Finally, fleet 
standardization is not an aspect that a hybrid carrier will prioritize.  It appears that a 
diversified fleet is more accommodating to the prospective network. 
 
8.2.4 FSC – LCC – regional imitation 
The final external mimetic business model configuration is the triple overlap of the 
FSC, LCC, and regional strategic groups.  This conglomerate may not be the most 
likely imitative configuration, but the researcher elected to include it to cover all 
feasible external configurations.  The details of proposition 10 are presented in table 
8.20.  
  186
 
Table 8.20: Overview of proposition 10 
 
Variable 
headings Network Distribution Service Operational 
     
P10 Increased network integration 
Sustained GDS 
presence 
Unbundled service 
features Fleet standardization 
     
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
An FSC-LCC-regional hybrid would display increased network integration, similar to 
the FSC-regional partnership witnessed currently.  Distribution via GDSs, similar to 
current FSCs, will continue.  This type of business model will imitate the LCC 
practice of unbundling service features and striving for fleet standardization.  The 
thresholds utilized in the analysis are presented in table 8.21. 
 
Table 8.21: FSC-LCC-regional imitation – thresholds 
    
Dummy variable 0 1 2 
    
Online transfer 0 1  
Interline transfer 0 1  
Through-fare discount 0 1  
Ticket restrictions 0 1  
GDS presence 0 0.5 1 
Frequent flyer program 0 1  
Lounge access 0 05 1 
Cabin numbers 1 2 3 
Alliance membership 0 1  
Codeshare agreements 0 1  
Capacity lift provider 0 0.5 1 
Capacity lift user 0 1  
ASK % to primary airport  x<0.55 x>0.55  
ASK % by partner x<0.13 x>0.13  
Fleet purity x<0.75 x>0.75  
Stage length x<3150 x>3150  
    
Operating margin x<0.00 0.00<x>0.15 x>0.15 
    
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
This analysis has one carrier, Italian Alitalia, removed to ensure that there is a 
minimum of contradictions present in the truth table (see Appendix VI).  If this carrier 
had not been removed from the analysis then four carriers with identical business 
models but differing operating margins would have been omitted.  Alitalia was one 
carrier of four that differed in the outcome.  It will be analyzed separately in an 
attempt to explain why an identical business model resulted in a differing outcome.  
The results of the QCA analysis of the remaining 61 carriers with 38 unique business 
model combinations are presented in figure 8.14.  
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Figure 8.14: Configurational FSC-LCC-regional imitation results 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
A triple hybrid carrier, in other words, a carrier that overlaps with the FSC-, LCC-, 
and regional business models would be comprised of the following elements: 
 
• GDS access via third-party OR 
• A capacity lift provider and own-brand operator OR 
• A dual class configuration AND an FSI greater than 0.75 OR 
• A pure capacity lift provider AND a single class configuration OR 
• A pure capacity lift provider AND an FSI less than 0.75 OR 
• No ticket restrictions AND no through-fares AND an FSI less than 0.75 OR 
• No ticket restrictions AND a frequent flyer program AND no lounge access OR 
• No ticket restrictions AND a frequent flyer program AND a single class 
configuration OR 
• Ticket restrictions AND GDS access AND a frequent flyer program AND a 
dual class configuration AND an ASK feed share less than 13%  
 
The combinatory analysis shows that a tri-business model configuration will consist 
of carriers that continue to adhere to the traditional FSC model (seen in the last line of 
figure 8.14), pure capacity lift providing regional carriers, and a group that will focus 
on a segregated network and amenities.  This analysis shows that although a 
combined FSC-LCC-regional business model is possible it will continue to adhere to 
one of the three main models rather than becoming an intimately entwined model; the 
combinatory configuration will continue to display sub-groupings.   
 
FSC-LCC-Regional (P10): 
GDS (1) + CLP (1) + In-flight classes (2) + In-flight classes (1) Fleet (1) + 
CLP (2)        In-flight classes (1) + Fleet (0)
Restrictions (0)     Thru-fare (0) Fleet (0) + FFP (1)      Lounges (0) + In-flight classes (0)                 +  
+  
Restrictions (1) GDS (2) FFP (1) In-flight classes (1) Feed share (0)  
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8.2.4.1 Proposition confirmation 
Table 8.22 is a confirmation of proposition 10 segmented in the four main headings. 
 
Table 8.22: Confirmation of proposition 10 
 
Variable 
headings Network Distribution Service Operational 
     
P10 Partially confirmed Partially confirmed Unconfirmed Partially confirmed 
     
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The network proposition called for an FSC-LCC-regional hybrid focusing on an 
integrated network, however this is only partially confirmed.  Some carriers will focus 
on providing an integrated lift capacity, or integrated network, while others will focus 
on a simplified network of single-leg pricing and no restrictions.  The results show 
that some triple-overlapped hybrid carriers will utilize traditional GDS distribution 
tactics, while others will benefit from third-party access.  QCA results show that 
unbundled services are not an element within this type of hybrid, as a matter of fact, 
some carrier will continue to integrate them if operating as feed partners while others 
will omit them entirely.  The final measured category, operations, proposed that 
carriers will focus on a standardized fleet.  However, findings suggest that this will 
only hold true for some carriers. 
 
8.3 Imitation within strategic groups 
The final analyses are grounded in the findings that imitation of peer group members 
is present in the airline industry, as shown in figure 8.15.  The results showed that 
imitation between group leaders and secondary airlines takes place and these analyses 
will investigate what specific business model configurations can appear.  This 
investigation is bi-directional; it is not possible to differentiate between pure airlines 
imitating non-pure or vice versa.  Each analysis is segmented according to the three 
strategic groups and a table is presented which shows the thresholds utilized in each 
analysis. 
 
Figure 8.15: Internal imitative configurational analyses 
 
Source: Author’s own creation 
FSC LCC 
REGIONAL 
13
11 12
Strategic group
Leading firms 
Imitation 
analyses: 
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8.3.1 FSC 
Proposition 11 and its specifics are presented in table 8.23.  Imitation among FSCs 
will focus primarily on network segregation and fleet standardization, while 
distribution and service levels will remain relatively unchanged.   
 
Table 8.23: Overview of proposition 11 
 
Variable 
headings Network Distribution Service Operational 
     
P11 Network segregation 
Sustained GDS 
presence 
Sustained service 
levels 
Fleet 
standardization 
     
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
Table 8.24 shows the thresholds that the internal FSC MVQCA analysis utilized.  
Unlike the previous innovation and external-imitation analyses which utilized three 
thresholds for operating margin, the internal-imitation analyses only incorporate a 
single threshold.  This is grounded in the fact that both pure and non-pure carriers will 
mold together, rather than focusing on either category specifically.  This analysis only 
utilizes a single threshold, 0% operating margin, to ensure that those carriers that were 
financially unsuccessful were not imitated. 
 
Table 8.24: FSC internal imitation – thresholds 
    
Dummy variable 0 1 2 
    
Online transfer 0 1  
Interline transfer 0 1  
Through-fare discount 0 1  
Ticket restrictions 0 1  
GDS presence 0 1  
Frequent flyer program 0 1  
Lounge access 0 1  
Cabin numbers 2 3  
Alliance membership 0 1  
Codeshare agreements 0 1  
Capacity lift provider 0 0.5 1 
Capacity lift user 0 1  
ASK % to primary airport  x<0.90 x>0.90  
ASK % by partner x<0.1 x>0.1  
Fleet purity x<0.26 x>0.26  
Stage length x<1210 x>1210  
    
Operating margin x<0.00 x>0.00  
    
Source: Author’s own creation   
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The results from the Boolean analysis are shown in figure 8.16. 
 
Figure 8.16: Configurational FSC imitation results 
 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
If FSCs are going to imitate within their own strategic group the carriers will be 
comprised of the following business model elements: 
 
• No through-fares OR 
• No ticket restrictions OR 
• Triple class configuration 
 
These results show that imitation within the FSC strategic group leans towards non-
pure airlines as it is a segregated network and its combinations that contribute to 
financial success.   
8.3.1.1 Proposition confirmation 
Confirmation of the four categories comprising proposition 11 are presented in table 
8.25. 
 
Table 8.25: Confirmation of proposition 11 
 
Variable 
headings Network Distribution Service Operational 
     
P11 Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Unconfirmed 
     
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The results indicate that imitation within the FSC strategic group will focus on a 
segregated network.  FSCs may elect to simplify their network by transitioning to 
single-leg pricing, similar to LCCs, or removing their ticket restrictions while 
maintaining a triple class configuration.  Distribution and service levels will continue 
to adhere to the traditional FSC strategy in future FSC business model compositions.  
Finally, fleet standardization is not a distinguishing feature of future FSC business 
models.   
 
8.3.2 LCC 
Internal imitation among LCCs will focus on providing a greater seamless travel 
experience through network integration, while carriers will adapt their distribution 
strategies to be more present within GDSs, although only via third-parties rather than 
direct access.  Service features will be offered to customers in unbundled packages 
FSC (P11): 
Thru-fare (0) + Restrictions (0) + In-flight classes (1) 
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and available for purchase, while operationally the carriers will focus on standardizing 
their fleets.  These characteristics are summarized in table 8.26. 
 
Table 8.26: Overview of proposition 12 
 
Variable 
headings Network Distribution Service Operational 
     
P12 Network integration GDS presence via third-parties Unbundled services 
Fleet 
standardization 
     
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The thresholds utilized in this analysis are summarized in table 8.27.  No carriers were 
removed from the analysis as there were no contradicting business models among the 
19 study group carriers, which is a testament to the diversity within the strategic 
group. 
 
Table 8.27: LCC internal imitation – thresholds 
    
Dummy variable 0 1 2 
    
Online transfer 0 1  
Interline transfer 0 1  
Through-fare discount 0 1  
Ticket restrictions 0 1  
GDS presence 0 0.5 1 
Frequent flyer program 0 1  
Lounge access 0 0.5 1 
Cabin numbers 1 2  
Alliance membership 0 1  
Codeshare agreements 0 1  
Capacity lift provider 0 0.5 1 
Capacity lift user 0 1  
ASK % to primary airport  x<0.55 x>0.55  
ASK % by partner x<0.03 x>0.03  
Fleet purity x<0.75 x>0.75  
Stage length x<740 x>740  
    
Operating margin x<0.00 x>0.00  
    
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The results for internal imitation within the LCC strategic group are presented in 
figure 8.17. 
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Figure 8.17: Configurational LCC imitation results 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
Internal imitation within the LCC strategic group results in the business model 
configurations: 
 
• GDS access via third-party OR 
• ASK to primary airports less than 55% OR 
• No ticket restrictions AND an FSI less than 0.75 OR 
• Average stage length less than 740 NM AND a dual class configuration OR 
• Average stage length less than 740 NM AND on-line tickets AND no capacity 
lift taker OR 
• Average stage length less than 740 NM AND on-line tickets AND an ASK 
feed share less than 3% OR 
• A frequent flyer program AND an average stage length less than 740 NM AND 
no capacity lift taker OR 
• A frequent flyer program AND an average stage length less than 740 NM AND 
an ASK feed share less than 3% OR 
• Through-fare ticketing AND an ASK feed share less than 3% AND a frequent 
flyer program OR 
• Through-fare ticketing AND an ASK feed share less than 3% AND an average 
stage length less than 740 NM OR 
• Through-fare ticketing AND an average stage length less than 740 NM AND 
no capacity lift taker 
 
These results show that imitation within the LCC strategic group will result in carriers 
that continue to follow the LCC mantra with a few caveats.  Distribution channels 
may be adapted to capture higher-yielding segments, however carriers will continue to 
LCC (P12): 
GDS (1) + Primary a/p share (0) + Restrictions (0) Fleet (0) + Stage length (0) In-flight classes (1) + 
Stage length (0) Online (1)     CLT (0) + Feed share (0)      +
Thru fare (1) Feed share (0)     FFP (1) + Stage length (0)     + Thru-fare (1) Stage length (0) CLT (0) 
FFP (1) Stage length (0)   CLT (0) + Feed share (0)        + 
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focus on short stage lengths to secondary airports, restriction-less tickets, and limited 
feed from other carriers.  Network integration though appears to be on the agenda 
though for future LCC business models, as some carriers will offer through-fare 
ticketing and on-lining, as well as, a frequent flyer program. 
 
8.3.2.1 Proposition confirmation 
Table 8.28 reviews the confirmation of proposition 12.  The results show that the 
proposed integration of future LCC networks is confirmed with the introduction of 
though-fare ticketing and on-lining.  Third-party access to GDSs also confirms the 
distribution tactics of future LCCs, while the services offered is unconfirmed.  The 
results show that unbundled, pas-as-you-go features are not necessarily a prominent 
feature of this type of business model change.  Operationally, LCCs elect to diversify 
their fleets rather than focus on standardization.   
 
Table 8.28: Confirmation of proposition 12 
 
Variable 
headings Network Distribution Service Operational 
     
P12 Confirmed Confirmed Unconfirmed Unconfirmed 
     
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
8.3.3 Regional 
Imitation within the regional strategic group proposes two categories of business 
models: to continue the current supporting role as a feeder for larger carriers or to 
operate as an integrated stand-alone carrier.  Table 8.29 reviews proposition 13.  This 
suggests that regional carriers in the future will continue to offer an integrated 
network, either via larger partner carriers or within their own network.  Distribution 
via GDSs and service features will continue to be offered as regional carriers rely 
upon their FSC partners.  Fleet standardization among regional carriers is proposed to 
be a future goal. 
 
Table 8.29: Overview of proposition 13 
 
Variable 
headings Network Distribution Service Operational 
     
P13 Sustained network integration 
Sustained GDS 
presence via 
partners 
Sustained bundled 
services via 
partners 
Fleet 
standardization 
     
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
No regional carriers were removed from the analysis for contradictory reasons (see 
Appendix VI).  There were 13 unique business model element combinations among 
18 carriers, which is a relatively diverse field.  The thresholds utilized in the analysis 
are shown in table 8.30.  As with the other two internal-imitation analyses the 
outcome is measured as a dichotomous condition, and the threshold is set at 0. 
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Table 8.30: Regional internal imitation – thresholds 
    
Dummy variable 0 1 2 
    
Online transfer 0 1  
Interline transfer 0 1  
Through-fare discount 0 1  
Ticket restrictions 0 1  
GDS presence 0 1  
Frequent flyer program 0 1  
Lounge access 0 1  
Cabin numbers 1 2  
Alliance membership 0 1  
Codeshare agreements 0 1  
Capacity lift provider 0 0.5 1 
Capacity lift user 0 1  
ASK % to primary airport  x<0.93 x>0.93  
ASK % by partner 0   
Fleet purity x<0.75 x>0.75  
Stage length x<383 x>383  
    
Operating margin x<0.00 x>0.00  
    
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The results for this analysis are shown in figure 8.18. 
 
Figure 8.18: Configurational regional imitation results 
 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
Mimetic behavior within the regional carrier strategic group will result in the 
following combinations of business model elements: 
 
• No onlining OR 
• No through-fares OR 
• Ticket restrictions OR 
• No GDS access OR 
• No frequent flyer program OR 
• No lounge access OR 
• An average stage length less than 383 NM OR 
• A single class configuration OR 
Regional (P13): 
Online (0) + Thru-fare (0) + Restrictions (1) + GDS (0) + FFP (0) + Lounges (0) + Stage length (0) + 
In-flight classes (0) + Primary a/p share (0) + CLP (1,2) 
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• An ASK percentage to primary airports less than 93% OR 
• Capacity lift provider with own-branded flying AND a pure capacity lift 
provider 
 
This QCA analysis indicates that imitation within the regional strategic group will 
result in carriers that will continue to operate a business model in a supporting 
capacity for FSCs, while some may explore own-branded flying.  The results are 
segmented into single conditions, although the CLP condition indicates an entire 
business model.  Both types of results indicate that imitation within the regional group 
will most likely result in carriers that continue to act purely as feed partners for FSCs, 
or those that will continue to feed FSCs while branching off to operate their own-
branded flying.  This may incorporate those aspects from the analysis results: a 
segregated short-haul network with a focus on secondary airports, no GDS 
distribution, and no amenities.   
 
8.3.3.1 Proposition confirmation 
Proposition 13 is only partial confirmed by the QCA analysis, as shown in table 8.31.  
Those carriers that elect to continue to operate as capacity lift providers will have 
integrated networks, however for those carriers that may operate using their own 
brand they will most likely offer no through-fare ticketing and no on-lining, indicating 
a segregated network.  The segregation of a CLP or CLP coupled with own-branded 
operations continues.  Own-branded operators will elect to bypass the GDSs, even via 
third-parties, and focus on other forms of distribution.  Services will either be 
provided by FSC partners or not at all.  Finally, fleet standardization among future 
regional carriers is not a high priority according to the QCA results.   
 
Table 8.31: Confirmation of proposition 13 
 
Variable 
headings Network Distribution Service Operational 
     
P13 Partially confirmed Partially confirmed Confirmed Unconfirmed 
     
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
8.4 Contradicting airlines 
Contradictions within a Boolean analysis are omitted and therefore limit the number 
of observations that are used to determine a unique configuration.  One practice is to 
remove the observations which are causing the contradiction.  Other solutions include 
the establishment, or moving, of thresholds, or addition of conditions.  These analyses 
saw four carriers removed from three analyses in order to improve the results.  These 
carriers are presented in table 8.32. 
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Table 8.32: Contradicting carriers 
   
Carrier Analysis Section 
   
Alitalia Pure/non-pure FSC innovation 8.1.1 
United Airlines Pure/non-pure FSC innovation 8.1.1 
American Eagle Pure/non-pure regional  innovation 8.1.3 
Skywest Pure/non-pure regional innovation 8.1.3 
Alitalia FSC-LCC imitation 8.2.1 
 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
These carriers will be analyzed separately in an attempt to discover what unique 
features or situations were causing a contradiction.  These analyses will review the 
carriers presented in the order they appear in table 8.32. 
 
Alitalia, the Italian flag carrier, had an identical business model to US carriers 
Continental and Northwest in the innovation analysis, along with Spanish carrier, 
Iberia, and the two US carriers in the imitation analysis.  However, Alitalia’s poor 
financial outcome was causing a contradiction among the carriers.  In 2006 it reported 
an operating margin of minus 10% while the average for airlines with similar business 
models was 4%.  The carrier has struggled for years with increasing competition and 
labor unrest, and has often been held captive by political disorder55 (Baker, 2007; 
Endres, 2006).  In 2006 the carrier suffered a number of labor disputes and saw a 
3.4% decline in yields, and the government had to propose two new business models 
for the carrier while seeking to create an attractive carrier that was sellable (Airline 
Business, 2006b); however, constraints (i.e. labor, political, etc.) have hampered 
business model change while the financial situation soured.  This carrier was therefore 
removed from the analysis as its strategic struggle has hampered an analysis with the 
carrier included. 
 
United Airlines, the third largest airline in the world ranked by passenger numbers in 
2006, reported an operating margin of 2%, which was one percentage point below the 
researcher-established threshold.  The carrier was forcing a contradiction among four 
other carriers, which would have otherwise been omitted from the analysis.  United 
entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy at the end of 2002 in an attempt to stem the financial 
hemorrhaging it was suffering.  Five years later the airline exited bankruptcy at the 
start of 2006 and had managed to cut US $7 billion from its annual expenses, although 
some analysts state that it had not cut costs as effectively as its nearest FSC 
competitors (USA Today, 2006).  The Research and Innovative Technology 
Administration (RITA)56 department of the U.S. Department of Transportation 
provides performance measurements of the U.S. airline industry (U.S. Department of 
Transportation & RITA, 2006) and its data for 2006 show that United Airlines, 
system-wide, reported a profit of US $11.47 per originating passenger, which was 
more than one dollar less than the FSC average.  This income metric is complemented 
by expense metrics which shows that United has failed to lower its costs significantly 
compared to its competitors.  The carrier had the highest system-wide operating 
                                                 
55 The Italian government owns 49% of the carrier 
56 RITA (http://www.rita.dot.gov/) 
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expenses and fuel expense per passenger.  These figures are shown in table 8.33.  
These figures show that the carrier has not lowered its costs enough compared to 
carriers with identical business models; the result is a operating margin below that of 
other carriers. 
 
Table 8.33: 2006 United Airlines performance metrics  
    
Metric 
System operating 
profit/loss per originating 
passenger ($ US) 
System operating 
expense per originating 
passenger ($ US) 
Fuel cost per 
originating passenger 
($ US) 
    
United Airlines 11.47 392 123 
Network average1 12.56 321 98 
    
1: Average of US Airways, Northwest, Continental, American, United, Delta, Alaska 
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation (2006) 
 
American Eagle, the wholly-owned regional subsidiary of American Airlines, had a 
2006 business model that was identical to three other carriers, all of which were 
closely affiliated in some manner with a full-service carrier (Davies & Quastler, 1995; 
French, 1995); however the carrier reported an operating margin of 10%, twice as 
much as the next highest reported margin in the group.  American Eagle is the largest 
regional carrier among the four carriers with identical business models in terms of 
passenger numbers57.  Although, the agreement between American Eagle and its FSC 
affiliation with American Airlines is confidential it can be assumed that the size of the 
mainline carrier is of a benefit to the regional partner.  Although the business model 
may be identical to the other three carriers the sheer size of American Eagle’s 
mainline affiliation may aid in pushing the regional carrier’s operating margin higher. 
 
Another US regional with strong ties to numerous full-service carriers is SkyWest.  
This carrier was grouped with three other regionals with affiliations to European full-
service carriers, however SkyWest reported a margin of 11%, which was causing a 
contradiction among the remaining carriers which had lower performance results.  
Skywest operates as a contractual feeder carrier for United Airlines, Delta Air Lines, 
and Midwest Airlines58.  The 2006 operational figures show that the carrier increased 
its ASMs by nearly 60%, which is a result of its acquisition of Atlantic Southeast 
Airlines in late 2005.  This resulted in nearly an equal percentage increase in revenues 
for 2006, while the carrier managed to decrease its operating expense, excluding fuel, 
by 2%.  These features, combined with the expansion of the carrier in 2006, and the 
fee-per-departure revenue model enabled SkyWest to report a margin greater than 
others with an identical business model. 
 
8.5 Interpretation of results 
The analyses of innovative and imitative behavior using the MVQCA technique have 
shown promising findings.  MVQCA has the ability to determine specific 
combinations of conditions that lead to a predetermined outcome; financial success, in 
this project’s case.  The results, as a whole, are interesting and may aid in improved 
understanding of industry evolution in a number of industries, the airline industry 
                                                 
57 2006 passenger figures were 18,765,715 for American Eagle  
58 The agreement with Midwest Airlines was entered into in 2007; outside the timeframe of the analysis 
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included.  It is concluded that it is possible to extend the method to other industries, 
where classification of business model elements is feasible.  The method is dependent 
upon the researcher’s underlying theoretical basis for establishing conditions and 
thresholds.  This enables the method to complement other analyses in very specific 
contexts, however it may limit its use by non-experts in respective fields.  The method 
is dynamic and allows a researcher to conduct research both at the firm level and 
industry level.  However, this wide, methodological expanse requires the researcher to 
be intimately familiar with a subject prior to initiating analyses.  Some limitations of 
the method appear though at firm-level analyses, the number of conditions utilized 
and the number of conditions present in results, which are discussed below. 
 
A researcher is required to strive for a balance between detail and parsimonious 
solutions when using the Boolean method.  Three to five conditions may work well in 
some contexts, however such a low number may fail to capture the nuances of firm 
strategy.  The airline analyses utilized 16 conditions, which may be near the limit of 
the method (Marx, 2005).  While fewer variables may have resulted in more 
parsimonious results, it may have diluted the depth of understanding of business 
models in the industry.  The construction of meta-variables may help to alleviate this 
limitation of the method, however deciphering the results may prove challenging.  
Reverse-engineering of Boolean results using meta-variables may not be feasible.   
 
One limitation of the method and its applicability at the firm-level is its inability to 
produce results that incorporate all conditions, which is a key feature of QCA.  
Rather, results state specifically the presence or absence of a condition, while the 
omission of a condition in a result implies inconsequence.  No results analyzing 
airline business models contain all 16 conditions, which is regarded as a method 
restraint since all airlines were measured using 16 business model elements59.  While 
useful in studies that research cases where theory does not dictate the presence of all 
elements, the method is less applicable to those theories that require the full spectrum 
of conditions.  This may challenge application of the method to strategic contexts 
where theories often incorporate all conditions to explain outcomes.  This is 
displayed, for example, among the future airline business model results that fail to 
incorporate the FSI condition.  This may imply that the specific business model can 
be flown with any composition of aircraft, including no aircraft at all, a standard fleet 
(i.e. a high FSI), or a non-standard fleet (i.e. a low FSI).  While operationally possible, 
it may not be financially responsible, as certain aircraft types are better integrated to 
specific route distances.  For example, a business model that recommends short-haul 
flights (i.e. a low stage length), yet does not specify an FSI, implies that an airline 
either not have any aircraft in a fleet or may choose to have both short-haul and long-
haul aircraft to operate very short flights, which is seldom economical.  One solution 
to this problem may be an increased number of thresholds, as determined by the 
researcher.  An increase in the number of thresholds may have ensured the inclusion 
of additional conditions in the results, however parsimony may have been lost.  This 
is again a balance the researcher must strike, which requires strong knowledge in the 
theoretical foundation of the cases.   
 
                                                 
59 The reader should not interpret this to mean that all airlines had all 16 business elements present, 
merely that 16 elements were used to measure an airline’s business model; for example, the absence of 
a specific element, such as GDS distribution, indicates that a carrier was studied and no element was 
found.     
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The Boolean analyses attempted to investigate the impact of both innovative and 
imitative behavior among airlines populating the industry.  The method proposed 
what business model elements are present in successful carriers, implying which 
elements are deserving of innovative attention.  On the other hand, the analyses 
attempted to construct future business models based on imitative behavior displayed 
both within strategic groups and among strategic groups.  While the analyses have 
successfully constructed possible future business models, the method is lacking in 
integrating various theoretical aspects. 
 
The innovation analyses in this research are based on internal innovations.  However, 
inspiration for innovation may be rooted externally from the industry.  For example, 
Internet distribution, well integrated in nearly all carriers worldwide, was an 
externally inspired innovation in the mid-1990s.  If this analyses had been conducted 
in the early 1990s it would have failed to identify Internet distribution as it was not a 
part of the established 1990-business model.  The Boolean method, however is not 
able to incorporate external influences, unless the theoretical foundation justifies 
creating conditions from external sources for measurement.  Innovation was 
investigated by researching combinations that consistently lead to financial success, 
which highlight those business model elements airlines should implement.  However, 
this would have been the identical method utilized if one investigated imitation among 
similarly grouped airlines, for example imitation by pure FSCs of other pure FSCs60.  
This limitation is addressed below.   
 
The airline industry displayed imitative traits, both within groups and among groups.  
While the MVQCA method is adaptive to investigate the impact of imitation among 
groups, it is poorly tailored to explore the effect of imitation within a strategic group 
among peers.  While the airline industry showed that pure airlines are internally 
imitative of non-pure airlines it is not possible to establish the direction of imitation.  
In other words, the MVQCA results are identical if it is pure airlines imitation of non-
pure airlines, or non-pure airlines imitating pure airlines; it is bi-directional.  
However, differences may exist, yet the method is unable to discern such variation.  
Another challenge that MVQCA is unable to address is internal imitation within a 
strategic group among similarly categorized carriers.  For example, the method is 
unable to analyze the imitation results of pure airlines that imitate pure airlines.  This 
distinction is lacking. 
 
Despite the limitations that appear in analyses at the firm-level, the researcher is 
confident that the Boolean method can add to both firm and industry understanding.  
Additional researching using the method may allow precision in applying QCA and 
MVQCA in strategic management contexts.  Understanding of the theoretical 
underpinnings used to justify the selection and creation of conditions is important, 
while knowledge of potential limitations found in results will facilitate applicability.   
 
                                                 
60 This exact analysis was used to investigate innovation in carriers.  If the ANOVA analyses had 
shown, for example, that pure FSCs imitate pure FSCs it would not have been possible do perform both 
an innovation and imitation analysis as they would have been the same. 
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8.6 Conclusion 
This chapter attempts to extend the understanding of business model change within 
the airline industry by introducing the MVQCA method utilizing Boolean algebra.  
The goal of this method is to indentify those business model elements that are present, 
and their unique combinations, in successful carries, which may provide guidance to 
future carriers wishing to innovate their models.  In addition, the method allows one 
to propose those business model elements, and their combinations, that may appear in 
carriers that base their business model change on imitation, both externally among 
strategic groups and internally within the strategic group.  The findings suggest that 
the industry composition is changing and that distinct business model definitions will 
become blurred in the future.  For example, innovation among FSCs indicates that 
some carriers may reconsider their alliance membership or the ticket restrictions that 
has served some carriers well for so long.  This hints at the idea that some FSCs may 
migrate closer towards a semi-LCC business model.  LCCs, on the other hand, may 
adopt some of the FSC business model elements, such as amenities, differentiated 
classes, and network integration.  At the same time, regional carriers may attempt to 
create their own brand and operations, while continuing to provide a capacity 
platform for larger carriers.  This conjoining of business models, evidenced by the 
findings in Chapter 7, forms the basis for the business model propositions based on 
imitation.  While the Boolean results are grounded in behavior indicated by industry 
actors, the author wishes to investigate the validity of such findings with airline and 
trade organization executives.  The following chapter explores how the industry 
interprets the MVQCA results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What future airline business models can be proposed? 
 
The findings indicate that there will not be one defined successful business
model in the future but many.  Rather, the three strategic groups in the industry
show a tendency of decreasing the strategic distance between the members,
from a business model perspective.  This distance will decrease due to both
innovation and imitation, both internally and externally among strategic groups.
The gamut of proposed future business models can be found in Chapter 8. 
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9. Validity 
 - Statistics state that the chance of being involved in an airline accident are 
approximately 1 in 11 million while the chance of being in an automobile accident are 
1 in 5,000; your chance of being struck by lightening is 1 in 700,000 - 
 
 
This chapter attempts to extract recurring themes from the MVQCA analyses which 
present future possible scenarios and multiple directions for carriers in the industry.  
The goal with this exercise is to validate the Boolean findings, which utilized data 
from 2006, by complementing the results with the latest primary and secondary data.  
Although it is not possible to validate the future until it has happened, and this 
research has not defined a specific terminating future point61, it is desirable, 
nonetheless, to highlight current events that corroborate or negate the analyses results.  
The data is gathered from brief62, open interviews with airline and trade organization 
executives representing the three strategic groups.  These interviews focus primarily 
on the present condition of the respective strategic groups, and views regarding future 
direction.  Airline representatives were assured anonymity, however a brief overview 
of the carriers is provided.  In addition to interviews, secondary data from trade 
journals, newspapers, and other media is presented.  The chapter is segmented 
according to strategic group, with each group segment commencing with a review of 
the business model change themes, followed by the primary and secondary data.  
Prior to group validation a review of theme creation and an interview overview are 
presented. 
 
The author has created themes which present the specific business model elements 
that dominate the MVQCA results.  In other words, themes are a simplification of the 
Boolean findings that highlight business model elements that carriers are most likely 
to focus on in the future.  Themes of future business model change are segmented by 
depth and breadth, and are classified as strong, moderate, or weak themes depending 
on the number of times present.  A deep theme is defined as a business model element 
that is present in a high number of unique business model combinations within a 
specific analysis63.  In other words, a strong deep theme is heavily represented in a 
specific analysis pertinent to a particular strategic group, while a weak theme may 
only be present in a limited number of business model combinations in the same 
analysis and strategic group.  While a deep theme refers to those business model 
elements present within a particular analysis and strategic group, a broad theme refers 
to those business model elements present across all analyses within a strategic group.  
For example, a deep theme may indicate reoccurring business model elements among 
pure FSCs or the LCC-Regional combination, while a broad theme refers to 
reoccurring business model elements present among all FSCs or regionals.   
 
                                                 
61 The researcher has stated that the results are applicable during the next five to 10 years. 
62 Approximately one hour 
63 These analyses include: innovation of pure and non-pure business models, external imitation among 
FSC-LCC, FSC-Regional, LCC-Regional, FSC-LCC-Regional, and the internal imitation within 
strategic groups; there are 9 unique analyses (i.e. innovation and internal imitation for each strategic 
group) and 3 repeating analyses present in each external imitation analyses (i.e. the 3 external imitation 
analyses). 
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Themes were created by listing the individual business model elements for each 
Boolean result segmented by strategic group and analysis type.  This resulted in six 
lists per strategic group: three unique to the group (i.e. innovation and internal 
imitation), two lists that repeated within two groups64, and one list that repeated in 
each group65.  Within each list the condition of the business model element was 
noted66, while conjunction was ignored67.  It is important to note that themes are a 
simplification of the Boolean findings and that the themes are often not stand-alone 
business model elements but frequently accompanied by combinations of other 
elements, which is the strength of the Boolean method.  The themes however are 
simplified by removing the combinations; the researcher stresses to the reader that the 
themes should be reviewed in conjunction with the Boolean results.  The objective of 
this exercise is to create general themes to discuss with industry experts.  Duplicates 
of business model elements are used to create theme strengths (i.e. strong, moderate, 
or weak).  A strong deep theme is a business model element that is repeated the 
greatest number of times within the particular analysis, moderate themes are those 
elements repeated one less than the greatest number, and weak themes repeated two 
less than the greatest number.  While duplicates within each analysis are used to 
create deep theme strengths, duplicates across analyses are used to create broad theme 
strengths.  A strong broad theme is a business model element that is present within a 
strategic group across all analyses; in other words, an element that is present six times 
for each strategic group.  A moderate theme is present five times, and a weak theme 
four times.  The concepts of deep and broad themes are reflected in figure 9.1.  The 
deep themes are represented by the two single cubes which analyze reoccurring 
business model elements in innovation among pure FSCs or reoccurring elements in 
internal imitation among regional carriers.  The broad theme, depicted by the 
rectangle, highlights the reoccurring business model elements across all analyses 
within the LCC strategic group.  Readers may notice that there are occasionally 
contradictions presented among themes, as well as, MVQCA results.  This stems from 
the power of the MVQCA method, which identifies the combinations of business 
model elements that will be present in the future, however conjunctions are omitted 
from the validation themes.  In addition, one may interpret such results as indicating 
that there is not one particular element that ensures success, rather a business model 
must be adapted to meet the market and competitive environment at hand. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64 External imitation among two strategic groups (e.g. FSC-LCC imitation) 
65 External imitation among the three strategic groups (FSC-LCC-Regional imitation) 
66 Conditions of a business model element are the literal; for example, the a GDS distribution presence 
is noted with a 1, while an absence with a 0. 
67 Conjunction (i.e. the AND in the Boolean results, signified by the implied multiplication symbol) was 
ignored to bring clarity and simplicity to the themes. 
  204
Figure 9.1: Example of deep and broad themes 
 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
Airlines representing all three strategic groups were interviewed.  The researcher 
personally interviewed two individuals at FSC A, FSC A1 (FSC A1, 2008)and FSC A2 
(FSC A2, 2008), and individuals at LCC and regional carriers.  All interviewed were 
middle to upper managers.  Individuals and carriers will remain anonymous, although 
table 9.1 presents key performance indicators (KPIs) of the carriers, displaying their 
applicability. 
 
Table 9.1: KPIs of validation interviews 
    
Strategic group FSC LCC Regional 
Carrier FSC A LCC A Regional A 
    
~ Fleet size 300 30 20 
~ Employee size 25,000 1,300 700 
~ Revenue (USD mill) 9,000 800 180 
~ Operating profit (USD mill) 210 -35 7 
    
~: Approximate 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
In addition to the carrier interviews the researcher conducted an interview with the 
president of the US Regional Airline Association68 (RAA), Roger Cohen (R. Cohen, 
2008).  The following section presents the themes and primary and secondary data of 
the three strategic groups in an attempt to validate the research findings. 
 
9.1 FSC 
The creation of a list of business elements present among all FSC analyses results in 
28 unique elements.  A categorization indicates five strong themes which reverberate 
throughout four analyses, the maximum number of reoccurring business model 
elements across all analyses, rather than six.  These themes focus on the FSCs’ 
                                                 
68 http://www.raa.org/ 
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network, cabin configuration, and fleet standardization.  In addition, there are three 
moderate themes, present in three of six analyses.  Again, the focus is on the network, 
cabin configuration, and operations.  There were 12 weak broad themes, present in 
only two of six analyses, however the researcher was of the opinion that such a low 
reoccurrence of business model elements and a high number of specific elements does 
not offer a parsimonious result69.  However, there are two additional business model 
elements that the researcher elected to designate as deep themes, GDS distribution 
(moderate theme) and capacity lift provider (strong theme).  The GDS element was 
present in two of three analyses where it was possible for the element to be measured, 
while the CLP element was present in both analyses where possible70.  The moderate 
themes include a focus on in-flight classes and ticket restrictions, while weak themes 
are fleet standardization and ASK to primary airports.  A summary is presented in 
table 9.2.    
 
Table 9.2: FSC broad themes  
  
Strong themes 
4 of 6 analyses 
Moderate themes 
3 of 6 analyses 
  
Single & dual cabin configuration1 Triple cabin configuration 
Fleet non-standardization Relative high percentage of ASKs to secondary airports2 
Removal of ticket restrictions Presence of through-fares 
Removal of through-fares  
Pure capacity lift provider and 
capacity lift provider and own 
branded operations 
GDS presence through traditional channels and 3rd parties 
  
1: Both cabin configurations are mentioned as strong themes because of the differences in threshold 
settings among strategic groups; for example, the element condition in-flight classes (0) was noted in 
both the Pure FSC and FSC-LCC headings, which have varying thresholds (compare tables 8.3 and 
8.15). 
2: It is not possible to specify the exact ASK percentage, as was done in the thresholds, because they 
are unique to each analysis; the business model element condition, ASK % to primary airport (0), was 
present in the Pure FSC, Non-pure FSC, and FSC-Regional headings 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The results indicate that more than half of future business model change will focus on 
desegregation of the FSC pricing structure and removal of through-fares, which will 
be driven by innovation among pure FSCs, internal FSC imitation, or external FSC-
LCC-Regional imitation, which may be combined with the removal of ticket 
restrictions.  While, on the other hand, fewer business model changes will be built on 
the opposite, namely an integration of the network via through-fares.  This will take 
place among non-pure FSCs, as well as, FSC-LCC and –Regional combinations.  In 
addition, FSCs fleets will continue to be segregated in the future, which allows for a 
network of short-, medium-, and long-haul routes.  Future FSC cabin configurations 
strive for simplification in the form of single or dual configurations, while slightly 
                                                 
69 These elements are: alliance (0), alliance (1), CLP (1), CLP (2), Feed share (0), FFP (1), GDS (1), 
GDS (2), Lounge access (0), ASK share to primary airports (1), and ticket restrictions (1). 
70 All FSC carriers utilize GDSs as a distribution channel, which resulted in its omission from all 
MVQCA analyses because it would always be a contradicting condition.  However, within the LCC 
and regional strategic groups the GDS condition is an integral business model element in results.  
Therefore, the author elected to include it as a strong theme because it was present in all possible 
analyses (FSC-LCC, and FSC-LCC-Regional).  The same reasoning is behind the inclusion of the CLP 
condition, which was present in the two analyses possible (FSC-Regional and FSC-LCC-Regional). 
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fewer business model changes will be focused on expanded cabin configuration 
offerings.  Operational change will also include a moderate focus on a relatively large 
presence at secondary airports.  This is true for pure and non-pure FSCs and FSC-
Regional carriers, indicating that an external FSC imitation of regional carriers will 
attempt to operate in potentially less dense markets.  Table 9.3 presents the deep 
themes present in the unique FSC analyses. 
 
 
Table 9.3: FSC deep themes 
     
  Strong Moderate Weak 
     
Innovation Pure FSC Relative high 
percentage of ASKs 
to secondary airports 
Alliance membership Capacity lift taker 
from regional 
partners 
    Relative long stage 
lengths 
 Non-pure 
FSC 
No reoccurring 
elements1 
  
     
External 
imitation 
FSC-LCC Presence of an FFP Relative low 
percentage of feed 
share  
Dual cabin 
configuration 
     
 FSC-
Regional 
Dual cabin 
configuration 
Single cabin 
configuration 
Triple cabin 
configuration 
  Fleet non-
standardization 
Pure capacity lift 
provider 
Capacity lift provider 
with own-brand 
flying 
  Absence of an FFP Fleet standardization  
  GDS absence Relative high 
percentage of ASKs 
to secondary airports 
   No lounge access Presence of through-
fares  
    Removal of through-
fares 
     
 FSC-LCC-
Regional 
Removal of ticket 
restrictions 
Dual cabin 
configuration 
Single cabin 
configuration 
  Presence of an FFP Capacity lift provider  
  Non-standard fleet No lounge access 
    Removal of through-
fares 
     
Internal 
imitation 
FSC No reoccurring 
elements1 
  
     
1: No reoccurring elements signifies that there are no repeating elements present in the particular 
analysis, however there are individual elements; the author omitted these as they were regarded as 
non-parsimonious 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The deep themes among FSC analyses show that the pure FSC business model will 
continue to find its place within the industry in some shape.  For example, FSCs will 
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continue to utilize capacity production from regional partners, which introduce a 
lower cost production and flexibility.  As one FSC manager said: 
 
“That [regional carrier capacity production] is one way forward for 
Europe’s national carriers.  It gives increased flexibility which has 
been a big advantage for LCCs.  Many national carriers are too slow 
to react.  The national carrier would be able to cater to specific 
markets through regional carriers.  This is because national carriers 
know that they are not best in class when it comes to production, while 
LCCs are best in class in production” (FSC A2, 2008). 
 
The use of regional partners may allow an expanded presence in secondary airports, 
which aids in explaining the presence of this business model element among 
innovative pure FSCs.  The relationship between FSCs and regionals may accompany 
some FSCs as they transition closer to an LCC business model, indicating that LCCs 
may entertain the notion of utilizing regional-produced capacity.  Although there were 
no reoccurring deep themes within the non-pure FSC innovation analyses one 
interesting finding is the suggestion that non-pure FSCs should consider departing the 
major alliances in the industry.   
 
Although there are no recurring business model elements among the analysis results 
investigating innovation among non-pure FSCs some interesting findings are 
presented none the less.  This includes the result that non-pure FSCs may cancel their 
alliance membership71.  This behavior has been reiterated by United Airlines’ CEO, 
Glenn Tilton, that the carrier would consider leaving Star Alliance if necessary to 
consummate a merger with another carrier (Johnsson, 2008).  Such a statement is 
noteworthy as the US carrier is a founding member of the alliance, along with Air 
Canada, Lufthansa, SAS, and Thai.   
 
Table 9.4 shows the FSC results from the distributed survey regarding recent business 
model changes in early 2007.  These results highlight that Internet distribution among 
FSCs is a high focus area, however it was omitted from the Boolean analyses due to 
lack of data.  Onlining and fleet purity are the business model elements that receive 
the second-most level of focus.  Fleet purity is present within the Boolean results 
among FSC-Regional imitation.  This implies that if FSCs were to migrate into a 
regional carrier role they would likely adopt a single fleet. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
71 Additional results include a relatively high ASK percentage to secondary airports, removal of ticket 
restrictions, and the presence of through-fares. 
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Table 9.4: Recent FSC business model changes – survey results 
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1: 5-point Likert scale 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
FSC survey respondents were also asked to comment on the challenges they 
experienced related to initiating business model change within their carrier.  These 
statements may indicate challenges that accompany future business change among 
FSC strategic group members as well. 
 
“Getting the customer to accept change and conform behavior.” 
 
“Difficulties to change organizations or relationships with supply 
chain without interrupting production” 
 
“While implementing the electronic ticketing within our organization: 
initial lack of internal experience and expertise; discovering new 
training needs; staff resistance to the implementation of the new 
working procedures.” 
 
“Difficulties in obtaining supervisory board approval for strategic 
changes.  Trade unions’ opposition to changes.” 
 
“Change is the only constant in the airline business and time needs to 
be spent on ‘selling’ change internally.  This is the biggest challenge 
for any large organization.” 
 
“Main challenge is to follow the industry trend and knowing where 
and how to grow.” 
 
“Changing the inertia of current practice often needs great effort to 
change the mindset.  Convincing board of directors is also a big 
challenge.  Market situation changes so quick and accurate decision 
making is critical.  Powerful and leading edge simulation tools for 
quick decision are essential but difficult to keep improving them.” 
 
“Getting employees and other stakeholders (tour operators, agents, 
hotel, etc…) to accept the change process.” 
 
“Managing expectations of employees, customers, and partners.” 
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These statements from various FSCs all indicate that managing change, both 
internally and externally, is the greatest business model challenge that carriers face.  
This suggest that future change, whether grounded in innovation or imitation, 
necessitates FSC managers focus on promoting and advising employees, customers, 
and suppliers on the importance of business model change and the anticipated 
outcomes.   
 
9.2 LCC 
The broad LCC themes, shown in table 9.5, indicate that this strategic group will 
focus strongly on accessing traditional distribution channels, and less so on their fleet 
composition, amenities, and partnering with regional carriers.   
 
Table 9.5: LCC broad  themes   
   
Strong theme  
6 of 6 analyses 
Moderate theme  
5 of 6 analyses 
Weak theme 
4 of 6 analyses 
   
GDS presence through a 3rd 
party 
Fleet non-standardization Relative short stage lengths1 
 Removal of ticket restrictions Relative low percentage of 
ASK production by a 
regional partner 
 Presence of an FFP  
 Dual cabin configuration  
   
1: Less than 740 NM (the thresholds for the 4 of 6 analyses were identical) 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The broad themes complement those found among the deep themes.  These are 
presented in table 9.6.  This indicates that innovative LCCs, both pure and non-pure, 
will investigate the implementation of GDS distribution in their business model.  
However, with the caveat that it will bypass traditional GDS feed.  SITA, an air 
transport IT solution provider, developed a portal aimed at LCC inventory distribution 
that allows travel agents to book directly on airline websites.  This shift by GDSs is a 
response to the threat of travel-buyer fragmentation brought on by LCCs and the 
Internet, which forced GDSs to accommodate the LCC needs and requirements.  The 
GDSs Amadeus and Galileo were able to accommodate easyJet’s needs, which 
convinced the airline to sign agreements with the systems rather than develop their 
own travel management link.  As one LCC executive stated: 
 
“If you compare low-cost carriers with traditional carriers, they 
[FSCs] have always had their distribution in these systems, but they 
haven’t had control over their inventory.  If a carrier is present in a 
GDS then it’s the agency that owns the reservation.  The inventory is 
placed with a third-party and they have the control.  LCCs did the 
opposite and pulled their distribution in-house.  They [LCCs] know 
their customers and prefer a one-to-one or one-to-many relationship.  
This was done by going online or via the call-center.  A network 
carrier may only know the names of 10% of their customers while we 
know the names of maybe 90%.  GDSs experienced that a large 
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number of travel agents questioned why they can’t book with an LCC, 
and realized they [GDSs] only needed access to the LCC inventory.  
LCCs have been able to stipulate that they retain inventory control in 
their own reservation systems but they [GDSs] can have a link.  I think 
you’ll see more of this type of distribution because LCCs are able to 
keep the benefit of reservation ownership” (LCC A1, 2008).   
 
A GDS presence displays LCC inventory to the business traveler, which is often 
higher-yielding.  In addition, it has the added advantage that GDS distribution offers 
economies of scale.  Southwest Airlines, the LCC patriarch, recently added the 
Galileo GDS as a channel in an attempt to reach more corporate travelers, and the 
airline states that 10% of its revenue is from GDSs (Field, 2008).  Kevin Healy, senior 
vice-president of planning and marketing at AirTran, stated: 
 
“We changed the old model.  We have business class on every flight, 
and wanted to sell to higher-yielding business travelers…We didn’t 
really want to be in the GDSs, but we have to be realistic.  We could 
try to go down our own path or make a middle ground.  The Southwest 
business model makes simplicity important but their brand is known, 
and is very much in the minds of travelers, while we or someone like a 
JetBlue may not be known everywhere” (Field, 2008).   
 
While JetBlue has re-entered the GDS distribution channel in an attempt to access a 
larger proportion of business travelers, just as Kevin Healy of AirTran stated, the 
carrier has also created a virtual business class, one moderately broad-themed focus.  
This is an attempt to cater to the business segment and sell seats for a premium, and to 
increase its 20% business-traveler customer base (Ray, 2008).  This enhanced cabin 
configuration increases legroom at the front of the cabin, a slight emulation of a pure 
business class cabin without the added expenses.   
 
Within an LCC network future business models many will aim for greater integration 
via through-fares and onlining.  This will take place among innovating pure LCCs and 
internal imitation.  This adds complexity to a business model but it also allows 
carriers to capture a higher share of a market by expanding destination options for 
passengers.  This has been seen recently among European LCCs.  Danish LCC, 
Sterling, announced in spring 2008 its Sterling Connect service, which allows 
passengers from Aalborg and Gothenburg to online via Copenhagen to destinations 
beyond (Sterling, 2008), and recently stated that it wishes to expand its network by 
possibly cooperating with other carriers and operate flights between European points 
outside of Scandinavia (Jørgensen, 2008b).  Aer Lingus recently announced the 
combination of its web-only fares.  Previously the Irish carrier operated two distinct 
networks: Ireland to continental US or Europe and US to Ireland.  The carrier will 
now integrate the two and offer US originating passengers onward travel to 
continental Europe by way of Ireland (Airline Business, 2008a; Sobie, 2008a).  In 
addition, Clickair of Spain is planning to introduce a new combination fare that will 
take passengers between two European points via Barcelona (Sobie, 2008a).  Many 
LCCs have seen that passengers are conducting own-onlining and own-interlining.  
This entails that passengers purchase two point-to-point tickets, not necessarily with 
the same carrier, and transfer their own baggage and are at their risk in the case of a 
missed connection.  LCCs are aware of this and may use it as a gauge of how many 
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are interested in such a feature.  Dohop, an IT provider to the air transport industry, 
has developed the Dohop Connection Platform, which is aimed at offering LCCs an 
alternative interline and codeshare solution than the FSCs’.  This allows passengers to 
see their connection options on an LCC website.  Although the Boolean findings did 
not indicate that interlining will be a theme of future business model change, one LCC 
executive stated:  
 
“As the technology becomes more flexible you’ll see it [onlining and 
interlining].  I would call it virtual interlining.  One LCC retains its 
own reservation, another carrier its reservation and a solution is 
added on top so that it’s a virtual interline.  From a passenger 
perspective it’s one reservation.  It’s a technological hindrance that 
exists because it’s possible to interline today.  I can screen scrape one 
LCC website and screen scrape another LCC website and make my 
own connection, but the technology is lacking where the two carriers 
communicate.  For example, talk to each other to transfer baggage or 
if there is a schedule change.  It’s that technology that is missing.  
When the technology is available there will be virtual interlining” 
(LCC A1, 2008). 
 
Industry consultant, Doug Abbey, supports this statement by saying: 
 
“Southwest will eventually be flying outside the confines outside of the 
48 states, and that may beg other alliances going forward.  I just don’t 
think it’s safe to assume that the LCCs are going to operate 
independently exclusively going forward.  There’s plenty of room for 
cooperative types of agreements across disparate geographical areas” 
(Abbey, 2008). 
 
This interline feature has just been demonstrated by the tie-up between JetBlue and 
Aer Lingus (Sobie, 2008b).  This agreement will allow Aer Lingus passengers to 
purchase tickets on Jetblue for onward travel in the US, or JetBlue passengers to 
Dublin, and eventually continental Europe.  The carriers have announced that the door 
is open for additional partners, and JetBlue anticipates adding up to seven partners in 
2008.  US-based Frontier has stated that the carrier may entertain similar alliances (C. 
Walsh, 2008).  In addition, successful South American LCC, Gol, has entered into 
interline agreements with three FSCs, Continental, Delta, and Aerolineas Argentinas 
(Airline Business, 2007e).  While at the same time talks are taking place between 
Virgin Blue and Air Asia (Thomas, 2008). 
 
Analyses results also indicate that LCCs will experiment with the use of regional 
carriers as capacity producers, though to a limited degree.  One advantage of using a 
regional partner is that they often complement an LCC network with routes to less 
dense markets using smaller aircraft.  The LCC is free from purchasing and operating 
these aircraft.  Recent regional start-ups have been in connection with LCCs.  Frontier 
in the US founded Lynx, which is a subsidiary tasked with operating to markets close 
to their Denver, Colorado hub with less competition and provides connecting traffic 
(Airline Business, 2008b; Low-Fare and Regional Airlines, 2008b).  UK-based Flybe 
recently entered into a franchise agreement with Loganair of Scotland, the first of its 
kind among LCCs.  Loganair will assume the commercial risk for the flights under the 
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agreement and its allows the LCC to expand its presence in the Scottish market, while 
Loganair benefits from the established brand of Flybe (Low-Fare and Regional 
Airlines, 2008a).  The challenge facing LCCs that are in search of regional partners is 
often the oversight from an FSC partner.  The mainline partner may not be willing to 
allow a regional partner to operate for an LCC competitor, or the regional partner may 
not wish to offend an existing partner.  One LCC executive commented on this 
phenomenon: 
 
“It’s a definite possibility that cooperation between regional carriers 
and LCCs will happen.  The problem is that there are few independent 
regional carriers who do not cooperate with network carriers.  The 
network carriers have control over their regional partners and will 
stop their partnership if they [regional carriers] cooperate with an 
LCC competitor” (LCC A1, 2008). 
 
Table 9.6: LCC deep themes 
     
  Strong Moderate Weak 
     
Innovation Pure LCC GDS presence via 3rd 
party 
Fleet non-
standardization 
Presence of an FFP 
   GDS absence Absence of an FFP 
    Presence of onlining 
    Relative high 
percentage of ASKs 
to secondary airports 
    Relative short stage 
lengths 
    Presence of through-
fares  
     
     
 Non-pure 
LCC 
Lounge access for 
payment 
GDS presence via 3rd 
party 
Absence of an FFP 
    Absence of onlining 
    Absence of through-
fares  
     
External 
imitation 
LCC-FSC Presence of an FFP Relative low 
percentage of ASK 
production by a 
regional partner 
Dual class 
configuration 
     
 LCC-
Regional 
Fleet non-
standardization 
No reoccurring 
elements 
No reoccurring 
elements 
  Removal of ticket 
restrictions 
  
     
 LCC-FSC-
Regional 
Removal of ticket 
restrictions 
Dual cabin 
configuration 
Single cabin 
configuration 
   Presence of an FFP Capacity lift provider 
   Fleet non-
standardization 
No lounge access 
    Absence of through-
fares  
     
Internal LCC Relative short stage Relative low Capacity lift taker 
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imitation lengths percentage of ASK 
production by a 
regional partner 
    Presence of an FFP 
    Presence of through-
fares 
     
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
Table 9.7 shows the results from the survey inquiry about what areas LCCs have 
focused on when changing their business models in early 2007.  These findings show 
that LCCs, as a strategic group, have focused strongly on integrating their network 
through onlining.  These findings aid in verification of the Boolean findings, although 
the business model element was not indicated as strongly in the survey results.  
Interestingly, fleet standardization was reported as the second greatest business model 
change among survey respondents, while both a broad and deep theme focus on fleet 
non-standardization was reported by the Boolean findings.  The Boolean results may 
be grounded in the analyses showing that a less pure fleet is consistently a factor 
among successful LCCs.  Although beyond the scope of this research, it may be stated 
that a pure LCC fleet positions the carrier negatively in future fleet renewal 
negotiations.  The final element, which was not incorporated in the Boolean analyses, 
is the focus among LCCs on ancillary revenue.  This has allowed LCCs to transition 
beyond the concept of merely providing air travel but into retail.  Stressed by one 
LCC executive:  
 
“Add-ons [lounges, FFPs, catering selection, etc.] are elements that 
we will see more of in the future.  Flying supermarkets.  In the future 
passengers will experience an identical product as FSCs’ but at a 
lower cost and it will be purchased add-ons” (LCC A1, 2008). 
 
One add-on that some LCCs are weighing is the implementation of an FFP by some 
European LCCs.  Danish Sterling has recently announced that it will implement an 
FFP (Jørgensen, 2008a).  The intention is reward loyal customers with discounted 
travel or other purchases.   
 
Table 9.7: Recent LCC business model changes – survey results 
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The LCC survey respondents from 2007 are quoted regarding the challenges 
executives faced with implementing business model within the organization.  The 
findings are identical to the FSC group: current business model inertia and culture 
challenges change within the organizations.   
 
“Inertia of mother airline.  Opposition of unions.  Reconcile LCC 
model with prevailing practices and policies of mother airline.” 
 
“Since we merged two airlines with very different cultures, the biggest 
challenge has been to re-align cultures.” 
 
9.3 Regional 
The themes present in the regional strategic group are presented.  The broad themes 
focus on service, network, and operational aspects.  The strong broad theme is present 
in all regional carrier analyses, indicating that business model change will be strongly 
grounded in this element, while the moderate and weak themes will still weigh 
heavily in future change.  Table 9.8 lists the business model elements present in the 
broad themes. 
 
Table 9.8: Regional broad  themes 
   
Strong theme  
6 of 6 analyses 
Moderate theme  
5 of 6 analyses 
Weak theme 
4 of 6 analyses 
   
Single class configuration Capacity lift provider Dual cabin configuration 
 Capacity lift provider with own-
brand flying 
Fleet non-standardization 
 Absence of through-fares  Fleet standardization 
  No lounge access 
  Presence of ticket 
restrictions 
   
Source: Author’s own creation   
 
The strong broad themes indicate that a focus on the service offering by regional 
carriers will dominate future business model change.  This focus will be on a single 
class configuration, which brings simplicity to a regional carrier’s business model, 
both operationally and within back-office functions.  Moderate themes are tied to 
network elements and include a focus on offering capacity for larger carriers, both 
FSC and LCC.  As Mr. Cohen (2008), of the RAA, stated: 
 
“Lynx [a regional carrier] is part of Frontier [an LCC]. Cape Air [a 
regional carrier], one of our independent, small turbo-prop operators, 
is growing increasingly its partnership with JetBlue [an LCC].  So, 
there is no one-size-fits-all.  You get virtually every variety of 
relationship you can possibly imagine.”  
 
This statement shows that regional carriers’ business model will focus on producing 
capacity for larger carriers, often due to their lower cost base.  However, this 
production may be the sole activity of a regional carrier, as in the case of Lynx, or it 
may be a share of the regional carrier’s overall business.  This is the case of US-based 
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regional carrier, ExpressJet, which produces some capacity for Continental and Delta, 
as Continental Express and Delta Connection respectively, while maintaining and 
building its own brand at the same time.  This business model has the advantages that 
it is not entirely reliant upon the whims of the contracting carrier.  As the CEO of a 
regional carrier said: 
 
“A regional carrier’s role in the industry varies depending on their 
stage of development.  Many started initially as pure capacity 
providers, often during the period of regulation, however during a 
downturn it is often the contracted regional carriers that are pushed 
out so it is necessary for them [regional carriers] to own their own 
customers.  It is important to be capable of more than merely provide 
capacity or operate one’s own routes.  One should be able to operate a 
little bit of everything” (Regional A1, 2008). 
 
In addition to the regional carrier group’s focus on capacity lift production the group 
will ground future change in network simplicity through an absence of through-fares.  
This may challenge passengers to travel onwards in a regional carrier’s network, 
however it offers simplicity.  The final category of themes among regional carriers 
includes a weak focus on a dual cabin configuration, ticket restrictions, and no lounge 
access, while operationally regional carriers will elect to either standardize or 
diversify their fleet.  This contradictory, operational theme may stem from the close 
relationship regional carriers have with contracting, mainline carriers, as fleet 
decisions and restrictions are often dictated by the larger partner. 
 
The deep themes found in the regional analyses are presented in table 9.9.  The results 
show that there future business model change among regional carriers will be spread 
among all business model element headings; network, service, distribution, and 
operational elements are all represented in future models.  There will be varying 
degrees of focus on cabin configuration, especially among innovative non-pure 
regionals and models grown out of imitative behavior of FSC-Regional and FSC-
LCC-Regional carriers.  One regional carrier has found a distinctive balance; the CEO 
says: 
 
“We have focused on providing a near single-class of service which 
has proven to be beneficial, especially when competing with low-cost 
carriers.  We do provide a business class, however all our passengers 
receive something complimentary” (Regional A1, 2008). 
 
Within the network, future regional business models will be focused on producing 
capacity for other carriers, with some continuing to develop their own regional carrier 
brand.  Non-pure regionals, FSC-Regionals, and FSC-LCC-Regionals will have a 
focus on pure capacity production, while solely FSC-Regionals may also focus on 
capacity production for others and themselves.  There is no indication that regionals 
will operate as pure stand-alone operators with no FSC or LCC affiliation.  As Roger 
Cohen (2008) stated: 
 
“All [regional carriers] are affiliated in some regard, but some do 
their own ticketing in the end, like Cape Air, Great Lakes, ExpressJet.  
It is own branded flying but it [the regional carrier] still flies a 
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significant amount for Continental and other carriers.  It’s [purely 
own branded flying-no affiliation] been tried before.  Independence Air 
was formerly Atlantic Coast and they are no longer in existence.  The 
jury is out on the viability of it [purely own branded flying-no 
affiliation], but there is no magic way it can’t work.  Yeah, that [purely 
own branded flying-no affiliation] we haven’t seen yet.  Two new 
regional carriers came on board recently in 2007.  Lynx and Compass 
but both are owned and offshoots of existing carriers.” 
 
The CEO of the interviewed regional carrier acknowledged the regional business 
model and its future affiliation with larger carriers is not limited to the local FSC; 
regional carriers will be creative in creating future partnerships: 
 
“New opportunities are opening up in the future related to regional 
carriers with Open-Skies and providing feed for various network 
carriers…I envision regional carriers providing capacity for LCCs in 
the future, certainly those that have a ‘network’ carrier model.  We 
will cooperate with anyone who wants to work with us.  However, most 
of their IT platforms do not enable interlining today” (Regional A1, 
2008). 
 
Operationally, there is a strong to moderate focus on fleet non-standardization among 
many possible future business model changes.  These findings are often combined 
with a carrier focusing solely on pure capacity production.  This may indicate that 
scope clauses among contracting carriers affect fleet standardization indexes among 
regional carriers (Airline Business, 2002).  However, there is an indication that 
regional carriers are maintaining a watchful eye on the possibility of transitioning to 
larger aircraft.  For capacity providers this may be an indication that regional carriers 
are prepared to upscale their fleet as scope clause restrictions at contracting carriers 
are relaxed (Abbey, 2008), while for regionals with own-branded operations it is a 
signal that as market power expands in the future carriers may be prepared to expand 
to larger equipment.  Chuck Evans, of Bombardier Aerospace, stressed that yields, 
cost, and load factors are driving regionals to acquire larger aircraft (Abbey, 2008).  
This move is reflected in orders by US regionals, SkyWest and Republic, for next 
generation regional jets with capacity for up to nearly 90 passengers (Low-Fare and 
Regional Airlines, 2008c; Low-Fare and Regional Airlines, 2008d).  As the Regional 
Airline Association representative and the CEO of a regional carrier declared: 
 
“The aircraft are getting larger, and larger regional jets and larger 
turbo jets are replacing smaller regional jets and smaller turbo props.  
Increasing stage lengths, which have doubled in the span of about 5 
years” (R. Cohen, 2008). 
 
“We would like to, and anticipate, migrating to a larger aircraft when 
the market is prepared for it.  We like to operate with adequate 
frequencies where ever possible [read: high]” (Regional A1, 2008). 
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Table 9.9: Regional deep themes 
     
  Strong Moderate Weak 
     
Innovation Pure 
Regional 
Absence of through-
fares  
No reoccurring 
elements 
No reoccurring 
elements 
     
 Non-pure 
Regional 
Capacity lift 
provider 
Dual cabin 
configuration 
Presence of ticket 
restrictions 
   Fleet non-
standardization 
Presence of through-
fares  
     
External 
imitation 
Regional-
LCC 
Fleet non-
standardization 
No reoccurring 
elements 
No reoccurring 
elements 
  Absence of ticket 
restrictions 
  
     
 Regional-
FSC 
Dual cabin 
configuration 
Single cabin 
configuration 
Triple cabin 
configuration 
  Fleet non-
standardization 
Capacity lift 
provider 
Capacity lift 
provider with own-
brand flying 
   Absence of an FFP Fleet standardization 
   GDS absence Relative high 
percentage of ASKs 
to secondary airports 
   No lounge access Presence of through-
fares  
    Absence of through-
fares  
     
 Regional-
FSC-LCC 
Absence of ticket 
restrictions 
Dual cabin 
configuration 
Single cabin 
configuration 
   Presence of an FFP Capacity lift 
provider 
   Fleet non-
standardization 
No lounge access 
    Absence of through-
fares  
     
Internal 
imitation 
Regional No reoccurring 
elements1 
  
     
     
     
Source: Author’s own creation 
1: No reoccurring elements signifies that there are no repeating elements present in the particular 
analysis, however there are individual elements; the researcher omitted these as they were regarded as 
non-parsimonious  
 
The final validating link presented, are the survey results for the regional respondents 
from the distributed survey (see Chapter 7).  These results indicate that there is a 
strong focus among regional carriers on Internet distribution, which is a business 
model element inquired about in the survey but not incorporated in the two analyses72 
due to lack of data.  The second greatest focus on recent business model changes was 
                                                 
72 Chapters 6 and 8 
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in fleet purity, which is a weak73, broad focus within the entire regional group.  The 
survey indicates that regional carriers had implemented the least amount of change in 
cabin configuration, which is contradictory to the MVQCA findings.  These results 
indicate that the strongest focus in the future will be on a single cabin configuration.  
This variation may be attributed to survey respondents.  Ticket restrictions as an 
element is ranked fourth in the survey and the Boolean findings show that there will 
be a weak, broad focus on this particular business model element, which can be 
interpreted to be comparable with the Boolean findings. 
 
Table 9.10: Recent regional business model changes – survey results 
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The following quotes are extracted from the regional carrier survey respondents from 
the 2007 distributed survey. 
 
“Paradigm shift; unifying the thought.” 
 
“High flexibility demands to apply an aggressive ‘low-cost’ model on 
one route (with high competition) and a classical high-fare on 
monopoly routes.  Lack of revenue management systems.  Lack of 
specialists with profound knowledge of low-cost model.  Adaptation to 
market differences, for example high Internet sales in Western Europe 
and practically no Internet sales in C.I.S./Middle East markets.” 
 
“Training requirements to meet changes.  Motivation to change.  If 
correctly used in an open and people-oriented management style 
implementation of change is successful.” 
 
“Employee resistance.” 
 
These statements mirror those by the two other strategic groups found in the industry.  
Business model change within regional carriers is challenged by stakeholder 
resistance, both internally and externally.  However, one carrier did indicate that the 
lack of proper technological solutions challenged change, although the majority of 
carriers indicate stakeholder resistance was the primary challenge whether or not built 
on technological advances.  In addition, the same regional carrier stated that a lack of 
                                                 
73 Four out of six analyses 
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skilled personnel was a challenge, which is a growing threat within the industry 
(Arnoult, 2007b; Karlsson, 2007). 
 
9.4 Conclusion 
This chapter nearly completes the cycle presented in figure 2.2 by integrating primary 
and secondary data in an attempt to validate the Boolean findings in Chapter 8.  The 
remaining step is to complete the rotation by questioning the underling philosophy of 
science, which will be done in the following chapter.  Although it is not feasible to 
prove or disprove future events before they happen the researcher has questioned 
members of various strategic groups and trade organizations about their own 
interpretations of the findings and future.  Many statements suggest that the Boolean 
findings contain a level of validity and credibility.  This is supported by the 
statements of airline executives and examples from various events throughout the 
industry.  This supports the researcher in concluding that the Boolean findings are 
valid and applicable when investigating future developments in the industry.   
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10. Conclusion 
- The busiest route in the world measured in operations is Barcelona to Madrid with 
971 per week; nearly six flights per hour, 24 hours a day - 
 
 
Industry change may be grounded in various phenomena.  Studies suggest that 
technological advancements may form the basis of industry evolution (Christensen et 
al., 2004) while others indicate that change may be based on industry asset and 
activity developments (McGahan, 2004a).  However, researchers are focusing 
increasingly on advancements in business model change as a basis for industry change 
(H. W. Chesbrough, 2006; Markides, 2006).  One explanation for this increased focus 
may be that business model change is applicable to all firms and industries, 
manufacturing and service alike.  This contrasts with research in industrial change in 
manufacturing industries which is often grounded in technological evolution 
(Christensen et al., 2004), with results that are often extrapolated to other industries.  
Business model research is more advantageous because of its wide applicability 
across both service and manufacturing industries.   
 
The airline industry exemplifies business model evolution, which, although heavily 
dependent on technology, is often unable to patent or protect intellectual property.  
Airlines offer a service which is often regarded as highly commoditized which 
exposes management to demanding challenges (O'Conner, 2001).  In an industry 
where technology plays a secondary role and business practices may be unique for 
only brief moments the business model is often the airline managers’ only opportunity 
to achieve differentiation.  However short-lived that may be.  This creates intense 
focus on an airline’s business model and management is often challenged to 
constantly implement business model changes, which in turn leads to an evolutionary 
process in the industry.  This dissertation investigated the type of business model 
change present in the industry and incorporated this knowledge in developing 
scenarios for future business models.  In other words, it projects industry evolution 
based on firm behavior.  The research questions that are addressed are: 
1. How does the variation of airline business models affect profit? 
2. Why is there variation in airline business models? 
3. What future airline business models can be proposed? 
 
The research stream was segmented into three themes.  The first theme investigated 
industry heterogeneity in the industry and its impact on airline performance, with the 
goal of confirming the presence of business model variation.  The second theme 
researched the explanation for such variation by questioning airline executives about 
their business model changes, which were grounded in innovation and imitation.  The 
final theme utilized the principles of innovation and imitation to propose future airline 
business models using Boolean algebra.  The findings from the final theme support 
the continuing existence of firm heterogeneity in the industry.  As airlines are prone to 
imitate competitors the Boolean results suggest business models that are comprised of 
successful combinations of elements from two or more strategic group business 
models; in other words, winning hybrids.  These concepts and their relationships are 
shown in figure 10.1.   
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Figure 10.1: Research project stream 
 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
The first theme researches the existence of the lack of homogeneity among airlines in 
the industry and how this impacts operating margins, which was investigated at both 
the strategic group and industry levels.  The results show that business model 
variation is evident and that there is a positive correlation between the two factors at 
both levels of measurement.  Although, the analysis of the full-service carrier group 
showed a weak, negative relationship between business model variation and airline 
performance; the researcher is hesitant to advocate such findings, and rather suggests 
that additional research be conducted on this particular group.  This wavering is based 
on the results from the two other groups, and the industry-level analysis, which 
indicate otherwise.  The measured spread among carriers in the three strategic groups 
varied.  Full-service and regional carriers showed limited heterogeneity compared to 
the low-cost carrier group.  The full-service carrier’s limited spread is most likely a 
reflection of the group’s historical role as an infrastructure provider regulated at the 
international level, and the subsequent struggle by some carriers to transition to a 
viable commercial entity.  On the other hand, the small variation seen among regional 
carriers is most likely a result of the group’s limited scope in the industry.  This group 
has historically often been mandated to operate as a capacity production platform for 
full-service carriers and this constrains the ability for carriers in this group to bring 
variation into the business model as it must often complement a larger partner’s 
business model.  The low-cost group, on the other hand, displayed a large business 
model spread, which may be a testament to the lack of historical constraints in this 
group and the freedom this brings. 
 
Industry heterogeneity is grounded in both innovation and imitation of business 
models.  A survey distributed to airline executives worldwide and analyzed using 
statistical methods confirm the presence of these two phenomena.  However, it is not 
all carriers that utilize these methods equally.  Results show that carriers that deviate 
from their strategic group’s traditional business model are more imitative of other 
groups than those that follow the model closely, and that this behavior is only 
intensified by rivalry, both among peers within the same strategic group and between 
other strategic groups.  Findings also show that carriers that adhere to the traditional 
business model tend to be more imitative of their peers within their own strategic 
group.  In addition, if there is a perception of high external rivalry among strategic 
groups, carriers that closely follow their group’s traditional business model are more 
likely to imitate internally.  However, it is not possible to distinguish whether this 
imitation is of other peers that adhere to the traditional model, or peers in the same 
strategic group though with a low level of adherence to the traditional model.  Such a 
distinction may imply that heterogeneity is strengthened or weakened; further 
research may therefore be beneficial.  Innovation, on the other hand, has been shown 
Business model 
heterogeneity exists 
Heterogeneity is 
grounded in innovation 
and imitation 
Innovation and imitation 
form basis for future 
business models 
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to be present among all carriers, both those that follow their group’s business model 
closely and those that deviate from tradition. 
 
The findings indicate that airlines rely on both innovation and imitation when 
attempting to change their business models, which form the basis for the third 
analysis.  Through application of the multi-value qualitative comparative approach it 
is possible to indicate which combination of business model elements are present in 
successful carriers, which specify where innovative attention should be focused in the 
future.  However, firm advantages from innovation may be short-lived due to the 
mimetic behavior that airlines display.  The same approach allowed the researcher to 
study and propose scenarios for future business models based on imitative traits.  
Although the results are too abundant to list all in this chapter some highlights are 
presented in table 10.1.  Please refer to Chapter 8 for detailed results. 
 
Table 10.1: Excerpts of future business models 
   
Full-service Low-cost Regional 
   
No alliance membership and 
use of regional partners 
GDS presence through a 3rd 
party and online transfers 
Absence of through-fares and 
online transfers 
Presence of through-fares and 
removal of ticket restrictions 
No GDS presence and a non-
standard fleet and no frequent 
flyer program 
Capacity lift provider with own 
branded flying 
Focus on secondary airports 
and alliance membership 
Lounge access for payment and 
no interline transfers 
Single cabin configuration and 
a standardized fleet 
   
*: Only highlights from results; see Chapter 8 for detailed findings 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
This behavior implies that the strategic distance between strategic groups in the 
industry is diminishing and that the industry may soon experience a winning hybrid 
based on the successful characteristics copied from competing strategic groups.  
Biologist Edward Wilson discusses the implication of imitative behavior on the 
human race and concludes that in the future humans will all be of the same racial mix, 
however the variety of human beings will increase (Harford, 2006).  This implies that 
future airlines and their business models may all be cut from the same cloth due to 
imitation, however the industry will continue to display variation.  Said another way, 
some future carriers may strive to be low-cost but differentiation will continue to 
flourish.  This is a reinforcement of industry heterogeneity, implied by the return 
arrow from the final analyses and its link to the first, as shown in figure 10.1.  The 
following section will address the chosen methodology and theories. 
 
10.1 Methodological and theoretical reflections 
This research project is grounded in the researcher’s interpretive paradigm and the 
perspective of the research problem as a closed system.  This perspective allowed the 
researcher to interpret the research problem and its complementing elements by 
incorporating the relationships between business model elements.  This paradigm 
complemented the action research method utilized by the researcher.  The caveat of 
this approach is the involvement of the study group, which is allowed to aid in 
guiding the research, much like a consultant-client relationship.  It allowed the 
researcher to work in collaboration with the users of the knowledge, namely SAS 
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Danmark.  The systems approach complemented the theoretical foundation by 
regarding the research problem in a similar, entwined perspective.  This approach 
recognizes that a system, or business model, is comprised of various elements whose 
combinations may have a positive, negative, or neutral impact.  The researcher may 
have been able to incorporate one of the other two approaches (Arbnor & Bjerke, 
1996), however the research stream would have been conducted in a different manner.  
An analytical approach would have failed to capture the relations between the 
business model elements, and their respective contributions would not have 
incorporated the impact on each other.  Rather, the approach would have investigated 
each individual element’s impact on carrier performance.  An actors approach may 
have been appropriate, especially with the project’s grounding in the interpretive 
paradigm, however such an approach may not have been able to capture the intricate 
combinations present in business models.  It is the relations between business model 
elements that are stressed in the literature and the chosen approach was the one that 
best captured these relationships.  This approach may have been more appropriate 
with a method other than the multi-value qualitative comparative approach. 
 
The theories incorporated in this research include business models, strategic groups, 
imitation, and innovation.  The business model framework leans heavily against 
strategy, however it differentiates itself by focusing on value-creating activities, while 
strategy is primarily concerned with positioning (Magretta, 2002).  The research could 
potentially be carried out using strategic theory, although results may have been 
diluted due to strategy’s broad-reaching grasp.  An example of such a theory may 
have included the resource based view (Wernerfelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1995; 
Wernerfelt, 1997).  The theory of strategic groups was incorporated to integrate 
structure into the research.  Groups were populated according to carriers with similar 
business models.  One critique of the project may include the researcher’s failure to 
create groups using industry data and the creation of taxonomy; rather, literature was 
used to construct the project’s strategic groups.  However, the research merely utilizes 
strategic groups as a tool and it is not a primary aim of the research to investigate such 
a framework.  This research postulates that airline industry change is primarily 
grounded in business model imitation and innovation rather than technological 
advances.  The researcher recognizes that advancements in technology74 do, and will 
continue to do so in the future, advance airline industry change, however the time 
frame for appearance is stretched and the impact less pronounced than business model 
initiatives75.  Historical, radical technological advances in the industry had a greater 
impact on the industry than today’s incremental achievements.   
 
Measurement of imitation of business models is challenged due to variation of 
perceptions and metrics.  While product imitation may be easier to distinguish it is 
important to attempt to capture business model imitation.  The same holds true for 
innovation.  Measurement of this feature is difficult as some may interpret innovation 
as an imitation, and vice versa.  This research project proposes new business models 
based on innovation already present within business models.  This limitation of the 
application of the theory is presented and may be an issue for future research.  For 
example, innovation grounded in other industries or creative solutions is not captured 
                                                 
74 The author may include such technological advances as the introduction of regional jets or 
continuing research on alternative fuels. 
75 Regulatory changes may have the greatest impact on industry change in the future, however changes 
in regulations often precede and contribute to business model change. 
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in this research.  Complementing theories that may have contributed to the research 
include activity sets (McGahan, 2004a) which studies industry change based on the 
activities present, similar to a business model, but at a macro, industry perspective.  
This theory may have been utilized instead of a business model framework, however 
the analyses at the firm level (Chapters 7 and 8) may not have been possible. 
 
The methods utilized in this report include the standard statistical tools of correlation, 
regression, and ANOVA, as well as, an application of a relatively new method, multi-
value qualitative comparative approach (MVQCA), in the realm of strategic 
management.  MVQCA allowed the researcher to investigate the combinations of 
business model elements that will appear at some point in the future in the airline 
industry grounded in innovation and imitation.  Alternative methods could have been 
utilized, such as scenario planning, a Delphi study, which would have complemented 
the actor’s approach, or backcasting; however the researcher wished to incorporate a 
quantitative rigor in the study, while attempting to maintain a qualitative 
interpretation, as well as, match the business model framework.  Application of 
MVQCA in the realm of business model studies and future studies has not been 
attempted in previous research, and it has shown potential in proposing alternative 
future scenarios.  The researcher’s primary critique is the method’s failure to 
incorporate many, if not all, of the business model elements.  Many MVQCA results 
produce parsimonious findings with one or two business model elements, which is 
interpreted to indicate that such a parsimonious business model ensures success.  For 
example, many results do not indicate a fleet standardization index, implying that 
aircraft are not necessary in an airline business model.  An incorporation of more 
thresholds in the MVQCA analyses may have enabled for the inclusion of more 
business model elements, however these results may not have been parsimonious and 
rather superficial.  This is a contradicting dilemma present in the method.  The use of 
meta-variables may also be a solution, however the challenge of reverse-engineering 
such results may prove challenging.  The method was applied to the strategic groups 
grounded in the theories of innovation and imitation.  Its application in an innovative 
theme may not have been possible if it had been shown that, for example, pure 
carriers imitate other pure carriers in their own group.  This would have conflicted 
with the method in which the researcher applied MVQCA to propose innovation 
solutions.  Therefore, additional investigations into the application of the method and 
these theories would be beneficial.  Overall, the MVQCA method is an initial first 
step in proposing the shape of the future airline industry, and the researcher is 
comfortable recommending continued research with the method in this realm.    
 
A researcher and his or her paradigm are at risk at being thrown into disarray at the 
conclusion of a research project.  Findings may be so profound that a paradigm shift 
occurs.  This research project, however, has failed to produce such esoteric results that 
have shifted the researcher’s core interpretation of the subject.  Rather, the outcome of 
this research has provided evidence for what the researcher, and many in the industry, 
intuitively understand to be taking place in the airline industry.  One may say that the 
results strengthen the chosen paradigm and present empirical evidence which supports 
this notion, however no shift has taken place.   
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10.2 Limitations 
This research project investigates the scheduled passenger airline industry within a 
closed systems model perspective, and attempts to propose future business models.  It 
fails though in incorporating external environmental events.  These events are not 
incorporated due to their uncertainty and challenge in integrating such externalities in 
the applied methods, which would be better addressed using other methods, such as 
scenario planning or Delphi study methods.  Examples of these include regulatory 
changes, such as the recent Open Sky agreement (ATW, 2008a), the environmental 
impact of aviation and possible constraints (ATW, 2007a; ATW, 2008b), or the 
impact of oil prices.   
 
10.3 Managerial implications 
Although the researcher strives to adhere to academic rigor this project was 
constructed with airline practitioners in mind.  These results show the industry is 
dynamic and managers rarely have an opportunity to relax.  Findings from each of the 
three themes have implications for management. 
 
Differentiation of a carrier and its position as a secondary firm in the strategic group 
shows that this has a negative affect on operating margins.  In other words, carriers 
that strive for differentiation incur a cost penalty which is not entirely compensated 
through higher revenues.  This is not to imply that carriers attempting differentiation 
will post negative margins, merely that managers can expect their margins to be lower 
than their peers that are leading firms in the strategic group.  However, a transgression 
to a non-pure carrier may be appropriate if carrier survival is endangered at the 
present position.   
 
The analyses of executive responses show that innovation and imitation is present in 
the industry, and this challenges managers to maintain a competitive lead as any good 
idea is eventually mimicked.  This behavior implies that constant evolution of a 
carrier’s business model is necessary, and that once an innovation is implemented 
managers should be preparing their next business model change.  An innovation, 
especially a good one, is not free from the peering eyes of competitors.  Such 
behavior may lead non-threatening, distant competitors to minimize the competitive 
distance, and become potential rivals.  However, one source of competitive advantage 
may be the entanglement of business model elements and the impact that an 
innovation or imitation may have throughout.  If management is able to entwine an 
innovation throughout the entire business model it may protect the carrier from 
imitative advances. 
 
The overall results from this research aid management by proposing which business 
model elements are deserving of innovative or imitative attention.  The results provide 
a potential map that inspires management’s future direction.  However, some airlines 
may opt to maintain their current business model, and this project aids these carriers 
as well by providing a glimpse into the possible future industry construct of their 
partners and competitors.  In other words, a proposal for the future industry makeup is 
presented which aids in management’s overall understanding of the industry.   
 
  226
10.4 Areas for future research   
The researcher hopes that this research has extended the boundary of understanding 
within the field of business models, industry change, and the airline industry.  Some 
areas that may benefit from additional research include increased analyses of business 
models using Boolean methods, longitudinal studies, and weighting of business model 
elements.  One example includes the incorporation of more variables or creation of 
meta-variables that integrate a number of variables.  The challenge is the deciphering 
of Boolean results using such techniques.  This research has investigated possible 
future business models grounded on business models that create the greatest operating 
margins.  However, alternative analyses may include investigating those business 
model combinations that result in the lowest cost per available seat kilometer, the 
highest passenger satisfaction, or expanding the theoretical framework to include 
strategic and financial elements to measure net profit.  In addition, the researcher 
would like to expand this research to investigate geographical or operational 
differences.  For example, results may show that North American low-cost carriers are 
successful with an entirely different business model combination than their European 
counterparts.  In addition, an expansion of the industry may be beneficial.  The charter 
industry was not integrated in this research, which is an option in future analyses.  
Operational analyses may include investigating how a long-haul business model has 
characteristics that distinguish it from short-haul, which may aid in research 
understanding of the combination of low-cost and long-haul operations.  The enticing 
aspect of the MVQCA method is its applicability to a range of topics. 
 
This study used one year, 2006, as a base year, which influences the research and 
findings by relying on a snapshot of the industry.  The research would be strengthened 
by incorporating longitudinal analyses, as the industry is highly cyclical.  However, 
the challenge may be to incorporate such a study with the theoretical underpinnings of 
innovation and imitation and Boolean methods.  It may be appropriate to conduct time 
series analyses on each strategic group to identify which combination of business 
model elements over several years has lead to financial success.  One alternative may 
be to conduct an annual Boolean analyses across a number of years on each strategic 
group, and then combining these annual results into one Boolean analysis for each 
groups.  In effect, a meta-minimization analysis of a number of years.   
 
The correlation analyses were controlled for size, however if greater market analyses 
were possible more controls could be introduced.  A control for market location 
would benefit the analyses by investigating the effects of market growth in various 
regions that may influence the results.  A measure of competitiveness may be 
possible, such as an average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index comprised of the routes 
flown by each carrier.  Passanger data may provide the necessary, and can possibly be 
obtainabled from APG (Seabury Airline Planning Group, 2008).  Control of 
operational aspects may have provided added understanding, such as fuel exposure.  
However, data collection may be hampered by the lack of airline reporting.   
 
The results discovered during the course of this research were an inspiration for 
potential additional theoretical studies.  While findings indicate that imitation is 
prolific in the industry the survey failed to delve deeper in this phenomenon to 
discover the justification for such behavior.  The researcher would like to investigate 
whether imitation in the airline industry is an attempt to reduce rivalry, a result of 
information gaps, or a combination of both, and whether some strategic groups or 
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group members imitate for differing reasons.  In addition, internal imitation by pure 
carriers was indiscernible whether it was of other pure carriers or non-pure carriers.  
This knowledge may have implications for future industry composition.  The 
researcher also suggests additional research in mobility barriers and their prevalence 
in the industry.  Discussions with airline managers hint to the existence of 
asymmetrical mobility barriers, with some industry participants stating low-cost 
carriers may face lower mobility barriers than full-service carriers.  Such a declaration 
is grounded in the belief that low-cost mobility often entails an increase in product 
offerings and the accompanying expenses, while full-service mobility is frequently 
associated with a simplification of product offering and cost reduction.  This implies 
that low-cost carriers wish to improve customer experience with added expense, while 
full-service carriers may degrade customer experience while striving for efficiency, 
which may lead to asymmetrical mobility barriers; it may be easier to spend money 
than to save money. 
 
These topics include an expansion beyond the airline industry.  The airline industry 
has witnessed an influx of low cost and differentiated firms, which is similar in a 
number of industries.  This analytical method can be extended to such industries as 
retail, banking, or computer software.  These industries are all witnessing new, price-
leading business models enter the industries, expand the markets, and post impressive 
results.  Eventually, imitation proliferates and hybrid business models appear.  
MVQCA allows one to research the developments that may take place and propose 
potentially new constructs in the industries.   
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Appendix I: Freedom rights 
 
The airline industry is supported by the fundamental, underlying agreements that 
allow airlines to carry passengers between countries.  Below you will find an 
explanation of the industry’s nine freedom rights.  This information is adopted from 
the website http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/Data/freedoms.htm.  
 
• First freedom: The right to fly across the territory of a foreign country. without 
landing (e.g. United Airlines flies from the United States over Ireland en route 
to Germany). 
• Second freedom: The right to land in a foreign country for technical or non-
traffic purposes, such as for re-fueling or maintenance. (e.g. American Airlines 
flies from the United States and lands to refuel in Ireland enroute to Germany). 
• Third freedom: The right to deplane traffic in a foreign country that was 
enplaned in the home country of the carrier. (e.g. United Airlines carries 
passengers from the United States to France ). 
• Fourth freedom: The right to enplane traffic in the foreign country that is 
bound for the home country of the carrier. (e.g. American Airlines carries 
passengers from the United Kingdom to the United States). 
• Fifth freedom: The right to enplane traffic at one foreign point and deplane it 
in another foreign point as part of continuous operation also serving the 
airline's homeland (e.g. Northwest Airlines has "fifth freedom" rights to carry 
traffic between Tokyo and Hong Kong, on services which stop at Tokyo en 
route between Los Angeles and Hong Kong). 
• Sixth freedom: This term is applied to Fifth Freedom traffic carried from a 
point of origin in one foreign country to a point of destination in another 
foreign country via the home country of the airline. (e.g. KLM, carries sixth-
freedom traffic between New York and Cairo, carrying passengers traveling 
from New York to Amsterdam and on to Cairo). 
• Seventh freedom: This term is applied to an airline's operating turn around 
service and carrying traffic between points in two foreign countries without 
serving its home country (e.g., Lufthansa operates between New York and 
Mexico City without serving Germany). 
• Eight freedom: This term is used to refer to "consecutive or fill-up" cabotage 
in which an airline picks up traffic at one point in a foreign country and 
deplanes it at another point in that same foreign country as part of a service 
from the home country of the airline (e.g., Singapore Airlines enplanes traffic 
at Wellington and deplanes it in Aukland as part of its service between New 
Zealand and Singapore). 
• Ninth freedom: This term is used to refer to "pure" cabotage in which an 
airline of one country operates flights and carries traffic solely between two 
points in a foreign country (e.g., Air France operates flights between Berlin 
and Frankfurt). 
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Appendix II: Glossary 
 
ANOVA Analysis of variance; method to measure for significant 
differences between groups 
ASM; ASK Available seat mile/kilometer; total number of seats 
available on scheduled flights multiplied by the number of 
kilometers (or miles) seats were flown 
ATA Air Transport Association; trade organization of North 
American airlines; performs lobbying on behalf of 
member to US legislative authorities 
Average daily utilization Average number of block hours an aircraft flies per day; 
used to determine average asset utilization 
Block hour Time aircraft moves under own power to parking brake is 
set; used to calculate asset utilization 
CASM; CASK Cost per available seat mile/kilometer; the cost of moving 
one seat, one kilometer (or mile); measurement of unit 
cost in the airline industry 
CLP Capacity lift provider; a regional carrier whose primary 
function is to produce capacity for a partner, often an FSC  
CLT Capacity lift taker; often an FSC, sometimes an LCC, that 
uses a regional carrier to produce capacity on designated 
routes; the regional carrier is a CLP for the CLT 
Codeshare Agreement between two or more airlines that allow each 
other to use their own flight codes or share a common 
code on flights 
Competitive cusp The balance between differentiation and legitimacy; firms 
can differentiate themselves too much that they are not 
deemed legitimate  
Condition The independent variable that is used to study a 
phenomenon using Boolean methods 
Conditions Independent variables used in QCA, MVQCA, or fs/QCA 
analyses 
Conjunction Used in QCA, fs/QCA, and MVQCA to describe two or 
more conditions that combine to produced a designated 
outcome; referred to as logical AND; designated by a 
multiplication symbol (x or *) in notation, which is often 
implied and not written 
Control variable Used to extract the variance it explains from each of the 
two initial variables which are correlated 
Dependent variable Output of a function; the observed to change in response 
to the independent variables 
Disjunction Used in QCA, fs/QCA, and MVQCA to describe two or 
more conditions that do not combine to produced a 
designated outcome; referred to as logical OR; designated 
by an addition symbol (+) in notation, which is always 
written 
ELFAA European Low Fares Airline Association; trade 
organization of European low-cost carriers; identifies 
policy areas affecting the low-fares industry group, 
lobbies on behalf of regulatory issues, promotes the 
common interest of its members 
Feed (passenger) Passengers that are often flown to an airport to transfer 
onto another flight by the same airline or a partner airline; 
may be flown by a regional partner or alliance partner 
FFP Frequent flyer program; program used by airlines to 
reward loyal passengers 
fs/QCA Fuzzy set qualitative comparative approach; a 
development of QCA that allows for more refined 
 IV 
measurement of conditions 
FSC Full-service carrier; sometimes referred to as network 
carrier, legacy carrier, flag carrier, hub-and-spoke carrier; 
a carrier that often relies upon a complex business model 
to offer high levels of service to customers 
FSI Fleet standardization index; a measurement of the level of 
fleet purity in an airline’s fleet 
GDS Global distribution system; computerized databases of 
travel-related inventory such as airline seats, hotels, cruise 
ship tickets, car rentals, etc. often used by travel agencies; 
airlines use these systems to sell their inventory 
IATA International Air Transport Association; international 
industry trade group of airlines with the main objective of 
assisting airlines in achieving lawful competition and 
uniformity in prices 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization; agency of the 
United Nations tasked with adopting standards and 
recommended practices in air navigation and cross-border 
procedures. 
ICT Information and communication technology 
Independent variables The input of a function; the manipulated variables that 
invoke a change in the dependent variable 
Interline; interline passengers Agreement between two or more airlines that allow 
passengers to continue a journey on one set of travel 
documents 
Isomorphism The process of one unit in a population mimicing other 
units that face identical environmental conditions 
KPI Key performance indicator 
LCC Low-cost carrier; a carrier that often relies upon business 
model simplicity to keep costs low 
Literal Presentation of a condition in MVQCA and its outcome; 
often written Condition Name and {outcome} 
Load factor or cabin factor Efficiency of filling the aircraft cabin with passengers; a 
high load factor does not necessarily equate to high 
earnings  
MVQCA Multi-value qualitative comparative approach; a 
development of QCA that allows for refined measurement 
of conditions  
Online; online passengers Ability to transfer from one flight to another on the same 
airline 
Operating income The income that an airline earns purely from airline 
operations 
Operating margin The percentage of revenue that can be categorized as 
income 
Outcome Dependent variable used in QCA, MVQCA, or fs/QCA 
analyses 
Outcome The dependent variable that is solved for using Boolean 
methods 
Primary airport A main airport that serves a nearby city; often serviced by 
FSCs 
QCA Qualitative comparative approach; method used to 
measure combinations of conditions  
RAA Regional Airline Association; trade organization of North 
American regional carriers; its goal is provide technical, 
government relations, and public relations services for 
regional airlines 
Restrictions (ticket) Ticket rules that place restrictions on how a ticket may be 
used or when it may be purchased; also referred to as 
fences; used to force customers to pay higher fares during 
peak times, or ensuring that low-paying passengers are 
 V 
forced to purchase tickets during off-peak times 
Revenue passenger mile/kilometer 
(RPM; RPK) 
Number of paying passengers carried on scheduled flights 
multiplied by the number of kilometers seats flown 
Seat pitch The distance between one seat and the same point on 
another seat directly in front or behind  
Secondary airport An airport that is often smaller and more distant than a 
primary airport, however it may be located nearer a city 
center in some areas; often have lower costs and less 
congestion than primary airports and used by LCCs 
Stage length Flight distance flown by an airline; often measured as an 
average 
Through-fare A discount in ticket fare offered to passengers when they 
fly two or more legs on a journey; a through-fare from 
point A to point C, via point B is less than the individual 
fares from A to B, plus B to C 
TOSMANA Tool for small-N analysis; computer program used for 
QCA or MVQCA analyses  
Transfer; transfer passenger Necessity to change planes en route to reach final 
destination 
Turbofan engine Today’s common jet engine that is comprised of a low 
pressure fan blade in front of the engine, which produces 
the majority of the thrust of a jet engine 
Yield Average revenue collected per passenger kilometer; 
measurement of the average fare paid 
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Appendix III: Representative airline data 
 
This section presents the reader with appropriate financial and operational metrics regarding the researcher-chosen study group.  The table below 
lists the carriers in the groups and their respective IATA codes.  It should be used as a reference to the metric table. 
 
Appendix IV: Researcher-chosen study group 
    
Full-service carriers (IATA code)   
   
Air Canada (AC) British Airways (BA) Emirates (EK) Qantas (QF) 
Air China (CA) Cathay Pacific (CX) Iberia (IB) SAS (SK) 
Air France-KLM (AF) China Eastern Airlines (MU) Japan Airlines (JP) Singapore Airlines (SQ) 
Alitalia (AZ) China Southern Airlines (CZ) Korean Air (KE) Thai Airways (TG) 
American Airlines (AA) Continental Airlines (CO) Lufthansa (LH) United Airlines (UA) 
ANA (NH) Delta Air Line (DL) Northwest Airlines (NW) US Airways (US) 
   Virgin Atlantic (VS) 
    
Low-cost carriers (IATA code)   
    
Aer Lingus (EI) EasyJet (U2) Midwest Airlines (YX) Sterling (NB) 
Air Asia (AK) Flybe (BE) Norwegian (DY) Virgin Blue (DJ) 
Air Berlin (AB) Frontier Airlines (F9) Ryanair (FR) Vueling (VY) 
AirTran Airways (FL) Gol Transportes Aereos (G3) Southwest Airlines (WN) WestJet Airlines (WS) 
ATA Airlines (TZ) JetBlue Airways (B6) Spirit (NK)  
    
Regional carriers (IATA code)   
    
Aegean (A3) Air Wisconsin (ZW) ExpressJet (XE) Régional (YS) 
Air Canada Jazz (QK) American Eagle (MQ) Horizon Air (QX) Skywest (OO) 
Air Macau (NX) Brit Air (DB) Lufthansa Cityline (CL) TSA (AX) 
Air Nostrum (YW) Comair (MN) Mesa (YV)  
Air One (AP) Eurowings (EW) Pinnacle (9E)  
 III 
The table below shows various metrics for the chosen carriers.  The carriers’ IATA codes are listed.  One may refer to the above table for the 
carrier name. 
 
Appendix IV: Researcher-chosen study group statistics 
          
Airline  
(IATA code) 
Operating Revenue  
(US $ millions) 
Operating Profit 
(US $ millions) 
Operating 
margin 
Net profit  
(US $ millions) 
Passengers 
(thousands) 
ASK 
(millions) 
RPK 
(millions) 
Load 
factor 
Fleet 
          
FSC          
AC 8,690,993 97,738 1.1% -63,444 23,124 89,610 72,584 81% 192 
CA 5,748,207 322,060 5.6% 422,782 31,504 79,476 60,322 75.9% 193 
AF 30,765,100 1,653,390 5.4% 1,092,040 72,732 NA 197,482 NA 364 
AZ 6,232,840 -614,046 -9.9% -825,394 24,157 52,211 38,427 73.6% 148 
AA 22,563,000 1,060,000 4.7% 231,000 98,200 280,252 224,482 80.1% 674 
NH 12,635,000 781,000 6.2% 273,900 50,644 87,926 60,229 68.5% 142 
BA 16,662,900 1,181,240 7.1% 859,439 36,072 150,710 114,841 76.2% 235 
CX 7,792,700 669,000 8.6% 547,700 16,728 89,076 71,172 79.9% 101 
MU 4,760,673 1,800 0.0% -360,300 35,016 70,467 50,243 71.3% 195 
CZ 6,078,811 40,310 0.7% 26,087 49,202 97,036 69,575 71.7% 233 
CO 13,128,000 468,000 3.6% 343,000 48,782 157,182 127,475 81.1% 358 
DL 17,171,000 58,000 0.3% -2,001,000 73,655 201,798 159,219 78.9% 439 
EK 8,475,150 988,270 11.7% 941,800 16,748 97,886 73,904 75.5% 104 
IB 7,050,900 157,500 2.2% 73,500 27,799 65,781 52,493 79.8% 151 
JP 19,503,730 194,189 1.0% -135,100 56,869 137,817 95,783 69.5% 199 
KE 8,598,000 529,000 6.2% 366,900 11,607 71,871 52,178 72.6% 122 
LH 25,447,400 1,665,400 6.5% 1,029,500 53,432 146,715 110,330 75.2% 244 
NW 12,568,000 740,000 5.9% -2,800,000 54,888 137,987 117,013 84.8% 377 
QF 9,961,100 529,800 5.3% 350,400 24,574 103,865 82,261 79.2% 125 
SK 8,867,752 187,739 2.1% 691,596 25,099 36,970 27,506 74.4% 171 
SQ 9,548,725 863,270 9.0% 1,403,642 17,975 112,099 87,325 77.9% 94 
TG 4,848,722 452,576 9.3% 239,138 18,775 NA 55,505 76,9% 84 
UA 19,340,000 447,000 2.3% -219,000 69,284 230,326 189,098 82.1% 404 
US 11,557,000 558,000 4.8% -217,000 36,083 76,326 59,763 78.3% 224 
VS 3,327,500 72,500 2.2% NA 4,907 48,261 35,279 73.1% 37 
          
 IV 
LCC          
EI 1,430,500 40,900 2.9% -89,600 8,631 17,220 13,363 77.6% 35 
AK 233,800 29,600 12.7% 34,700 NA NA NA NA 34 
AB 2,065,800 84,300 4.1% 65,900 15,228 27,301 21,704 79.5% 68 
FL 1,893,400 42,100 2.2% 15,500 20,051 30,595 22,273 72.8% 132 
TZ 752,113 -30,905 -4.1% 1,321,747 2,969 13,138 9,039 68.8% 29 
U2 3,073,400 223,500 7.3% 178,600 33,676 33,875 27,608 81.5% 120 
BE 5411 -61 -1.1% -221 4,537 3,989 2,525 63.3% 80 
F9 994,300 -7,900 -0.8% -14,000 8,898 17,587 13,401 76.2% 58 
G3 1,777,890 328,014 18.4% 266,138 17,447 20,272 14,819 73.1% 69 
B6 2,363,000 127,000 5.4% -0.800 18,565 46,004 37,539 81.6% 123 
YX 664,500 0.600 0.0% 5,400 3,894 8,115 6,232 76.8% 36 
DY 452,500 -5,000 -1.1% -2,000 5,105 5,346 4,223 79% 22 
FR 2,986,771 628,155 21.0% 580,820 40,532 NA NA 83% 135 
WN 9,086,300 934,300 10.3% 499,100 96,349 149,265 109,113 73.1% 491 
NK 540,426 -45,375 -8.4% -57,046 4,965 9,324 7,329 78.6% 36 
NB 6991 -341 -4.9% -251 4,000 NA NA 82% 24 
DJ 1,043,800 92,100 8.8% 63,300 14,643 21,406 16,932 79.1% 49 
VY 3001 -671 -22.4% -851 NA NA NA NA 20 
WS 1,516,000 170,500 11.2% 98,000 10.169 20,157 15,763 78.2% 65 
          
Regional          
A3 5061 511 10.1% 321 4,448 4,022 2,932 72.9% 24 
QK 1,184,010 123,459 10.4% 120,029 8,700 8,515 6,148 72.2% 135 
NX 3661 -151 -4.1% -81 2,410 4,052 3,039 75% 16 
YW 7961 361 4.5% 281 5,269 4,523 2,836 62.7% 66 
AP 789,032 33,548 4.3% 8,100 6,300 5,902 3,382 57.3% 49 
ZW 568,345 55,137 9.7% 28,443 5,790 5,087 3,607 70.9% 70 
MQ 1,911,027 185,903 9.7% 5,524 18,766 18,197 13,557 74.5% 262 
DB 346.062 15.232 4.4% 2.882 3,963 3,505 2,240 63.9% 45 
MN 1,201,937 46,230 3.8% -292,063 10,596 11,462 8,516 74.3% 140 
EW 1,000 23 2.3% 13 2,497 2,143 1,305 60.9% 32 
XE 1,679,600 141,100 8.4% 92,600 18,331 21,335 16,620 77.9% 271 
QX 644,022 8,953 1.4% 8,191 6,860 5,849 4,334 74.1% 75 
CL 1,1642 612 5.3% 332 6,229 6,346 4,036 63.6% 77 
YV 1,337,200 100,800 7.5% 34,000 15,358 14,736 11,096 75.3% 138 
 V 
9E 824,623 127,548 15.5% 77,799 8.988 9,084 6,904 76% 126 
YS 7362 62 0.8% 52 3,884 3,841 2,385 62.1% 62 
OO 3,114,700 339,200 10.9% 145,800 19,496 19,254 15,288 79.4% 264 
AX 371,367 19,674 5.3% 12,905 3,705 3,608 2,558 70.9% 48 
          
Source: Financial data from ATW (2007d) unless otherwise indicated; 1: Airline Business (2007c); 2: Amadeus financial database; traffic data from ATW 
(2007f) unless otherwise indicated 
NA: Not available          
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Appendix IV: QCA  
 
There are ten basic features of Boolean algebra and its use within QCA; the examples 
that follow are reproduced from Ragin (1987 pgs. 86 – 101) for clarity purposes. 
 
1. Notation 
Within QCA there are two states: true (present) or false (absent).  These two 
states are represented in base 2: 1 indicates presence; 0 indicates absence.  
This binary representation requires that all variables, both independent and 
dependent, must be nominal-scale measures.  This does result in minimal data 
loss, however it is usually arbitrary to the outcome, and many topics of interest 
for comparatists are usually already in nominal-scale measurements.  The 
application of interval- or ordinal-scale measurements was developed 
following Ragin’s QCA method, which will be presented and described after 
the basics of QCA and Boolean algebra.  Independent variables are commonly 
referred to as conditions and dependent variables as outcomes. 
 
2. Data representation 
Once data has been coded into binary notation it is necessary to sort the cases 
and their various configurational data into a matrix table; known as a truth 
table.  Each logical combination of conditions and outcome is represented as 
one row in the table.  When using binary notation the number of logically 
possible combinations in the truth table is two to the power of number of 
conditions (2x); with three independent variables there are 8 possible 
combinations (23).  Table IV is a truth table example using 3 independent 
variables.   
 
Appendix IV: Truth table example 
      
       
Conditions  Outcome  Frequency 
A B C  O  F 
       
0 0 0  0  9 
1 0 0  1  2 
0 1 0  1  3 
0 0 1  1  1 
1 1 0  1  2 
1 0 1  1  1 
0 1 1  1  1 
1 1 1  1  3 
Source: Author’s own creation 
       
 
 
The frequency is shown in the table, although it has no bearing on the analysis.  
It is merely included to remind the viewer that each row is a specific 
combination of independent variables that is present a number of times in 
reality.   
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Conditions and outcomes are commonly denoted with a letter, as in the truth 
table example above.  Both when writing a specific combination of variables 
or analyzing QCA results these letters are used in place of variable 
expressions.  To express the dichotomous representation of presence and 
absence one uses upper- and lowercase letters.  For example, an uppercase A 
indicates the presence of variable A (depicted with a 1 in the truth table), or a 
lowercase c indicates the absence of variable C (depicted with a 0 in the truth 
table).   
 
3. Boolean addition 
Boolean addition requires that the researcher think in logical rather than 
arithmetical terms.  For example, if: 
 
A + B = Z 
 
and A = 1 and B = 1, then Z = 1 
 
in other words, 1 + 1 = 1 
 
In Boolean algebra addition is equivalent to logical OR.  Therefore, the 
example above can be restated to read: if A equals 1 OR B equals 1, then Z 
equals 1.   
 
4. Boolean multiplication 
Boolean multiplication, like Boolean addition, is not arithmetic.  Boolean 
algebra is concerned with simplifying expressions, referred to as sums of 
products, a product being a specific combination of causal conditions.  Using 
the example truth table above, one can write the unique combinations using 
Boolean techniques as follows (note that the multiplication symbol, *, is not 
actually written but implied): 
 
O = Abc + aBc + abC + ABc + AbC + aBC + ABC 
 
The term Abc does not signify mathematically A (1) multiplied by b (0) 
multiplied by c (0), but merely that the presence of A is combined with an 
absence of b and with an absence of c.  In Boolean algebra multiplication is 
equivalent to logical AND.  Note that there are only seven causal expressions 
in the example above, as the first row in table IV indicates an outcome 
absence.  The unique combination for an absence of the outcome is: O = abc.   
 
5. Combinatorial logic 
A Boolean analysis incorporates combinatorial design.  From the example in 
table IV, if one only had the first four rows of data, one would state that the 
mere presence of any single condition would result in the outcome.  This 
oversimplification of the analysis is not correct, and in a Boolean analysis an 
absence of a condition has the same importance and status as a presence of a 
condition.  If one reviews row two, Abc causes O, independently it might be 
concluded that the presence of A alone is enough to cause O, regardless of the 
absence or presence of other conditions in future predictions.  However, using 
Boolean techniques it is possible to determine whether outcome O will occur 
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in the presence of condition A and the presence of either conditions B or C.  
Combinatorial logic supports the notion that cases and their variables should 
be viewed holistically rather than independent parts; causes are viewed as 
combinations of conditions rather than isolated incidents.   
 
6. Boolean minimization 
The fundamental rule of Boolean minimization is as follows: 
 
“If two Boolean expressions differ in only one causal condition yet produce 
the same outcome, then the causal condition that distinguishes the two 
expressions can be considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a 
simpler, combined expression” (Ragin, 1987). 
 
This is to say that a researcher can take two Boolean expressions that only 
differ in one condition and compose a more parsimonious result.  For example, 
the expressions Abc and ABc that both produce the outcome O only differ in 
condition B.  It can be stated that outcome O will be present regardless of 
condition B in those two expressions.  Therefore, condition B can be omitted 
from the expressions, which can be minimized to the parsimonious statement, 
Ac.  This minimization is a step-wise process as the Boolean expressions are 
funneled into parsimonious explanations.  Using our example from table IV 
we can reduce the following primitive explanations:  
 
Abc + aBc + abC + ABc + AbC + aBC + ABC = F 
 
Abc combines with ABc to produce Ac 
Abc combines with AbC to produce Ab 
aBc combines with ABc to produce Bc 
aBc combines with aBC to produce aB 
abC combines with AbC to produce bC 
abC combines with aBC to produce aC 
 
The expressions with two conditions present and one absent can be reduced to 
the following: 
 
ABc combines with ABC to produce AB 
AbC combines with ABC to produce AC 
aBC combines with ABC to produce BC 
 
This step-wise reduction to parsimony can be further minimized: 
 
Ab combines with AB to produce A 
Ac combines with AC to produce A 
aB combines with AB to produce B 
Bc combines with BC to produce C 
aC combines with AC to produce C 
bC combines with BC to produce C 
 
This minimization results in the following parsimonious expression explaining 
the outcome O: 
 IV 
 
O = A + B + C 
 
7. Prime implicants 
Implication is a concept within Boolean analysis.  It is possible for a Boolean 
expression to imply another expression if the membership of the second term 
is a subset of the first expression.  In the parsimonious explanation from 
above, Abc is included as a subset of A.  Table IV is a reproduction of a prime 
implicant chart from Ragin (1987 page 97). 
 
Appendix IV: Prime implicant chart 
      
      
  Primitive expressions 
  ABC AbC ABc aBc 
AC ? ?   
AB ?  ?  Prime implicants 
Bc   ? ? 
      
      
Source: Ragin (1987) 
 
A longhand minimization prior to using a prime implicant chart would provide 
three causal combinations, AC, AB and Bc.  However, using the prime 
implicant chart the researcher can see that the prime implicant AB overlaps 
with the primate expressions found in prime implicants AC and Bc.  Therefore, 
the most parsimonious minimization would be to state the both AC and Bc are 
the causal expressions, and combination AB is superfluous.  Such 
minimization is possible using longhand techniques, however for more 
complex solutions computer algorithms are necessary, which various QCA 
software provide. 
 
8. De Morgan’s law 
The majority of analyses utilizing Boolean algebraic techniques are researcher 
the combinations that results in the presence of a particular outcome.  
However, if a researcher is interested in also researching which combinations 
lead to the opposite, or an absence of the dependent variable, it is possible to 
do without reconstructing a new truth table and analyzing the entire data 
matrix again.  De Morgan’s Law, formulated by Augustus De Morgan, related 
to logical processes simply requires that a Boolean minimized resulted be 
recoded with opposite notation; a present condition becomes an absent 
condition, logical OR becomes logical AND, and vice versa.  Using our 
example from the prime implicant chart, O = AC + Bc, and applying De 
Morgan’s Law results in the following: 
 
O = AC + Bc    ⇒ 
o = (a + c)(b + C)  ⇒ 
o = ab + aC + cb +  cC ⇒ 
o = ab + aC + cb 
 
One can state that outcome, O, is present when either condition A is present 
AND condition C is present, OR condition B is present AND condition c is 
 V 
absent.  Likewise, it can be stated that outcome, O, is absent when either 
condition a is absent AND condition b is absent, OR condition a is absent AND 
condition C is present, OR condition c is absent AND condition b is absent.   
 
9. Necessary and sufficient causes 
The concepts of necessity and sufficiency are present in Boolean analyses and 
parallel common research language, an advantage of the method over others.  
A condition is deemed necessary if it must be present for an outcome to occur.  
Likewise, a condition is deemed sufficient if it can produce an outcome by 
itself.  Below are four examples of necessity and sufficiency: 
 
S = AC + Bc (No cause is either necessary or sufficient) 
S = AC + BC (C is necessary but not sufficient) 
S = AC (Both A and C are necessary but not sufficient) 
S = A + Bc (A is sufficient but not necessary) 
S = B  (B is both necessary and sufficient) 
 
10. Factoring Boolean expressions 
Algebraic factoring of Boolean expressions is possible, which can be helpful 
in determining which conditions are causally are necessary or equivalent.  
Factoring is useful to help clarify minimized expressions and aid the 
researcher in getting a clearer picture of the results.  An example of factoring 
is: 
 
S = abc + AbC + abd + E  ⇒ 
S = a(bc + bd + E) + A(bC + E) 
 
This example shows those conditions combined with an absence of a OR a presence 
of A that are necessary to produce outcome S. 
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